


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MAXIMILIAN
AND
CHARLOTTE
OF
MEXICO
I

Great Pages of History



COLUMBUS *by Marius André*


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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX

MAXIMILIAN AND
CHARLOTTE OF
MEXICO

Egon Caesar Count Corti

Translated from the German by

CATHERINE ALISON PHILLIPS

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VOLUME ONE

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*The translator wishes to express
her gratitude to her husband,
Professor W. Alison Phillips,
for his kind assistance at every
stage of the translation.*



PREFACE

OF all the tragedies in history there is scarce one which has so deeply excited the sympathy of the world as that of the ill-fated Emperor and Empress of Mexico. Their experiences, their efforts and their hopes, their battles and their sufferings, transcend the fate of any other pair of human beings. They are, as it were, the incarnation of that human type ever reappearing under various forms in innumerable individual destinies, which, urged on by an inward fire, by ambition, love of action, and a thirst for honour and glory, strives after things which lie far beyond its powers, far beyond any possibility of attainment by any force or energy at its command. The efforts of such people to take heaven by storm must end in their own ruin; but the world is interested in their destiny, which exalts it even while moving it to pity.

The Emperor Maximilian listened only to the hot blood of his ancestors coursing through his veins. His glowing ambition conjured up fantastic dreams in his soul, and he conceived an idea, Utopian and yet great, the realization of which he attempted, as it were, in the spirit of an amateur, and believed to be possible, if only by reason of his exalted birth and high position in the world. Thus he

grasped at a crown which existed only in the realms of the imagination; thus he devised plans which could never be carried out. In this it was not vanity and ambition alone that moved him, but also the noble impulse to live up to the tradition of his imperial ancestors by bringing happiness, peace, and well-being to a people distracted by party quarrels and civil war.

But such a mission in an unknown land, among people of various races and a foreign tongue, demands a body of steel, an iron will, a clear intelligence, and generally favourable conditions. The desire and the effort to do good are not enough. This task, which would have transcended the powers of the most forceful of men, and only seemed possible for a short time owing to special circumstances and chances, was undertaken by a man of weak physical constitution and fantastic mind, good-natured and kindly at bottom, but also somewhat self-willed and inclined to over-estimate his own powers, with a young wife who was primed with the ambitious ideas of her father. They were warned, but in undertaking the adventure both listened to their inner voice. There were tempters enough; and, once arrived in that distant land, entangled in a thousand difficulties and dangers, they had to recognize in the working out of destiny the proof that the task they had undertaken was an impossible one. But when the time came to pay for the mistake, their noble blood, chivalrous hearts, and sense of honour asserted their rights. The Empress did all she could to help and save her husband, even to the point of

PREFACE

madness. As for him, the spectacle of his death on the place of execution is such as to blot out all his faults and stamp him once and for all as a hero. There too the crown lent pride to its wearer. In his last hour Maximilian remembered the monarchs before him who had died in similar fashion. He knew with what a cheerful and dignified mien Charles I of England had met his death, with what courage Mary Stuart had laid upon the block the head whitened with forty-five years of suffering, with what a proud and royal carriage Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, also a Habsburg, had ascended the guillotine. He was in no mind to fall short of their example. Maximilian, too, died like a hero, while afar from him his wife sank into utter mental darkness.

It is not only with the young imperial couple that these volumes will be concerned. They will deal also with all those who knew their wish for a crown and dangled the attractive object before their eyes — Napoleon and Eugénie, Leopold of Belgium, and the Mexican exiles in Paris. These, together with their victims, will pass in review before us in this work, and what there is to say in their favour or against them will be said. But it must be borne in mind throughout that the young couple were themselves the artisans of their fate and that it was their own innermost desires and ambitions that made them listen to the tempters, of whom some, like the Emperor and Empress of the French, were at first themselves deceived.

In the course of my researches I was able to make use of

the so-called Mexican Archives of the Emperor Maximilian, which, with their innumerable treasures, had hitherto been kept strictly secret and wholly unexploited. This opened to me a picture of the most terrible tragedy of human endeavour, struggle, error, and retribution. For nigh on three years I have laboured to reduce these documents, together with those already known, to a form which will perhaps make it possible to present a clear picture of the events which led up to the tragedy of Querétaro. The story of the imperial couple had given rise to innumerable works inspired by a purely political and partisan judgment. Sometimes it has been adherents of Maximilian, who used the whole as a weapon of attack on everything French; sometimes clericals, who looked at everything from the religious and ecclesiastical point of view; sometimes liberal revolutionaries, who judged the tragic business from the standpoint of their political interests alone; or again it has been Austrians, for whom everything about Maximilian was good, solely because he was an imperial Prince of Austria. I myself have been guided by the endeavour to be just, and to distribute the lights and shadows, proper to all things human, as the actions of those concerned demand. This has been my earnest desire, though I am myself unable to judge how far I have succeeded. In this matter I have naturally been greatly helped by the innumerable letters and other documents. They were read in their due sequence, and they often gave, as it were, a photograph of the writers.

PREFACE

I have to make my grateful acknowledgments for the help I have received from all quarters. I am in a special degree indebted in this respect to Baron Dr. von Mitis, Director of the Archives, and his courteous assistants, Dr. Antonius, Dr. Kletler, Drs. Reinöhl and Schmidt, as well as to Hofrat Pick, Director of the National Library, and Regierungsrat Dr. Beetz.

The fortunate circumstance that the private archives of the Emperor have been preserved is due to the intention to leave the country, which he had in mind for a short while in October 1866. He had at this time placed not only his personal effects, but the whole of the Secret Archives on board an Austrian war-ship, which carried them home. They were thus preserved in their entirety for posterity, and were for the first time examined and sifted by me. In this way all the original letters of Napoleon and Leopold, as well as those of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to Maximilian have been preserved, together with the drafts of all his answers. The letters of Eugénie to Charlotte were also at my disposal and the Empress of Mexico kept copies of her answers, written by her own hand. In addition to these most important letters, and the deeply affecting letters written by Charlotte immediately before she lost her reason, thousands of other documents were included in the collection, and these I have been able to supplement by yet others in the possession of private persons.

I have also had access to the library of Maximilian, which was brought from Miramar to Vienna during the

World War and added to the Family Trust library in the new Burg. This includes the books collected by him before he accepted the crown and also part of those acquired in Mexico. They show how, especially before his departure for Mexico, Maximilian was systematically misled as to the true state of affairs in that country, not only by those whom he consulted, but by the skilful choice of the books recommended for his reading. For permission to examine this library I must express my sincere thanks to Hofrat Payer von Thurn and Dr. Beetz, as well as to my uncle, President Hugo M. Müller, for the use of his rich library, and to Professor Baron von Hold-Ferneck for his kindness in looking through my work. Herewith I give this work to the public, in the hope that, with all this help, I have succeeded in throwing light upon the drama which once held in breathless suspense and moved to the depths of their being millions of people in the Old World and the New.

THE AUTHOR

Vienna, June 1923

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MAXIMILIAN
AND
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The discovery of Mexico — Short account of its early history — The conquest by Hernando Cortés — Mexico under three centuries of Spanish rule — She wins her independence — Anarchy at home and war abroad — Mexico about 1860.

C HRISTOPHER COLUMBUS DIED IN 1506 UNDER THE ILLUSION that the lands he had reached were portions of eastern Asia, possibly territories of Farther India. He had no idea that he had discovered a new continent. The names "West Indies," as applied to the Central American archipelago, and "Indians," as applied to the aborigines, still bear witness to this great historical error. Columbus did not touch at the country now called Mexico, though on his first and second voyages his course had been set straight in that direction; but he turned aside to the Bahamas and afterwards to Cuba and Haiti. It was not Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile who were to boast of having revealed the glorious land of Mexico to the western world. This was reserved for a Habsburg, Charles V, who rewarded the daring explorers with gold and honours, and actively encouraged their plans.

It was natural that from Cuba, which had already been occupied in the days of Columbus, the first land to be reached in 1516 was the boldly projecting peninsula of Yucatan, now belonging to Mexico. Grijalva, who landed on the peninsula in 1517, gave confused accounts of a people with a highly developed civilization, and a mighty State governed by a powerful

sovereign residing far away in the interior. He brought back all kinds of beautiful things produced by this land, among them objects made of pure gold, which excited the envy of the Spaniards in Cuba, and made them long for fresh voyages of discovery, however dangerous they might be.

One of the most active and adventurous of them was Hernando Cortés, who had the ruthless, cruel, unbridled nature of a *condottiere*, brave and on occasion cunning. With the assistance of the Governor of Cuba he fitted out a few small ships, and set sail on his adventurous journey with some five hundred infantry, sixteen horsemen, a few small cannon, with stone cannon-balls, and thirteen muskets.

Cortés landed on a flat, sandy coast on Good Friday 1519, and christened the spot Villa Rica de Vera Cruz, in memory of our Saviour's crucifixion. This little settlement in a very unhealthy, fever-ridden spot, poisoned by the exhalations from the neighbouring swamps, was to prove worthy of its name. It has ever since proved a heavy cross for all those forced to stay in it, and its murderous climate has been the death of countless Europeans.

Cortés's little force did not tarry there long. He burnt his boats, so as to deprive his men of all chance of turning back and fill them with the idea that they must press onward at all costs. Nothing was now left to them but to push on into the interior.

The natives with whom the Spaniards met were terrified at the white-faced strangers, with their unfamiliar weapons and clothes and their martial bearing. No horse had ever been seen in the land before; the horsemen were taken for winged war-gods. The use of gunpowder was as strange to the natives as the effect it produced in fire-arms. Aztec artists hastily drew the pictures of the strangers, their horses and guns, in hieroglyphs on great strips of woven silk-cotton fibre (*ceibón* or *Bombax pentandria*) and sent them post-haste by relays of fast runners from the coast to the capital, Tenochtitlan, now Mexico City, where the mighty Aztec prince Moctezuma, afterwards called Montezuma by the Spaniards, held his sway.

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The Aztecs had entered Mexico from the north towards the end of the thirteenth century, driven out or subdued the population settled there, and absorbed the remains of them so completely that hardly a trace of the former inhabitants remained in the territories immediately occupied by the Aztecs: namely, the lake zone of the Mexican plateau. This had not been achieved without hard fighting. At times the Aztecs were so hard pressed that in order to save their skins they had to withdraw to houses built on piles in the lakes, like prehistoric lake-dwellers. Tradition has it that this state of affairs lasted till one day an eagle with a rattlesnake in its talons arose from a cactus plant, as a portent announcing that all their hardships were at an end. Hence the arms of the old Aztec empire bear the eagle upon them, and it is still the chief emblem on the national arms of Mexico.

From this point onwards their progress was continuous. The Aztecs, with their rigid military organization, fanatically addicted to warfare, and governed by a priestly caste, which prudently honoured the warriors while keeping them in the fear of the gods, had succeeded in extending their dominion more and more widely over the neighbouring peoples, who, after much fighting, submitted sullenly and unwillingly to their yoke. They all became tributaries of the mighty Montezuma, who ruled as Emperor over a vast federation of States. Their lives and property were at the service of the Aztecs, whose empire continued to flourish more and more powerfully. The Emperor, who was about thirty-six years of age at the time of Cortés's arrival, held his splendid court in a magnificent palace, served by thousands of the loveliest maidens in the land. He possessed glorious palaces and gardens, and even a great menagerie, a thing then quite unknown in Europe.

The capital, too, bore witness to this splendour and magnificence. Built on piles for reasons of safety, like another Venice, in the middle of a lake, the city contained some three hundred thousand inhabitants and had its mighty palaces and gigantic temples in the form of pyramids. Every kind of wares was set out in the market-place, from the most delicately worked jewels and goldsmiths' work to the softest silken fabrics, from

fans of brilliant humming-birds' plumage to golden-hilted swords of the hardest obsidian. Chocolate (in Aztec, *chocolatl*), prepared from the fruit of the cacao plant, had its origin in Mexico, and tobacco-smoking, which was quite unknown in Europe before the discovery of America, had already been the custom in the old Aztec empire for centuries past among the rich and great. Gold-dust kept in vessels of fixed capacity was the ordinary currency. This primitive method of measuring took the place of coins, which were unknown to the Aztecs, and any attempts at cheating were liable to the most cruel penalties.

Domestic animals, such as oxen, horses, and asses, were unknown, and so was iron; on the other hand, they already made use of a hieroglyphic script on paper made of silk-cotton fibre, in which the history of the people and State was recorded in thousands of volumes. A few of these (three codices) have been preserved till the present day, but most of them are lost; for a fanatical Spanish bishop, Zumarraga by name, had these venerable and costly hieroglyphic manuscripts collected throughout the whole country and burnt as abominable evidences of heathen customs and a godless life. The same archbishop had twenty thousand statues of the Aztec gods destroyed. And whatever records of the old Mexican heathen prayers remained were burnt by the Inquisition. But they could not destroy the traditions, which handed down a picture of the high culture of the old Aztec empire, with its magnificent roads, bridges, irrigation works, and artistic productions of every kind. The religious practices of this people, with their idolatrous religion, showed evidence of a cruelty and barbarity which are ingrained in the Indian character, and found a hideous expression in their custom of human sacrifice.

The primitive religion of the Aztecs was sun-worship. They venerated in the sun the supreme divine being, and built their temples upon high pyramids (*teocalli*) so as to be nearer to the sun. This sun-worship later absorbed into it the conception of a supreme god, the creator and lord of the world. Subordinate to him, but with cults of their own, were thirteen greater and some hundreds of lesser divinities. It is remarkable that the Aztecs were acquainted with such ideas as original sin,

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baptism, which was intended to symbolize its washing away, heaven and hell, and had moreover a ceremony in which they partook of a flat maize cake which they held to be the flesh of their god.¹ They also venerated crosses, and Aztec tradition had a legend of a flood from which one family alone escaped,² and another with an extraordinary resemblance to the Bible story of the Tower of Babel. But in contrast to these striking similarities with the usages of the Christian religion stood the hideous aberrations to which we have referred in connexion with their sacrifices. The powerful *papas* (priests) used to sacrifice on a great open platform at the summit of their temples, so as to be nearer to the sun. The luckless victims, sometimes men, sometimes women, were fattened in wooden cages in which they could scarcely move, then taken up to the temple platform and chained to the sacrificial stone of jasper; the high-priest cut the heart from the living body with a swift blow from an obsidian knife with the sharpest of edges and threw it, still smoking, at the feet of the hideous, grimacing image of the god, which, like that of the god of war, Huitzilopochtli, with outstretched hands begging for hearts, was made of the blood of human hearts baked together with clay. The fattened bodies of the victims then provided a cannibalistic feast for the priests and great ones of the land.

Montezuma, who had himself been high-priest before rising to be Emperor, had himself cut the hearts from the bodies of hundreds of miserable victims. The people were entirely enslaved to their idolatrous religion. At the dedication of the great temple of the god of war, which took place in Mexico in 1486, seventy thousand victims, led to the spot in a solemn procession two miles long, are said to have been slain during a butchery which lasted for days. There are said to have been as many as forty thousand temples in the Aztec empire. The number of priests was accordingly very great. The service of the great temple of Mexico alone was carried on by no less than five thousand of them.

Thus, even if a sovereign had not risen from the ranks of

¹ A. de Schrynmakers: *Le Mexique* (Brussels, 1882), p. 10.

² The Aztec Noah was called Cox-Cox.

the priests, he and his people were absolutely in their hands. What the priests intended and desired always happened, for they had spread abroad the doctrine that the gods must be consulted before anybody did anything of importance in public or private life. The will of the priests was then accepted as that of the god, and followed implicitly, for persons who appeared hostile or dangerous to the priests at once fell victims to the sacrifice. In the absence of any such persons, the subject races were forced to provide men for the purpose, which raised their hatred of the oppressors to boiling-point. But they were kept under by the powerful armed forces of the Aztecs, numbering hundreds of thousands. The sight of these warriors, who often went about dressed in human skin flayed from the bodies of their victims, was enough in itself to strike terror and loathing into all hearts.

The cruel ceremonies of their worship were often refined upon by the priest in order to make a greater impression upon the people.³ For example, the strongest and most beautiful of the young men would be chosen a year beforehand from the band of victims destined for sacrifice, to impersonate the god Tezcatlipoca, whom the Aztecs represented as a young man of eternal youth and perfect beauty. This youth was then splendidly dressed in the most costly garments, and lived in a palace surrounded by glorious flowers and fragrant perfumes, and a band of pages waited upon his slightest word. He wandered freely through the whole city with an instrument of music in his hand, and wherever the fancy took him to play a tune, the crowd prostrated itself on the ground, for they saw in him the living incarnation of that divinity, who spoke to them, as they thought, in the sounds of the melody.

A month before the sacrifice the four loveliest maidens in the capital were brought to him. As soon as he had consummated his union with them, they were also regarded as incarnations of the four chief goddesses worshipped. And so the young man passed these last weeks in pleasure and splendour, taking the maidens whom he had espoused to magnificent feasts with the highest dignitaries of the realm, who vied with one

³ See Chevalier: *Le Mexique ancien et moderne* (Paris, 1863).

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another in entertaining him and showing him honour as to the god himself.

But at last the day of doom came round. The young man was separated from his companions, but still clad in his splendid robes; and was taken across the lake in a gaily decorated boat to the shore where stood the pyramid of the god whom he had impersonated. Slowly he ascended from stage to stage of the staircase which wound up the *teocalli*, pausing at each stage to cast from him one of the splendid, flower-like robes which adorned him, till at last he arrived on the sacrificial platform in all the glory of his naked body. There he was met by six priests, five of whom were dressed in black, the sixth all in white. In a trice the one in white sprang upon his victim, and in a few moments the young man's heart was reeking in the sun at the feet of the god.

Then the priest made an address to the people in honour of the god, declaring that all this was meant to show the faithful how inscrutable are the ways of fate, and how often a being who seemed to be destined for nothing but happiness and joy is suddenly faced by a crisis in his life. Thus the priests kept the people in constant fear of the gods, which was the mainstay of their own power.

Such, roughly, was the state of affairs found by Cortés. He had at first no idea of it; it was not till he had pressed on into the land, meeting none but a few of the peoples subdued by the Aztecs, and negotiated with Montezuma's envoys, that he at last realized what enormous difficulties stood in the way of his projected conquering march. But he concealed this from his companions-in-arms. He cleverly profited by the dissensions between the subject races and their conquerors, and formed a close alliance with the inhabitants of Tlascala, the mortal enemies of the Aztecs, who afterwards stood by him through thick and thin. Where he met with treachery, as in the city of Cholula, he did not shrink from mowing down thousands upon thousands with unprecedented frightfulness by means of his superior weapons.

And so this resolute leader, with his handful of white men, succeeded in subduing this giant empire with its many millions

of inhabitants, entering the capital, taking Montezuma prisoner by a stratagem, and robbing him of his treasures! Cortés intended four of the most splendid emeralds from the Emperor's treasury for his betrothed at the Court of Spain, but these matchless gems were lost in a shipwreck.⁴

The widespread superstition of the Aztecs had also served Cortés's purposes. There was a legend that Quetzalcoatl, one of the Mexican gods, had once lived and ruled on earth, creating such an earthly paradise by his kindliness, gentleness, and justice that men imagined the golden age was theirs for ever. Then came a sinister, more powerful god and drove out Quetzalcoatl, who sailed away into the east. He lived in the memory of the people as a tall man with a white skin and a blond beard, and the Aztecs never ceased to hope that one day he would return from the east and bring back the golden age to the people whom he had been forced to abandon. And so when the news of the arrival of the Spaniards came, Montezuma believed it was the god who had returned, and, though he doubted and hesitated, the thought none the less paralysed his will, so that he succumbed to the stern and active energy of Cortés. It was others, with the priests at their head, who raised the standard of war against the invaders.

For wherever he arrived, Cortés cast down the gods from their altars, set up the images of Christ and the Virgin in their place, erected crosses, prohibited human sacrifice, set free the doomed victims from their cages, and took them into his service. But by so doing he made bitter enemies of the priests, for till his coming their power had known no bounds; but now they saw its foundations sapped by the proceedings of Cortés. Though Cortés had taken Montezuma prisoner and was able to exercise the supreme power for a time, the influence of the priests over the people was stronger than that of the sovereign. Religious and national motives were cleverly exploited by the clergy, who succeeded in stirring up the people against the invaders. Montezuma himself fell, and during the night of July 1-2, 1520, Cortés had to retreat from Mexico with heavy losses.

⁴ Dr. Josef Lauterer: *Mexiko*, p. 54.

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But Cortés was not the man to be frightened off by a single reverse. He returned in greater strength, and, after a terrible siege lasting ninety-three days, he succeeded in recapturing Mexico, in a half-ruined condition. Hundreds of thousands of the subjects of Guatemozin, the new sovereign, had fallen in battle or in the horrors of the siege, and the young Aztec prince himself was taken prisoner and slain by Cortés.

This done, the bold Spaniard pushed his conquests westward toward the Pacific Ocean and southward over what are now Honduras and Guatemala. Thus was built up the Spanish dominion in Central America, an enormous colonial empire, which received the name of New Spain and was destined for three centuries to be ruled by Spanish viceroys.

The Spaniards became the governing race, immeasurably vast estates being carved out of the conquered territories for the companions of Cortés, both officers and men. The priests followed in the train of the soldiers, zealous for the spread of the Christian faith, but careful also of their own power and wealth. The terrors of the Inquisition followed, and the Indian element, stripped of its possessions, was reduced to almost complete slavery. Office and honour were reserved for Spaniards, and half — or, according to some, two-thirds — of the land is said to have passed ultimately into the hands of the clergy. However this may be — and the estimates differ with the party views of those who make them — it is certain that the Church in Mexico amassed enormous wealth.

The population was kept in utter ignorance; for the Inquisition took care that no enlightening literature should ever reach New Spain. None but Spaniards were allowed to trade with the colony, and even those born in the colony of Spanish parents, the so-called creoles, were deprived of equal rights, held in subjection, and exposed to every sort of hampering restriction. All the wealth of this vast country, which stretched from the Rio Grande in the north to Guatemala in the south, and from the shores of the Gulf of Mexico in the east to the Gulf of California in the west, was regarded as the monopoly of the mother country and of those of her sons, by no means always the best of them, who went out to the colonies.

With its coast-line on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, Mexico was peculiarly well situated for carrying on trade with both the east and the west. The varieties of climate and soil, which pass through every phase from the tropical coast plains to the eternal snows of the Cordilleras, make it possible in Mexico to cultivate the vegetation of every zone on earth, while the wealth of the country in precious metals, in iron, copper, coal, and mineral oil, seems inexhaustible. With such conditions, what could not have been made of the country under wise management! As it was, the one idea was to drain it of its wealth. And meanwhile the terrible social conditions stirred up the hatred of all against all, thus gradually forming the character of the Mexican people as it was when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the events took place which led to their independence. The national freedom was achieved suddenly, without preparation and with no period of transition; hence the fifty years of anarchy and embittered partisan strife which followed the first tumultuous raptures of liberty.

Spanish rule had led to an immense reduction in the population, as compared with that in the old Aztec empire. At the outset of the nineteenth century the vast territories of Mexico were inhabited by only some 6,000,000 people. The intolerable oppression to which the majority of the population was subjected, the glaring contrast between the wealth and pride of the Spaniards and the miserable plight of creoles and Indians alike, produced an atmosphere heavily charged with electricity, in which any impulse from without would easily produce an elemental explosion. The impulse presently came. Even the efforts of the Inquisition to keep the country hermetically sealed against all enlightenment could not keep out the news of the Declaration of Independence, issued, on July 4, 1776, by the thirteen British colonies of North America, of their triumphant assertions of its claims against the mother country and, later, of the mighty upheavals which followed the French Revolution.

Among the consequences of the Revolution was the weakening of the power of Spain, the setting aside of the Bourbon dynasty by Napoleon, and the establishment of his brother

Joseph on the throne at Madrid. This event made a great impression in all Mexico; for it revealed the feet of clay of the power which had so long ruled and oppressed the Mexican people. The first outcome of this revelation was that, as early as the summer of 1808, a party was formed which, protesting its faithfulness to the royal house, approached the Viceroy with a petition for some sort of national representation.

The Viceroy referred the deputation to the Council of State, which was composed wholly of native Spaniards, and rejected the petition as revolutionary and highly dangerous to the continuance of Spanish rule. As the Viceroy had been inclined to agree to the petition presented by the party led by the magistrates of the city of Mexico, he was himself arrested and imprisoned. The government was now handed over to a military general, and terrible punishment was visited on all those who had been compromised in the liberalizing movement.

This gave the signal for battle. The leader of those who were now out for independence was a priest sixty years of age, Miguel Hidalgo y Castillo, who began the insurrection under the banner of the miraculous picture of the Madonna of Guadalupe, and drew his most numerous recruits from the oppressed Indian population. At the head of this force he succeeded, in September 1810, in advancing to the walls of Mexico City; but he lacked the means to take the city itself, and in the end his loosely compacted army was no match for the disciplined troops of Spain. The insurgents were badly defeated and dispersed. Hidalgo himself was taken and shot.

The war, however, was not ended by this severity. Others took up the heroic struggle, among them a former associate of Hidalgo's, the priest Morelos. After fighting with varying fortune he, too, met Hidalgo's fate. The war was carried on by both sides with terrible bitterness and cruelty, a foretaste of the sixty years of party struggles with which Mexico was now faced.

By a curious whim of fate the final victory of Mexican independence is associated with the name of a Spanish officer, who, up to the year 1815, had distinguished himself in the battles against the heroes of liberty, Hidalgo, Morelos, and

Guerrero. This was Don Agustin Iturbide, a man of rare energy and high intelligence, who had been born of Spanish parents at Valladolid. The bloody and defiant spirit of the insurgents, and the fanatical pride with which those condemned to death met their fate, convinced him that Spain was faced with an elemental popular movement and that her dominion could not long survive.

Meanwhile things had been happening in Europe. Napoleon had fallen; the Bourbon Ferdinand VII was once more seated on the throne of Spain, where he had abolished the liberal constitution granted in 1812, and had been compelled to restore it by a revolution which broke out in 1820.

In Mexico the Viceroy Apodaca tried to suppress the reviving liberal agitation by force, and for this purpose placed the supreme command of the army in the hands of Iturbide, in whom he had every confidence, owing to his record in the previous risings. His confidence was misplaced. The ambitious officer thought the moment opportune to declare for the partisans of independence, and he joined them at the head of some of the Indian regiments which had hitherto been faithful to Spain. On February 24, 1821, he issued at Iguala the declaration of Mexican independence, and so opened the long series of party struggles for supreme power in the liberated State.

He himself had other plans at first. He wished to make Mexico a monarchy, and for this purpose to secure a Spanish prince or, if this should prove impracticable, a member of some other European royal house. The Spanish princes having all refused the offer, attention was directed to the Archduke Charles, the victor of Aspern, who enjoyed a widespread and excellent reputation, not only by reason of his military talent, but of his other qualities. A Mexican deputation actually proceeded to Vienna to beg the Archduke to accept the crown. But he had little stomach for so dubious an adventure. Moreover, the new throne would have had its roots in a revolution against the "legitimate" dominion of the Spaniards, and to such a proceeding Metternich, who was then all-powerful in Austria, could never give his consent, still less his active support.

When Don Agustin Iturbide saw how matters lay, his personal ambition awoke, spurred on by some of his officers and the troops devoted to him. His reputation as the victorious Liberator would, he thought, enable him to grasp the prize which others had refused. He yielded to the temptation and, after skilful preparation, had himself proclaimed Emperor in May 1822. At once there developed the most bitter opposition to the usurper, who had promptly surrounded himself with all the pomp of an imperial court. The envious and the disgruntled had an easy task, for they had only to draw attention to Iturbide's earlier warfare *against* the heroes of Liberation. At the head of his enemies was a man who largely owed his own advancement to Iturbide, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Though only twenty-five years old, he had attained high rank in the army; this did not, however, satisfy his ambition. Having inherited great wealth and an independent position, he was able in a short while to assemble a considerable mass of troops at Vera Cruz, where he had been appointed governor by Iturbide. His ambition now soared higher, and he did not hesitate to turn his arms against his benefactor.

The insurrection, in which several other eminent Mexican soldiers also took part, was successful. Iturbide was forced to abdicate and go into exile in Europe. He could not, however, long endure being cut off from Mexico, and so decided to imitate the recent example of Napoleon's return from Elba, and attempt a landing on the Mexican coast, in the hope that, like Napoleon, he would at once be joined by a crowd of adherents. Fate had decreed otherwise. The Mexicans had forgotten his former services; no sufficient number of followers flocked to his standard, and presently he was taken prisoner and shot. So ended in tragic fashion this attempt to re-establish the empire of Montezuma and Guatemozin, the last two ill-fated Aztec emperors. Iturbide left three sons, of whom the eldest died without issue, while the second and third each had a son destined to play a part in the era of the Emperor Maximilian.

Santa Anna enhanced his fame, won at the cost of so much ingratitude, by his successful defence of the new republic against the power of Spain, which in 1829 thought to take

advantage of the internal disturbances of the country in order to reassert her dominion. This victory made him popular throughout the country, and this popularity Santa Anna, who was as energetic, forceful, and indefatigable as he was sly, unscrupulous, selfish, vain, and ruthless, knew how to increase and exploit on every occasion. During the next thirty years he was president or dictator no less than six times. That his ambition shrank from no means, however dishonourable, for raising him again and again to the head of the Mexican nation is shown by his attitude during the period of Maximilian's empire, which fully confirms Bancroft's scathing judgment of him as an "arch-intriguer, political juggler, brazen blusterer."⁵

The way was now open for the Mexicans to attain to freedom, equality, and justice. It would now have been possible to establish conditions under which Spaniards and creoles, mestizos and Indians would have enjoyed equal rights. It was soon clear, however, that, as had so often happened before, the cry for freedom and social reform was no more than a device for attracting the masses to the banners of a new party. As soon as this party has gained the upper hand, it too begins to rule for selfish personal ends, and of liberty, equality, and fraternity not a trace remains. The attempt of Spain to win back her colony was made the pretext for driving out of it all those of Spanish birth. Their place as rulers was now taken by the creoles, for the most part uneducated, and deprived by their former exclusion from office of all knowledge or experience of affairs; and they had no intention of conceding equal rights to the mestizos, though numerically in a large majority, not to mention the vast Indian population. Everyone possessed of a little military talent or a few followers aimed at being president. The simple method was to issue a *pronunciamiento*; i.e., to declare in favour of anyone but the actual president, preferably oneself, and back one's opinion by arms. Wild party warfare was the outcome. The Centralists, who supported the idea of a strong central government,

⁵ H. H. Bancroft: *History of the Pacific States of North America*, IX, *History of Mexico*, 1824-61, V. 802.

and included the clergy and many military men, fought the Federalists, who favoured a looser organization of the State.

Among the innumerable men of all parties who rose to power in turn the name of Santa Anna continually recurs. In addition to Centralists and Federalists, who presently organized themselves respectively as Conservatives and Constitutionalists, there appear from time to time adherents of Iturbide or of monarchy generally. But these were weak in numbers, and could never play any decisive part. In the end, indeed, Don José Maria Gutierrez de Estrada, their leader, drew down upon himself the hostility of both the great political parties, and was forced to leave the country.

This gentleman was the scion of a wealthy creole family of Mexico, where he was born in 1800. He had taken up a diplomatic career, and at the age of twenty-one he was a member of the deputation which carried the offer of the crown to the Archduke Charles. He had then been appointed Mexican Minister in Vienna, where he married a Marquise de St. Laurent, whose mother later became the wife of Count Rudolf Lützow and Mistress of the Robes in the household of Ferdinand Max. After his return to Mexico he had even been for a time Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was a man of Jesuitically strict and even fanatical clerical views, reactionary and conservative to the depths of his being, intolerant and completely impervious to any views but his own. His whole life long he followed the lines laid down by these principles of his faith, without the slightest deviation.

He was absolutely convinced that, in view of the anarchy in his country, there was only one means of salvation for it — absolute monarchy and the predominant authority of Jesuitism and the Catholic Church. In 1840, when the struggle between Centralists and Federalists was at its height, he wrote a *brochure* in this sense, under the form of an appeal to the President. In this he pointed out that the prevailing anarchy was greater than under the Spanish government, recommended the setting up of a monarchy under a prince of royal blood, and warned the Mexican people that, if another twenty years were

to pass in the same way as the years since Liberation, the star-spangled banner of North America would float over the National Palace in Mexico.

It was, as Gutierrez himself said, "a simple counsel." But it roused the passionate wrath of both political parties, each of which saw in it a threat to its own existence and to its hopes of supremacy. Gutierrez, threatened in person and property, had hurriedly to leave the country; and his European connexions and the relationships of his wife determined him to go to Europe. He was destined never to revisit his native land, but none the less to exercise an influence momentous and fateful for it. Gutierrez had also entertained relations with Santa Anna, who at that time, however, had not expressed himself explicitly in favour of his views. The departure of Gutierrez severed these relations for a considerable time.

Santa Anna was coming more to the front. His restless nature, which had ruined his father's plan of a commercial career for him and had driven him into the army, left him no peace. Parties were all one to him; Federalist or Centralist, he would gladly be either, or, if necessary, absolute dictator, so long as his person was in the foreground. His personal courage alone was not in doubt.

The constant changes of government in Mexico, and the prevailing anarchy, had ended by creating a desire in wide regions of the country to separate from it, especially in the provinces bordering on the United States, which were largely peopled by immigrants from the great northern Republic. In 1836 Texas declared itself an independent republic, not without strong support from the United States. The Mexican Government sent an army against Texas; but Santa Anna had no luck; he was beaten at San Jacinto, and taken prisoner. His fate was shared by Colonel Juan Nepomuk Almonte, who had acted as his aide-de-camp during the campaign. This man, who was born in 1809, is said to have been the son of the priest Morelos, who played so heroic a part in the war of liberation, his name being derived from the fact that his father, who had made him a colonel as a child, carried him for safety into the mountains (*al monte*) whenever that warlike priest himself

took the field.⁶ The capture of Santa Anna and Almonte might have had serious consequences for them, as the Texan campaign was conducted with great barbarity, but in the end their release was successfully negotiated. Texas, however, was lost, and so remained.

In foreign relations, too, the perpetual changes of government and of party leaders had led to difficulties; for whenever a foreign power made complaints and received promises of satisfaction, these were rendered doubtful again by such a change of system.

France was least of all disposed to suffer this treatment gladly. She was beginning to feel her strength, and was burning to recover that leading place in the councils of the nations

⁶ After the execution of his father he fled with his mother to the United States, where he supported himself with difficulty in various ways—even as a waiter in a café, according to his enemies. It was only under President Guerrero that his circumstances improved, when in 1829 he was sent as Secretary to the Mexican Legation in London, where he remained four years. On his return home he at once plunged into the party struggles, in which he made full use of his peculiar political gifts. Thus, in order to make himself popular, he wrote an autobiography. The higher he rose, the greater grew his ambition, and he was soon aiming at the presidency. Herrera, who saw through these plans, refused in 1845 to employ him in the public service. Almonte at once began to make war on Herrera, at first with the pen, in the pages of the *Amigo del Pueblo*, and later in person, when he joined in the armed attack of Paredes on Herrera. When Paredes became President, he made Almonte Minister of War; but this, too, did not satisfy his ambition, and he was soon engaged in stirring up opposition to the new President also. Paredes tried to get rid of him by appointing him Mexican Minister in Paris; but Almonte delayed his departure, as he foresaw the short duration of Paredes's presidency and wanted to be on the spot when the vacancy should come to be filled up. Santa Anna admitted him to his intimacy, and he was at his side during the campaign against the United States. After the collapse Almonte once more busied himself with his designs on the presidency, and was very active as a publicist. Under Santa Anna he once more became politically prominent, but incurred the enmity of an influential minister (Tornel), who explained the dangerous qualities of Almonte to Santa Anna and so succeeded in getting him sent abroad. Appointed Mexican Minister in Paris in 1853, Almonte accepted the position, as the rising star of Napoleon III was then holding all the world in breathless suspense, and the post of a diplomatic representative was becoming much more interesting and important than it had hitherto been.

Almonte was confirmed in his post by all subsequent presidents, until Benito Juarez turned against him. He did not waste his time in Paris, and succeeded in winning Napoleon's complete sympathy. His residence in Paris was of far-reaching importance, for Almonte himself as well as for Mexico.

which for twenty years after the Peace of Vienna she had been in no condition to fill. Since various demands of a financial nature, including that for compensation for damage sustained by French nationals during the civil wars, had not been met by the Mexican Government, France in 1838 delivered an ultimatum, sent a fleet to Vera Cruz, and began the so-called Pastry War. The fortress of San Juan de Ulloa was shot to pieces, and during the bombardment Santa Anna, who had hurried to Vera Cruz to resist the attack, was so unlucky as to have a leg so badly shattered that it had to be amputated. He did not neglect so good an opportunity of increasing his reputation as a patriot and champion of liberty. He addressed, as though from his death-bed, a proclamation to the Mexican nation, in which he appealed for a united front against the foreign foe and made the most of his own doings and sufferings. The manifesto did not fail of its effect, and Santa Anna became one of the most popular men in Mexico. His amputated leg was carried to the capital and there solemnly interred under a handsome monument. The general had the bad taste to be present at this ceremony.⁷

Before long he was once more President of the Republic and displaying all the severity of a dictator. But his measures were not happily inspired, and by 1843 he had become so unpopular that his leg was dug up and dragged through the streets of Mexico, while his statue was insulted. Another president followed.

Shortly afterwards the Congress of Texas, after coming to an agreement with the United States, voted for the incorporation of that State in the great northern Union. Mexico refused to recognize this and in 1843 declared such a step to constitute a *casus belli*. The mighty Republic of the north had no intention of yielding to the Mexican Republic, weak as it was and rent by internal dissensions. On the contrary, at Washington the war — of which the outcome could not be in doubt — was looked upon as a favourable opportunity for securing, not only Texas, but also parts of New Mexico and California. So in 1846 the war broke out. Santa Anna once more took command

⁷ Bancroft, op. cit., p. 200.

of the Mexican forces. He was, however, badly supported by his Government and by his countrymen; the American troops were superior both in numbers and in discipline, and he suffered a crushing defeat. In 1848 the Americans even occupied the city of Mexico. The Mexican Republic had to pay a heavy price for the war. Texas, New Mexico, and California — occupying an area equal to one-sixth of that of Europe — were ceded to the United States. In what remained of Mexico only some eight and a half millions of people now lived, of whom about one million were whites, three million mestizos, and four million pure Indians.

The internal dissensions and blind party fury had thus been terribly expiated, though the ceded provinces were glad enough to be at last rid of the perennial anarchy. It is, on the other hand, easy to understand that in the United States the idea now became firmly rooted of extending the power of the Union southwards to the Isthmus of Panama, where the great inter-oceanic canal was bound to be constructed. All the more jealously did the Americans now watch the destiny of the remnant of the Mexican Republic; all the more suspiciously did they regard every step taken by a foreign power in connexion with this weak and faction-ridden State. Such was the situation when, about the middle of the nineteenth century, the star of the third Napoleon began to rise, and Louis Napoleon, at first as President, took his place at the head of the French nation, with hopes and aspirations as yet more or less veiled and obscure.

The defeat in the war with the United States and the flight and banishment of Santa Anna were again followed by a period of hopeless anarchy. In despair of restoring orderly conditions in any other way, and in spite of the fear of coercive methods, the party leaders once more had recourse to Santa Anna. In February 1853 this irrepressible being was called yet again to the presidency. He was endowed with all but unlimited powers, and now ruled as an autocrat. Again and again he was pressed to assume the imperial crown. But the crafty general did not forget the fate of Iturbide; and, in any case, it was but a question of a name, since he already possessed the essentials

— the plenitude of power. The title of "Most Serene Highness," which he did assume, sufficed. His position, indeed, was not as unassailable as he imagined it to be. He had identified himself too much with the clerical and reactionary party, and in 1854 he made himself unpopular by selling what is now the southern part of the State of Arizona to the United States. Lastly, there were in the country innumerable ambitious generals and politicians who continued to cast covetous eyes on the presidency. Santa Anna began to feel his position insecure, and in 1854 he sent an envoy to Paris to negotiate the formation of a corps of three thousand Swiss.⁸

When, towards the end of 1854, the water had mounted almost to his mouth and the peril became more and more imminent, he bethought him of Gutierrez de Estrada, exiled in Europe, and commissioned him to sound the European powers as to the setting up of a monarchy in Mexico. Santa Anna, of course, conceived this foreign ruler merely as a figure-head, under whose nominal sovereignty, and with the assistance of whose material and military resources, he himself would continue to exercise unlimited sway over the country.

All these plans, however, came to nothing for the moment. Santa Anna succumbed to the revolution which broke out in February 1854, and was again forced to leave the country. He went first to Havana, where for safety's sake he had banked a large part of his enormous fortune, and thence proceeded to St. Thomas, one of the smaller islands of the Antilles eastward of Porto Rico, where he acquired a splendid estate and held a sort of small court. But he was far from regarding his political career as at an end, and his residence on the island may be compared to the position of one who eagerly scans the world from a watch-tower, in order to seize any favourable moment for again trying his luck. This one-legged man, now sixty-five years old, continued his intrigues diligently, working with his pen and with the power of his gold.

In Mexico, meanwhile, the struggle of parties had broken

⁸ Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, January 1, 1862, draft. *Mexikanisches Archiv des Kaisers Maximilian*, Vienna National Archives (henceforward referred to as V. N. A.).

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out once more, each party, of course, fighting for freedom, justice, and the well-being of the people, while the true motives, as always, were the selfish interests and the lust for autocratic power of the party leaders. After Santa Anna's fall his victorious rival, Alvarez, had soon been compelled to resign his authority to the Liberal Ignacio Comonfort. As an adherent of constitutional government and an opponent of the unlimited power of the priests, the new President summoned a Constituent Congress, caused it to work out a new constitution, and attempted to put a ban on civil war in his country. It was, however, precisely the provisions of the new Constitution, some of which displeased one of the parties and some the other, which fanned the embers of strife ever anew. Comonfort, whom the Liberals regarded as wholly their own, wanted to reconcile the two great parties with each other and to take the middle way between them. Pressed by the Liberals to remedy the Republic's perennial lack of funds by confiscating the rich possessions of the clergy, he decided, indeed, to issue a decree secularizing Church property, but at the same time he recognized the clergy as its legitimate owners. Property held in mortmain was therefore to be sold, but the proceeds were to be handed back to the clergy in one form or another.

This pleased neither the Liberals nor the Clerical-Conservatives, the latter fearing that they would receive as payment for their property nothing but worthless State paper. Comonfort thus destroyed his credit with both parties, and the result was his downfall. He was succeeded, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, by the President of the Supreme Court, who was also Vice-president of the Republic, Don Benito Juarez.

Juarez was now, in 1856, fifty years old. He was of un-mixed Indian descent, describing himself proudly as "a genuine Aztec."⁹ He had been brought up in the poorest circumstances, and the mere struggle for existence had made it impossible for his Indian parents to look after the child, so that at the age of twelve he could neither read nor write nor speak a

⁹ J. N. Baron von Fürstenwärther (Ed. Veltzé) : *Kaiser Maximilian von Mexiko. Die letzten Monate seiner Regierung und sein Tod* (Vienna, 1910), p. 166.

word of Spanish. His intelligence and his anxiety to learn, however, so impressed a wealthy tradesman that he took the boy in hand and, after he had rapidly repaired the neglect of his education, set him to study theology. This subject not appealing to him, he turned to the study of law, with the idea of becoming an advocate. Though his intellectual gifts far exceeded not only the Indian, but the Mexican average, his personal appearance was, to European eyes, almost repulsive. The squat little man, with his broad, flat head crowned with lank black hair, his cold, cunning eyes, and his face disfigured by a blood-suffused scar, was anything but attractive. But his passionate energy, his immovably firm will, his confidence of success even in the most adverse circumstances, were early apparent. From the law he passed, as it were automatically, into the fairway of politics.

It is in politics that the personal ambition and selfishness of individual men can most easily bring them power and wealth at the cost of the rest of the people. In all countries not subject to strong authority, and notably in Mexico, this boundless egoism, and the partisan strife to which it gives rise, are the scourges of the people. But few politicians are great enough to bring to their work patriotic idealism and the unselfishness which, to a greater or less degree, is its outcome. To Juarez this virtue cannot be denied. It was combined in him with an ambition ruthless to the point of cruelty, with a lust for power, and a convinced belief in the rightness of the most extreme Liberal principles. It was this conviction that made him the bitterest enemy of the Conservative dictator Santa Anna, and led him to join Alvarez in compassing his overthrow. Comonfort he also supported, so long as the President was true to Liberal principles.

After Comonfort's resignation there were two Governments in Mexico. In the capital the priests and the Conservatives raised Zuloaga to the presidency. Juarez, who, as leader of the Radical party, was driven from city to city, ultimately established his headquarters at Vera Cruz, where he was recognized by the United States as the rightful President of Mexico.

It was the unhappy country which had to pay the cost of these quarrels, which weighed heavily upon it; the party leaders, bent upon power and wealth, cared for nothing but the realization of their ambitions. Zuloaga began to meet with lively opposition from a section of his own party, notably a large number of the military, who were devoted to the Conservative faction. These decided to supplant him by General Miguel Miramón, who was but twenty-six years old in 1858, but had distinguished himself in the American war of 1847 and in the rising against the Liberal Comonfort. To him they assigned the command in the campaign against Juarez, and in 1857 they raised him to the presidency.

Miramón's position was no easy one. Juarez was supported by the United States, and, since he was established on the coast, he was able to meet his financial needs out of the proceeds of the customs, the chief source of revenue in Mexico. Miramón, on the other hand, was ill supported by his partisans, who were for ever quarrelling among themselves. His chief lieutenants were Leonardo Marquez and Tomás Mejía.

Marquez was an adherent of Santa Anna, who under the presidency of Herrera, in 1849, had suddenly arrested his superior officer, General Guzman, and with the battalion entrusted to him "pronounced" for Santa Anna. In addition to this change of opinions, which was common enough at the time, Marquez was known for his ruthless conduct both in war and peace. He had, for instance, after capturing the village of Tacubaya, caused a large number of prisoners of war and civilians to be shot.

Tomás Mejía, like Juarez a full-blooded Indian, was the opposite of Marquez. He was still quite young, fiery, and enterprising, and he was a pattern of faithfulness as well as of courage; energetic and yet of almost childlike simplicity, and modest as well as of undisputed heroic bravery. His life was a single, straight, and clearly marked path, which he followed without looking to right or left.

President Miramón was in constant financial straits, which naturally reacted very unfavourably on the number of his adherents and troops, and so upon his chances of military success.

He grasped at every sort of expedient for supplying his need for money. Thus, in February 1859, he signed a contract with the Swiss banking-house of Jecker and Company, under the terms of which he was to receive a loan of three and three-quarter million francs in gold, in return for which the Mexican Government was to hand over to the bank bonds to the value of not less than seventy-five million francs, to be redeemed at fixed intervals! When, in November 1860, Miramón had no money left with which to pay and equip his troops, he caused the house of an English financial agent, which had been protected by the seals of the British Legation, to be broken open, and took from it a sum of six hundred thousand dollars which had been deposited there by the Mexican Government to cover the claims of English investors in the Mexican State loans.

In these circumstances it was impossible for Miramón to remain in power long. In December 1860 he was defeated by the Juarista General Ortega in a battle near Capulalpan, and was forced to leave the country and seek refuge in Cuba.

The way was now open for Juarez, who took over the government in the capital, in January 1861, with the firm determination to disregard the opinions of anyone, whoever it might be, and to order everything as seemed best to himself. Thus, in the teeth of the powerful Conservative element, he imposed internal laws which had hitherto been regarded as impossible. He "nationalized" all Church property, abolished the privileges of the clergy, declared all religions on a footing of equality with Roman Catholicism, suppressed all the religious houses, and banished the archbishop, the bishops, and all those, including the Spanish Minister, who had supported the opposite party.

When Spain, France, and Great Britain made representations to him as to the multifarious injuries inflicted on their nationals by the anarchic conditions in Mexico, and when the Jecker bonds were presented for payment, Juarez at first procrastinated, then suddenly issued a decree declaring all previous agreements with foreign States to be null and void, and suspending for two years all payments, whether of capital or interest, due on all foreign loans. He displayed, in short, in his

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dealings with European powers the same utter want of consideration as that which characterized his conduct to his political opponents at home. The European powers, he thought, were a long way off and could not do him much harm, the more so since, as he very well knew, they were at odds with each other. In this, however, he was mistaken, and for the moment they were to be a danger to him; for he had carried his arbitrary methods, in both internal and external affairs, too far. The consequences were not long delayed. The extreme attitude of the President at this fateful time was not the least of the factors leading to the opening of the drama of which, during the next seven years, his country was to be the stage.

CHAPTER II

AT THE EUROPEAN COURTS

Gutierrez de Estrada's first steps — The Countess of Montijo's family — A Mexican acquaintance — José Hidalgo — Eugénie de Montijo becomes Empress — The Court at Paris — Louis Napoleon's relations with America — The Archduke Ferdinand Max visits Napoleon III — The Archduke's impressions in Paris and Brussels — King Leòpold and his daughter Charlotte — The Archduke Max's critical sketch of the Belgian Court — His betrothal — Disputes over the dowry — The Archduke appointed Governor-General of the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia — Visits to Pope Pius IX and Queen Victoria of England — The Archduke's marriage — José Hidalgo talks of Mexico to the Empress Eugénie — The Empress's interest in politics — Napoleon III's unfaithfulness — The Empress Eugénie and America — She talks of Mexico to her husband — Imperial hospitalities at Compiègne — Interview between Napoleon III and Hidalgo — Italian anxieties — The Archduke Ferdinand Max's experiences as Governor-General in Upper Italy — His ideas upon Austrian politics — His accounts of Italy to his mother — The war of 1859 and its consequences — The Archduke's journey to South America — State of panic on his return — Miramar and Lacroma threatened — His love of adventure and active temperament.

DURING ALL THESE PARTY STRUGGLES AND CONSTANT political fluctuations in Mexico, a number of Mexican refugees had gradually found their way to Europe, having left the country from time to time on the defeat of their party and sought refuge in the capitals of Europe, taking with them as large a portion of their fortune as possible. Many soon fell under the spell of life in the great cities of Europe, and liked it so well that they quite forgot their own country. But there were others in whose hearts party spirit and party politics were deeply rooted, men to whom the victory of the opposite party meant the loss of their position and the sequestration of their property; and even when far from home, they continued their political activities, and left no stone unturned to damage their enemies, whenever feasible, by intriguing at the various courts.

To the latter class belonged J. M. Gutierrez de Estrada, who had remained abroad ever since the publication of his monarchist pamphlet in 1840. As early as 1840 the tendency of this pamphlet had been quite in accordance with the views of the French King's representative in Mexico. He sent Gutierrez an enthusiastic letter at the time, assuring him that he had already esteemed him before the publication of the pamphlet, but thought twice as well of him now he had read it.¹

Gutierrez pursued with stubborn energy his idea of setting up a monarchy in Mexico with a European prince at its head, and so to overthrow the power of his Liberal-Radical political opponents. In 1842 he approached the English and French Governments, which he believed to be as well-disposed towards his plan as the Spanish Government. In 1846, having first approached Lord Aberdeen, the English Minister for Foreign Affairs, he turned to the powerful Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich, and attempted to win him over to the idea that Austria should throw all the weight of her influence on to the side of Gutierrez's monarchist plans for Mexico.

¹ Baron Alleye de Cipaye, French Minister in Mexico, to Gutierrez de Estrada, Mexico, October 28, 1840. V. N. A.

Metternich received the Mexican as he usually did those who, like himself, were deeply imbued with strictly conservative principles; but Gutierrez's ideas seemed to him somewhat too chimerical, and he dismissed his visitor with a request that he should send him a memorandum on the subject. This was his way of politely shelving the matter. But it was a dangerous way to treat Gutierrez de Estrada. When he once began writing, it was hard to stop him; his letters, like his pamphlets and speeches, were interminable, and couched in an inflated, grandiloquent style full of empty phrases. He would write letters of thirty pages or more, the contents of which could have been expressed more easily and clearly in two. One would have thought that his epistolary style, with its unctuous, didactic tone, its incessant invocations of the Deity and all the saints, and its constant use of the superlative, would have alienated everybody. Yet it enabled Gutierrez to win over a great number of people to his side.

He accordingly sent a memorandum to Prince Metternich.² In it he said that, after nearly twenty-five years of anarchy, in the course of which monarchical sentiments had taken deep root in the hearts of the Mexicans, the moment had now arrived to assist General Paredes to bring "this budding plant into the sunlight." He recalled the fact that Metternich had mentioned to him at their last interview that the Emperor Ferdinand was "favourably disposed" towards approving the choice of Mexico, should it fall upon a prince of the Austrian imperial house. It might be to their own interest to give Mexico a good government, in order to obtain better economic advantages in her markets; otherwise the country would not be able to maintain its independence, and could only "contribute to the expansion of the ambitious Republic of North America." It was hoped that England would share these views and lend a helping hand. Towards the end of this interminable letter Gutierrez brought up his heaviest artillery, by appealing to the Chancellor's well-known conservative policy of "sta-

² Gutierrez de Estrada to Prince Clemens Metternich, March 28, 1846. Copy appended to a letter from the same to Prince Richard Metternich, July 4, 1861. V. N. A.

bility," in order to flatter his personal vanity. "The renown of your name, Prince, is so great," wrote Gutierrez, "that none is so fitted as Your Highness to take the initiative, when those same conservative principles in politics and religion which have spread your fame abroad are at stake. Do you, Prince, become Mexico's protector. Deign to lend her the countenance of your mighty fatherland, to which my now ruined country once belonged, forming one of the fairest jewels in the crown of Charles the Fifth."

The Chancellor answered the Mexican — who had formerly been sent as minister to the Court of Vienna — in terms which did not satisfy him. A few weeks later, therefore, Gutierrez wrote a further letter from Rome, where he had settled for good in his splendid residence, the Palazzo Marescotti.

In this letter Gutierrez was at pains to arouse the Chancellor's anxiety with regard to the expansion of the Republic of the United States of America. The conservative and monarchical principles of Europe, he argued, ought also to be strengthened on the American continent, lest by the open and overwhelming victory of the subversive principles of this republic — whose unbridled ambitions knew no bounds — these ideas should spread, not only to the rest of America, where they had already wrought incalculable harm, but even to Europe. In Gutierrez's opinion, this republic's "lust for power and domination" ought not to be encouraged. If the European powers were already beginning to flatter the susceptibilities of this aggressive colossus, a giant still most erroneously regarded as a child, "how were the European Governments ever to cope with the ever-increasing pretensions of American trade and industry?" Europe must therefore take immediate steps to prepare for herself a promising future on the other side of the Atlantic, if these lands were not to become the exclusive domain of Anglo-Saxon America and its principles. The triumph of America would be possible only at the expense of Europe, which would then pay heavily for its present incomprehensible lethargy and indifference. These arguments were followed by flattery addressed to old Prince Metternich, whose "glorious mission" it was to be to unfurl the flag of

Europe — and with it that of his salutary principles — in America.

The experienced Chancellor listened to all he had to say — perhaps even glanced through the letter — and gave orders that it should be answered in general terms; but, for the rest, did not go any deeper into the matter. His mind was preoccupied with other questions; disturbances had just broken out in Galicia, trouble was fermenting ominously in Hungary, and even in the Austrian provinces a stirring could be noticed here and there, which was to break out in 1848 with elemental violence, and drive from his post the Chancellor who had directed the external and internal political destinies of Austria for nearly forty years.

The events of the disturbed years 1848 and 1849 and their lasting consequences threw the whole Mexican question into the background. At the end of 1846 Gutierrez sent his pamphlet *Le Mexique et l'Europe* to Louis Philippe, King of the French, Metternich, and Palmerston, but without result. The two former were swept away by revolution, and Palmerston was far too much occupied with other matters. Gutierrez had to resign himself, and wait for a more convenient season in his Roman palace. He was ready to wait, but firmly resolved not to abandon his projects. At any rate, the most powerful European statesmen had given him a hearing and considered his propositions. This was not much, but he allowed himself to base further hopes upon these foundations.

Help next came to him from Mexico. In 1854, as we know, Santa Anna perceived that he would no longer be able to maintain his rule as dictator by his own unaided resources, and conceived the idea that he might possibly persuade a European prince to become monarch over Mexico. He would naturally be supported by European troops, and Santa Anna was already trying to arrange things so that the prince, who would naturally have absolutely no experience of Mexican affairs, should be forced to rely upon him alone. Santa Anna now called to mind Gutierrez, the monarchist refugee in Europe, with whom he had been out of touch for nearly fourteen years. On July 1, 1854 he wrote to him giving him full powers, in

virtue of his own position as President of the Republic of Mexico, to approach the courts of London, Madrid, Paris, and Vienna with the view of setting up a monarchy in Mexico under a prince belonging to one of the European dynasties.

Thanks to these full powers, Gutierrez obtained what he had hitherto lacked: namely, official credentials. So far he had always been received with great courtesy, but merely as a private individual of distinction. Things were now different, and he could set to work with renewed zeal. But he could no longer deal with such an accumulation of business. He required an assistant, and chose for this position of trust the young Second Secretary to the Mexican Legation in London, Don José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrizar.

This young diplomatist belonged to a noble Spanish family from Andalusia; his father had been a colonel in the Spanish service and chief of divisional staff under Iturbide's command, at the time when the latter was still fighting on the Spanish side; when Iturbide began to play for his own hand, the colonel joined him. In spite of the similarity of their names, he was in no way related to the priest Hidalgo, who had been the first to raise the standard of independence against the rule of Spain. After Iturbide's fall, the colonel had remained in Mexico, where he succeeded in maintaining himself in possession of his property; but his family had also a house in Madrid, where they were well known and respected. In 1847 the colonel's son had served in the Mexican National Guard against the United States, but was subsequently sent to London as Secretary of Legation, thanks to powerful influence,³ and also made a short visit to Rome, where he found occasion to be presented to Pope Pius IX and to win his goodwill. Owing to his slender and elegant appearance, a certain gentleness of character, and his engaging manners, he made himself popular everywhere, and particularly with the ladies.

His social qualities made him peculiarly fitted for the part assigned to him. His father belonged to that Conservative party in Mexico which alone contained a few elements with

³ See D. Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz: *México desde 1808 hasta 1867* (Madrid, 1872), II. 414.

monarchist sympathies, and he had connexions and influence in Madrid, which was particularly important, since the Spanish Infante Don Juan of Bourbon was then under consideration as a candidate for the throne to be set up in Mexico. Hidalgo had just been sent from London to Washington as First Secretary to the Mexican Legation, and while there, he was appointed to Madrid in a similar capacity at the instance of Gutierrez, with a secret letter from the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs, and orders to make himself useful to Gutierrez, but to keep the whole affair from the knowledge of his own chief, Olivo, the Mexican Minister in Madrid. His task was therefore in the highest degree distressing and onerous.⁴

Gutierrez was well aware that Spanish opinion was far from having recovered from the loss of this fine rich colony, and sought to win over the Queen and the Prime Minister, the Conde de San Luis, to his plan. According to a statement of Gutierrez,⁵ the Conservative Spanish ministry had promised its support when, at the end of July 1854, a revolution broke out in Spain which swept away the Conservative ministry, endangered the Queen's throne, and resulted in a total cessation of the Mexican negotiations in Madrid. In the following year Santa Anna was overthrown, and so the two negotiators lost the legitimate basis of their activity; for Comonfort's new Government belonged to the party opponents of

⁴ At the time when Maximilian's empire seemed to be successfully established in Mexico, José Hidalgo composed a memorandum entitled *Notes secrètes de M. Hidalgo à développer le jour où il conviendra d'écrire l'histoire de la fondation de l'empire mexicain*, which he sent to the Emperor Maximilian from Paris on April 15, 1865, and which was intended to throw full light on the part which he had taken in the foundation of the Mexican monarchy. This memorandum has been used and taken into account in the present narrative, always bearing in mind that the author was writing to the Emperor about himself, and was at that time interested in representing the part he had played in the foundation of the monarchy as being as important as possible (V. N. A.). A year after the catastrophe Hidalgo published a book, *Apuntes para escribir la historia de los proyectos de monarquía en México, desde el reinado de Carlos III hasta la instalación del Emperador Maximiliano* (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1868), but we can naturally draw from it no correct impression of the part really played by Hidalgo.

⁵ Gutierrez to Prince Richard Metternich, Austrian Ambassador to Paris, July 4, 1861. V. N. A.

Gutierrez, Hidalgo, and their like, and the latter at once lost his post as Secretary in Madrid. They both disregarded the change of government in Mexico, and secretly continued their negotiations. But the outbreak of the Crimean War broke them all off.

In 1857, as a consequence of various remonstrances on the part of Spain, war threatened to break out between her and Mexico. Hidalgo, who had remained in Madrid, kept Gutierrez informed of the course of events at the Spanish Court, and received from him the mission of speaking to the Marqués de Pidal, Minister for Foreign Affairs, about the future of Mexico. Pidal listened attentively to the proposals of the two Mexicans that Spain should help to place the Conservative party in the saddle, and immediately came to an understanding on the matter with Marshal Narvaez, the President of the Ministerial Council. But neither of them desired to make any communication on the subject to the rest of the ministers, and it all remained a secret between the Queen, the two ministers, and Cueto, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Later on, Hidalgo received from Comonfort his appointment as *chargé d'affaires* at Madrid; for though Comonfort had no monarchical leanings, the appointment was made because it was desired to make use of Hidalgo's connexions; for they knew nothing about his secret activities. Hidalgo entered upon his duties, and carried on negotiations with Spain till the arrival of the new Mexican minister, and afterwards too, when working under him, but without arriving at any result. On the contrary, in 1857 the Mexican Legation had to retire to Paris.

In past years, when Hidalgo had stayed in Madrid in an unofficial capacity, he had had opportunities of visiting at an old Spanish noble house, the fame of which was soon to resound throughout all Europe. It was the house of Count Manuel Fernandez de Teba, who afterwards, upon the death of his elder brother, became the head of his house, and as such bore the titles of Count de Montijo and Duke of Peñaranda. His wife was descended from an old family of the Scottish gentry, but by the time the Kirkpatrick family settled at

Malaga they were completely impoverished, and the Countess's father had founded a wine-merchant's business there. Among his clients was the elderly, one-eyed Count Teba, an enthusiastic partisan of Napoleon I, under whose standard he had fought up to the year 1814. His veneration for the great Corsican was most exalted. During those years of incessant fighting and unsettled life he had been unable to think of founding a home of his own, and had remained unmarried. But on returning home after Napoleon's fall, he found his solitary existence in a little garrison town doubly trying. And so it came about that the ambitious, lovely daughter of the now enriched and well-born wine-merchant succeeded in fascinating the elderly Count, until, in spite of the opposition of his family, he made her his wife. The young wife soon learnt to play her new part. Her house became one of the most distinguished and hospitable in Malaga. Society soon forgot the past, and thronged to the beautiful woman's salons; and since the newly-made Countess was most tactful and witty, she was able to bind to her persons who might be of permanent use to her in her rise. Slowly and gradually she achieved all her aims. At Granada, where the newly-married couple had resided temporarily, two daughters were born within a short time, the second, Eugénie, on May 5, 1826; that is to say, the day on which Napoleon I had closed his eyes for ever at St. Helena five years before. It is hard not to feel a certain connexion between the two events when we think of this date, and then of the young girl's subsequent destiny. At least, so it struck Eugénie's mother at the time, for she too was an ardent admirer of the great Emperor, in which enthusiasm she had been confirmed by her husband and his experiences, so that she collected and read whatever might recall this giant among men. In short, the cult of Napoleon was supreme in the house of Teba. When the Count died, in 1839, the Countess removed to Madrid with her two daughters, who had been brought up at the *Sacré-Cœur* in Paris and were now grown-up; and here she succeeded in winning for them that brilliant position at court and in society to which the fame of their illustrious name entitled them. For their family was invested with three gran-

deeships of Spain and related to the best-known families of that country; among others with the house of Guzman, which had also a branch in Mexico.

The Countess de Montijo was rich, still young, and a widow, with the most distinguished position in society, and, in spite of her grown-up daughters, gladly listened to her suitors. One of her favourite admirers was General Narvaez, then all-powerful with the young Queen. It was in this house that the young, elegant, and supple Mexican diplomatist Don José Hidalgo had won a footing. The Countess Teba took pleasure in the society of this young man, with his modest address, who soon came to frequent the house of Montijo as regularly as if he had been related to it by blood. He was naturally well acquainted with the Countess's two daughters, who from this time onwards always treated him as an old friend of their family.

But fortune suddenly visited the Countess's family. First her elder daughter married the Duke of Alba, one of the greatest and richest matches in Spain, and next, during her mother's frequent travels, Eugénie, whose beauty had become most striking, made the acquaintance of Prince Louis Napoleon, who was shortly to rise from the position of an insignificant, despised, and ridiculous pretender to become one of the most powerful of European sovereigns.

Eugénie had indeed become dazzlingly lovely. Her great blue eyes looked out from a regular countenance, with the most delicate complexion, and heavy braids of red-gold hair were plaited round her head. Her delicately formed body was flawless in its proportions, and, to heighten her fascinations, her whole being was steeped in a charm that the greatest painters — even Winterhalter himself — could not adequately perpetuate, so that scarcely one of the many pictures of Eugénie really does justice to her peculiar characteristics. She was undoubtedly a remarkable woman, though she was not exactly brilliant. She had only partly inherited her mother's voluptuous nature, and so in matters of the heart she was almost always entirely mistress of herself. On the other hand, the mother's insane ambition had descended to the daughter,

and, as Daudet relates,⁶ she always preferred men to overshoot the mark rather than fall short of it. Eugénie combined feminine grace with downright masculine qualities. She was fearless and rash to excess, as she showed in particular when riding. She despised nothing so much as cowardice of any kind, and was energetic and wayward, but without guile and with a pure heart. Music meant nothing to her, but she applied herself a great deal to good literature and especially to history. Even when quite a little girl she had a decided preference for it, which she did not abandon afterwards when, as Empress, she was herself making history. She often put to shame court circles, which for all their brilliance were for the most part thoroughly uneducated, by her dazzling historical accomplishments and also by her amazing knowledge of languages, which enabled her to express herself in both speech and writing in French, English, Spanish, and Italian, if not faultlessly, at any rate quite well.

Such was the woman to whom Louis Napoleon began to draw near in 1852, at the time when he was Prince-President of the French Republic. Only a short interval now separated him from the imperial dignity which he soon strove openly to win. At reviews and in the streets of Paris the old Napoleonic "*Vive l'Empereur!*" was already beginning to be raised at the President's approach, and the unbroken spell of the first great Napoleon's name was drawing his great-nephew towards the crown. Even if the greater part of his success must be ascribed to his name, it cannot be denied that Louis Napoleon possessed many qualities which contributed considerably towards it. Above all he was filled with a conviction of his historic destiny, which was confirmed by a current prophecy. Twice had he sought in vain — at Strasbourg and at Boulogne — to place himself at the head of the French nation. He expressed himself well, he was courteous and amiable, and had a winning personal charm which enabled him to bind men to his fortunes.

He was above all things consistent and methodical, tenacious and patient, personally honourable, but ruthless and

⁶ Lucien Alphonse Daudet: *L'Impératrice Eugénie* (Paris).

unscrupulous in political matters, and guided only by what was of advantage to his country and dynasty. With increasing age, when he was weighed down by the cares of government and the effects of a wasting disease, the lack of these qualities began to be more and more noticeable; the less favourable qualities were apparent in his outward aspect and countenance. There was hardly a trace of his great-uncle in his appearance; indeed, his retreating brow, and the whole expression of his face, were significant of anything but intelligence, power, and firmness of will. Yet his nature was too much above the average for him not to attempt to profit by the chance offered by his name. But he was not great enough firmly to keep what he had once gained, to build prudently on its foundations and to carry out a previously premeditated plan with energy. At first he was led by fortune, but he neglected to follow it up, and, unlike the first Napoleon, who had steered the ship of State with a steady hand, Napoleon the Third often let himself drift before the waves, which were bound to drag such a fragile craft down into the vortex.

Louis Napoleon was very susceptible to feminine attractions, and had given frequent proofs of this even before he placed the crown of France upon his head. His intentions with regard to Eugénie de Montijo had not been so very serious, but the proud Spaniard was not to be inveigled into a mere flirtation. Napoleon III fell seriously in love with the young girl, and contemplated making her his wife, but not until he had met with humiliating rebuffs from a variety of princesses belonging to the old European dynasties. He therefore resolved to make a virtue of necessity and marry Eugénie de Montijo, as a proof of his democratic opinions, which led him to make love his guiding principle in the choice of a wife. He did so shortly after assuming his great-uncle's heritage, not only in fact, but openly and in name. On January 29, 1853, she became his wife. The old Countess of Montijo and her daughter had reached the goal of their most ambitious dreams, and the task was now adequately to fill this brilliant but difficult position.

In America, and especially in North America, the rise of Louis Napoleon was received with mixed feelings. For the

establishment of his rule meant the disappearance of a republic, a form of government which the United States of America would gladly have seen spread throughout the whole world. They had recently displayed the greatest sympathy for the revolutionary outbreaks in 1848-9 in Europe, and when Louis Kossuth went into exile in the New World, he was received with tumultuous enthusiasm. Not only the Government and press of the United States, but even their representatives in Paris, received the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1852, with ill-concealed disfavour, as an act running counter to their conception of "liberty."

Napoleon III was well aware of this, and was very sensitive with regard to the recognition of his usurped power. He never forgot this attitude on the part of the United States, and, on the other hand, as long as he lived, he was grateful to Palmerston, who at once had him recognized, without consulting or even informing his Queen beforehand. America's attitude wounded him all the more since in 1841 — at a time, it is true, when he was imprisoned in the fortress of Ham — he had had cause to be glad of the marked sympathy shown him by a considerable number of Central Americans. A petition had been sent from that quarter to King Louis Philippe, with many thousand signatures, requesting that Louis Napoleon should be set at liberty on condition that he should live in Nicaragua and pledge his word never to leave that country. This request grew out of his reluctant sojourn in America after the ill-fated attempt at a military revolt at Strasbourg, and also from the fact that during his enforced leisure at Ham, Louis Napoleon had been very much occupied with the project for connecting the Atlantic and Pacific by a canal cut through Nicaragua. He had drawn up a memorandum on the subject,⁷ and got into touch with the Nicaraguan Minister in Paris, who was doing his best to promote the project. It is said that there was even an idea of appointing Louis Napoleon director of the canal works. But all these plans broke down as a result of Louis Philippe's attitude, for he would not let this scion of the Napoleonic line out of durance, until, on May 25, 1846,

⁷ Louis Napoleon: *Le Canal de Nicaragua* (1846).

he made good his escape disguised in Badinguet the mason's clothes.

During the Crimean War, too, which was Napoleon's first great warlike enterprise, North American sympathies were throughout upon the Russian side. By the beginning of 1856 this war had just ended in the victory of the western powers, and Napoleon's joy had been increased by the birth of an heir, a "child of France," on March 16, 1856, when a royal visit to Paris was announced. To the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, the twenty-four-year-old brother of the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph, was assigned the mission of visiting the victorious descendant of Napoleon.

The Archduke was the second son of the Archduke Charles and the Archduchess Sophie, and was born on July 6, 1832, at the palace of Schönbrunn, near Vienna; that is to say, he was only two years younger than his brother Francis Joseph, who had succeeded to the Austrian throne. Both the boys had been brought up by the same tutor, Count Heinrich Bombelles, who developed over a period of many years a plan of education which grew steadily more exacting as they increased in age, and included a bewildering variety of subjects.⁸

Nor was religion neglected. But Count Bombelles took care that the children should not be inoculated with a blind and bigoted piety foreign to the essence of Christianity, and having nothing to do with true faith. Thus he strictly forbade⁹ his pupils to carry rosaries, considering, as Maximilian had often occasion to observe later, especially in Mexico, that such practices easily led to superstitious fetishism and mechanical prayer without soul or understanding. Great emphasis was laid upon physical training and sport, and the Archduke Maximilian especially delighted in riding, in contrast to his brother Francis Joseph, who as a child was always reluctant to mount a horse. As for Maximilian, the faster and madder the race, the better he liked it. Careless of danger — which, moreover, hardly

⁸ Count Josef Bombelles showed me a copy of this educational scheme at the Castle of Opeka in Jugoslavia, from which it can be seen that, allowing for the interval of age, the two brothers followed the same course of instruction.

⁹ Letter of the Emperor Maximilian to Gutierrez, March 19, 1866. V. N. A.

existed in the case of the perfectly broken horses in the imperial stables—he always endeavoured to outstrip his companions. “To walk one’s horse is death, to trot is life, a full gallop is bliss,” as the Archduke once wrote in his memoirs.¹⁰ “It is not given to me to ride slowly.” But he was not satisfied even to fly over the ground at a tearing gallop. He desired to rise higher and higher into the blue sky, above the clouds. “It is from flying alone,” he once wrote, “that I look for extraordinary experiences; and if ever the theories about the air-balloon become a reality, I shall take to flying, and certainly find the greatest concentrated pleasure in it.”¹¹

After bodily exercise in the open air he would return all the more willingly to more serious occupations. The Archduke amused himself for a time with painting and modelling, but his chief talent was for literature. In the study of art and science he found, to use his own words, an “inexhaustible source of consolation.”¹²

The young Archduke soon grew out of a certain awkwardness which was natural to him, and with those whom he particularly liked he could be charmingly cordial, engaging, and entertaining, so that he was often envied by his colder and more reserved brother for his personal popularity.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max was slender and slightly built, with fair hair, blue wide-open eyes, and a rather retreating chin, which was later concealed by a well-cared-for fair beard, parted in the middle, which he was often in the habit of stroking. His complexion was in general pale, and, on the whole, he was a charming figure of a young man, instinct with a gentle and almost feminine quality. Just as the Empress Eugénie possessed certain decidedly masculine characteristics, though without detriment to her feminine nature as a whole, so in Maximilian certain features prevailed which are usually most marked in women. The heart played a great part with him.

¹⁰ Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria: *Aus meinem Leben. Reiseskizzen, Aphorismen, Gedichte* (Leipzig, 1867), II. 215.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, III. 220.

¹² *Ibid.*, V. 9.

As a friend he had not his like, and he would requite friendship offered him, whether sincerely or not, with gratitude and even emotion. His richly endowed nature was true to the core. His tender heart often made him weak in action; energy and strength were not his strong point, though he must be credited at most with a certain tenacity. At times, especially when he felt that he was being thought weak, he had spasmodic bursts of exaggerated energy, prompting him to rash acts, which he afterwards regretted.

Ferdinand Max had romantic and exalted tendencies, and took a pleasure in nature, animals, flowers, and fruits. His pride in his Habsburg descent had developed his sense of honour to the highest degree; he grew to manhood full of ardent ambition, and went his way through life permeated with the same sentiments. In other respects his whole temperament was a little superficial, with something of the easy-going, light-hearted Austrian character, but he was always filled with the highest rectitude and honour. The Archduke Max, as he was called for short, was a typical Viennese, with all the qualities and defects of one. Among his intimates, or in circles where the object was to please, he often displayed a merry wit and a turn for irony which won him success in the salons. But on the whole he did not feel quite at home in the social crowd: he himself said that, unlike those who delight in the giddy throng and are bored by solitude, he belonged "half and half" to those who feel lonely in society and find satisfaction in solitude. But only "half and half"! These words are equally true of many of the imperial Prince's other qualities.

On the other hand, there were also extremes in his nature. If he once gave his confidence to anybody, he always went too far. He would lay bare his whole heart and pour out all his ideas to his confidant, but he was often mistaken in people, and so fell into complete dependence upon them. This love of confiding in people was a result of his good-heartedness, and his innate conviction — which seemed to him self-evident — that everybody else was like himself, and could only think, feel, and act like a thorough gentleman.

The following rules of life, noted down upon a small card ¹³ which he often carried about with him, and, to judge by the traces of frequent use, frequently consulted, are highly characteristic of Ferdinand Max:

1. Let the mind rule the body and maintain it in moderation and morality.
2. Never a false word, not even out of necessity or vanity.
3. Be kindly to everybody.
4. Justice in all things whatsoever.
5. No evil speaking about one's neighbour.
6. Not to answer without reflection, lest one fall into a snare.
7. No abuse or obscenity.
8. Nothing offensive, even when it is a sign of wit; for corners tear things (*Ecken zerreißen*).
9. No superstition, for it is the fruit of fear and weakness.
10. Never joke with one's inferiors, never converse with the servants.
11. Take thought and show delicate consideration for those around one; pay them attentions.
12. When in the right, iron energy in everything.
13. Never scoff at religion or authority.
14. No exaggeration, but moderation in all things.
15. Listen to all; trust few.
16. Never let oneself be carried away by the first impression.
17. Never complain, for it is a sign of weakness.
18. Always make a good division of one's time, plenty of regular employment.
19. In judging others' faults remember one's own.
20. When taking any step think of the consequences.
21. Seek retirement and find in it time for reflection.
22. Take it coolly. [This is quoted in English.]
23. Time comes for everything.
24. Nothing lasts for ever.
25. Keep silence if you can do no better.

¹³ This card, torn and grubby from being carried about on his person, was among the papers in the V. N. A. See facsimile.

13. Wie über Religion der Autorität sprechen.
14. Nicht überprüfend, sondern in allem Mann's Glauben.
15. Jäten für den, Manieren lehren.
16. Wie ein von einem Freundlich sein sollt man.
17. Wie klagen, denn das ist ein Zeichen der Gerechtigkeit.
18. Keine Zeit einem von sich selbst zu klagen, nicht um
regelmäßige Befehlsgebung.
19. Denen Befehlen zu gehorchen, die die eigenen Sachen.
20. Bei jenen Gerechtigkeit die folgenden Sachen.
21. Die Gerechtigkeit zu sein, und in ihr Zeit zu
nehmen finden.
22. Take it coolly
23. Zu allem können Zeit
24. Nicht eilen - wie
25. Gerechtigkeit ist es nicht besser zu sein als zu sein.
26. Gerechtigkeit & Mäandern Gerechtigkeit.
27. Bei Mäandern ist es ganz von der Welt abgehehen.

S OF CONDUCT,
N HANDWRITING, WHICH
ED ON HIS PERSON

26. Two hours' exercise daily.

27. When unwell, cut oneself off entirely from the world.

These were good maxims, which were not always observed, but the very fact of stating them shows his effort to perfect himself and, so far as in him lay, to fulfil the requisites which an ideal thinker might justly demand of him as man and prince.

The Archduke from youth upwards displayed a decided bent towards action. "Happiness is only found in action," he wrote, his meaning being that young people with a superfluity of ambition should be given employment calculated to develop them as much as possible, in order to turn the fire of ambition in as useful a direction as might be.¹⁴ He did not disguise from himself, it is true, that ambition was useful only within the bounds of possibility, and became dangerous if too overweening; that it was, in fact, like the air-balloon: "To rise to a certain height is interesting and fine, and one gains a clear, wide vision, but if one strives to rise yet higher, one turns dizzy, the distant prospect becomes clouded and confused, the air becomes too rare, and at last one may quite easily fall and break one's neck."

Maximilian, then, kept such a fate before his eyes, but he was consumed by an inward fire, and could not see without a certain pang of envy the mighty field of activity which had fallen to his brother Francis Joseph's lot since his accession in 1848. He desired to share in it and give his advice and aid, but such was not Francis Joseph's wish. In all friendliness, but, beneath it all, full of courteous denial, he refused his brother the collaboration which he desired. He did not wish to have any second person near him, especially not such a near relation. Ferdinand Max's repeated hints met with a rebuff. This hurt him, for he saw quite well that all they were ready to assign to him was a merely subordinate and ornamental sphere of activity — one, at any rate, which would keep him at a distance from the capital, and hence from all possibility of directly influencing the business of government. These circumstances

¹⁴ *Aus meinem Leben*, VII. 222, 228.

embittered the young Archduke, and caused him to desire to leave home and find satisfaction for his thirst for knowledge, and his inward impulse towards an intenser and more active life, by long journeys in foreign lands.

A love for the sea was early awakened in the young man. He was not at ease in lovely mountain scenery, where the surrounding heights shut in the view. They weighed like a nightmare on his soul, with its craving for space and distance. The sea alone, with its infinite extent, and its ever-changing appearance, offering at one moment a picture of peace and stillness, at the next the terrifying spectacle of waves surging in fearful majesty, allured and charmed him; he therefore desired to become an officer in the navy, and this preference met with approval, for on a number of grounds such a tendency was pleasing to his imperial brother in Vienna.

As early as 1850 the Archduke Ferdinand Max began to take long cruises on board the war-ships of the fleet, of which he was made Commander-in-Chief in 1854 — that is to say, at the age of twenty-two. He first visited Greece, Asia Minor, Southern Italy, and Spain. And in this connexion a typical episode occurred. On one occasion the young Archduke's suite tried to persuade him to abandon a projected journey to Andalusia and Granada, where he wished to visit the tombs of his Spanish forefathers; but the Archduke would brook no opposition. "However stubborn people may be, and however hard to persuade to anything, I am still more obstinate and harder to dissuade from my intentions," he wrote in his memoirs.¹⁵ And the journey did indeed take place. Throughout his whole life he preserved this quality of persisting in a desire which had once become deeply rooted in his soul. It was to be of fateful import to him.

Beside the royal tombs in Granada — those of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Spanish Habsburgs — he indulged the proud emotion aroused by the ancient glories of his house. As a legitimate descendant he felt himself drawn to the dead, even closer than the Spanish Queen and princes, and gave himself up to the sentiments inspired by a sense of kinship even after the

¹⁵ Ibid., II. 144.



THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX AT THE
SLAVE-MARKET AT SMYRNA

lapse of centuries. There lay the royal insignia of Ferdinand the Catholic.

"Proudly, longingly, and yet sadly, I grasped the golden circlet," relates the Archduke, "and the once mighty sword. What a lovely glittering dream for a nephew of the Spanish Habsburgs to wield the latter in order to win the former!"¹⁶

These words reveal his inmost thoughts at a single flash: it was chance that enabled his brother to place the Austrian crown upon his head — the chance of primogeniture. Was it not an injustice of fate that he, Ferdinand Max, of equal ancestry and equal birth, should go through life without a crown, simply because he was two years younger? It was the seductive glamour of a crown which enticed and fascinated the young man; he recked nothing of the thorns, but saw only the happiness of the high task of devoting his personality and life to the well-being of a people.

But these transient visions appeared to him but for a moment; everyday life swept them away again, and drew the young prince away into more sober paths. He was torn from the daily monotony of his services in the navy, to which he had devoted himself with great zeal, by the Emperor's command that he should go to Paris, there to sound the disposition of Napoleon's new imperial court and report on the whole situation.

The Archduke joyfully accepted this interesting task. On May 17, 1856 he arrived in Paris. The reports sent by the Archduke to his imperial brother have been preserved. They help us to characterize not only the Prince's state of mind and his way of looking at things at that time, but also the conditions prevailing at the court, which they describe.

"Prince Napoleon,"¹⁷ reported Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph,¹⁸ "who had been delegated by Napoleon III to receive me at the station, discharged this task in such a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, II. 164.

¹⁷ Son of King Jérôme, hence a cousin of Napoleon III, to whom he maintained an attitude of steady opposition.

¹⁸ From the rough draft of the report preserved in the V. N. A. The words and phrases in brackets were either crossed out by the Archduke in the draft, or replaced by others.

cold, stiff manner that for my part, by way of reprisal, I felt bound to behave with great reserve. I may add, as a curious and typical detail, that on my arrival the carriages which were to drive me out to St. Cloud had not yet appeared, so that I had to wait some time for them. The Emperor, who received me at the top of the steps at St. Cloud, displayed at our first meeting, and during the whole evening, an insuperable embarrassment, which hardly produced a favourable impression upon me. His short, unimposing stature, his exterior, which is utterly lacking in nobility,¹⁹ his shuffling gait, his ugly hands, the sly, inquiring glance of his lustreless eyes, all these things made up a whole which was not calculated to correct my first unfavourable impression.

"I found the Empress, whom I visited immediately afterwards, in a state of great weakness and lassitude; she took extraordinary pains to be nice, but was at the same time uncommonly embarrassed. Her beauty, which is undeniably great, though it owes a good deal to art, reveals no trace of the Spanish type. She is quite thoroughbred, but essentially lacking in the august quality of an empress; and the impression produced in me by her appearance was dimmed by imperial memories of Vienna.²⁰ Owing to her weak condition, she was unable to appear at table on either that day or the next. The dinner was badly served, every [word illegible] was lacking. At the table the Emperor was so ill at ease that the conversation was never entertaining, and it was all I could do to infuse a little life into it. I spent the evening with the Empress. As I was taking a turn in the garden next morning, the Emperor took occasion to appear there, so as to meet me. In order to have a subject with which to introduce the conversation he at once took me into the famous orangery of the 18th Brumaire,²¹ which gave him the opportunity of talking with much archness about December 2. Thereupon he expressed himself on the subject of Your Majesty with great appreciation, saying what great

¹⁹ The original draft says: "vulgar."

²⁰ The glorious beauty of the Empress Elizabeth.

²¹ Brumaire of the Year VIII (November 9, 1799), when Napoleon overthrew the Directory and proclaimed himself First Consul.

things you have already accomplished in spite of your youth. He next turned the conversation upon Count Buol and alluded to the candour of his dealings with the imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs; but he slipped in a complaint — which was not altogether unexpected on my part — as to our not having joined in the war.²² I replied to the Emperor quietly that, since he had spoken to me so frankly and graciously, I would permit myself to say to him without reserve that our most important material interest in the war with Russia would have been the security and freedom of the Danubian Principalities; had we drawn the sword, the war would have been endless. This observation appeared to take the Emperor somewhat aback. But I was astonished at the frankness with which he now declared that it might have been preferable to partition Turkey, instead of maintaining it, in which case Austria could have enlarged her borders by annexing Albania and Herzegovina. I replied that the right time for such a partition did not seem to me to have arrived, especially since Turkey had displayed far more vitality in the course of the war than she had been generally credited with. The Emperor then changed to a half-laughing tone and said that, after all, it was a sorry business to have to bolster up the Turks, the stupidest people in the world. At any rate, Europe had now got peace. 'It is not a durable achievement, but it will last at least a few years.' The aim of the war had been to thrust Russia back within her limits; and this aim had been achieved. The Emperor spoke with great satisfaction of the humiliation of Russia's power. Though every effort is being made on behalf of the Court of St. Petersburg to win the friendship of France, and these attempts meet with a response and support in many quarters in this country, I saw from the Emperor Napoleon's statements that any inclination towards such a tendency is foreign to him.²³ I emphasized the point that, in the circumstances then prevailing,

²² The Crimean War, waged against Russia by France, in alliance with England and Turkey.

²³ The draft also said: "On the contrary, indeed, he still cherishes a lively grudge against Russia, and is glad to see a weak tsar at the head of an enfeebled nation." This sentence was struck out by the Archduke.

an alliance with Austria might well go hand in hand with an English alliance.²⁴ It is true, I said, that Austria's principles rest upon a conservative foundation, whereas the policy of the great nation of shopkeepers was dominated solely by the changing vicissitudes of real or supposed interest.

"He answered sharply and energetically: 'Yes, it is a misfortune that England has misguided principles!' Only he did not acknowledge that alliance with England was a necessity. I was entirely of his opinion in this respect, but merely remarked how desirable it was that Austria should to a certain extent take up an intermediate position. The Emperor spoke of the poor part played by Russia in the course of the Eastern complications with a contempt in which I joined within suitable limitations. For the rest, he displayed apropos of several questions an ignorance of Austrian conditions which astonished me. For instance, he did not know how long the Emperor Ferdinand had reigned, nor where he was at present residing, and things of that sort.

"He spoke warmly about an alliance with Austria and his esteem for Your Majesty. . . .

"After an informal luncheon with the imperial pair I called upon the ex-King Jérôme, who was very nice, but whose Italian exterior is most unprepossessing;²⁵ upon the Princess Mathilde,²⁶ whose undistinguished appearance²⁷ did not make a favourable impression upon me; and lastly on Plon-plon,²⁸ out of whose room, as I arrived, there came strange bearded figures, and on whose amiability I had as little reason to congratulate myself on this occasion as before. He has absolutely the look of a worn-out *basso* from some obscure Italian opera-house.

"The state dinner which took place in the evening at St. Cloud, and at which all the great officials and dignitaries appeared in court dress, none the less had none of the quality of

²⁴ The draft further contains: "which the Emperor Napoleon did not conceal from me that he had for long doubted," but this was crossed out.

²⁵ At first he had said: "strongly reminds me of an old Italian dentist."

²⁶ Daughter of King Jérôme, Napoleon I's brother.

²⁷ He originally said: "common appearance."

²⁸ Nickname of Prince Napoleon, the son of King Jérôme.

an imperial entertainment. The Emperor's incredible lack of ease was particularly obvious; it occurred to me that he still felt ill at ease in the presence of a prince of more ancient lineage; when he gets over this constraint, he displays great frankness, and the more closely I get to know him, the more solidly does his confidence in me seem to be established. In general there appears to be the most excellent intention of giving a proper setting to the Court, but the whole machinery does not as yet work smoothly. In spite of the unconstrained manner which they try to affect at court, the parvenu etiquette keeps coming through everything. So far it is my impression that the Emperor of the French is respected by many, but loved by none. The city of Paris produced upon me an unfavourable, though upon the whole grandiose impression. It is a cosmopolitan city without any characteristic national stamp, such as is possessed, for instance, by Rome and other great capitals. Even our modest Vienna has more of the quality of an imperial city, which is utterly lacking in Paris. I need hardly assure Your Majesty that I take pains to be very nice, and to let no sign appear of the unpleasant impressions which strike me here and there. Hübner²⁹ is a man of great intelligence, but inclined to see everything connected with French conditions in the most rosy light. It is my endeavour to check the expansiveness of this sentiment in those cases when it occasionally seems to me to manifest itself in a too exuberant fashion."

May 17 and 18 were spent sightseeing in Paris.

"It would hardly be believed," continued the young Archduke's report, "what transformations Napoleon has effected in the outward aspect of Paris within a short time. The enigma is solved only when one finds out how little consideration has been paid to economizing expenditure, either by the State or the city. New streets, new boulevards, countless new buildings, all of gigantic dimensions, have sprung up under the present Government. Paris, as I said, is not the capital of an emperor, but of an *imperator*, hence the deification of art which prevails

²⁹ Josef Alexander, Baron and afterwards Count Hübner, at that time Austrian Ambassador in Paris.

here, the wealth of monuments, columns, and so forth. Just as the First Empire took as its model the Rome of the Cæsars, so the second edition takes pleasure in a stiff imitation of the same style. On all sides one has an impression of the transitory; it is all very brilliant, but unmistakably intended for the moment alone. Nowhere does one obtain the idea of anything lasting. I did all this going about unaccompanied by the Emperor, who lives in great retirement, and I did not think this very tactful on his part. Perhaps he is deterred by the cold reception with which he meets everywhere from the public; the Emperor and the Empress are hardly greeted in the street by anybody but members of the court; it may be that it makes him uncomfortable to have me as a witness of this universal indifference.

"I have *déjeuner* daily with the Emperor and Empress. Napoleon is one of those men whose personality has nothing winning about it at first sight, but ends by producing a favourable impression owing to his great calm and noble simplicity of character. The reckless way in which he speaks in the presence of his servants is most remarkable; he often lets fall the most incredible statements before them; this seems to me typical of a parvenu, utterly lacking in that *esprit de corps* which makes one careful not to expose oneself before those in subordinate positions. The Empress's gaiety and naïve vivacity do not always seem to please her imperial husband, who sometimes casts reproving glances at her. It is striking how few persons have the good fortune to be spoken to by the Emperor on great occasions. One can see, moreover, that his suite has formerly been that of the president of a republic: it is often hard for them to maintain themselves on a fitting level. The bearing of the court ladies towards the Empress, too, their shaking hands with her, their hearty friendliness, are a little shocking to our conceptions of imperial etiquette. The whole impression is, so to speak, that of a make-believe court, the various offices of which are occupied by amateurs who are not very sure of their parts. There can be no question of a good or bad tone here, for this Court is absolutely lacking in tone."

After passing this severe judgment upon the condition of the



THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX
AND THE ARCHDUKE KARL LUDWIG
WITH COUNT ANDRÁSSY
IN THE PASHA OF SMYRNA'S CAIQUE

French Court, the Archduke Ferdinand Max went on to report to his imperial brother a conversation which he had had with Napoleon upon the condition of Italy. He obtained the impression that the Emperor of the French must set great store by Piedmont, on account of its excellent attitude towards France during the Crimean War, which gave it a claim to fair treatment. The Emperor did indeed remark that he would "do his very best to prevent the Piedmontese from doing anything silly," but he closed the conversation on Italy with the following words, spoken in a tone of the deepest seriousness: "Italy is a question which causes me much thought."

The Archduke next resumed his account of his visit. "The Empress," he relates, "let fall a few naïve remarks, expressive of her absolutist aspirations. I asked, among other things, whether the Prince of Wales possessed character and energy. 'Oh,' she exclaimed, 'he is another of these constitutional kings,' upon which the Emperor checked her with the remark that in England it was necessary to respect the Constitution." Ferdinand Max attached particular importance to these communications, for he was at pains to make the state of mind of the French Emperor and Empress as clear as possible to his imperial brother.

On May 20 a great review took place in the plain of Satory, near Versailles, in honour of the Archduke and Prince Oscar of Sweden, who had just arrived. Ferdinand Max, as he remarks himself, had been a little afraid of the Prince's appearance, for he had been preceded by a reputation for a brilliant exterior and superior intelligence, and the Archduke was afraid that he might be put in the shade by him. After his arrival the Archduke was somewhat reassured, for his impression was that he stood the comparison perfectly well.

Among other things, the flower of the French cavalry was brought out at the review. The Archduke reported his impression of this review, and of the personalities of the Emperor and Empress, in a second dispatch, in which he entirely reversed the opinions which he had so far expressed, and indulged in expressions of the utmost enthusiasm. For this report was entrusted to the French post. He was convinced that it

would be intercepted by the French Government, read, and copied, before being forwarded to its destination. In expectation of this the Archduke expressed it in suitable terms, and the only unfavourable remark that occurred in this partial account was one about Prince Plon-plon, for Ferdinand Max was well-informed as to his incessant differences of opinion with the imperial pair, and consequently expected that an unfavourable remark from him would make the best impression upon the Emperor of the French and his wife. The other secret reports, full of outspoken and trustworthy information, were sent by Austrian gentleman couriers, and were thus safe from all indiscretions. In the following one, therefore, the Archduke did not mince matters.

"I have but little to add," continued Ferdinand Max, "to the report which I made to Your Majesty upon the review held at Satory on the 20th, for it was framed for the express purpose of being read in high quarters here. The Empress's horsemanship, about which such a fuss is made, is nothing out of the way. In spite of my profession as a naval man, I appeared by Prince Oscar's side on my fiery Andalusian by no means to my own disadvantage, and look back with gratitude to the riding-lessons which we took together. The review was very fine, the front marching, in particular, being a great success. The march past, with the cheers of the detachments as they went by, had to my eyes an absolutely prætorian character—it was the *imperator* among his hordes to the life, the *semper Augusta* was conspicuous by its absence from the soldiers' plaudits. On the day of the review I left early for Versailles by myself, in order to see the château and the two Trianons. The *grandes eaux* played for me. On the whole, Versailles cannot be compared to Schönbrunn; the gardens may be grandiose, but Louis XIV's creation does not come up to the dignified style of our imperial palace.

"The Emperor came out later with Prince Oscar. The latter is a tall, lean young man, with a black beard, very pleasant and friendly, but not calculated to arouse my jealousy to any great extent. He has nothing of the soldier or sailor about him.

"In the evening there was a theatrical performance at the

château of St. Cloud, with an invited audience of an incredible character; a very improper piece was performed, which according to our ideas ought not to have been played before ladies.

“The pleasantest time of day is *déjeuner*, at which the Emperor can be very attractive in his frankness and amiability. He speaks well and with animation, and the impression is heightened by a certain flash of the eyes. On these occasions great candour prevails, in which I join with due moderation. The Empress, who also thaws rather more at these *déjeuners*, is given at times to riding her hobby, Marie Antoinette; she takes a lively interest in everything concerning the unhappy Queen.

“The Emperor gives utterance to some very shrewd ideas; but I never cease to be shocked at his incredible *sans-gêne* before his attendants.

“The following days were occupied in visiting collections of every kind. Most of what I saw is extremely remarkable; everything is pervaded by the spirit of the Emperor, to whom is due the arrangement and system introduced into most of these collections. In all his building enterprises he seems to have taken as his fundamental principle *miscere utile dulci*, for he has borne in mind not only the beautification of the city, but also strategic advantage. Witness the Palace of Industry, which he himself pointed out to me as a splendid rallying-place for troops; witness the rue de Rivoli, which leads to the Caserne Napoléon; witness the macadamized roads, which are very pleasant to drive along, and have also the advantage of doing away with what used to be material for barricades; witness the squares, which are intended to provide open spaces for the troops, in which they can move freely. Witness the filling up of the trenches, which makes attacks by cavalry possible; witness, in short, all the main lines constructed or projected by the Emperor Napoleon in Paris — the whole arrangement of which is mainly dictated by military aims.

“At the state ball which took place at St. Cloud on the 22nd, it was I who led the Empress into the ball-room. The entertainment was opened by all the guests’ filing past the imperial

family, which really produced an irresistibly comic effect upon me. The society was inconceivably mixed, and distinguished for its disgusting dress and tactless behaviour. Adventurers swarmed, which is a leading characteristic of this Court. Among them I reckon a certain Countess Castiglione,³⁰ who is lovely, but reminds one, not only by her costume and coiffure, but also by her free and impudent bearing, of some dancer of the Regency period come to life again. This person may prove dangerous to the domestic happiness of the Emperor and Empress. The courtiers are already vying with one another in paying court to her; Princess Mathilde and the Countess Hatzfeldt spoke to me indignantly, and with a characteristically French lack of reticence, about her lack of decency in choosing this precise moment for supplanting the Empress. The Emperor's assiduity with all the pretty women is unpleasantly conspicuous, and detracts greatly from his sovereign dignity."

Such were the Archduke's first impressions of his visit to Paris. The longer he stayed — and his whole visit lasted only twelve days — the better the relations between the two princes grew. The Archduke's friendly, frank, and amiable nature had in fact become more sympathetic to Napoleon III; he gradually laid aside the reserve which Ferdinand Max had remarked at first, ascribing it entirely to his embarrassment; and his winning, attractive nature came more into the foreground. The impressionable young Archduke at once reacted to the change.

The last report to the Austrian Emperor,³¹ which was already dated from Brussels, gave evidence of this mutual sympathy which had sprung up.

"Since I sent my last report from Paris," it ran, "the bearing of the French Emperor towards me has increased noticeably in friendliness; he is, as I believe I have remarked before, one of those men who do not produce a favourable impression at first sight, but know how to attract on closer ac-

³⁰ A Marchesa Oldoini, born according to the records in 1835, according to herself in 1843, who married Count Francesco Verasis Castiglione, whom Cavour thereupon sent to Paris as Italian Minister.

³¹ According to the rough draft of a report of the Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph I, Brussels, July 2, 1856, in the Baron De Pont's handwriting. V. N. A.

quaintance by their calm, easy-going and open nature. In the frequent conversations which he sought with me, I had occasion to appreciate the sound principles that seemed to inspire him. I could also observe how a *phrase à effet* in the French taste never fails of its effect upon the Emperor Napoleon, when it is introduced, not as servile flattery, but quietly, with an appearance of candour, and apparently without intention. I managed to introduce one of this sort on the eve of my departure, at a splendid review of all the Parisian troops held on the Champ de Mars, when I said: 'Sir, it is grand to have made peace when one has such a fine army.' I aroused the same gratification by the following phrase, which I fired off at close range when the conversation turned on the first Napoleon: 'Napoleon I had genius, Napoleon III has wit; genius inspires, but wit governs' (*le génie entraîne, mais l'esprit règne*).

"The review to which I have alluded was one of the finest military celebrations I have ever seen; there were some 30,000 men present. The disposition and appearance of the troops were admirable. Yet in reality it was only the first mass impression that was so overwhelming; the manœuvring left much to be desired, and the march past (which took three hours) even more. The prætorian cheers struck me as less enthusiastic than they had been at the earlier review.

"In the evening a conjuring performance took place at the château of St. Cloud before a large company. The Emperor was extraordinarily friendly; he repeatedly drew me aside into an adjoining room, which appeared to arouse some jealousy among various of the guests.³² During these last moments the Emperor Napoleon made, as it were, his confession of faith to me. He spoke most cordially about Your Majesty, and was so good as to say much that was complimentary to myself too. He also touched upon the situation in general; I congratulated him upon having endowed France with a state of peace and prosperity such as she had lacked for many years past, and particularly upon the fact that during his reign religion had

³² The draft originally ran: "seemed to make Prince Oscar a little jealous," but was modified as above.

flourished as it had not done for a long time past. He complained about Germany and Prussia, and expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of peace, but repeatedly hinted his doubts as to its durability, and advanced the opinion that the great powers would have to proceed to a rearrangement of the map of Europe. I replied that to my mind the time had not yet arrived for such a far-reaching step, and that the evils arising out of the very existence of the small German and Italian States must be endured for the present.

"The Empress, of whom I next took my leave, invited me most cordially to come back soon, and was altogether extraordinarily friendly. So was the Emperor, who with his own hands invested all the gentlemen of my suite with orders. Shortly before my departure, which took place on May 28 at eight o'clock in the morning, I had yet another half-hour's conversation with the Emperor. He betrayed a certain emotion. 'We are like old friends,' he said. He at first tried to avoid a discussion of Italian conditions, but I put the screw on him by asking him quite bluntly: 'May I assure my brother the Emperor that Your Majesty will proceed in perfect harmony with him in the Italian question, as in all others?' The answer I thereupon received was most satisfactory. The Emperor gave me his assurance that his desire was always³³ to act in agreement with Austria; he had every desire to work hand in hand with us; his Minister at Turin had instructions to make emphatic representations with regard to the assembly of troops and the other unfortunate proceedings of that Government; he was obliged to spare the Piedmontese, on account of the services they had recently done him, but would not allow this question to grow into a cause of dispute between the Cabinets of Vienna and Paris."

Napoleon also went into the Italian question in detail; he admitted that Cavour had wished to see the alliance between the two imperial courts become less close, but all the same he gave such satisfactory assurances and good counsels upon all points that the Archduke received the very best impression.

³³ The draft first said: "in everything whatsoever," which was afterwards altered to "always."

His distrust with regard to the Italian question was not, it is true, entirely overcome, but on the whole the visit had gone off most propitiously. "The Emperor," he finally reported, "displayed great frankness at this last interview, and, in so far as it is legitimate to build upon words, his utterances bore the stamp of the utmost straightforwardness. He had quite shaken off the lack of ease which is usually characteristic of him, and its place was taken by a cordiality which may perhaps not be unconnected with that report which I sent Your Majesty from Paris by the post, as we had arranged, so that it was bound to fall into the hands of the French police. Our leave-taking was markedly friendly on the Emperor's side; he escorted me down to the carriage, and repeated more than once that he counted upon seeing me again. It was generally remarked that his bearing towards me was much more courteous than towards others — even towards sovereigns, and in particular the King of Sardinia. Indeed, I was far better pleased with his manner during the latter days of my visit than I could at first have expected. The Empress's amiability remained unaltered up to the last moment.

"But, touched as I was by the friendliness displayed by Their Majesties, my regret at leaving Paris was none the less small; indeed, I may say that I blessed the day upon which it was granted to me to turn my back upon the centre of civilization."

Such were his last impressions of his visit to Paris; but his hosts too had day by day been more and more attracted by the gay and charming Archduke. The Empress Eugénie, whose enthusiasm was hard to arouse as a rule, had been as pleased as her husband with the Archduke; his delicate flattery had fallen upon fruitful soil, the more so since his hosts had soon noticed that the Archduke Ferdinand Max had felt visibly more at home towards the end; in short, warm sympathy was aroused on both sides. There had of course been no allusion to Mexico. At that time the Court of Paris was not yet concerned with the state of that distant land.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max continued his tour, and next arrived in Brussels, at the Court of the doyen of European

sovereigns, King Leopold I of the Belgians (then aged sixty-six), the founder of the world-encompassing power of the house of Coburg.³⁴ This King had managed with singular good fortune to manœuvre his kingdom, newly founded in 1830, between England and France, in spite of the jealousy prevailing between them in all matters concerning Belgium; and he had brought it to a flourishing condition which could nowhere be equalled.

He had managed to bind all the courts of Europe closely to him by a series of cleverly negotiated marriages with princes of his house; and in all the great problems of European politics he always had a hand in the game, and by means of his alliances exercised the greatest influence on the march of events.

The prince of the house of Coburg who had ascended the throne of Belgium had married as his first wife the heiress to the English throne, Princess Charlotte. He had lived for a long time in England, and watched over the education and development of his niece Victoria, the future Queen. As soon as she was of an age to marry, Leopold of Coburg, who had meanwhile, in 1830, ascended the Belgian throne, had skilfully succeeded in bringing about a marriage between his royal niece and his nephew Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg. From the day upon which this project was carried into effect the prestige of the Belgian King had risen immeasurably throughout all Europe, for it was realized that he was the only man on the Continent who might with any justice be conceded any influence upon the course of events in Great Britain, and in particular upon her foreign policy. The extent of this influence was indeed greatly overrated, for the English ministers watched jealously to see that no unconstitutional influences were brought to bear upon the Queen, and she herself, in spite of her family feeling and deep love for her husband, was not so easy to win over as was often supposed.

³⁴ See my *Leopold I von Belgien. Sein Weltgebäude Coburger Familienmacht* (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922). [English trans., by Joseph McCabe, London, 1923.]

But it was only against Napoleon that the King of the Belgians had a certain grievance: he had calculated upon the continuance of the Orleans dynasty, for he had married the daughter of Louis Philippe and, in order to secure the position of the next generation, had also married a Coburg prince and princess to children of the French King. The Revolution of 1848, which had driven the Orleans family out of France, had badly upset his calculations, and the rise of Napoleon was most inopportune for him, not only because he did not find him personally congenial, but because he might justly fear that, like his great-uncle, Napoleon III might stretch out his hand towards Belgium, against which encroachment King Leopold was not protected by any family ties, as had been the case with the Orleans family.

The visit of the Archduke Ferdinand Max, the Austrian Emperor's brother, was a compliment to the high position occupied by the King of the Belgians in Europe; but it had another, as yet secret object, in the fact that the young Habsburg Prince was in search of a wife. He had already been in love with a young princess, and desired to make her his wife.³⁵ She was a Portuguese princess, and the Archduke had made her acquaintance at Lisbon, in 1852, at the height of her youth and beauty. But her healthy, fresh appearance was deceptive: the Princess already bore within her the germs of a grave disease, to which she succumbed during the following winter, before the announcement of the projected betrothal. It had been a bitter experience for the Archduke, from which he had suffered for years, but he had now recovered, and was once again occupied with projects of marriage.

The Archduke had availed himself of the yacht *La reine Hortense*, which Napoleon had placed at his disposal at Le Havre for his journey to Belgium; and on setting foot on Belgian soil he was met by the Crown Prince, the Duke of Brabant. On quitting France, Ferdinand Max had addressed from

³⁵ Our source for this information is a letter of Ferdinand Max of January 1, 1853 to the Empress-dowager of Brazil, the Duchess of Braganza. Original in V. N. A.

Cherbourg a letter of thanks and leave-taking to the Emperor of the French couched in the most exalted terms.³⁶

In the cities of the Netherlands, Tournai, Ghent, and even the capital, Brussels, the Archduke saw on all sides traces of the former Austrian rule and memories of his forbears which filled him with melancholy. At the Court of Brussels, in spite of all the burdensome ceremonial, he at once met with a pleasing friendliness which set him at ease; every effort was made to make his visit appear as pleasant as possible. Things were so arranged at court that the guest did not spend a single dull hour. But Ferdinand Max was a caustic critic; even at the Court of Brussels he had much to find fault with, and he sent full accounts of it all to his imperial brother.

"On the first day," he reported,³⁷ "a great dinner took place, at which were present the Duchess and the whole of the royal family. The King afterwards drew me into a window-embrasure and involved me in an interminable political conversation, to which might have been prefaced the motto, 'Wash my fur, but don't wet me'; his discourses were like articles from the *Indépendance* and the *Débats*, but throughout them all a mild, sensible judgment was apparent. The King repeated several times the hackneyed phrase that he was the Nestor among monarchs and that all of them might learn from him. He also promised to come and see me on the following day and give me a lecture upon political science and the balance of Europe; an offer which I received yawning in spirit.

"On the second morning, therefore, I saw the King enter my apartments in order to impart the promised political instruction. He managed to turn this into a Coburg *coup de théâtre*, by appearing at the time appointed for *déjeuner*, the consequence being that the whole company had to wait an hour.

"During this interview he displayed very shrewd, if not quite novel ideas; and in all his utterances his well-known

³⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Cherbourg, May 29, 1856; draft. V. N. A.

³⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph; draft report from Amsterdam, June 1856. V. N. A.

knowledge of men was apparent; a calm, soothing balance rounded off by experience; that security, based upon prudence, of which he has managed to leave the stamp upon his country, but which is not based upon principles, as in the other, older States. The phrase-maker was everywhere apparent; he overflowed with sayings about 'good Austria' and the like; and his constant refrain was how much might be learnt from him. He would gladly have heard something more precise as to the reasons and results of my visit to Paris. He repeatedly returned to the subject of France and Italy.

"In accordance with my principle of meeting people in the spirit in which they meet me, I confined myself to giving the King back phrase for phrase, which I felt the more bound to do since all communications one makes to him are forthwith made use of in other quarters. He tried to scare me about Italian affairs, in order to assume a sort of paternal superiority. He would jolly well like, if I may use such an expression, to play the part of a political pope, before whose pronouncements all the rulers of Europe must bow. He maintains that the Emperor Napoleon expressed himself to the effect that, after the Eastern question had been settled, he was not in a position to satisfy the wishes of the King of Sardinia, but that in a few years' time 'we will make a great war,' and till that time he had put off King Victor Emmanuel with promises. It is possible that there is some truth in this; but one must never forget that the King's phrases are not much to be trusted, for in everything he does and says the fox peeps out unmistakably. . . . The Court is well ordered; in all the Belgian cities court carriages were ready for me; on the other hand, the arrangements in the palaces are wretched: Laeken is a delightful residence, but for the rest, the palace in Brussels has not even stone staircases; yet a certain dignity is to be noticed in everything, a *ton de bonne compagnie*, and the accustomed formality of a court, and by comparison with Paris I was impressed here with a comfortable sensation of being once again among my own kind, for Brussels has for me that pleasant feeling — which I missed in France — of well-bred existence and of being at home. . . . Thus I travelled through the whole of Belgium,

which can, however, be managed without difficulty in a few hours. It is indeed the most lovely, blooming land that I have yet seen; a country possessing all the elements of prosperity and plenty; a fertile soil, rich cities crowded closely together, harbours, the sea, a well-laid-out network of railways, commerce and factories. On all sides is manifest a feeling of well-being in which the traveller involuntarily shares; on all sides one sees happy, friendly faces; the whole country is well cultivated; forests of factory chimneys, industrial establishments, on a scale which I had never seen before, cover whole stretches of the landscape. Belgium fully deserves the self-chosen name of a model country; this it undoubtedly owes in the first place to the prudent procedure of the King, and it is very much to be wondered whether the peace of the kingdom and the dynasty will survive Leopold I. The sympathy for Austria, which is displayed with somewhat too little reticence, may be the reason why the rather Machiavellian Duke of Brabant, under the guise of overwhelming friendliness, never let me out of his sight during the whole of my travels about the young kingdom, in order by his ceaseless presence to see to it that the homage of the inhabitants, which might otherwise perhaps have been too marked, should not go beyond the limits of a fitting cordiality. In all parts I heard the name of Maria Theresa mentioned with enthusiasm, and here, just as in Spain a few years ago, I have had the painful experience of having to see the arms of Austria nearly everywhere.”

Although the Archduke proceeded to report in great detail on the nature and character of the Duke of Brabant and his wife, the Archduchess Henrietta of Austria, he was absolutely silent on the subject of the King's daughter, the sixteen-year-old Princess Charlotte of Belgium, whom he saw for the first time on the occasion of this visit. He further intended to visit the Courts of Holland and Hanover, and preferred as yet not to commit to paper his impressions of the princesses in those countries which he had visited.

But we may gather from his later statements that the Archduke on this occasion found it quite incredible that the young Princess should be so much in advance of her years in intelli-

gence. He was particularly pleased with this, and her young and as yet undeveloped beauty gave great promise. It is stated that King Leopold said of his daughter at that time: "I think she will be the most beautiful princess in Europe; if only it might bring her happiness!"³⁸

Her mother, Queen Louise of Belgium, who was already dead, had insisted, out of unselfish consideration for her husband, that the child should be given the name Charlotte, after King Leopold's ill-fated first wife, whom he had so truly loved, and borne to her early grave with such deep sorrow. The little Princess grew up light-hearted and merry at her father's court, and showed quite plainly from the very beginning, even in her bearing towards her tutors, that she had inherited certain qualities of her father's, his sober prudence and objectivity, in addition to his boundless ambition and personal vanity, and in general a conception of life dictated by the head rather than the heart. Though the heart and temperament played a far smaller part in the Princess than in other women, she was subject, in spite of her superior intelligence, to passionate impulses, which would then press into their service the whole of her understanding and practical qualities, and prevent her from maintaining unclouded her usual cool-headedness and clear-sightedness. The Princess's whole appearance was slender and elegant, fine brown eyes sparkled in her round face, with its exquisite features, and her head was crowned with a mass of heavy braids.

King Leopold, who had already made so many matches, was glad of the Archduke's visit; it suited his plans to have a brother of the Austrian Emperor as his son-in-law, and he was pleased to see the mutual attraction between the young people. The Princess, in particular, was enchanted with the Archduke's personality; for his part he remained rather cooler, though he was undoubtedly much drawn towards the Princess, and was pleased to see that she promised to blossom into a great beauty.

And so the princesses at the other courts did not manage to put her memory in the shade in Ferdinand Max's mind. After

³⁸ Friedrich von Hellwald: *Maximilian I, Kaiser von Mexiko* (Vienna, 1869), p. 23.

the Archduke's return home, negotiations began to pass to and fro between the Courts of Vienna and Brussels.

Count Mensdorff-Pouilly,³⁹ a nephew of King Leopold of Belgium, conducted the negotiations in this delicate affair, and was several times empowered by the King in writing to encourage the Archduke to ask for the hand of the Princess Charlotte. Ferdinand Max had still some hesitation; he suspected, in particular, that behind the royal alacrity was concealed a move in the King's game, for he was known as a cunning statesman and a maker of political matches. He seems even to have expressed his doubts on this point, which reached Leopold of Belgium's ears, for the latter wrote on October 31, 1856:⁴⁰

"My dear and most gracious prince is a little inclined, I think, to take me for a great diplomatist, who has some special political reason in view in every step that he takes. This, however, is not the case, and in May you had already won my confidence and goodwill, quite apart from all political considerations.

"I soon noticed that my little daughter also shared my views; it was therefore my duty to proceed with circumspection. And now we have the fine result that my daughter chooses this alliance and prefers it to all others that offer themselves, and that I joyfully consent to her choice."

King Leopold, however, requested that the Archduke would not come till December, for he was rather superstitious, and the month of November had always been a sorrowful and ominous one for him. It was for this reason, too, that he had hastened to avail himself of the last days of October to write this letter, for, in his opinion, "a little superstition is permissible in all circumstances."

At last, in December 1856, the Archduke again visited Bel-

³⁹ Father of the former Ambassador to London, now the representative of the Austrian Republic at the League of Nations, Count Albert Mensdorff, belonging to the family of the Princes of Dietrichstein.

⁴⁰ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Laeken, October 31, 1856. Original in V. N. A.

gium, this time for the definite conclusion of his betrothal, which he announced by letter to Napoleon III on New Year's Eve of the same year. It may have been a marriage arranged for dynastic reasons, but there was a mutual attraction between the parties that might and did develop into love after marriage. The Archduke Ferdinand Max had brought with him an intimate friend, Baron De Pont, who conducted the material part of the negotiations for the marriage settlement with Count Conway, King Leopold's financial factotum. The King of the Belgians desired to give his daughter no further dowry but what she had inherited from her mother, of which she already had the disposal, in addition to the marriage portion voted by the Chamber. The Archduke requested through De Pont that the King should also contribute towards her dower, but he declined, calling attention to the fact that he had in addition already waived his claim to the usufruct of her share of what had been left by her mother, which still belonged to him until the Princess was of age, and that he had already made sacrifices, owing to his share of the expenditure on her trousseau and jewels.

There was a determined struggle over the financial basis of the marriage, which did not tend to decrease the Archduke's reserve towards his future father-in-law.

"This insuperable tenacity," he reported to his brother,⁴¹ who was at that time staying at Innsbrück, "prompted me, two days before my departure, to remind the King, in a note couched in the pleasantest terms, of his own words, 'how necessary it is that the princely household should be comfortably established.' I next drew his attention to the fact that, upon my return, I should have to give Your Majesty an account of these affairs, and that it could arouse none but the worst impression in Austria if it were to become known that the King could not bring himself to put his hand in his own pocket for the benefit of his beloved daughter. I received no direct reply either in writing or orally, but at the very last moment Conway asked me for an interview, at which he informed me that

⁴¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph. Draft report dated Brussels, January 14, 1857. V. N. A.

the King had resolved to do something, but he could not yet name the sum, and that this contribution must not figure in the marriage settlements. I am rather pleased with myself for having at last wrung from the old miser something of that which he has most at heart."

The Archduke supplemented these intimate communications by a detailed account of his experiences at the Belgian Court.

"The New Year ceremony at court, at which I stayed from beginning to end," he reported, "merits a brief description. For nearly five whole hours I had to swallow all the hackneyed phrases ground out to each other by the constitutional ruler and the various authorities and corporate bodies. I know the saying runs, *Variatio delectat*, but anybody who could manage to be delighted with *those* variations on one and the same theme is to be envied for his easy-going nature. The fact that it was the Government's twenty-fifth anniversary gave the speakers a welcome opening for the most pompous self-glorification; Belgium's good fortune, Belgium's powerful position in the 'great European family,' all due to nothing but Belgium's wise Constitution, and its wise administration by their wise sovereign, trickled in honeyed words from all lips. The monotonous flow of unctuous addresses and replies was interrupted by only two cheerful interludes. These were, firstly, the farcical appearance of the little Rabbi, who fired off his set speech right under the King's nose, in the position of *en avant deux*, with the top part of his body bent backwards, and in a piercing voice, amidst the stifled tittering of the audience, while the Duchess's ⁴² violent struggles against a fit of laughter were only half concealed by her gigantic bouquet. A contrast was provided by the Cicero of the civic guard, a colossus who stammered out his harangue in stentorian tones, faltering over the words and accenting them in a way so comically destructive of the sense that nobody had an idea of the meaning of what he was reading.

"The only ones who spoke with feeling were the Minister of the Interior and the representative of the Catholic clergy.

⁴² The Duchess of Brabant, *née* the Archduchess Henrietta of Austria.

The King's gentle, honeyed speeches did not produce a very enlivening effect; they were not addressed to the spokesman of each deputation, but as the royal orator spoke, he kept gliding to and fro with his characteristically slinking shuffle, nodding his head amiably. Moreover, it cannot be denied that King Leopold has considerable glibness and the art of adopting the tone adapted to each deputation. The comedy was wound up by the whole civic guard of Brussels defiling interminably through the reception hall, followed by all such natives and foreigners as had been presented at court.

"The whole affair was calculated to inspire the unprejudiced observer with a profound disgust for constitutional shams.

"On Twelfth-night I was offered another spectacle: that of a constitutional court ball. Since the Belgian regime has not consented to establish a hard and fast rule for presentation at court, so that it is not easy to reject any application, it may be imagined how mixed the company at such a ball must be. The higher nobility of the land rubs shoulders with its own tailors and cobblers; all the English shopkeepers who have retired to Brussels on grounds of economy have access to the ball with their respective families. The crowd is enormous, and was increased on this occasion by the circumstance that everybody wanted to see the Princess's future husband. The state officials and diplomatic representatives with their wives were truly a pitiful sight, being doomed to sit for five mortal hours tied to the same spot, in a semi-circle to right and left of the royal dais, with no resource save to groan a word of lamentation first to one neighbour and then to the other, and to receive from these an echo of their own despair. Anyone accustomed to the old court ceremonial must be unpleasantly struck by the ill-bred haste with which most of the guests went away after supper, even before the royal family had left the hall."

As we can see, the Archduke's betrothal had not dimmed his critical eye for conditions at other courts, even at that from which he was taking his wife. At last Ferdinand Max returned to Vienna to report personally to his imperial brother on his attitude towards the young Princess.

At the end of March the Archduke sent another envoy to

the King of the Belgians, this time the Baron von Gagern, to press for a definite statement, and for the Princess Charlotte's dowry and royal grant to be fixed at as high a figure as possible. Gagern put forward every sort of excuse and pretext for this proceeding, as, for instance, that the Archduke wished to prove himself a good man of business to his father-in-law, and a good domestic administrator for the future, but the King interrupted him with a smile and said: "The Archduke runs no risk of my misunderstanding him; I am glad to save him the experiences which I had to go through as son-in-law of two of the most powerful kings; not to speak of poor King Louis Philippe, who granted me by the marriage settlement only a prospective endowment, which I did not actually receive for years, my admirable English father-in-law handed over to me as marriage portion with Princess Charlotte nothing but her debts from as far back as 1809, with the comment that this would make some impression upon the Princess. This prediction was indeed fulfilled, but the impression was an unpleasant one, and remained so."

Meanwhile the King of the Belgians had at the same time requested the Emperor Francis Joseph to bestow upon his son-in-law a position within the bounds of the monarchy worthy of his high birth, which should afford him a rich field of activity. It went against the grain with the Emperor Francis Joseph, but the reports of his minister assured him, and, on the occasion of a visit which he made there, his own eyes obtained proof, that the state of affairs in the Upper Italian provinces of the Empire, Lombardy and Venetia, were taking such a threatening turn that something must be done to reconcile them to Austria, and in particular to the Habsburg dynasty.

The Emperor therefore decided to appoint his brother Ferdinand Maximilian Governor-General of the Kingdom of Lombardo-Venetia, though at the same time he was firmly resolved not to allow his own sovereignty to be in any way impaired.

The new Governor conceived his office in quite a different spirit: he set to work afire with zeal, for he thought that at last he would have the opportunity of putting into practice his

ideas for the happiness of the people, and find food for his ardent zeal for action. Thus from the very first, causes for dissension were present, and they were never to be lacking. The official appointment of Ferdinand Max took place in the latter days of March 1857, shortly after the Emperor Francis Joseph's tour round Upper Italy. On April 19, 1857, the youthful Governor-General made his entry into Milan. The news of his appointment was received with mixed feelings in the two provinces. Some expected an immediate improvement in the condition of the people, for the Prince had been preceded by a reputation for liberalism; others again let themselves be captivated by his attractive appearance and amiability; but, on the whole, the Italian population continued to strive for a total abolition of Austrian rule, and for the liberty and unity of the Italian nation, which, with the best will in the world, a Habsburg prince could not bring them. Yet his reception was in general not an unfriendly one, and his immediate issue of a number of well-timed and conciliatory ordinances contributed further towards this. But unrest soon broke out again here and there, which boded no good.

In June the Archduke Ferdinand Max made his first formal visit in his new capacity to Pope Pius IX at Pesaro.⁴³ The imperial Prince was deeply touched at being received even before the Pope's private mass, a distinction not accorded even to sovereigns; his reception was extremely cordial, and Ferdinand Max found the Pope "as merry as a grig, looking better than he did two years before, encouraged by the homage of the provinces, yet, so far at least, still cramped by memories of the year 1848." After breakfast, of which the Archduke partook tête à tête with the Pope, he received from his host the Order of Pius, with the apologetic remark that it had indeed no great value in itself, but as coming from the Holy Father was a *cosa santa*.

"To me it will be a relic," replied the Archduke. Accompanied by the Pope, he next drove "in an antediluvian carriage with patched-up harness and variegated stage liveries"

⁴³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, Lisbon, June 10, 1857. Draft report in V. N. A.

through rows of unenthusiastic inhabitants to the cathedral, where, as he reported, "the free and easy behaviour of the clergy, with their incessant chatter and snuff-taking," affected him disagreeably.

"After high mass," Ferdinand Max reported to Vienna, "came a conversation with the Holy Father, till the appearance at one o'clock of the four cardinals present at Pesaro started off a *conversation gaillarde*. I then partook with them of the Pope's dinner, a gruesome repast only fit for a parish priest, served by Monsignori of the papal household, which was none the less cheered by the good-tempered chat of the well-fed fathers of the Church; the Pope's condescension went so far that he himself helped me to ices and coffee. After dinner, and a very gay and animated conversation, I took my leave, with kissing of his foot and genuflections, having spent my time from seven in the morning till four in the afternoon uninterruptedly *en pleine parade*, with the ribbon and collar of my order; and I got into my carriage half dead, to start on the return journey. On the whole I had every reason to be very pleased with the reception which I met with from the Pope."

Shortly afterwards came an invitation to the Archduke to go to London on a visit to Queen Victoria. King Leopold had arranged for this invitation in the hope that Queen Victoria, who had another prince, more nearly related to herself, in view for the Princess Charlotte, might be won over to this marriage by the personal charm and amiability of the young Archduke.

Ferdinand Max was overwhelmed by what he saw in London.⁴⁴ He found the Court imposing and grandiose, and the appearance of the sovereign, as bearer of the ancient historic and ingrained traditions of the English Court, "everywhere irradiated by a sort of nimbus, and inspiring awe." Everything at the court was stamped with the historic luxury of a secular greatness. At the banquet he sat on the Queen's right, and was quite enthusiastic at Victoria's motherly solicitude for his well-being. Society was at first reserved, but afterwards, "in contrast with the French veneer of politeness," sincerely cor-

⁴⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, London, June 24, 1857. Draft in V. N. A.

dial. People were free here from the constant *sur le qui-vive* which was so burdensome for foreigners in Italy and France.

This good impression was based upon mutual liking; the Archduke had entirely won the Queen's approval. She wrote an enthusiastic letter about him to Brussels to her uncle, King Leopold, congratulating him heartily upon his daughter's excellent choice. The impression was a lasting one. In political circles, too, it was considered that Maximilian's views were very liberal and enlightened, and later on, when disagreements again began to arise between Austria and Hungary on account of the over-despotic government of the latter, it was even proposed to Austria by government circles in England that the Archduke Ferdinand Max, "with a free and independent system of government, should be placed at the head of Hungary."⁴⁵ Lord John Russell himself informed Count Corti, at that time the Italian *chargé d'affaires*, of this. It is true that the proposal met with a cold negative from Austria.

All the conditions necessary to earthly happiness seemed to be present; on July 27, 1857 took place the marriage of the Archduke Ferdinand Max with the daughter of the King of the Belgians. A few weeks later the young couple made their state entry into Milan. And a little later King Leopold even paid a visit to his son-in-law and daughter at Monza. On the occasion of a dinner, Maximilian related to the King how, some years ago, an inquiry had been addressed to him by some Mexicans as to whether he would accept the crown of that country, as there was a plan for the introduction of a monarchy, as being the only salvation for Mexico.

King Leopold answered with a smile: "That would be a fine position." Ferdinand Max never forgot these words; and the worse conditions grew in Italy, and in old Europe generally, the more he thought of that inquiry, which was, in any case, a mere passing episode, perhaps long since forgotten by its initiators.

Leopold's desire to see his son-in-law occupying a fine position seemed already to be fulfilled in Italy; but it soon became

⁴⁵ Count Corti to Count Cavour, August 26, 1861, from London. Archives of the Marchese Gaspare Corti, Taino.

apparent that the state of affairs there was even then most critical, and that national aspirations had already made too much progress for this "*Etablissement*" to bear within it the necessary guarantee for a great future.

Indeed, the political situation in the world at large was not a cheerful one; unrest was seething on all sides.

Misunderstandings between Spain and Mexico had continued to develop.

In the summer of 1857 a Spanish fleet set out from Cuba to make a demonstration before Vera Cruz, and relations had become steadily more strained, until in 1858 the representatives of Mexico in Madrid had to leave the city.

With regard to their tangled home affairs, one of them, José Hidalgo, was naturally on the side of the Conservative Zuñiga; he refused to recognize Juárez and the Constitution of 1857, and was declared by the latter to be discharged from his post, while, during the short period for which the Conservative Government won the upper hand, it appointed him Secretary of Legation in Paris, for it was well aware of his acquaintance with the Empress of the French, and desired to make use of it.

Just after José Hidalgo had crossed the Spanish frontier, on the way to Paris, and stepped out of the diligence at Bayonne, the Empress Eugénie, having left her beloved watering-place of Biarritz, drove past the hotel, on her way to the bull-fight which was to take place in Bayonne that day. As her glance fell upon the young Mexican respectfully saluting her in the street, she recalled their old acquaintance at the house of her parents, stopped the carriage, and summoned him to her side, to invite him to an excursion on the sea which she intended to make with a large party on the following day.⁴⁶ On the occasion of this excursion, Hidalgo had the chance of talking to the Empress at length and in detail. The idea flashed through his mind like lightning that he might seize this favourable moment to lay before the Empress the wretched situation of his country, where the parties were tearing one another to pieces, while the people paid the price; and to demonstrate to her

⁴⁶ From Hidalgo's own account in the *Notes secrètes*. V. N. A.



MARRIAGE OF THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX
TO THE PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF BELGIUM AT BRUSSELS,
JULY 27, 1857

what a splendid idea it would be, in his opinion, to set up a monarchy in Mexico, and thus save the Latin race and Catholicism in the New World. In so doing, the Mexican was counting not only upon the Empress's well-known piety, but also upon her sentiments as a Spaniard, which were bound to be stirred by the crushing of the Spanish elements in a former Spanish colony. But since she was now Empress of the French, Hidalgo only mentioned the "Latin race." The Empress listened with ever-growing attention to the passionate and inspired arguments of the young diplomatist.⁴⁷ She saw the magnitude of the enterprise involved in restoring order, peace, and happiness to a country rent by party strife, but above all she also saw in the whole business an opportunity of procuring fresh glory at small cost, and perhaps, too, brilliant commercial advantages for the Second Empire; and her opinion was confirmed by Hidalgo. She had at first no objection to Don Juan of Bourbon as the proposed candidate. She kept returning to the subject in conversation, and, it seems, promised spontaneously to speak to the Emperor Napoleon on the matter. She moreover wrote to her mother the very next day about her meeting with José Hidalgo, but made no detailed reference to his proposals. The young Mexican at once sent word of his conversation to Gutierrez in Rome, who was sincerely delighted to see his hopes once more revived in this fashion.

Hidalgo had been fortunate, for the Empress took an immediate and active interest in the matter. He had, however, also managed to avail himself of a highly favourable moment. Napoleon III was beginning to be more and more unfaithful to his wife, though without ceasing to love her. The Archduke Max had shown acute perceptions when he reported to his brother that, in spite of his fascinating wife, the Emperor of the French was running after all the pretty women. During the year 1857-8 — as the Archduke had also noticed and observed — it was the sprightly and bewitching Countess Castiglione in particular, whose husband Count Cavour had purposely chosen as minister in Paris, with whom the Emperor

⁴⁷ Based on Hidalgo's own account in his *Notes secrètes*, V. N. A.

entered upon a love-affair. But she was not the only one; the malicious and indiscreet Comte de Viel-Castel ⁴⁸ also mentions in his memoirs among the Emperor's favourites the Countess Walewska, wife of Napoleon I's natural son, who was a minister under the Second Empire, by the lovely Pole, besides the Comtesse de Labédoyère and many others. There were even women who afterwards chattered shamelessly in their memoirs about Napoleon's adventures of an intimate sort. The Empress, whose honour remained spotless, who was irreproachable and immune from scandal, was filled first with grief — though the Emperor always repented and came back to her — and then with indignation at the Emperor's conduct, and at times showed this in passionate scenes. Eugénie was, moreover, filled with unspeakable embarrassment at the thought that all France knew she had an unfaithful husband, and that, in spite of all her beauty, she was unable to bind him to her. But nothing was to be done now, and, disappointed of happiness at home, the Empress sought distraction outside.

It was now that she began to take a hand in politics, and though her husband was ill pleased at first, he let her do so, for he had far too bad a conscience to be able to make any strong representations to his wife. In time, however, he became accustomed to discussing all political matters with her; as the control of foreign policy became more difficult, and his health began to fail, he came to depend upon the support of the Empress, who was always well-informed on all subjects.

In the end she became quite resigned to her husband's love-affairs, and in order to show him how far this went, she even brought herself on one occasion to invite the twenty most beautiful women in Paris to a supper for him, in order to pay a bet she had lost; but such self-denial came extremely hard to her. At this stage of her existence, when she was satisfying her desire for occupation by politics, in order to escape from domestic sorrow, occurred the above-mentioned conversation with José Hidalgo, who did not fail to mention that danger

⁴⁸ Comte Horace de Viel-Castel: *Mémoires sur le règne de Napoléon III.* 1851-64. 3 vols. (Paris, 1883).

also threatened his country from the great Republic in the north.

The Empress found North America and its rising power by no means congenial. She knew perfectly well what they thought about her husband and the monarchical constitution which had dispossessed a republic. In general she had none but the vaguest and most superficial conception of American affairs; her ideas on the subject represented things there in the exclusively European — that is to say, Spanish — light thrown upon them by those who had taught her as a child, and this precluded a sound and impartial judgment. In the year 1853,⁴⁹ on one occasion when the conversation turned upon the Americans, the Empress spoke of their “*prétention de mise républicaine*,” of their arrogance, and of the United States Ministers, of whom the one in Madrid was, so to speak, a protector of the filibusters who desired to wrest Cuba from Spain.

“Sooner or later,” concluded the Empress, “war will have to be declared on the Americans.” Napoleon listened quietly and attentively, but a light smile of scepticism played over his lips.

“War,” he rejoined, “war, my love, is no longer possible in France; we are, so to speak, hemmed in by material interests and trade, which are all in all.”

Since then things had developed in a different direction. War had been waged, for the Crimean War had just ended in victory, and the Empress, who well knew that before long war would soon develop in Italy as well, had learnt by experience that her husband’s words were not always weighed very carefully. She determined, in fact, to talk to Napoleon of the communications and propositions made to her by José Hidalgo about his country.

The Emperor and Empress were in the habit of going to the château of St. Cloud at the opening of spring, to Fontainebleau in June and July, and towards the end of August to the seaside, at Biarritz, where, in contrast to the above-mentioned splendid residences, they lived quite simply in a small villa, which they called “our nest,” having the advantage of giving

⁴⁹ Viel-Castel, *op. cit.*, II. 243.

access to the bathing-huts by a staircase leading straight from their apartments.

Only a few "*familiers*" were invited to stay for long at Biarritz, for the Emperor and Empress did most of their entertaining at the château of Compiègne in the autumn during the hunting-season.

It was here that they invited, besides their "*familiers*" — among whom were Prosper Mérimée, Delessert, Hidalgo, etc.⁵⁰ — diplomatists such as the Austrian Ambassador, Richard Metternich, the Englishman Lord Cowley, and Nigra the Italian, besides the leading figures in the world of art and science, usually with their wives, for a week or a fortnight at a time in successive batches.

The morning was spent by the guests in their own delightful apartments, where they could entertain themselves as they liked; the Emperor and Empress appeared at luncheon, of which they partook with their guests at the great table in the magnificent Galerie Henri II, the most superb banqueting-hall in the world. In the afternoon they rode, drove, or walked in the park and the glorious forests in the neighbourhood, or there were hunting and other enjoyments. At these times strict etiquette was banished, and everybody did and said exactly what he liked without constraint. Thus the guests had opportunities of drawing nearer to the Emperor and Empress than on other occasions, and in the intervals of jest and chatter — perhaps in the fascinating *Salon chinois*, or during their long walks — of introducing serious political subjects, and so influencing the sovereign's opinions and actions. Napoleon III left the drawing up of the invitation-lists almost entirely to the Empress, and only occasionally expressed his wishes when he desired some person to be included or omitted from them. Thus it happened that, at the instance of the Empress, José Hidalgo too was invited to Compiègne during the autumn of 1858. On the very first day, after luncheon, the Emperor Napoleon III approached the young Mexican and asked what news he had from home.

⁵⁰ See also Frédéric Loliée: *La Vie d'une impératrice. Eugénie de Montijo d'après des mémoires de cour inédits* (Paris, 1907), p. 113.

Hidalgo replied without hesitation:⁵¹ "The news is very bad, and the country will be ruined unless Your Majesty comes to its aid."

This answer pleased the Emperor, and he drew Hidalgo into a window-embrasure, where he conversed with him on the subject for a whole half-hour. The young Mexican diplomatist informed the Emperor of all that had so far been done in connexion with setting up a monarchy in Mexico, but received from Napoleon the answer that in matters concerning America he could do nothing without England. He added that a few weeks before, he had spoken about the subject to Lord Palmerston, who had also been to Compiègne. "We told him," said the Emperor — and the pronoun clearly revealed the part played by the Empress — "that an army and millions would be required for the purpose, and, what is more, a prince."

"Your Majesty knows," answered Hidalgo, "that Don Juan has been mentioned?"

The Emperor did not answer at once; he turned to the table, drank a glass of wine, and then replied: "We thought of the Duc d'Aumale, but he refuses."⁵²

This answer aroused Hidalgo's astonishment, for he had not expected that his words had already had so much effect that the Emperor was actually occupying himself with the matter. So it was not a Spaniard, but a Frenchman, and an Orleans at that, for whom Napoleon was thinking of creating a throne! This meant that, in any case, the plan was sure of material support from the Emperor. When Hidalgo saw how matters stood, he redoubled his eloquence, took pains to represent to the Emperor in glaring colours in what danger Mexico stood from the policy of the United States, which threatened to destroy all Latin influence in America, and which had managed to gain possession of the richest silver-producing district, and desired to make itself master of world trade on both the oceans.

Hidalgo next stated what were in his opinion the most

⁵¹ Hidalgo: *Notes secrètes*. V. N. A.

⁵² Fifth son of King Louis Philippe and Queen Marie Amélie.

suitable means to employ in order to avert a war between Spain and Mexico. According to his account, the Emperor closed the conversation with the words: "I am quite of your opinion, and desire you to discuss the matter with Count Walewski."

Napoleon III seemed really to desire that the project should be carried into effect, but it was not yet clear to him how this was to be done. He understood perfectly well that any action in Mexico would arouse not only the jealousy of England and Spain, but, above all, the opposition of the North American Union; and would be met with an assertion of the great ideas of the Monroe Doctrine, which repudiated any acquisition of further power by European States on the American continent. During the last few years there had indeed been bitter struggles going on within the Union, especially in internal policy. The slave-owners of the South were combating the abolitionist ideas of the North. Voices were already being raised which sought the solution of the point at issue in a complete secession of the Southern States from the Union. "Let us separate peacefully from the North," they said, "and attempt to organize our constitution and existence in such a way as to safeguard our vast possessions, consisting in four millions of slaves, with a value amounting to thousands of millions of dollars. Without the slaves, half our landed property is valueless."⁵³

So far the discussion had not led to open war. The Emperor's immediate attention had been distracted from events in America to the important problems of European politics which lay closer at hand. The problem was how to solve the question of Italian unity, which had become a burning one. The unceasing efforts of Cavour to show that no lasting peace could be arrived at in Europe so long as the national unity and independence of Italy had not been effected, the machinations of his fair political agent the Countess Castiglione, who was intended to involve Napoleon in her toils, the attempt at assassination made by Orsini, who, after missing the Emperor with his bomb, wrote him a letter from prison urging upon him the

⁵³ Report of the Ritter von Hülseman, Austrian Minister in Washington, to Count Rechberg, January 23, 1860. V. N. A.

cause of Italian unity, Napoleon's disregard of which, he said, had been the sole cause of his action, all these influences — persuasion, feminine arts, fear, and, by no means least, a mania for playing the part of liberator to an oppressed nation, had gradually led Napoleon to resolve that, should the occasion arise, he would step forward and bring the Italian question to a solution, if need be against Austria and by force of arms.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max had entered upon the office of Governor-General of Lombardo-Venetia at a critical moment. The consequences were now apparent of Cavour's clear-sighted policy, which had succeeded in masterly fashion in pressing Napoleon into the service of his ends, assisted by the impression aroused by Orsini's attempt at assassination. The feeling grew more and more widespread in the Italian provinces of Austria that their desire for freedom had found a powerful ally in France. A report of the Archduke's to his father-in-law, King Leopold of the Belgians,⁵⁴ gives us an insight into these conditions.

"At Napoleon's prompting," it runs, "our government in Italy has become the butt of journalists and revolutionary polemics. Napoleon needs an unsettled question for two purposes: first and foremost, to distract the attention of Europe from the troubles of France and its despotic administration, and, secondly, in order to have a popular revolutionary ground for war during the period of danger that may unfortunately arise any moment. He has chosen the Italian question, and that, so it seems to me, for two reasons: firstly, on account of the Bonapartist tradition, which hates Austria and fights her on the fields of Italy, and, secondly, because he knows from his own depressing earlier connexions how strong an interest is unfortunately taken in England in this, the chief question involved in the continental revolution, and what emotion it arouses there."

But the relations existing between the Archduke and Vienna were none too good. The Archduke had not even been invited

⁵⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Miramar, June 2, 1858. Original in V. N. A.

to the Ministerial Council that was to define the scope of his activities in Italy. He was presented with the solution of all the great problems concerning the internal administration of the Italian provinces as *faits accomplis* and was never thoroughly initiated into the wider aspects of the general political situation.⁵⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max had moreover too sound views, especially with regard to foreign policy, for Count Buol, one of the most unfortunate ministers ever called upon to guide the fortunes of Austria, to be inclined to listen to him or help him to find his bearings more exactly. The Archduke held⁵⁶ that there were two powerful means of helping Austria, which he had been advocating for a long time past. One of them consisted in finding by skilful diplomacy an issue from the dangerous political isolation of Austria caused by her unfortunate policy in the Crimean War, and in working towards a firm alliance with Prussia, and, so far as possible, with England, while avoiding any direct affront to the touchy Napoleon. On the occasion of his visit to England the Archduke had even hinted at these ideas in quiet but friendly terms in replying to his toast at a dinner at Buckingham Palace, at which he sat between Queen Victoria and the Crown Prince Frederick William. The second means he considered to be the setting of the Italian provinces upon a just and sound basis suited to the spirit of the age and country, while inducing the other Italian States gradually to do the same. Ferdinand Max also did all he could to agitate against "Buol, who gets more and more bungling";⁵⁷ but in vain, and he had, on the contrary, to expiate the sins of Vienna in Milan. It is true that neither the most sympathetic government nor the extremest severity or mildness would have essentially altered the situation in Italy. There was only one means by which the Austrian Government could have gained the entire consent of the Italian population: namely, by abolishing itself, or, in other words, giving the provinces their en-

⁵⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, draft dated 1859 without date of the month. V. N. A.

⁵⁶ Letter of the Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Miramar, June 2, 1858; original and draft, both in V. N. A.

⁵⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Miramar, July 15, 1858. Draft in V. N. A.

ture liberty; and this would naturally have been asking too much.

The Archduke had not yet fully recognized to what lengths this sentiment had already gone, and supposed that he would be able to effect a radical improvement by his proposals. The personal liking which he and his young wife aroused among large sections of the public by their undoubtedly excellent intentions and their friendly, winning manners, contributed greatly towards this. But it could not prevent many families, both noble and middle class, from staying away from their court for national reasons; it did not prevent an insult to his wife on one occasion in Venice, or the holding of demonstrations throughout the whole land, and the almost entire ignoring of the concessions granted on July 16, 1858, under the Emperor's own signature, with regard to taxation and other matters. Thus the Governor-General's position grew steadily more painful, like that of a military occupation of an enemy country.

The Archduke's intimate letters of this period are the best mirror of the state of mind in which he discharged functions which were hopeless from the outset. It was to be a foretaste of the far bitterer destiny which Fate had in store for him in the distant future.

In the autumn of 1858 he poured out his soul to his mother, the Archduchess Sophie.

"I am fully convinced, dear Mother," he wrote,⁵⁸ "of what you say to me from the religious point of view. . . . If it were not for my religious duties, I should long since have left this land of misery, where one is doubly depressed by having to act as the representative of an inactive Government with no ideas, which one's judgment tries in vain to defend. It was with a feeling of profound shame that I recently entered Milan, doubly weighed down and depressed by the friendly manner, full of goodwill, in which we were both personally received, as it were, like respectable private persons. This private friendli-

⁵⁸ Draft of a letter from the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian to the Archduchess Sophie, dated 1858, without month or day, but judging from the order of the documents, some time in the autumn. V. N. A.

ness, combined with public repudiation, is what shows me most clearly how things stand; it shows how powerless I am, but also shows how irresponsibly the Government trifles with the goodwill of the masses. One thing has been achieved at Vienna; if that was the aim, then we have displayed a statesmanlike spirit; that is to say, there is no longer any opposition. How has this wonder been worked? The explanation is simple; it is because the opposition comes from all the Navas, Archintos, and Scottis — that is, from the soldiers, officials, and clergy. Only one voice is now heard, that of indignation and disapproval; it pervades the whole country, and before it I stand alone and impotent; I am not afraid, for that is not the way of the Habsburgs, but I am silent and ashamed. . . . If things continue to grow serious at the same rate as they have done, I shall soon begin to think about sending Charlotte back to her father at Brussels; for I have no mind to let her be sacrificed to weakness and irresolution; and where there is danger, it is no place for young and inexperienced women. . . . We are at present living in a complete chaos, and only the perfect calm which I try to affect, in despite of my twenty-six years, keeps the whole thing from going to rack and ruin; all those around me have lost their heads and their courage, and I am accordingly beginning to ask myself whether my conscience will allow me blindly to follow instructions from Vienna; Radetzky disobeyed through loyalty, and monuments are justly set up to him out of gratitude; there is a deep truth in this which can perfectly well be reconciled with religion."

The Archduke drew his conclusions from this state of affairs. In private life he made all preparations for a crisis; he actually sent his wife to her father at Brussels under colour of visiting her home for the first time since her marriage, and early in the winter of 1858-9 had his goods and chattels packed and sent out of Italy. The lines which he wrote his mother at the end of January 1859 give a good impression both of the situation and of the Archduke's state of mind.

"I sit here unable to move," he wrote,⁵⁹ "and as lonely as

⁵⁹ Draft of a letter from the Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Archduchess Sophie, January 24, 1859. V. N. A.

a hermit in the great palace at Milan; before me dances and whirls the carnival, but in my apartments it is as silent as Lent, and the old Countess Lützow takes the place of the mistress of the house at table. I am the prophet at whom they laughed and who has now to experience to the uttermost all that, word for word, he foretold to deaf ears, and upon whom they all now want to hammer, in order to make people forget the causes of it all, as though it were he who has conjured up all the trouble by his false mildness or sugary amiability. The world is a funny place; it entirely forgets that the poor prophet begged them to do all the things which now in their mortal terror they want to do: the suspension of the University of Pavia, the fortification of Milan, the removal of weak officials, deportations, etc., etc. Only he desired it when things were quiet, and the measures could have been represented as part of a systematic plan. Such strong measures combined with *beneficent laws* were never foreign to my character.

"In spite of mockery and every calumny, which I expect, I stick quietly to my post. It is not in time of danger that I turn back. Two reasons restrain me: the duty of not at a critical moment leaving the post entrusted me, and of restraining as far as possible the rash measures arising from fright and nerves. What I shall do when good times return and the danger is over is my affair; where there is a fire, I shall help up to the last moment, even though I have to stand in the midst of the flames; but where they want to shove on the chariot of mediocrity, they may harness other nags to it."

The Archduke had written thus to his mother out of the depths of his heart; this was indeed how the young Prince saw things in his own mind, and he made good in later life the judgment on himself which he expresses here. Besides his anxieties as Governor-General, the Archduke Ferdinand Max had also experienced slights which arose out of the position which he had retained of Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. This section of Austria's defensive forces, to the improvement of which the Archduke had devoted much trouble, work, and anxiety, lay very near his heart; for years he had carried on a somewhat unsuccessful campaign directed towards strengthening

the navy by grants from Parliament for the building of new ships. But where the personnel of the navy was concerned, there were also noticeable differences of opinion between the two brothers. "Those whom I praised," he once wrote to his father-in-law, the King of the Belgians,⁶⁰ "were usually passed over, and those whom I removed received conspicuous marks of favour."

The young Prince was more and more overcome by a sentiment of bitterness. "It is horrible," he wrote again,⁶¹ "to see enterprises that have cost one so much pains nipped in the bud, never to know how any day will end, to be hemmed in by hostile parties, never to be sure whether one will be approved by the vacillating centre (Vienna), in constant fear of hearing that one's innocent wife has been insulted or injured, never to be sure that one will not be hissed at the theatre, or whether one will return alive from one's promenades." And now, to be also separated from his wife, and struck at through the navy, "the thing dearest to me for years past" — this was too much for the young Prince's far from stern, and highly impressionable nature.

Moreover, at the beginning of 1859 came orders from Vienna to reinforce the troops, and there accordingly arrived in Milan, by way of Verona, General Count Gyulai, to whom, in view of the threatened outbreak of hostilities, was granted by an autograph letter from the Emperor, dated April 20, the supreme command in both civil and military affairs. The Archduke was relieved of the Governor-Generalship without much ceremony, and placed in a subordinate position to his junior in rank, Lieutenant-General Alemann, Commandant of the fortress of Venice; for in case of war Ferdinand Max would have had the command only of the "four or five wretched ships" stationed there. In opposition to his wishes and without his previous knowledge, as he complained,⁶² recruiting and

⁶⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, draft letter of 1859 without precise date. V. N. A.

⁶¹ The same to the same. No date, but the order of the documents would place it in 1859. V. N. A.

⁶² The same to the same, draft letter of 1859, without precise date. V. N. A.

reform of the coinage were thrown into the inflammable temper of the people like an incendiary torch. Disaster was now imminent, and blame was heaped upon him to the most exaggerated extent. In utter despair Ferdinand Max turned to the Emperor Francis Joseph with the prayer that he might at least preserve his "good name," and the respect due to an Archduke.⁶³

In the mean time Napoleon had entirely gone over to the Sardinian camp; at a secret meeting at Plombières, Cavour and the Emperor of the French had decided the future of Italy, determined upon war, and already concluded definite territorial agreements. It was now apparent how right the Archduke Ferdinand Max had been when, on the occasion of his visit to Paris, he had introduced into his report upon Napoleon's friendly attitude towards Austria the prudent words: "in so far as it is permissible to build upon words"; but the sagacious old King of the Belgians, whom the young Ferdinand Max had been so forward in judging, had been even more clear-sighted, when, as early as 1856, he had said right out that Napoleon III was working towards a war on behalf of Italy, a remark repeated by the Archduke with a sceptical comment.⁶⁴

This prediction had now been fulfilled, and Napoleon was victorious over the badly led Austrians. Immediately after Solferino, peace was promptly concluded without further ado, for on account of Prussia both sides were interested in bringing the war to a speedy end: Napoleon since he saw himself threatened on the Rhine; Francis Joseph, on the other hand, since he did not want to let Prussia come forward as saviour and decisive arbiter.

The Archduke had followed the events of the war with sorrow. The French victory had once more induced him to "tell home truths" to his brother Francis Joseph, but he did not expect it to do much good. Sympathy for Napoleon III had indeed received an ugly jar. "Napoleon's star," wrote the

⁶³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Monza, April 17, 1859; draft letter in V. N. A.

⁶⁴ See p. 63.

Archduke to his father-in-law at Brussels,⁶⁵ "must fall like all luminaries of its kind; what seems to me to be necessary — though it will take great skill — is to keep our heads above water till day breaks." "It is so wretched," he wrote, "to see our fine and once powerful monarchy sinking lower and lower through incompetence, misunderstanding, and conduct difficult to explain."⁶⁶ He was aghast at seeing all his prophecies come true, and took a gloomy view of the future.

His stay with his wife at Ischl — where, moreover, he met with a cordial reception from the imperial family — could not be further prolonged, and he was longing for the completion of his splendid residence of Miramar, which he had had built upon a rock not far from Trieste, upon which he had once nearly been wrecked during a storm. The building was now approaching completion. The Archduke had chosen this place, for one thing, because he wished to make his home as far as possible from Vienna, and, for another thing, because he was particularly fond of the sea.

The palace was built of brilliant white limestone and rose sheer from the sea; it was built on a little rocky peninsula, and offers a picture as artistic as it is lovely. The soil for the garden was brought from a distance. Oleanders and olives, myrtles and laurels were soon growing in it. The granite required for the terraces came from the Tyrol; from them one has a glorious view over the sea, and a panorama of the city of Trieste, rising like an amphitheatre; on the terrace are set up two sphinxes brought by the Prince from Egypt. The internal arrangements of the house were splendid, with sometimes quite a personal touch. Thus the Archduke's study was a faithful copy of the admiralty cabin on board the frigate *Novara*, and even the saloons, hung with blue damask covered with a pattern of anchors, recalled the owner's profession. The house was given the Spanish name of Miramar, in mem-

⁶⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand to Leopold, King of the Belgians, July 3, 1859; original in V. N. A.

⁶⁶ The same to the same, Ischl, 1859; draft with no precise date in V. N. A.



THE CASTLE OF MIRAMAR NEAR TRIESTE

ory of an equally enchanting retreat which the Archduke had seen on his travels in Spain.

They had a second house, situated in the midst of an even more glorious landscape than the first, the islet of Lacroma, which rises from the deep blue Adriatic opposite the fortifications of Ragusa; it is a poetical, divinely favoured spot which compels every visitor to ecstasy and wonderment.

After the events that had just taken place in Italy, the Archduke began to have fears for the security of these two properties lying on and in the Adriatic. Like the whole of the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, indeed, they were exposed to attack from a hostile Italy. The Archduke took a very black view of the future, and was seized with anxiety for his own personal property. His foresight had already been rewarded once before, when he had had to leave Italy at a moment's notice. Moreover, the Baron De Pont, a young diplomatist who had been in charge of the Archduke's chancellery during his Governor-Generalship, sent bad news from Vienna.⁶⁷ He informed him of the affair of General Eynatten, which was bringing to light grave scandals in the Army Supply Department, reported to him the state of opinion among the Viennese, who grumbled at everything and concealed their disgust by bitter jests. He wrote, for instance, that the saying was going round Vienna about the Emperor's Adjutant-General to the effect that his name had formerly been "Grünne will,"⁶⁸ but was now "Crenne will,"⁶⁹ and that the Viennese were asking one another why the Emperor wore a laurel wreath on the coins; on receiving the answer: "I don't know," the questioner would retort: "Nor do I." These were jests, but they rang unpleasantly in the ears of the Emperor's brother, to whom such things were repeated. Anger, bitterness, and even disgust at conditions at home seized upon him, and he resolved to take refuge for a time from all his troubles on his beloved sea, to

⁶⁷ Baron De Pont to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 11, 1859. V. N. A.

⁶⁸ Karl Ludwig, Count Grünne, General of Cavalry, Adjutant-General to the Emperor Francis Joseph, 1850-9.

⁶⁹ Franz, Count Folliot de Crenneville, appointed Adjutant-General to the Emperor Francis Joseph in October 1859.

visit distant, foreign lands, in order to find distraction from the unending worries and gloomy spectacles at home. Besides, winter was approaching, and cold was the Archduke's bitterest enemy; he loved the tropics, especially when a cold "horrid December" prevailed everywhere else. Ferdinand Max left his wife, who dreaded a very long journey, in Madeira, the lovely island of flowers, and sailed afar over the Atlantic Ocean, to the new world of South America.

"Man is interested in what is distant and unknown," he wrote on catching sight of the American coast, "and when he divines that there is life on some distant point, it draws him to it. . . . It seems to me like a fairy-tale that I am the first scion of the blood of Ferdinand and Isabella the object of whose life has been from childhood upwards to set foot upon a continent which has acquired such gigantic significance in the history of mankind."⁷⁰

In Brazil, whither his course next led him, he had extraordinary opportunities of broadening his views and experience. But he saw everything from the favoured standpoint of an imperial prince; he was received and entertained everywhere with the greatest hospitality, everybody held it an honour to be visited by him, and even at a so-called farm in the primeval forest he met with a highly civilized and hospitable reception. It was, however, the opposite to this that he found particularly fascinating, and when the farmer spoke of fighting the Indians, who had often attacked his property, the Archduke became quite exalted, as he himself recounts in his *Lust nach Abenteuer*. The Archduke returned home early in 1860, still full of his experiences, his head full of fresh impressions, thirsting for adventures, and inspired with an overpowering desire for action, which revealed itself particularly in the days of enforced leisure during his long sea-voyages. At home he found things no better; on the contrary, in his view they were rather worse.

In April 1860 he made a short expedition from Lacroma to Vienna, and returned home greatly depressed.

⁷⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max: *Aus meinem Leben*, V. 216.

"I found the condition of our poor country," he wrote to his father-in-law,⁷¹ "as I expected, tangled and gloomy. Corruption on the one hand and unrest on the other are growing stronger and more disquieting every day. As in the days of Louis XVI, irresolution and inaction prevail; men do not and will not grasp the situation; there is storm and stress on every side, but in face of it all, men close their eyes and ears more and more. Perhaps I see things in too gloomy a light, but in my private life I am making all preparations for a crisis."

The last remark was to prepare the King for the dispatch of Baron De Pont to Brussels in connexion with precautions which he had planned. De Pont was charged with the mission of requesting the King to become the nominal purchaser of Miramar and Lacroma, so that in case the Adriatic coasts were torn from Austria by Italy these two properties should not be lost. The diplomatist did indeed go to Brussels, and discharged his mission. And since the Archduke also dreaded the secession of Hungary and a general collapse, he desired him to ask his father-in-law's advice as to whether he should sell Hungarian bonds, in which a large part of his fortune was invested.

King Leopold advised against this;⁷² he considered that even in the most extreme case — namely, the secession of Hungary — whatever government was established would be bound to accept responsibility for the bonds. He even considered that the Miramar estate was perfectly safe, for the residence was situated within the territory of the German Confederation, and in the then state of patriotic feeling in Germany any interference with it would involve an immediate intervention on the part of the Confederation, besides which it would meet with the veto of the powers. As regards Lacroma, the King declared his readiness to lend his signature in the matter of the proposed nominal purchase, more, to use the King's words, "because it might serve to set the young people's minds at

⁷¹ Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, draft letter from Lacroma, near Ragusa, April 21, 1860. V. N. A.

⁷² Baron De Pont to the Archduke Ferdinand Max on his conversation with King Leopold; Brussels, January 16, 1861.

rest " than because he held such a step to be urgently necessary. "The Italians will not be such fools," the old royal politician considered, "as to embark upon such wild undertakings as an invasion of the Dalmatian coasts; England would never consent to it." But these views were in contradiction with those of the Archduke, who had got into a panic, and thought it likely that Italy would be more ready to make an attack in the Adriatic and on its coasts than to hazard one against the Quadrilateral.

Such, then, was the Archduke's state of mind at the time when he was seriously approached for the first time about Mexico: he had no congenial employment, for he bitterly regretted the command of the fleet; he had had bitter experiences as Governor-General of Italy and because of the war that had cost Austria Lombardy; he was not on the best of terms with his brother, the Emperor, and at the same time he was possessed with a youthful longing for adventure and desire for action. In this state of mind he received the first intimation and earliest information about the crown of a mighty great land of boundless wealth which beckoned him from a distance. Moreover, he had at his side the Archduchess Charlotte, who was by no means satisfied with the position assigned to her at the imperial Court of Vienna. Her desires and complaints increased the Archduke's discontent, all the more so since she had not found the imperial family very congenial, and in particular did not get on very well with the Empress Elizabeth. She, too, was characterized by a boundless longing for action, intensified by the ambition inherited from her father, and the Orleans pride, her mother's heritage.

Thus the soil was well prepared to receive the germ of dangerous ideas.



CHAPTER III

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE MEXICAN CANDIDATURE

The Empress Eugénie intimate with Hidalgo — Position in Mexico at the beginning of 1861 — The claims of the powers — Outbreak of the War of Secession — Europe gains courage — Hidalgo's grand coup with the Emperor and Empress of the French — First mention of the Archduke Ferdinand Max — Almonte's position at the Court of Paris — Confidential inquiries at the Austrian Embassy — Count Walewski and Mexico — The Emperor Francis Joseph and the Archduke give a contingent consent — The Austrian Emperor's comments — The London Convention of October 1861 — Differences between the signatories — America's participation "a mere formality" — The Archduke draws up a memorandum to ease his mind — King Leopold's opinion — Schertzenlechner's mission — Rivalries among the Mexican exiles — The Archduke receives warnings — He gladly listens to what is good, but ignores what is bad.

WHILE THE TURMOIL OF THE WAR OF 1859 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES kept Europe in breathless suspense and threw all other questions into the background, Hidalgo, who had ready access to the Emperor and Empress, often unannounced, not only at the Tuileries, but also at the châteaux of St. Cloud, Fontainebleau, and Compiègne, never wearied of reminding them of the Mexican project.

Napoleon III had many misgivings; the strength of the Republic of the United States prompted him to reiterate on every occasion that nothing could be done without England. With her, on the other hand, Napoleon might have ventured on action even *against* the will of the Union. Almost every time Hidalgo left the Emperor, the latter would say to him: "I should be very glad to do it, but how is it to be done?"¹ Hidalgo kept on hammering away. Wherever he could, he got in a word about Mexico. He was particularly assiduous with the Empress, who was always inviting him, admitted him to unusual intimacy, and, among other proofs of the exceptional position of trust which he had acquired at the imperial court, entrusted him with the honourable mission of accompanying the body of her beloved sister, the Duchess of Alba, who died in Paris in 1860, on its last journey to Madrid. Hidalgo always kept Gutierrez at Rome informed of all the steps he took, and had his full and complete approval.

In the mean time Juarez had managed to win the upper hand in Mexico and proudly entered the capital at the beginning of January 1861. Only a few Conservative generals, among them Marquez and Mejía, continued to wage guerrilla warfare against him here and there. But he had not yet managed entirely to establish order in the country. Robbery and theft were the order of the day, and nobody knew what laws he had to observe; so that every man observed those that suited him, and refused to recognize the rest. Hence arose a continual conflict of private interests, in which not even foreigners settled in Mexico were spared. Thus many foreign nationals, and subjects of European powers in particular, were injured in their persons and property. Juarez cared nothing for this; he even offered a direct affront to Spain and the Pope by expelling their ministers from Mexico for having recognized Miramón, his predecessor and opponent, and presented their credentials to him.

Spain entered a protest against this, accompanied by claims for damages on account of those of her subjects affected. The

¹ *Notes secrètes de M. Hidalgo, etc.* V. N. A.

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latter step was also taken by Sir Charles Wyke and the Vicomte de Gabriac, the representatives of England and France respectively, the latter of whom was replaced on December 1, 1860, by Count Saligny.

Juarez promised all that was demanded of him in treaties and conventions, but the payments were never forthcoming. It was already Spain's intention to back up her demands by force.

In the mean time mighty events were afoot in North America. Abraham Lincoln had been elected President. With this the struggle against slavery in the Southern States entered upon its decisive stage. It was recognized in the South that the maintenance of slavery could be effected only by a separation from the North. On December 20, 1860, the first Southern State declared its independence of the Union. Before March 1861 it was followed by six more big States, among them Mississippi and Texas. It looked like the end of the mighty work of 1776. But things were not to go on so smoothly as that. The North took up the challenge, and there began the bitter civil struggle known as the War of Secession. The contest was an unequal one in point both of population and of material resources. The Southern States had about nine million inhabitants, of whom, however, three and a half million were negro slaves, who had to be held in subjection; the Northern States had twenty-two millions. The case was much the same in the economic and military spheres. But the tenacious energy and fanaticism of the South enabled it to achieve considerable successes for a time, and, above all, to prolong the war for years.

The result was that in Europe it was assumed in many quarters, and by most of the sovereigns in particular, that the South would prevail against the North. This confusion of opinions was further increased by the fact that people in Europe were thoroughly badly and inaccurately informed about American conditions. The English Government was in the best case; thanks to its excellent intelligence service, it was able to pursue a policy so prudent and cautious as to protect Great Britain from any damage or rash policy.

Napoleon and Eugénie were among those who had no clear

views of American affairs. The Empress in particular, who had come to take a growing interest in the Mexican question, and exerted an increasing influence upon her husband in political affairs, saw in the War of Secession a means of facilitating their plans and ideas, and hoped for the victory of the Southern States.

In May 1860 the Empress discussed with Hidalgo the project of giving the Spanish General Elio command of a Mexican army to be formed by the monarchist party, and, in the mean time, of sounding the Duke of Modena as to the possibility of his becoming a candidate for the throne, but without alluding in any way to French protection, for this would suffice, in her opinion, to call forth a refusal from the Duke.

In the mean time Gutierrez, who had several years before had occasion to submit a memorandum to Napoleon III, had never ceased urging Hidalgo to introduce him at court, so that he too might take an active part in the affair. But this was not at all to Hidalgo's mind. He desired, if possible, to have no Mexican about him who might interfere with his calculations. But, on the other hand, it was hardly possible to leave Gutierrez completely out of the game, for he was the true begetter of the monarchical idea; and so he did speak about him to the Empress, but without recommending him very warmly.² Gutierrez was entirely in favour of the plan, but he demanded material assistance from France instead of the moral assistance at first adumbrated.

Prince Richard Metternich, son of the great Chancellor, who had been Austrian Ambassador at the Court of Paris since 1859, and was in particular favour with the Empress Eugénie, was informed of the plan by the Empress in person, and at once declared it to be impossible.

The Prince was a big man, though heavily built, with a finely cut face, framed in his long, fair whiskers, and the most exquisite manners; he was not only very popular with the ladies, but admirably fitted for his important position, and

² Hidalgo indeed asserts the contrary in his *Notes secrètes*, but it is obvious from everything else that in so doing he was not telling the truth.

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possessed of a peculiarly calm and sound judgment in political affairs. His exalted social position, his wealth and famous name, made him unusually independent, and he did not hesitate to say even to royalty exactly what he considered right and just. Such was the case in this matter, but the Empress, who held Metternich in particular esteem, was rather put out because the Ambassador was not of her opinion. She had not as yet quite made up her mind to advocate the scheme with all her might; for when Hidalgo represented to her the need for military assistance, and said that Gutierrez must not be proved right in saying that the French Court would give none but moral assistance, the Empress replied: "If they want soldiers, that is the point at which I exclaim." Hidalgo sent word of this to Gutierrez, who answered "that it was also the point at which he exclaimed," and that, since there was no prospect of military support, he would stay in Rome, and not go to Vienna in support of the affair, as in Paris they wanted him to do. Gutierrez said³ that he did not wish to appear indifferent to the Empress's wishes, that the Duke of Modena would suit his ideas very well, owing to his decidedly monarchical and Catholic principles, but that it was no good flying in the face of circumstances. It would be waste of time to promote a candidature which was not backed up by a Catholic monarchy, like that of France, which was also a strong military power.

According to what he says himself, Hidalgo apparently agreed with this, and seems at this time to have made up his mind to waste no more words over the Mexican question. This was particularly hard, since he was then spending a fortnight constantly in the society of the Empress, whose suite generally consisted of two persons only, and was lunching, dining, and walking with her. He seems actually to have maintained this resolution for a whole month. One is bound to have grave doubts of this assertion, for Hidalgo had just made his ideas public by publishing a pamphlet,⁴ and the newspapers were

³ Gutierrez to Hidalgo, August 19, 1861; copy in *Notes secrètes*, V. N. A.

⁴ José Hidalgo: *Algunas indicaciones sobre la intervención europea en México* (1859).

canvassing the pros and cons of his proposals, without his taking any steps to oppose them.

Moreover, thanks to the extremely high-handed attitude of Juarez towards foreigners, the Mexican question was coming more and more into prominence.

On July 17, 1861 the Mexican Congress ordered the suspension of all payments due on account of foreign loans, such as interest and the like; upon which indignation rose to its height. Count Saligny, the French representative, broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico, as Spain had long since done, and Sir Charles Wyke also prepared for vigorous measures. The Spanish and French representatives recommended immediate armed intervention, but, while not entirely shrinking from an appeal to force in protection of British interests, Wyke⁵ showed greater moderation in his reports, and considered that the occupation of some of the harbours of the Republic would produce the desired impression. In this he was in agreement with the views of his Government, which was more sceptical as to the chances of the Southern States in the War of Secession than the other European Governments, and, in spite of its sympathy for the South, would not as yet be drawn into any rash intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico, that witches' cauldron. But neither did it meet England's views that any other power should establish itself in Mexico single-handed; she desired at any rate to keep an eye on the proceedings of others, while furthering her own material claims wherever possible. Such were the considerations determining Lord Russell's attitude during the time that followed.

At first it was Spain which took the leading part in urging an active policy. Sorrow for the loss of her colony rankled in the depths of every Spanish heart, and, in court circles in particular, the hope was entertained that a fresh connexion might be set up with it through the establishment of a Bourbon dynasty.

Count Saligny, who, moreover, represented the interests of important French financial circles, never ceased pressing for

⁵ See Domenech: *Histoire du Mexique* (Paris, 1868), II. 354.

European intervention and a complete change in the Mexican system of government. Juarez, in view of the increasingly threatening state of affairs, looked for financial and moral support to the mighty neighbour republic in the north, and held out to it the prospect of great advantages, which, however, as the outcome of the last war between America and Mexico had shown, were bound to be regarded as, to say the least of it, highly dubious. This procedure also offered a fruitful source of agitation to the Mexican exiles and party opponents of Juarez in Europe; and they used it to the full.

In September 1861, while at Biarritz, Hidalgo received by letter information about the events which had taken place in Mexico in July, the indignation of the representatives of the powers, and their projects; for, owing to the length of the voyage, the post took six weeks to come from Mexico, and there was as yet no cable. He saw that the powers had now apparently no other course open to them than that of armed intervention in Mexico, and he resolved to seize the opportunity.

He happened to be the guest of the Emperor and Empress, and received the letter immediately before dinner. During the meal he resolved to hazard the "great coup," to use his own words.⁶ When dinner was over, the Empress sat down to her work at a little table with two of her ladies. Hidalgo seated himself by her side on a little stool, and said in a low voice: "Your Majesty, I have just received some very interesting letters; events are moving in our direction, and I hope that the idea of intervention and of an empire may become a reality. I should like to tell the Emperor." The Empress rose, went out of the room for a moment, then came back, and called Hidalgo, with whom she returned to the Emperor's study. "Tell the Emperor what you just said to me," she said to Hidalgo.

The Emperor was holding in his hand a letter from the King

⁶ The following conversation between the Emperor and Empress of the French and José Hidalgo is taken from his *Notes secrètes*. Although he shows a tendency in this account, intended for the Emperor Maximilian, to exaggerate his share in setting up the Empire as much as possible, it is quite probable, from the whole condition of affairs and taking other sources into account, that things passed very much as Hidalgo described.

of Siam. He showed it them as a curiosity, laid it down on the table again, rose, lighted a cigarette, and turned to Hidalgo.

"Sir," said Hidalgo, "it is long since I lost all hope of seeing those ideas realized about which I had the honour of speaking to Your Majesty four years ago; but England, together with France and Spain, is now irritated by Juarez's policy, and they are all going to order war-ships to our ports. And so, Your Majesty, we have what we needed: English intervention. France will not be acting alone, which was what Your Majesty always wished to avoid. Spain has long been prepared; General Concha told me not long ago that he had left six thousand men in Havana, ready to land at Vera Cruz, but that the Cabinet of Madrid prefers to proceed hand in hand with France, and, if possible, England. And so French, English, and Spanish naval squadrons might be dispatched to Vera Cruz and land these six thousand Spaniards. In view of the three combined flags, Mexico would recognize the full strength and superiority of the alliance, and the overwhelming majority in the country could rely on the support of the intervening powers, annihilate the demagogues, and proclaim a monarchy, which alone can save the country. The United States are in the throes of war; they will not move. Besides, they would never oppose the three united powers together. Let the allied flag once show itself, sir, and I can assure Your Majesty that the country will rise as one man and rally to the support of this beneficent intervention."

To which Napoleon replied: "I have not yet received Monsieur Thouvenel's dispatches.⁷ If England and Spain are prepared to act, and the interests of France demand it, I will also join them, but I will send only war-ships, no landing-troops; and, if the country declares that it desires to organize itself with the support of the European powers, I will lend a hand. For the rest, as you justly say, the state of affairs in the United States is very propitious."

Hidalgo thought he was dreaming; he saw himself at the goal of his desires. He at once answered the Emperor as fol-

⁷ French Minister for Foreign Affairs from January 4, 1860 to October 15, 1862.

lows: "Sir, whatever may happen, we shall have only France to thank for it; will Your Majesty allow me to ask whether you have a candidate in view, for the Mexicans would accept him from Your Majesty, as if it were their own idea?"

The Emperor turned round, lighted another cigarette, and answered calmly: "I have none."

So far the Empress had said not a word. But upon this Hidalgo said, with a glance at her: "We cannot think of a Spanish prince. Señor Mon⁸ has always told me that, sad to say, there was no possible choice."

"Indeed," agreed the Empress, "there is no possible choice in that direction, and that is unfortunate; for if there were a prince there, he would be the most suitable." The Empress and Hidalgo next mentioned two or three German princes, but there were drawbacks to them all — for instance, religion and the comparative insignificance of their countries.

"When Prince Metternich opposed the choice of the Duke of Modena," observed Hidalgo, "did he not say something, at any rate, about whether an Austrian archduke would accept this crown? For we ought not to forget that, as early as 1846, President Paredes, who wanted to carry out the projects of the founders of Mexican independence, desired an archduke, and Gutierrez himself visited Vienna with this aim in view."

"But which archduke?" asked Eugénie.

"I believe," answered Hidalgo, "that the Archduke Rainer was spoken of."

"Yes," said the Empress, "for the Archduke Maximilian would not be willing."

"Oh no. He would not accept," chimed in Hidalgo, and the Emperor likewise agreed: "Oh no, he would not be willing."

There followed a moment's silence, till the Empress, who had remained standing, suddenly, as if in answer to some inspiration, struck herself lightly on the breast with her fan and exclaimed: "Well! I have a presentiment that tells me he will accept."

"We can but try," said Hidalgo, "and I might write to

⁸ Alejandro Mon, Spanish Ambassador at the Court of Paris.

Gutierrez de Estrada to go to Vienna and sound His Imperial Highness."

The Emperor made a movement, as though to say that this must be done by the Mexicans, that the initiative must come from them. The Empress spoke in praise of the Archduke Ferdinand Max, but added that she would place no obstacles in the way of the choice of the Mexican people, on whatever prince it might fall.

Hidalgo left the Emperor's study full of joy and high hopes. A few minutes later the Empress followed him into the drawing-room, where she also found Count Walewski, the Secretary of State. She summoned him to the terrace and related all that had just taken place. She then turned to Hidalgo and said: "I have told the Count what we were saying just now." Count Walewski added: "Monsieur Hidalgo, you may remember how, when I was still Minister for Foreign Affairs, you often spoke to me of your desire to see France intervene in Mexican affairs and how I always told you the thing was impossible. But today matters have changed, and I think it is quite feasible. What can I do for you?"

Hidalgo asked for a moment's use of the ministerial telegraph, in order to inform Gutierrez, who was staying in Paris for his son's marriage, that he would have to go to Vienna on Mexican business. He likewise informed the Mexican General Almonte of the conversation at once. Almonte had been in Paris since before the rise of Juarez, and had also succeeded in winning a particularly confidential position at the French Court, where he had been of great assistance to Hidalgo. He too was in Paris, no longer as Mexican Minister — for Juarez had naturally removed and disowned him at once — but as an exile, discontented with the Juarista regime, and a bitter enemy of the Mexican President, whom he did all he could to damage and, if possible, overthrow. Side by side with Hidalgo he had never ceased agitating in all quarters of the capital, as well as at court, for France to espouse the cause of Mexico. He had, indeed, done so even before Hidalgo arrived in Paris. He was now the third in the league which also included Gutierrez and Hidalgo, but he prudently attached himself more to

the latter, for, living in Paris, he had the opportunity of seeing how powerful Hidalgo's influence was with the Empress. Furthermore, he was separated from Gutierrez by the fact that the latter was closely associated with Santa Anna, whereas Almonte had now but small use for his former patron. He knew that if Santa Anna got the opportunity, he would play the leading part in Mexico after the sovereign, and this did not suit Almonte at all, for he had ambition enough of his own, and would have been only too glad to play such a part himself. And so he preferred to attach himself to Hidalgo, for he knew that, whatever happened, Hidalgo would hardly wish to leave his comfortable corner at the French Court.

Thouvenel, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was, indeed, personally in favour of the Mexican enterprise. None the less, he took the precaution of carefully studying the Mexican exiles who appeared in Paris. He did not venture to criticize Hidalgo, who was too firmly established at court, but he could do so in the case of both Gutierrez and Almonte. He had the worst possible impression of the former. In his eyes Gutierrez was just a fanatical ultramontane and phrase-maker. He therefore recommended Almonte for the mission of going to Mexico as the Emperor Napoleon's confidential agent, for a man like Gutierrez, "with his antediluvian notions," could do nothing but harm to the cause.

At last it was settled at the French Court to start the Mexican enterprise going. Count Saligny, the French Minister in Mexico, an ardent Catholic of monarchical views, had been recommending armed intervention in Mexico more and more urgently ever since April 1861. This ambitious man, capable of great and vehement excitement, thought that his advice would also meet the views of the imperial Court, for he had close connexions with it, and knew perfectly well what went on around the Emperor and Empress. Saligny was, in fact, on terms of close friendship with the Duc de Morny, who, as all Paris knew, was a natural son of Queen Hortense, and hence a half-brother of Napoleon III, who in general, during his reign, summoned round him all those who had had any connexion with the

First Empire and gave them high positions in the State. For instance, Walewski, Napoleon I's natural son, had become first Minister for Foreign Affairs and then Secretary of State. So Morny, too, was made a minister and President of the Corps Législatif. He certainly possessed great political, and especially financial ability, but he had a passion for gambling on the Bourse, and for risky industrial and speculative enterprises; and, owing to the splendid style in which he lived, the money he made melted away as quickly as it had come. Morny had, moreover, an interest in Jecker's banking-house, which had arranged for the loan to the Mexican President Miramón; but in consequence of events in Mexico, and President Juárez's refusal to fulfil the exorbitant conditions exacted from the Mexican Republic, to which Miramón had agreed, the bank failed, and it was therefore to Morny's interest that Saligny, and consequently France, should become interested in these claims. Jecker was indeed Swiss, so it was not exactly France's business to espouse his interests; but Morny had him naturalized as a Frenchman. In supporting these claims, and in recommending intervention in order to assert them more strongly — for he knew intervention to be a favourite scheme of the Empress's — Saligny thought he was acting in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor and Empress and of their entourage. This, he considered, could not but serve his ambitions, and so it remained the guiding principle of his negotiations.

Influenced by Saligny's reports, urged on by the Empress and the Mexicans surrounding her, and himself not averse from the enterprise, Thouvenel now resolved, at the instance of Napoleon, to institute confidential inquiries by a Mexican in Vienna, through the agency of the Austrian Legation, as to how the suggestion would be received that an Austrian archduke should occupy the Mexican throne which it was proposed to set up. Thouvenel considered Hidalgo's proposal to send Gutierrez an acceptable one, for Gutierrez had been Mexican Minister in Vienna in his day, he had an Austrian countess as his wife, and, as the first to advocate the establishment of a Mexican monarchy, he could not be entirely overlooked.

Moreover, in July 1861 ⁹ Gutierrez had already, on his own initiative, made inquiries of Metternich as to what prospects such representations in Vienna would have. He explained that the moment had arrived to approach this question, in view of the internal embarrassments of the United States, which seemed to guarantee, or at least to facilitate, success. He said that he could not think of the country's future without trembling, for it was hardly permissible to hope that a foreign nation might conquer it. "This," he wrote, "would really be fortunate for the country, and, indeed, its sole salvation."

Almonte, too, had been in communication with the Prince as to a possible change of government in Mexico in a monarchist sense. Metternich at that time stated it as his opinion,¹⁰ to Count Rechberg-Rothenlöwen, who was then in charge of Austria's foreign policy, that the idea in itself did not lack a certain grandeur, but, so far as its practical execution was concerned, they were "guilty of the most lamentable and disheartening errors." Rechberg replied ¹¹ that he did not, indeed, underestimate the greatness and attractiveness of the project, but, for the time being, must deny it any practical significance. There was no sort of security that England and France were ready to support a monarchical restoration in Mexico by force, and so to "plunge themselves into the unknown." As yet there were no serious guarantees forthcoming for such a policy. "None the less," he concluded, "we do not wish entirely to discourage this diplomatist [Gutierrez] nor to reject his advances; only to show him that the general situation and the peculiar difficulties of our position do not allow us to contemplate such distant enterprises." In the Count's eyes the risk of compromising the Austrian Emperor's dignity was too great.

But in the September following the conversation which Hidalgo had had with the Emperor and Empress at Biarritz, negotiations were opened once more. It was the Empress who

⁹ Gutierrez to Prince Richard Metternich, Paris, July 4, 1861. This letter was accompanied by copies of the letters addressed by Gutierrez to Prince Richard's father, the Chancellor, Prince Clemens Metternich, on March 28 and April 14, 1846.

¹⁰ Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, July 8, 1861. V. N. A.

¹¹ Count Rechberg to Prince Richard Metternich, July 28, 1861. V. N. A.

pressed the matter with particular impatience; the supposition can hardly be rejected that, even before that conversation in the Emperor's study, she and Hidalgo had already selected the Archduke Ferdinand Max as the most suitable candidate for the throne. She had also spoken about Mexican affairs with Metternich once before, at Étioilles, and now she prompted Count Walewski to write privately to the Austrian Ambassador, who was at that time at home on leave.

On the whole, Walewski was not enthusiastic about the Emperor's projects;¹² he even said he did not deny that he would be surprised if the Archduke accepted,¹³ but the generally conservative tendency of the project reconciled him to it, for he was an out and out monarchist. He was gratified to see the United States, "that ideal of a republic," rent asunder internally and in danger of falling into ruin. That in itself would exert a cooling effect upon European republicans; but what a scattering there would be of the Utopias which they were disseminating among the masses if the second largest republic in America were voluntarily to renounce that form of government, and return to monarchy, which was everywhere being undermined in Europe! In a private letter¹⁴ written at the instance of the Empress, Walewski now definitely mentioned the name of the Archduke Ferdinand Max, whom, he added, there was a strong disposition in Paris to support, though of course only "morally." If agreeable to Vienna, Paris was furthermore prepared to take the initiative with London and Madrid in the matter. Count Walewski requested an answer, in order that he might discuss the attitude subsequently to be taken up with the Empress, whose interest "cannot be denied."

Metternich replied that he would mention the matter again in Vienna. "How odd this persistence is!" he wrote to a friend.¹⁵ "Note well that, if the Empress is in question, the Emperor is largely concerned in it." In any case the Amba-

¹² Count Mülinen to Count Rechberg, Paris, October 21, 1861. V. N. A.

¹³ The same to the same, Paris, November 3, 1861. V. N. A.

¹⁴ Count Walewski to Prince Richard Metternich, Biarritz, November 16, 1861. From a summary in V. N. A.

¹⁵ Richard Metternich to Roger, Baron Aldenburg Königswart, November 25, 1861. V. N. A.

sador was very sceptical about the matter, but the great interest taken in it by the Empress made him uneasy.

About this time Gutierrez appeared at the Austrian Embassy in Paris, and confided to Count Mülinen, who was carrying on business while Metternich was absent on leave, that France wished to see an archduke upon the throne of Mexico, and that he believed England would also accept this arrangement. He asked for a confidential assurance that, if France took the initiative in proposals to this effect, it would not be rejected by the Austrian Cabinet. Gutierrez also stated that he counted very much upon an immediate answer, since the matter was bound up with the projected expedition to Mexico.¹⁶

This serious step prompted Rechberg to report to the Emperor Francis Joseph at once and ascertain his views. It was decided first to sound the Archduke Ferdinand Max, the person chiefly concerned. And so, on October 10, 1861, Rechberg was sent to Miramar, in order to talk to him about the scheme, upon which further light had been thrown by two couriers newly arrived from Paris. Thus the Emperor Francis Joseph had his brother sounded by Rechberg in the name of the French and Austrian Governments. The upshot of the negotiations was that Rechberg convinced himself, on the one hand, that the Archduke was attracted by the offer of such a crown, and, on the other hand, that his imperial brother advanced no fundamental objections to his possible acceptance of it, though he expressed himself with his habitual reserve. The whole trend of the Archduke's disposition, reinforced by the influence of his wife, who had too little distraction for her loneliness at Miramar and was ripe for a grave folly, disposed him to listen to the offer. The Emperor, on the other hand, appeared in a sense glad of the possibility that his restless, critical, "free-thinking" brother, who was always causing him embarrassment and anxiety, but was at the same time extraordinarily beloved in the whole country, should find a sphere of activity which should at once be grandiose, promise fame, and be worthy of the house of Habsburg.

¹⁶ Count Mülinen to Count Rechberg, Paris, November 27, 1861. V. N. A.

It had also the great advantage that the scene of this activity lay very far from home. The relations between the two brothers were not exactly of the best; a separation might be beneficial, and possibly the antagonism that seemed irreconcilable at close quarters might be allayed by a parting. Hence, when Rechberg mentioned the offer, the Emperor, seeing his brother's willingness and the great interest of his sister-in-law, did not say no; but he was far from encouraging Ferdinand Max or urging him to it.

At first sight, however, there was much that was hazardous about the affair, and it was above all necessary to protect the dignity of his house. And so his contingent approval might be announced, but acceptance must depend upon important conditions. The outcome of these deliberations and conversations were the instructions sent by Count Rechberg to Paris.¹⁷ In these it was stated that, since the prospects were more solid now than in July, they shrank from excluding *ab initio* all possibility that an archduke might be summoned to lend fresh lustre to his glorious house overseas. Accordingly Gutierrez was to be informed in strict confidence that the Austrian Emperor would not reject serious proposals, and in given circumstances the Archduke Ferdinand Max would not refuse to respond to the wishes of the Mexican nation, should it call him to the throne. But it was necessary that the success of the undertaking should be guaranteed, in order to safe-guard the future and the dignity of the Archduke and of his august house. The conditions required were the active material support of the two great naval powers, and a clearly formulated request from Mexico. If these preliminary conditions were secured, it would be possible to continue the discussions. For the time being, however, everything was quite vague and tentative. But Austria would take no sort of initiative in this question, and would adopt a purely passive attitude, until she received a formal proposition based upon acceptance of these preliminary conditions.

Gutierrez, who had furthermore adjured Metternich in his inflated and rhetorical style to save Mexico, "which would

¹⁷ Count Rechberg to Count Mülinen, October 7, 1861. V. N. A.

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die " if nobody came to her help,¹⁸ was summoned by Mülinen in order to receive this communication. Mülinen witnessed the old man's expressions of joy with some scepticism. The Archduke was indeed accepted with enthusiasm, but only by the Mexicans settled in Paris.¹⁹ Metternich, who was temporarily absent from his field of activity, was disturbed by the rapid progress of the affair.²⁰

Gutierrez was quite beside himself; he kept repeating his expressions of joy at the fact that a task to which he had devoted twenty years of his life was now approaching a happy fulfilment. For, he asserted, " Napoleon himself told me that, if Austria accepts, the matter is settled within twenty-four hours."²¹ He compared Austria's outstretched hand to the helping hand of one offering rescue to a drowning man. He quite understood that Austria desired to remain passive and reserved, and compared her attitude to that of a young girl waiting modestly for someone to come and ask for her hand.

" Very good," replied Mülinen, " I accept the comparison. But no dowry must be asked for with the young girl." Gutierrez declared himself content to pledge his head that no such request would be made, which did not mean much, but sounded well.

He immediately conveyed this favourable response to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thouvenel and Hidalgo at once drove out to Compiègne to the Emperor Napoleon, who was thus informed of Austria's contingent consent on the evening of October 9, 1861.

On the selfsame evening, after receiving Austria's answer, which called forth great joy and enthusiasm, especially from the Empress, Napoleon III wrote two important letters, which were intended to set the Mexican affair going. One was addressed to General Count Auguste Charles Flahault de la Billarderie, an old martial figure of the time of the first Napoleon, who was at that time French Ambassador at the Court

¹⁸ Gutierrez to Prince Richard Metternich, Paris, September 24, 1861. V. N. A.

¹⁹ Mülinen to Rechberg, October 12, 1861. V. N. A.

²⁰ Metternich to Aldenburg, Plass, October 6, 1861. V. N. A.

²¹ Mülinen to Rechberg, Paris, October 15, 1861. V. N. A.

of St. James's. Flahault stood in a particularly close relation to the Bonaparte family, for Napoleon III's mother, Queen Hortense, had had a liaison with him, the fruit of which had been the Duc de Morny, the friend of Count Saligny, French Minister in Mexico. Count Flahault was to transmit to Lord Palmerston the ideas developed in Napoleon's letter; the Emperor hoped that by this means the negotiations about Mexico, which "were making no progress," might be set in motion.²²

In this letter Napoleon laid stress upon the common interest of the three naval powers in a firmly constituted and stable government for Mexico. The establishment of that country as a power would set an insuperable barrier to the encroachments of North America, and constitute an incomparable market for the trade of these powers. The Emperor, he wrote, had always interested himself in that glorious land, exposed to anarchy and threatened with utter ruin, and this sympathy had further been fostered by a number of distinguished Mexicans in Paris, who constantly talked to him of the unhappy state of their country. Up till now the Emperor had considered the matter impossible, for it seemed difficult to come to an agreement with the British Cabinet on the subject, and there was risk of a rupture with the United States. But now matters had completely changed. The War of Secession had "made it impossible" for the United States "to interfere in the matter," and the affronts of which the Mexican Government had been guilty gave an opening for intervention. He had been given to understand that the moment the squadrons of the powers appeared before Vera Cruz, a strong party would arise in Mexico, summon a national assembly, and proclaim the monarchy. He had first proposed the Archduke Ferdinand Max as candidate, in order to spare all susceptibilities, and because the Prince's personal qualities, and his marriage with the daughter of the King of the Belgians, "the natural link between France and Eng-

²² The Emperor Napoleon to Count Flahault, Compiègne, October (9) 1861. From a copy sent by the Paris Embassy among the dispatches from Paris of the year 1861, and now in the Vienna State Archives, and identical in terms with King Leopold I of the Belgians' autograph copy, sent to his son-in-law as an enclosure in a letter of October 20, 1861. V. N. A.

land," made him peculiarly fit for the position. The Emperor alluded to the conditions put forward by Vienna, and added that he considered it in good taste to choose for this purpose a prince belonging to a power with which he had recently been at war; he assured Flahault that he sought nothing but good, and was convinced that this attempt to give prosperity to a nation would mean an effective contribution to the well-being of all.

In the second letter he urged Leopold, King of the Belgians, as the uncle of Queen Victoria, to give vigorous support to Flahault's *démarche* at the English Court. Napoleon added that Spain, while desiring order in Mexico, none the less stated that she had no candidate, and he for his part did not desire to put forward any Frenchman or any exclusively French interest.

King Leopold answered Napoleon on October 16,²³ to the effect that he shared his views upon Mexico; that he had already done so in Canning's time;²⁴ and that, in earlier days, of all the former Spanish republics Mexico had been the one containing the most monarchical elements. As regards the Archduke Ferdinand Max, King Leopold wrote that he was very gratified at the kind way in which Napoleon had introduced the matter, but that "*for the time being, he could give no opinion upon these views.*" King Leopold at once informed his son-in-law of all this; he gave it as his opinion that the English would always be very cautious in such matters, but that *pourparlers* had already taken place with a view to seeing how the tide of anarchy might be stemmed. "The situation is very complex," said the King, "and, in any case, a trustworthy body of troops will be required. Who will give us them? I beg you to answer me by post, yes or no, as to whether you have yet heard anything about the matter, and would like to consider it."

The Empress Eugénie was full of joy and enthusiasm at

²³ See King Leopold's letter to the Archduke Max, Liège, October 20, 1861. Original in V. N. A.

²⁴ While King Leopold, then a Prince of Coburg, was still living in England, he had himself been considered as a possible candidate in the event of a monarchy being set up in Mexico. See the author's work: *Leopold I*, p. 253.

these steps on the part of her husband, which were to a large extent due to her active influence. On the following day, at ten in the morning, she sent for Hidalgo, read him the letter to Count Flahault, and then entrusted it to the young Mexican for an hour, so that he might show it to Gutierrez. Since Thouvenel's bad reports of him, the latter had sought in vain to gain access to the Emperor and Empress. Hidalgo's influence had also been against it, for he was jealous lest he might meet with too dangerous a competitor for the imperial favour.

Napoleon's vigorous efforts to win England over to his project were due to his having observed that she took up an attitude of extreme reserve in all Mexican affairs, and was all the more inclined to do so in proportion as France and Spain abandoned their reserve. England favoured neither a French nor a Spanish claimant, but there was no sympathy even for a candidate belonging to a less dangerous continental power. On September 27 Lord Russell said to the American Ambassador in London,²⁵ in a truly prophetic spirit, that he dreaded the project of introducing a new system in Mexico, for he was convinced that intervention in the internal affairs of that country would bring in its train the most terrible disappointment to those who embarked upon it.

The English Cabinet was thrown into no little embarrassment by Count Flahault's communications, made to it on the strength of Napoleon's letter. For, though there was no desire in England to take part in a hazardous venture, Palmerston, the Prime Minister, had always been a friend of Napoleon III; he had even, after Orsini's attempt to assassinate the Emperor of the French, brought in a much-contested bill in England, directed against conspirators and anarchists; and he was by no means inclined to alienate the Emperor. Moreover, he had already discussed with Sir Charles Wyke, the British Minister in Mexico, a project for a monarchy in Mexico, and had shown himself personally not entirely averse from the affair, if the Liberal party in Mexico would take the initiative. The Prime Minister had not gone beyond a theoretical discussion of the plan and of the possible candidates, but this at least is

²⁵ See Léonce Détrouat: *L'Intervention française au Mexique*, p. 29.



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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III

sure, that Palmerston was not so firmly opposed to it as Lord Russell.

The form adopted by Napoleon for laying his views before the British Cabinet made it possible to deal with them without a direct answer; for, after all, it was no more than a letter from the Emperor to his Ambassador, and hence did not require to be dealt with officially. England therefore decided not to answer, to sign the desired Convention with regard to the steps to be taken in concert, but, at the same time, so to limit it that any such plans of the Emperor as were unacceptable to the English Government might be countered at need by an appeal to one or other of these reservations.

Spain took up a doubtful attitude, for while Mon, her Ambassador in Paris, did not oppose the project, and even approved it, the Minister-President afterwards disavowed it. Napoleon informed the Spanish Minister in Paris of his letter to Flahault. In reality Spain would have preferred a Bourbon monarch; and so Napoleon's project met with disfavour, for, though he wished to set up a monarchy, it must be with a prince of his own choice.

Thus divergent were the views of the three powers whose representatives now met in London to conclude a convention with a view to concerted action in pressing their various claims upon Mexico.²⁶ In consequence of the jealousy of the three contracting powers, who regarded one another with distrust, it was resolved (by Article II) that none of the powers was to aim at any territorial or other advantages as the outcome of the projected armed intervention in Mexico. They further undertook to exert no influence upon the internal affairs of Mexico, or upon her right to choose her own constitution and government. Moreover, a commissioner was appointed by each power to define the claims and conduct negotiations. The United States were indeed invited to adhere to the Convention, but at the same time it was determined not to await their answer, but at once to proceed to intervention, since the matter

²⁶ The text of the London Convention has been printed in full several times; e.g., in Dr. Ernst Schmit, Ritter von Tavera: *Geschichte der Regierung Kaiser Maximilian I und die französische Intervention in Mexiko*. 1861-7, I. 13.

was urgent. As to this last point, Count Walewski said to Mülinen in a confidential conversation that it was a "pure formality," since the Republic was in a state of dissolution, and could take no share in the expedition; but the exigencies of courtesy were thus satisfied. As regards England's attitude, and the fact that the letter to Flahault had received no answer, the French Court consoled itself with the thought that England had at least expressed no direct opposition, that she had, moreover, signed the London Convention, and was accordingly prepared to participate in the expedition.

The Convention of October 31, 1861 was as elastic as india-rubber; it was a compromise between conflicting points of view, and might be turned about and interpreted at will. Whereas England wished to abstain entirely from meddling with the internal affairs of Mexico, in France "liberty in the choice of a constitution" was taken to mean that Juarez must be prevented from holding down the Conservatives and monarchists. Each power had its own mental reservations, and the words were so carefully turned that anything one liked might be read into the Convention. Such was the basis upon which "concerted" action was to proceed.

So far, the Archduke Ferdinand Max had been kept conscientiously informed by Count Rechberg of all the negotiations concerning Mexico, to which end full copies of all documents, letters, and dispatches, in so far as they concerned this matter, were sent to him. For to leave his accustomed sphere and embark upon an enterprise which might be very brilliant, but might also be most perilous, was a hard resolve for the Archduke to take. As though to ease his own mind and excuse himself to his own conscience and to the few intimates who were allowed to see the document, he drew up at the end of September a memorandum on the acceptance of the Mexican crown.²⁷

"I shall always, and in every circumstance of life," it ran, "be found ready to make every sacrifice, however heavy it may be, for Austria and the power of my house. In the present

²⁷ Now in the V. N. A. The date "about November 30, 1861" was added later.

case the sacrifice to be made would be doubly great both for me and for my wife, for it would involve tearing ourselves away from Europe and its life for ever. I by no means underestimate the advantage this would be to Austria, in reviving the lustre of my house; it is a useful custom practised by all great dynasties for centuries past, to appoint their apanaged cadets to conspicuous posts, to place them in positions where they may be useful to their mother country in political and diplomatic relations, and act as important agents in forming commercial relations, etc.

"Owing to the pressure of contemporary conditions the pristine glory of our house has become dimmed; while the Coburgs gain throne after throne, and spread their growing power abroad over the whole earth, our family has in quite recent times lost two sovereignties.²⁸ None sees more clearly than I that it is the duty of our house to wipe out this stain; and so I cannot fail to see what an impression would be made upon the world, and above all upon an enfeebled Austria, if the proposition in question were carried into effect. I was the first warmly to advocate a Brazilian marriage in this connexion."²⁹ Ferdinand Max further declared that an archduke of Austria ought not to appear in the hazardous guise of an adventurer, and must therefore insist upon adequate guarantees; that, in particular, security must be given that he should not be forced upon a nation by foreign arms, and that "a member of a house such as his should only be greeted with acclamation in the new country." The Archduke was faithfully supported by his wife in his idea of being "prepared for even the heaviest sacrifices for the glory of his house." His words about sacrifice were indeed very fine, but at heart it was not such a serious piece of self-denial either for the Archduke or his wife; for both he and she were enthusiastic about the project, and showed the keenest interest in everything connected with the Mexican idea.

²⁸ The house of Austria-Este in Modena 1860, Tuscany 1859.

²⁹ The Archduke was alluding to the projected marriage of the Archduke Ludwig Viktor to the daughter of the Emperor Pedro of Brazil, who had no male heirs. We shall return to this later in more detail.

So far Ferdinand Max had received only two letters direct from a Mexican, and those from Gutierrez; these were peppered with "*Helas!*" and other exclamations, spoke of the "rescue of a perishing country by this noble prince," and piled flattery upon flattery in the most bombastic style.³⁰ The Archduke must already have been thoroughly blinded by the glittering prospect of a crown not to feel the repulsiveness of this style, which oppresses any unprejudiced reader. He did indeed write that the letters contained nothing but "expressions of joy, and incense,"³¹ but none the less the incense did its work, and clouded his usually sceptical and sarcastic mind. Gutierrez never wearied of sending pictures, books, and so on relating to Mexico, in order to show courtesy to the Archduke and entangle him more and more in the ideas of the Mexican exiles.

Gutierrez had a hard task to find other Mexicans outside his immediate circle — to which Almonte and Hidalgo belonged — to sign the first letter, dated October 30, 1861, and couched in the form of an address to the Archduke, which was still conceived in his characteristic style, full of phrases about the salvation of Mexico. For the moment, apart from his own son Fernando Gutierrez, he found only a single Mexican, Thomas Murphy, who was, like himself, a former Mexican Minister, in London, but had been repudiated by Juarez.

Warned by Rechberg, who was afraid that any letter might be put to a bad use, the Archduke did not at first answer the Mexican's letter. He decided once more to ask the advice of his father-in-law, who was so experienced and sagacious in all matters of high policy, before he ventured any further in the matter. He was, moreover, remorseful at not having done so earlier, before that encouraging statement had been handed in in Paris.

On October 18, 1861,³² he therefore sent all documents

³⁰ Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 4, 1861 and October 14, 1861. V. N. A.

³¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Rechberg, October 25, 1861. V. N. A.

³² The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold I, King of the Belgians, Miramar, October 18, 1861; original and draft both in V. N. A. This letter crossed the King's letter of October 20, 1861, referred to above at length.

bearing upon the Mexican question to King Leopold, and informed him that he had been sounded both by the Austrian and French Governments. "The whole matter," ran the letter, "is in a state of flux; I am still perfectly free to express my will; I have considered the matter maturely with Charlotte, and, thank God! she shares my views, as always, and we both turn in full confidence to our dear, wise father, and beg for his enlightened counsel in this critical moment." The King answered by return of post,³³ informing him that at the time when England had recognized Mexico's independence of Spain, the intention had been to persuade him to assume the government of Mexico, "the country best suited for a monarchy." "England, however," wrote the King, "was afraid that this might be too selfish; and it would have been dangerous for Victoria to send me so far away. Thus the idea is not a new one. The elements of political unity exist. Had this secession not taken place within the United States, Mexico would have been seriously threatened from that quarter; for the idea of entirely absorbing it had taken firm root in the United States; however the war turns out there, there can be no thought of further conquests in the south, and, as I have already said, the South would have an interest in the establishment of order in Mexico. We will now recapitulate: 'Mexico must *herself* enunciate the principle.' . . . Thus the *most important decision* turns in the first place upon *what the country itself would do*, for till then we have no ground under our feet. Until all these developments have taken place, it might be necessary to keep oneself *free*." What the King really meant was "to remain free, without, on the other hand, rejecting the proposition." It is true that the King could not give a very good account of England. "If," he considered, "England were following a grandiose policy, she would have a double motive for supporting this proposition; in the first place, in order to see Mexico productive once more; and in the second place, to raise a barrier against the United States, and provide a support for the monarchical and aristocratic principles in the Southern States." Unfortunately, since

³³ Leopold I, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 25, 1861; original in V. N. A.

the Reform Bill, very many influences were at work to impede a really "effective" policy, and so England's consent to internal intervention could not be reckoned upon to promote any particular form of government. "It might," the King remarked at the close of his letter, "be turned into a fine State, if only Heaven were pleased to overrule all things for the best."

King Leopold's son, the Duke of Brabant,³⁴ also wrote encouragingly to his sister: "It is a glorious country, where much good might be done. If I had a grown-up son, I should try to make him King of Mexico. Every brave heart upon earth must love to devote itself to what is good." The Duke concluded with the wish that it might be granted to the Coburgs to assume this high duty in America also.³⁵

In the mean time Gutierrez had presented a memorandum to the Archduke in which he proposed that the Mexicans resident in Paris should address an official request to the European powers to favour the establishment in Mexico of a monarchy, which must arise out of the definitive sanction of the monarch's authority by a national congress, to be summoned in the manner customary in the country. It would, however, be prudent to set up the temporary dictatorship of *one man*, whose function it should be to preserve "public peace and security during the election, and for the duration of the congress." One passage in the memorandum, which gave it clearly to be understood that he would more or less owe the crown of Mexico to the Mexican exiles, aroused the Archduke's disapprobation.

"I should never have decided," he wrote to Rechberg on this subject,³⁶ "to accept the crown at the sole invitation of the Mexican exiles, however many honourable men they may include within their ranks; nothing but the clear and distinctly expressed will of the country itself can make me determine upon it."

³⁴ Afterwards Leopold II, King of the Belgians.

³⁵ Leopold, Duke of Brabant, to his sister, the Archduchess Charlotte, November 1861; original in V. N. A.

³⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, November 9, 1861; draft in V. N. A.

Instead of the petition to the foreign powers, which the Archduke feared might strike the national pride as an appeal to foreign compulsion, he would rather see an appeal addressed to the Mexican people by the leading exiles; but for the rest he was in agreement with Gutierrez's proposals.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max now advanced a step towards them upon his own account. He sent to Paris a person in his entourage, a certain Sebastian Schertzenlechner, to get into touch with the Mexicans there. This man had once been a valet in the imperial household at Vienna, and then entered the service of the Archduke Ferdinand Max, where he had managed to make himself indispensable to his master by various services, and in time won his confidence to such an extent that the Archduke made this clever and zealous, if somewhat defectively educated person his confidential private secretary. As he gradually became initiated into everything through reading the Archduke's correspondence, he won a position of increasing importance, and soon even acquired a certain influence over the young Archduke, who was very accessible to external influences. So far Schertzenlechner had been painfully anxious to efface the memory of his former menial position, though, being still in the Archduke's employment, he still drew the allowance of a court servant.

Schertzenlechner met Gutierrez in Paris, and intimated to him that, as he happened to be the only Mexican who was in the habit of putting himself forward, it was possible that he also stood more or less alone in his political convictions. But the Mexican did not hesitate, as Schertzenlechner reported to the Archduke, to declare imperturbably that all Mexicans of any importance held the same opinions as himself. Even Schertzenlechner was struck by Gutierrez's exasperating love of phrase-making, but for the rest he found him full of ardent patriotism, "his views noble, elevated, national, practicable, and promising the best results." It must indeed have been a difficult matter for a valet, who hardly knew where Mexico was, to give a judgment on the subject. But he knew perfectly well what his master wanted to hear. Gutierrez took this opportunity of requesting that the Archduke should appoint

him as his confidential agent at Napoleon's court. This was a direct attack upon the position of Hidalgo, who, as Gutierrez himself said, was "the channel, as yet undiscovered by high diplomacy," through which the Mexicans communicated with the Empress Eugénie.³⁷

The Archduke now answered Gutierrez's letters and communications in a letter conceived in quite general terms, which happened to contain the phrase that, God helping, the enterprise, which "merited his attention," might finally be crowned with success.³⁸ He wanted to send Gutierrez to King Leopold to talk the whole matter over with him. This was guardedly suggested to the Mexican by the Austrian Embassy in Paris, and he did in fact wait upon the King of the Belgians, when all considerations bearing upon the subject came under discussion.

The Archduke entered into the affair more and more; after King Leopold, he addressed himself to the Pope,³⁹ requesting his advice at a "most important, perhaps even a decisive epoch" of his life, his blessing on the enterprise, which was absolutely necessary, and his powerful protection for the future. This letter, too, the Archduke had communicated to the Pope through the agency of Schertzenlechner, whom he commended in it as a confidential servant of long standing, to whom he could say anything. Moreover, the Pope already knew him, for in March 1857 he had been commissioned by the Archduke to take to Rome, as a present, a model of the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, carved in olive-wood by a humble artist.

Pope Pius IX answered, with his good wishes, that the Archduke was undertaking this mission in the interest of Mexico, and that it was to be hoped he would bring the country that peace under the protection of which alone the Church of Christ and the nation could prosper.

Gutierrez gave the Archduke no peace. Hardly had his

³⁷ Schertzenlechner to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Trieste, November 6, 1861. V. N. A.

³⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, Miramar, November 12, 1861; draft in V. N. A.

³⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Pope Pius IX, Miramar, November 9, 1861; draft in V. N. A.

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request that he might be officially entrusted with the position of confidential agent been put forward, when he began wanting to be allowed to come to Miramar.

The Archduke was not in favour of this. He was afraid that it might publicly compromise him; the more so, since the Mexican's step-mother, the Countess Lützow, was staying at Miramar, and he did not yet want to say anything to her of his leaning towards the Mexican project. But it is now beyond a doubt that this lady had discussed the matter with her stepson for a long time past, and supplied him with all necessary data, in order that Gutierrez might form a judgment as to how the Archduke was to be handled, so that he might finally be induced to do everything that the few Mexican exiles in Paris desired. Meanwhile Gutierrez subjected the Archduke to a perfect bombardment of letters,⁴⁰ and thrust himself forward in every way; and his conduct began to give offence in many respects. Thus he wanted to publish a fresh pamphlet, to throw light upon Europe's task in connexion with setting up a monarchy in Mexico. But he had to be curbed, for it was desirable to keep everything secret in Vienna as well as in Paris.

At the French Court he was not at all popular; his friend Hidalgo had contributed towards this, but so had Gutierrez's own personality. Napoleon said indeed that he was a loyal and trustworthy man both in heart and nature,⁴¹ but considered that he was far too zealous, and lost his head at the thought that his ideas might be realized. His judgment was not, indeed, based upon personal acquaintance, but he had already heard so much about the Mexican, and read so much he had written, that he sent word to him not to thrust himself into the business, and, above all, not to venture to come out with any pamphlets.

Hidalgo was behind this attitude of Napoleon's, for he wanted to keep all the glory of the business to himself. He would not let any Mexicans get near the Emperor and Empress, and only made an exception in Almonte's favour out of necessity, since, before Hidalgo's arrival, Almonte had

⁴⁰ In V. N. A. there are letters of November 20, 25, and 29, 1861.

⁴¹ Napoleon III to Prince Richard Metternich in his report to Count Rechberg of November 16, 1861. V. N. A.

already had a position at court; besides which, he was to be the Emperor's confidential agent in Mexico, and must therefore in any case soon leave Paris. For his part, Hidalgo was firmly determined on no account to plunge into the witches' cauldron of Mexican affairs and exchange his agreeable life in cosmopolitan Paris, with its dazzling court society, for the dangerous commotions over there.

The mutual rivalries between the Mexican exiles were already beginning to make themselves felt. Miramón, the twenty-nine-year-old ex-President, of an ultra-conservative stamp, a man of no education, but boundless courage and ambition, had come to Europe, in order to await an opportunity for his return and restoration as President. He particularly hoped for Spanish intervention, but also went to Paris, in order to make inquiries about the object of the expedition contemplated by the powers. He also desired to be received in audience by the Emperor Napoleon. But his countrymen had taken their precautions, and on all sides he was met with closed doors. "The Empress hates Miramón," reported Metternich, "and has informed me that her husband did not receive him."⁴²

When he heard of all these monarchist plans, Miramón indignantly said to everybody who would listen to him, in Madrid or Paris alike: "There is no monarchist party in Mexico."⁴³ On the other hand, shortly afterwards Santa Anna sent assurances of his entire sympathy to the Mexican monarchists in Paris from St. Thomas, the island where he was living in the Antilles, offered them his services, and declared that not only a party, "but the overwhelming majority of the nation is longing for the restoration of the empire of Montezuma."⁴⁴

Every Mexican domiciled in Europe represented the condition and desires of his home-land as it suited his political and private ends. It was really difficult to see clearly, especially for

⁴² Private letter of Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, Paris, December 2, 1861. V. N. A.

⁴³ Prince Richard Metternich to Rechberg, copy, Paris, November 28, 1861. V. N. A.

⁴⁴ Santa Anna to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, St. Thomas, December 22, 1863. V. N. A.

one so utterly at sea with regard to Mexican conditions as the Archduke.

Rechberg had concealed nothing from his Emperor's brother, not even the unfavourable reports — as, for example, Miramón's assertion as to the non-existence of a monarchist party. But warnings were also coming from other and disinterested sources, which were at once communicated to the Archduke. Count Crivelli, the Austrian Ambassador in Madrid, had written⁴⁵ that the Spanish Minister-President, Calderón Collantes, was convinced of the "absolute impossibility" of founding anything lasting in Mexico; that he, the Ambassador, had entirely shared these views for a long time past, and would therefore deeply regret it if this idea were to be taken into serious consideration.

Further, the Mexican Monsignor Labastida, Bishop of Puebla and Tlascala, who was living in exile in Rome, and was certainly interested in a conservative regeneration of his country, when questioned by the Austrian Minister in Rome, did not hide his opinion that there would be great difficulties in the way of a new order of things — indeed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish a lasting authority in Mexico. "The greatest courage, adroitness, strength, patience, and, most of all, good fortune, are necessary," the bishop considered, "if it is to succeed. The candidate's prospects are certainly not bright."

Metternich, too, raised a warning voice in a private letter to Rechberg, of which the Archduke at once received a copy.⁴⁶ The Ambassador wrote that, in spite of all favourable testimony, he was by no means edified as to the turn things were taking. "What a lot of cannon-shots it will take," ran his letter, "to set up an emperor in Mexico, and what a lot to maintain him there!" In Metternich's opinion the American war might end in the annexation of Canada by the North, and of Mexico by the South. And in that case, why should not the

⁴⁵ Count Crivelli to Count Rechberg, private letter, Madrid, November 11, 1861. V. N. A.

⁴⁶ Prince Metternich to Count Rechberg, private letter from Paris, December 2, 1861. V. N. A.

Monroe Doctrine — of which the European venture in Mexico would represent a direct negation — also be upheld by the South?

These and similar considerations ought to have given the Archduke pause, but warnings were not much good. Ferdinand Max took note of everything, read everything, and then put aside the unfavourable reports and intoxicated himself with the arguments in favour of the affair, the exuberant, flattering phrases of Gutierrez and his fellows. Like so many men, the Archduke possessed the disastrous quality of being willing to see only what was rosy and pleasant, while closing his eyes to what was less pleasant, or gloomy and difficult, banishing those who spoke of it, and giving preference to those who painted things in attractive colours. So he listened only to what he wanted to hear; the rest rolled off him without leaving any impression. Thus his destiny led him deeper and deeper into the unknown, in pursuit of that inviting will-o'-the-wisp the distant imperial crown. But unheard-of difficulties were still accumulating, which it would take years to overcome, and which should in themselves have acted as a clear indication that what was being aimed at was altogether too difficult.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

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IN THE MEAN TIME THE THREE SIGNATORIES OF THE LONDON Convention of October 30, 1861 had completed their preparations for the expedition to Mexico. Spain had the easiest task, for she could send the troops stationed in Cuba; whereas France and England had first to cross the Atlantic. According to the London Convention, all the three powers were to arrive and show their flags in Mexico simultaneously. Thanks to the convenient situation of the colony of Cuba, the officer in command there, General Rubalcaba, landed his troops at Vera Cruz as early as December 17, 1861, before the arrival of the French and English signatories, in the hope that, by landing his six thousand Spanish troops independently, before the arrival of the other powers, he would win a more advantageous position than those countries, and score a point for his own flag. The ostensible reason was that the order to this effect had already been issued by Spain on September 11 and countermanded too late. On January 9 arrived the French squadron, bringing with it 2,000 marines and some 600 zouaves and soldiers of the line, the latter having been sent by Napoleon at the urgent request of his wife; for he himself regulated all military matters down to the smallest detail of the *ordre de bataille*.¹ The English landed only 800 marines, as if to show that they did not wish to be entirely excluded from the demonstration — since they had actually signed the London Convention — but were none the less disposed to maintain a strict reserve.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish troops, General Juan Prim, Count of Reuss, arrived in Vera Cruz at the same time as the French. He was a very brave, ambitious man, unusually active and adventurous, and from the political point of view, too, was peculiarly fitted for his position, for he had married a rich Mexican lady, a relative of one of President Juarez's ministers.² He was an extravagant man, and had already squandered nearly all his wife's property, which

¹ See *Mémoires du Maréchal Randon* (Paris, 1877), II. 58, 64.

² See the account given by Count Crivelli to Count Rechberg in a private letter, Madrid, November 11, 1861. V. N. A.

amounted to millions; he was now bent upon cutting a great figure anywhere, whether at home or abroad. The Spanish ministry was accordingly glad to keep him away from home, for he was very popular, especially with the army. Even the democrats idolized him, and the Court flattered him so as to keep him quiet. At first Prim would not hear a word about Mexico, lest he might weaken his position in Spain. But when the intervention grew to larger proportions, he declared his readiness to assume the supreme command, thinking he might preserve, or rather regain, the pre-eminence in Mexico which belonged historically to Spain alone, at the same time putting himself to the front.

Hidalgo, who knew him, at once scented danger to his and the Empress's project if Spain put herself too much forward by herself. He learnt of Prim's appointment on being invited to Compiègne at the beginning of November 1861. He instantly declared that it would be believed in Mexico that a fresh Spanish conquest was contemplated, which might make the whole plan for setting up a monarchy with an Austrian archduke at the head of it impossible; and he urged both Emperor and Empress "to send a few red trousers."

"They wear blue ones," answered the Emperor, with a smile, alluding to the blue trousers of the marines, who were all he had intended to send at first. For a long time Napoleon stood out against sending any more troops to Mexico, but he at last consented, yielding to the urgent request of the Empress, who had espoused the Mexican cause with all the ardour of her passionate temperament, and the fervour of a woman in love with an idea. At first only 500 zouaves and a field-battery were sent. As regards Prim, too, Hidalgo was unyielding. "Madame," he said to the Empress, "the appointment of General Prim must be prevented at all costs." Eugénie had already said the same thing to her husband, and now invited Hidalgo to repeat his words on the subject to the sovereign. Napoleon, however, declared his inability to exert any influence in the matter.

Vice-Admiral Jean Pierre Edmond Jurien de la Gravière was selected to command the French expedition by land and

sea, besides being the French first commissioner, subordinate to the minister, Count Saligny. He was the gifted son of an admiral who had done meritorious service under Napoleon I, and for this reason alone was marked out for promotion, according to Napoleon III's custom. He took with him ³ comprehensive instructions from Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which arranged for the immediate occupation of important points on the coast in concert with the other powers; but in case a prompt and decisive settlement of the claims on the Mexican Government was not effected, further action was provided for, which might even involve the occupation of Mexico City. The provisions of the London Convention with regard to non-intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico were touched upon in passing; but next followed a saving clause, briefly recommending, in scarcely veiled language, the very opposite course; namely, support for the "sound" section of the population, if it was willing to place itself under a strong and stable government. Admiral Jurien moreover received further secret ⁴ instructions from the Emperor, his supreme war-lord.⁵ Trusting in the assurances of the Mexican exiles in Paris, the Emperor expected that immediately upon the landing of the troops the monarchist party would rise, and come to an understanding with the commanding officer. It is significant that he did not want a plebiscite to be taken to decide the question of the form of government. He expressed the opinion to Metternich that such a course was unsuitable in the case of an Austrian archduke. By a strictly secret instruction given him on departure, Jurien was therefore to induce the monarchist party to gather together a sort of constituent assembly formed of representatives nominated by all the provinces of Mexico, not elected deputies, and to "restrain" this constitu-

³ Thouvenel to Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, November 11, 1861, often printed, among others by Schmit: *Geschichte der Regierung des Kaisers Maximilian*, etc., I. 17.

⁴ Hitherto unknown.

⁵ Based on the Emperor Napoleon's conversation with Metternich. Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, Compiègne, November 16, 1861; copy in V. N. A.

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ent assembly "from intimating its wishes to the Allies." Naturally the whole thing was to be done in secret, so as not to wound the "susceptibilities" of England, which had proclaimed the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of the Mexican Government.

Thus while both the French Commander-in-Chief and Prim, the Spanish one, possessed full powers for an advance into the interior of Mexico, the commander of the English squadron, Admiral Dunlop, was expressly forbidden to do anything of the sort. Though somewhat reserved, England had acquiesced in the London Convention; for, at the bottom of her heart, she had no great sympathy for the American Union, which had cut adrift from the English mother-land in bygone days, and whose ever-increasing power now threatened even the English possession of Canada. At heart she was on the side of the South; but reason warned English statesmen that, owing to its population and material resources, the power of the North was so commanding that the defeat of the Southern States could only be a question of time. In agreeing to the London Convention, therefore, England had followed the promptings of her heart, her Queen, and the influence of Belgium; but sober reason now began to assert itself. Moreover, the incident of the arrest by an American war-ship of Mason and Slidell, the representatives of the South, who were on their way to Europe to press for the recognition of the Confederates, and were travelling on an English steamer, threatened to embitter the relations between England and the great Republic. But on no account were they prepared to join in the conflict against the Union; the possibility was too great that, in such a case, the Northern States might come to a settlement with the South on the question of secession, and look for compensation in Canada. Moreover, since the signature of the London Convention, the Northern States had gained considerable successes at the expense of the South.

Furthermore, the suppositions upon which Spain's participation in the expedition had been based were being falsified more and more. Queen Isabella II, who desired a Bourbon

candidate for the throne of Mexico,⁶ sounded Francis II, King of Naples, who was then engaged in a struggle for his own throne, and put forward his brother as a candidate. The King approached Napoleon III, with a view of ascertaining his views on the subject, but naturally received advice "diametrically opposed" to the wishes of Spain.

This episode still further heightened Napoleon's distrust of Spain, and, as Metternich complained, he was "not quite easy" about England's attitude. However, the Emperor thought that Spain was not in a position to undertake anything calculated to interfere with his proceedings. As for England, he admitted that from the moment he first broached the subject she had displayed the utmost suspicion, and given no answer to the ideas developed in his letter to Flahault; however, she would let things take their course (*laissez faire*), and that, as Thouvenel remarked, was all they wanted of her.

When Napoleon heard that the Spaniards had not waited for the troops of the two other powers, and had effected a landing in Mexico all by themselves, he saw in this a confirmation of the danger of which the Empress and Hidalgo had constantly warned him: namely, that Spain would try to forestall all the openings that might offer themselves in Mexico. Once again they both importuned the Emperor to send reinforcements; he therefore determined to send out Brigadier-General Lorencez with 4,500 men, so that the strength of the French corps should equal that of the Spaniards. So on January 9, immediately upon reception of the news of the Spanish move, an order to this effect was issued by the Emperor.⁷ On the occasion of the New Year's reception of ambassadors, Napoleon had already made the representative of Spain feel his dissatisfaction quite unmistakably, and Eugénie too expressed herself to him in the most excited terms. "The Empress," reported Metternich,⁸ "is in a tearing rage (*fuchsteu-*

⁶ See Prince Richard Metternich's report to Count Rechberg, November 16, 1861. V. N. A.

⁷ Randon: *Mémoires*, II. 60.

⁸ Private letter accompanying Metternich's dispatch to Rechberg, January 4, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

felswild) about the Spaniards, and says that, if the worst comes to the worst, France will undertake the whole business by herself."

The commissioners of the powers in Mexico at once issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants that they came, not as enemies, but only to lend them a helping hand in the regeneration of their country amid the prevalent anarchy and civil war. They then held a meeting to define the claims to be presented to the Government of Mexico. Though Sir Charles Wyke, the British Minister (now commissioner), had broken off diplomatic relations, he had been attempting to arrive at a satisfactory solution by secret negotiations with Generals Doblado and Comonfort, the representatives of the moderate liberal movement, who were still in the camp of Juarez. This could not remain a secret to Count Saligny, who, moreover, cherished a personal antipathy for the more liberal Englishman; it must have been peculiarly disturbing to him, since he had been the advocate of intervention all along, and now knew that his proposals had been officially adopted, while he was naturally well-informed as to Napoleon's further projects with regard to Mexico. Prim, on the other hand, must have been thinking that in proportion as the French were allowed to put themselves forward, Spain's prospects were getting worse. England was growing more and more cautious, for the Southern States of North America had just suffered a fresh defeat.

Saligny, who, in view of his own and his sovereign's far-reaching plans, was completely opposed to an understanding with those in power in Mexico, had therefore to aim at devising an ultimatum which should be unacceptable to the Mexican President from the outset. He therefore made a very vague estimate of the damages to French subjects in Mexico up to July 31, 1861, scaling them upwards to the then unprecedented sum of sixty million francs, and hinted at still further claims in the future. He requested a complete fulfilment of the contract concluded by Miramón with the banking-house of Jecker — i.e., the redemption at their face value of seventy-five million francs of the bonds given as security by the Mexican Government for the three and three-quarter millions which was all

they had actually received; and, finally, asked that he, the French Minister, should be authorized in person, or through his representative, to sit upon whatever tribunal should adjudicate upon the damages owing to any French subject. The English and Spanish representatives, who had started out determined to oppose any too marked aggression on the part of the French, now saw their way clear. They declared the claims put forward to be devoid of all justification, showed the impossibility of fulfilling them, and carried their moral indignation so far that the first meeting of the representatives of the "allied" powers ended in strife and discord. Yet time was pressing, and they had to come to a decision, for the troops landed in Vera Cruz, a seaport notorious for yellow fever, must be removed from the town as soon as possible. But they had brought neither carts, horses, nor other means of transport with them, for they had reckoned upon the "monarchist party" at once providing for all their requirements. But there was no sign of this, for Juarez's threats had prevented it, and he had had all carts and draught animals removed as far as possible from the coast. So there could be no thought of advancing far, especially if Comonfort and Doblado did not make a *pronunciamiento* against Juarez, as they had promised Wyke. But this was prevented by the fact that Saligny, a well-known clerical and supporter of the Conservatives, was playing such a prominent part among the Allies, with the French troops to back up his ideas.

In spite of all his diplomatic colleague's sharp practice, the French admiral, with his soldierly perspicacity, could not help feeling dubious. He favoured the plan of sending word to Juarez that they would open negotiations on condition that the troops should in the mean time be transferred from the dangerous "hot zone," with its fever-laden air, to the "temperate zone" half-way up the side of the Sierras, which border the high plateau of Mexico, producing a glorious climate of almost everlasting spring. It seemed almost grotesque to suggest that Juarez should worry about the health of hostile troops; but the Indian President hesitated to behave too brusquely towards three great European powers. He declared that the Mexican people required no outside help, but pledged

himself to appoint plenipotentiaries to negotiate upon the allied claims.

On the other hand, many representatives of the Conservative party had also their doubts.

Thus Francis Xavier Miranda, a respected and gifted ecclesiastic, regarded the whole enterprise with a sceptical eye. How was a country five times the size of France to be forced to its knees by some six to eight thousand men? If they started with such narrow resources, it would soon become necessary — in the opinion of this experienced observer — for Europe to make double the sacrifice that would suffice at this time, or else be forced to retire with no more than empty promises and disadvantageous agreements.⁹

Juarez grasped the situation. He was determined to negotiate with the European powers, but at the same time to bring home to the Mexicans with ruthless energy that he held every man a traitor who in any way helped on the intervention of the powers. Juarez even went further in his efforts to make things as difficult as possible for the intruders in the event of a protracted invasion. He promulgated a law by which anyone aiding intervention in any way — military, political, or economic — should be punished with death (January 25, 1862). The decree produced the deepest impression upon the country, and fear, quite as much as a patriotic aversion from foreign intruders, even drove many Conservatives back into Juarez's Liberal camp. The President's ruthless attitude, and the terrifying examples which he made in some cases, had evil consequences for the Allies. On all sides they were met with faces either hostile or distorted with fear as to what might happen if they infringed Juarez's decree. It was not such an easy business as the exiles had pictured to themselves in Paris, and as the Emperor and Empress of the French had allowed themselves to be persuaded. But for the moment they were still living on the illusions which had been conjured up before them.

At last the negotiations took place. On February 19, 1862, the delegates of both sides met at La Soledad. Prim was the

⁹ Francis Xavier Miranda to Gutierrez, Havana, December 7, 1861; copy in V. N. A.

spokesman of the Allies, Doblado represented Juarez. The first thing was to arrange the preliminaries for the actual negotiations, which were not to take place till April 15, at Orizaba, a city on the highway from Vera Cruz to Mexico. It was not till then that Prim desired to formulate his demands. He provisionally secured that the allied troops should be stationed in three healthful spots, high up in the mountains,¹⁰ declared that the powers had no intention of infringing the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of Mexican territory, and agreed that, in case negotiations were broken off, the European troops should evacuate these places and retire to within a line lying to seaward of the passes commanding the road to Mexico City.¹¹

In so doing, Prim already had in view the possible withdrawal of his Government from the enterprise; for it was obvious to Madrid that Spain would everywhere find Napoleon in its way in Mexican affairs, and Prim had come to the same conclusion from the demeanour of the French representatives in Mexico, especially Saligny. In any case, the Preliminaries of La Soledad were an indirect recognition of Juarez's irregular Government, and it is therefore noteworthy that they were signed, not only by the English, but also by the French negotiators. Prim, like his English colleague, had sent home a report of the proposed drastic ultimatum, and asked for instructions upon the subject; but he could not receive these before the middle of April, and must therefore gain time at all costs. In view of the unfavourable situation of the expeditionary force, which was numerically so weak, he was able to put it to Admiral Jurien that time must first be gained for the adequate equipment of the troops and the provision of means of transport.

The admiral was personally of the opinion that action on a large scale in Mexico would involve his country in an enterprise the consequences of which could not be foreseen, and was hence all the more inclined to agree to military arguments of

¹⁰ Córdoba, Orizaba, and Tehuacan.

¹¹ From the full text of the Preliminaries of La Soledad in E. Lefèvre: *Documents recueillis dans la secrétairerie privée de Maximilien I* (Brussels and London, 1869), I. 188; also Schmit, *op. cit.*, I. 52.

this nature. But Saligny was true to his plan, which he knew to be also that of the French imperial Court, and therefore opposed them, refusing to have any dealings with Juarez. It was not till the admiral insisted, on the plea of the security of the expeditionary force, that he consented to the conclusion of the Convention of La Soledad, though without signing the draft.¹² But Saligny's name was appended to the printed Convention, like those of all the other parties to the conference. Thus in case of need he could appeal to the fact that his name had been wrongly included in this document. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière's demeanour had not aroused much sympathy among the Mexican Conservatives. Miranda had written in annoyance to Gutierrez¹³ that he was "the most utter nonentity" that could be imagined, the weakest, most changeable and irresolute man he knew. Gutierrez took good care that this letter was brought to the notice of exalted personages in Paris and Miramar, and this did not fail to produce an effect.

The Allies, then, had gained time by this preliminary Convention, but so had Juarez. He made his preparations; his threats, and the mortal terror caused by his decree, increased the excitement in the country. Those who had remained true to the Conservative party felt an even more bitter hatred for the President than before. But the obscurity of the situation, the rumours that were rife, and the lack of adequate forces for maintaining order kept the excitement and unrest seething. Robbery, rapine, and murder were the order of the day, lawlessness and anarchy prevailed throughout wide regions, and only a few adherents of the Conservative party, with small detachments of troops, sought to join the European Allies. There was no sign of the powerful monarchist party which was to have risen immediately upon the landing of the expedition.

On January 27 ex-President Miramón had attempted to land at Vera Cruz independently of the Allies, accompanied by the priest Miranda, no doubt with the object of once more seizing the supreme power in view of the embarrassment caused to Juarez by the foreign intervention. But the English

¹² Schmit von Tavera, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹³ Miranda to Gutierrez, Vera Cruz, February 26, 1862. V. N. A.

remembered that it was Miramón who had given orders to sequester the sums deposited as a guarantee fund with the British Legation. So a British cruiser seized him just before he landed, and took him back to Havana, in spite of Saligny's opposition. Miranda, on the other hand, upon whom Gutierrez had reckoned to work hand in hand with Santa Anna, was allowed to remain in Mexico. The disorder and discord in the country, as well as among the European commissaries, was steadily fomented by such incidents as these, and from close quarters it looked a sorry beginning.

But Europe and Paris were a long way off, and the Empress Eugénie became more and more enthusiastic about Mexico and the claim of her protégé, Ferdinand Max. She busied herself with the financial questions with the utmost ardour, besides those concerning the more or less temporary limitations of the guarantees for the stability of the new throne. Her optimism was incredible, and, though Napoleon did not altogether share it, this did not prevent him from devoting himself whole-heartedly to the business. Indeed, it greatly flattered his vanity when Rechberg mentioned in a dispatch destined for the Emperor's eye the "lion's share" in the Mexican question which belonged to His French Majesty. At the outset Napoleon had indeed feared refusal on the part of the Austrian Court,¹⁴ and now, agreeably surprised at its contingent acceptance, he put the matter very simply to himself and Metternich. Either the Mexicans would accept the sovereign nominated at the right time and place without further ado, or else they would seek to prolong the state of anarchy indefinitely. In the former case the affair was settled; in the latter they would "have to see." They must take care not to mention the Archduke's name till a propitious moment. It was now Napoleon's task to prepare the way, and conscientiously to fulfil the conditions stipulated for. The Archduke must not appear upon the scene till everything was ready. "You may rest assured," said Napoleon to Metternich, "that it will not be my fault if I do not meet with success."

¹⁴ Napoleon to Metternich; see the report of the latter to Rechberg, Compiègne, November 16, 1861; original in V. N. A.

In the mean time Gutierrez de Estrada had prudently remained far from his home in Mexico, and continued his intrigues with the utmost zeal from the European cities of Paris and Rome, which he found so beautiful. Though he had not yet seen him, the Archduke fell more and more under the spell of the Mexican, owing to his countless letters, full of fine words and flattery. The reserve which Ferdinand Max had at first observed towards him by Rechberg's advice gradually disappeared. Gutierrez received letters from the Archduke which did indeed express doubts as to whether the country really desired to see him on the throne, as to the mutual confidence which ought to prevail between sovereign and people, and so forth;¹⁵ but there could be no further doubt of the Archduke's desire that the project should be carried into effect.

Gutierrez knew from his mother-in-law how strongly the Archduke could be influenced by personal intercourse, and kept begging and praying to come to Miramar and introduce himself, besides using this opportunity of putting his views before the Emperor Francis Joseph and Rechberg. At last he succeeded in obtaining his wish. On seeing Rechberg, Gutierrez played another trump-card. He proposed to the Minister that the exiled Mexican bishops, who had been living in Rome since their expulsion by Juarez, should now be allowed to return to Mexico in the train of the intervention, for they were out and out monarchists and would make their influence felt in favour of the election of the Archduke. He mentioned above all the Archbishop of Puebla, Labastida, a particularly intimate friend of his, and a fanatical ultramontane.

Rechberg consented to this, sent an inquiry to Napoleon as to whether such a step would be agreeable to him, and sent word to Baron Bach, the Austrian Minister in Rome, to do his best to influence the bishops in favour of throwing their whole weight into the balance in Mexico on the Archduke's side. The Emperor Francis Joseph desired that the greatest discretion should be recommended to the Mexican, for he too had heard of Gutierrez's plan of publishing a pamphlet in which the

¹⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, December 4, 1861; draft in V. N. A.

Archduke's name was mentioned. So the Mexican diplomatist actually went to Miramar, where he talked for hours on end to the Archduke of the beauty of his country, its sad fate, and the happiness which the imperial Prince would bring to the sorely tried Mexican people by accepting the throne. But he did not mention the fact that his lovely home had not seen him for twenty years. Gutierrez took it increasingly to heart that, in contrast with his colleague Hidalgo, who was so often received by the Emperor and Empress of the French, he himself had not yet been received by Napoleon. He took this opportunity of begging the Archduke to induce Rechberg to give him an introduction to Prince Metternich, who should in turn arrange for him to wait upon the Emperor Napoleon. The Archduke at once wrote to Rechberg in the sense desired, adding that in his estimation the alienation of the French Court from this "devoted servant" was not without its disadvantages.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max fell completely under the spell of Gutierrez's flattery and the seductions of the future as depicted by him in the rosiest colours. The Mexican had reason to be pleased with his work. After his departure he sent a letter of gratitude for his reception¹⁶ couched in the most exaggerated style; never would he forget the hour in which he had seen the Archduke for the first time; that day, like his wedding-day, would count among the fairest in his life. In conclusion he begged that he might be commended to the Archduchess, "whose imperial feet he kissed." This passage of the letter was even underlined. Such were the letters of the man whose influence over the Archduke in the period preceding his acceptance of the throne exceeded all others.

Gutierrez had aroused the highest hopes in the imperial Prince by his words.

Napoleon III now also considered that the time had come to open conversations upon the Mexican project with the Archduke. He was particularly pressed to do so by the Empress. Prince Metternich was therefore summoned by the Emperor

¹⁶ Gutierrez de Estrada to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, December 28, 1862; original in V. N. A.

and Empress, and thus had the opportunity of convincing himself of the Empress's enthusiasm and Napoleon's resolve to throw himself into the Mexican affair unreservedly. The Emperor and Empress went into the matter in detail, and wished to ascertain the Archduke's views as regards three points: firstly, with regard to the question of a loan, which seemed to Napoleon to be by far the easiest of solution; secondly, with regard to his sailing for Mexico in an Austrian war-ship, which depended entirely upon the Emperor Francis Joseph; and thirdly, the question of an armed force to support the new sovereignty, which seemed to the Emperor of the French the most thorny and the most important. He would have been best pleased if the Archduke had been accompanied by an Austrian army corps, but he saw the force of Metternich's representations to the effect that Austria was not a naval power, and was therefore unable to guarantee the course of events in Mexico against the vicissitudes of the future overseas. He declared in conclusion that it would be for those who offered the Archduke a crown to guarantee his possession of it. Only a guard of about five hundred men would be necessary, for the generals in Mexico, from whom a *pronunciamiento* was to be expected in favour of the new monarchy, would presumably supply the Government with a sufficient armed force to help it over the early stages. Metternich immediately reported the conversation to Vienna,¹⁷ which at once gave an accurate account to the Archduke. He was overjoyed at the news. He wrote to Rechberg¹⁸ at the end of the year with the utmost satisfaction that Mexican affairs were moving more and more quickly towards a gratifying conclusion, and requested him to convey to Prince Metternich "his unqualified appreciation."

But now that matters had taken such a big step forward, an explanation was urgently necessary between the Archduke and the Emperor Francis Joseph. An occasion offered itself while

¹⁷ Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, December 22, 1861, private letter, copy enclosed in Count Rechberg's letter to the Archduke Ferdinand Max of December 25, 1861. V. N. A.

¹⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, December 27, 1861; draft in V. N. A.

the Emperor was staying in Venice during the last days of 1861. The Archduke Ferdinand Max left Miramar for the city of the lagoons, and on New Year's Eve the two brothers talked the whole matter over.¹⁹ They first discussed the financial conditions. The Emperor Francis Joseph would advance his brother 200,000 gulden out of the family funds to meet the preliminary expenses in connexion with the Mexican candidature. After the acceptance of the crown the Archduke's apanage of 100,000 gulden was to be devoted to repaying this sum to the family fund, besides the money advanced for the building of Miramar; when these had been repaid, it was to be handed over to the State. As a beginning, a loan of twenty-five million Mexican piastres (dollars) was to be raised, guaranteed by the powers, the floating of which might be effected through the house of Rothschild; but in this connexion care must be taken that English as well as French financiers participated in it.

As regards military affairs, the Emperor Francis Joseph promised his brother that he would undertake recruiting within the territories of the Austrian monarchy for a volunteer corps to accompany him to Mexico. Officers should also be allowed to volunteer, and the Emperor promised that they should, if necessary, be taken back into the Austrian army with the same rank as they had occupied on leaving it. Only Catholics were to be chosen, and Italians were to be excluded. The Emperor furthermore promised officers from the General Staff, and artillery with competent gunners and pontoon-trains. The Archduke was to write to King Leopold of the Belgians and ask his permission for recruiting to be opened in Belgium as well.

As regards political conditions: if Europe recognized the Southern States of the North American Union as an independent State, it was to be demanded as a reciprocal condition that the new State should respect the integrity and independence of Mexico. If the existing Government of Mexico, with Juarez at its head, were to effect cessions of territory as a

¹⁹ Based upon a rough memorandum written down by the Archduke immediately after the conversation, and Ferdinand Max's letter to Rechberg, January 1, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

means of obtaining foreign support, or if for the same purpose it were to make any concessions to the Northern States with regard to the transport of troops through Mexican territory, the European powers were to make a formal protest.

The Archduke would, to begin with, receive leave of absence from his command of the Austrian navy, in order to have a free hand, and would be replaced by another archduke. Ferdinand Max intended to take this opportunity of drawing up, in a sort of testament, a project for the development of Austria's naval establishment. The voyage to Mexico would be made on an Austrian war-ship. Even in case of war, which the Emperor Francis Joseph obviously considered very probable at that time, means would have to be found for this, possibly by neutralization. As emperor the Archduke was to bear the name of Fernando, and not Maximiliano. A provisional regency, of as short a duration as possible, was first to be set up in Mexico, consisting of three persons, of whom, by Gutierrez's advice, one was in any case to be Santa Anna, and one a bishop. The regency should only issue decrees subject to the express reservation of the Emperor's future assent. Santa Anna was to receive thirty-six thousand scudi, the same sum as when he was President, and, if he so desired, the title of Duke of Vera Cruz, or Tampico, and he should accompany the new Emperor upon his entry into the capital.

There still remained a few questions to discuss between the two brothers, such as the composition of the imperial household, what persons were to accompany the Empress as ladies-in-waiting, and so forth. Baron De Pont was to go with them as Austrian Minister, General Corona as "Spanish *rédacteur*, secretary, teacher, and influence behind the scenes." The Order of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the centre of a pilgrimage of the Virgin in Mexico, founded by Iturbide, was to be revived, and a new Order of San Fernando and a female Order of Carlotta were to be founded.

As can be seen, the conversations already entered into great detail, and showed with what certainty the two brothers already reckoned upon the success of the project. To all appearance brilliant prospects were opening out before the

imperial house of Habsburg, which in the person of the Archduke, through his wife, was also closely connected with the house of Coburg, and its world-encompassing plans of domination. This was also the opinion of King Leopold's son, the Duke of Brabant, when at the beginning of 1862 he wrote to his brother-in-law²⁰ that it was his heart-felt wish that at a moment when the enemies of Austria were prophesying her downfall and ruin, the Archduke should prove to the world by his work for the happiness of Mexico that "on the contrary, the Habsburgs, joined with the Coburgs, see new prospects opening up for their legitimate passion for doing good to the most different peoples."

So far, if we except the Archduke's letters to Gutierrez, all negotiations had been carried on between Vienna and Paris through intermediaries and by word of mouth. But after the Venice conversation Ferdinand Max, in concert with his brother, departed from this principle and answered Napoleon's three questions, transmitted through Metternich, in a letter addressed directly to the Emperor of the French,²¹ of which the exuberantly amiable tone, so flattering to Napoleon, plainly showed how delighted Ferdinand Max was with the whole plan, and how thankful he was to Napoleon and Eugénie for appearing to adopt it so warmly, and putting forward his name as candidate. The Archduke recalled his visit to St. Cloud, which had marked a notable epoch in his life, and on the occasion of which Napoleon had gained in him a fresh admirer. With regard to the information he desired, Ferdinand Max wrote that Napoleon would earn the deepest gratitude from Mexico if he would facilitate the floating of a loan of twenty-five million piastres; for the rest, his brother the Emperor consented that a war-ship of the Austrian navy should bear its former chief to Mexico, thus rendering him a "last service."

As regards the question of the army, the Archduke was of

²⁰ Leopold, Duke of Brabant, afterwards King Leopold II of the Belgians, to Archduke Ferdinand Max, Laeken, January 23, 1862; original in V. N. A.

²¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Miramar, January 2, 1862; draft in Baron De Pont's hand. V. N. A.

opinion that it would be too dangerous, after all that had happened, to entrust the new Government to the protection of Mexican generals accustomed to anarchy; the Mexican sovereign should rather be surrounded by an armed force of his own. It was therefore his wish to be accompanied by a small body of troops recruited in Europe, but with the Mexican standard and uniform, and gradually supplemented by Mexicans, so as to form the nucleus of a national army. "I shall congratulate myself," wrote the Archduke, "if I learn that my way of regarding these three questions coincides with the wise and elevated ideas of him whose pupil I am proud to count myself." The letter closed with an assurance that it was an express condition of his acceptance of the crown that he should do so in response to a clear and unmistakable call from the country.

Metternich was charged to hand this letter to the Emperor, adding by word of mouth the Archduke's wish that, if the Southern States were recognized, this should be accompanied by the stipulation that they should at the same time recognize and join in guaranteeing the independence of Mexico; and that any attempt at the sale of territory, or permission to the Northern States on the part of Juarez's Government for the passage of troops, should at once be met with a vigorous protest.

Napoleon was entirely of the Archduke's way of thinking.²² He considered the idea of making the guarantee of Mexico a condition of the recognition of the Southern States an excellent one, and declared that he would not fail to raise the question at a favourable moment. The Emperor also advised that the Archduke should pay special agents. His idea was that General Almonte should return to Mexico without delay, and work in the Archduke's interest hand in hand with the commander of the expeditionary force. The general had the Emperor's full confidence; he was acquainted with all his plans, and was now charged with the mission of going to Miramar with a reply from Napoleon, so that he might have the

²² Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, January 8, 1862. V. N. A.

opportunity of discussing all questions with the Archduke before leaving for Mexico. And so it happened: Almonte was the bearer of Napoleon's letter²³ in which, after a few amiable introductory words, Napoleon said how greatly he desired to see the Archduke at the head of this great and noble enterprise, the success of which was guaranteed by his personal qualities and the prestige of the illustrious house of which he was a member. "Never," ran the letter, "will any achievement have grander results, for the task is to rescue a continent from anarchy and misery, to set an example of good government to the whole of America, and finally, to raise the standard of monarchy, supported upon a wisely directed freedom and a sincere love of progress, against dangerous Utopias and bloody confusion.

"The ideas which Your Imperial Highness was so good as to communicate to me seem to me very just, and when the time comes, I will do all I can to facilitate their realization.

"From this moment I shall impatiently await the news of how things have gone in Mexico; at first, in view of England's distrust, I did not venture to send more troops overseas, and I now regret it. Meanwhile I am sending another six hundred zouaves, *and I do not believe there will be any serious resistance there.*

"This letter will be handed to you by General Almonte. He is an excellent fellow, and, what is more, a most competent and valuable person. I think Your Imperial Highness would do well to give him full powers and choose him as the nucleus of the enterprise and your chief agent. He will go to Mexico, and his presence there will be of the greatest advantage."

The Empress Eugénie had also given Almonte an autograph letter to Charlotte, full of amiable phrases. In it she mentioned a report from the commander of a French war-ship lying off Vera Cruz, the *Foudre*, who described the anarchical condition of Mexico — possibly without having set foot on land, and in any case without having gone beyond this port.

²³ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, January 14, 1862; original in V. N. A.

The Empress wrote: ²⁴ "This officer, though unacquainted with the instructions to Admiral Jurien, none the less found in the country the germ of that monarchical idea which we have only to develop and bring to a good issue by God's help."

While Almonte was staying at Miramar, the whole matter was discussed exhaustively, and at once laid down point by point in a protocol.²⁵ In this document it was estimated that at least 10,000 men would be necessary for the support of the Government in Mexico. Until these troops were available, the French army must stay there, and they would also be able to reckon upon a native corps of from 6,000 to 8,000 men. Further, an attempt must be made to raise a loan of five million dollars secured upon the Church property which had not yet been sold, and was worth about twenty-five millions; but for this the consent of the Pope must first be obtained. As emperor the Archduke was gradually to concede a senate, a chamber of deputies, and a council of State, as in France, but without pledging himself to do so previously. For the temporary regency Santa Anna, Almonte, and Labastida were to be considered. Finally, they must try to obtain the appointment of a papal nuncio to Mexico, to expedite the departure of the Mexican bishops from Rome, and work towards the unity of all in Mexico.

It so happened that at Miramar Almonte met the Mexican bishop Labastida, whom the Archduke had invited there by the advice of Gutierrez, in order to arrange the preliminary steps towards the support of his future sovereignty by the Church and the Pope. The question of the Church property "nationalized" — that is to say, sequestrated — by Juarez, was also gone into, but without arriving at any definite solution. Labastida insisted that, as in other religious questions of importance, no decision could be arrived at before coming to an understanding with the Pope. He undertook to negotiate direct with Rome about it.

²⁴ The Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte, February 3, 1862; original in V. N. A. The reports of the commander of the *Foudre*, copies of which were sent to the Archduke, are also to be found there.

²⁵ Copy in V. N. A., with the title "*Points pour l'accomplissement du projet.*"

When Gutierrez heard that Almonte had been sent to Miramar, he was very jealous at anyone but himself having been sent by the Emperor Napoleon on a mission to the Archduke. Moreover, he thought he might assume that Almonte would conduct his business quite independently of himself, as well as of Santa Anna, Gutierrez's candidate for the highest rank after the sovereign. He immediately resolved to write to the Archduke about Almonte,²⁶ for he felt that he was rising higher and higher in the Archduke's favour and acquiring an influence over him, and he did not want to be outdone by anybody.

He wrote to Miramar that, in desiring to ask for troops and money in Vienna, Almonte did not intend to collaborate with Santa Anna, but to put himself in his place. He was not a helper, but an opponent, and an ill-concealed competitor. When he, Gutierrez, had asked him why he did not want to go to Mexico at once with Santa Anna, Almonte had replied that if Santa Anna wanted to go there, he would follow. Everything pointed to the conclusion that this former adjutant of Santa Anna's desired to make himself master of the situation. If it were no longer possible to prevent him from going to Mexico, he must at least be made to understand the nature of his mission, and the fact that Santa Anna's services had already been accepted; so that the latter must remain at the head of the whole undertaking. "Unity of procedure," wrote the Mexican, who desired to see the guiding threads of the whole plan in the Old World combined in his own hands, "is absolutely necessary among the three or four Mexicans concerned in the matter in Europe." "I venture to believe," he added, quite obviously hinting at himself, "that it would be a good thing to have a clear pronouncement as to which of us must be regarded by the rest as the instrument of the will of His Imperial and Royal Highness the most august Prince, the Archduke Ferdinand Max." This fourteen-page letter reveals beyond a doubt the ambition of the writer and the rivalries among the Mexicans.

²⁶ Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max. Beginning of letter dated January 16, 1862, the end January 17. V. N. A.

On his return Almonte took with him a letter to Napoleon from the Archduke and another to the Empress of the French from the Archduchess Charlotte. In it the Archduchess thanked Eugénie in extravagant terms for her interest in the "holy" enterprise, for the initiation of which she was "clearly" destined by Providence, in order to give fresh impetus to the Catholic religion among a nation torn by civil war. She also laid stress upon the Empress's Spanish descent, which made her peculiarly fitted for her present task, in view of the Spanish element in Mexico.²⁷

This time Gutierrez's warnings did not arrive at Miramar at the right moment. Almonte had marks of sympathy showered upon him. On his way back he was also received in audience by the Emperor Francis Joseph in Vienna, and assured by him that he would do all he could to further the Archduke's interests.²⁸ The general wanted to take with him to Mexico an immediate advance of 200,000 dollars on the loan; but the Emperor refused this, for a loan could only be contemplated if things reached a fortunate issue, and such a large sum of money could not be advanced on an uncertainty.

Napoleon had himself advised the Archduke to provide Almonte with money, and kept on returning to the charge, in spite of repeated refusals. He even sent word to the Archduke that, if the latter did not refuse his support in principle, he might forward the letter of credit to him, Napoleon, who would have it conveyed to General Almonte in Mexico without saying where the money came from—or even, if he so desired, with the statement that the Emperor had himself advanced this sum.²⁹ Metternich was of opinion that they could not very well draw back now; "We shall have to face the expenditure of one or two hundred thousand francs." But the

²⁷ The Archduchess Charlotte to the Empress Eugénie, Miramar, January 22, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

²⁸ General Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, January 30, 1862. V. N. A.

²⁹ Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, Paris, March 14, 1862; copy in V. N. A. Where the originals were extant, the author compared the copies of reports, letters, etc., made for the Archduke and found them correct.

Archduke refused, for he was afraid ³⁰ of giving the impression that he wanted to buy votes. And since the Emperor Francis Joseph shared this point of view, no financial support was granted to the Mexican general for the present, in spite of Napoleon's insistence. It was not till considerably later that the Archduke changed his mind, and requested Rechberg, if he would consent to this, to have a sum of 50,000 francs paid over to Almonte through Rothschild's in Paris—a corresponding amount to that allotted by Napoleon.

When the Emperor Francis Joseph first heard of the Archduke's wish to have an agent of his own appointed for Mexican affairs in Paris, he was unwilling to have the control of them taken out of Prince Metternich's hands. But Maximilian had pressure brought to bear upon the Emperor, for although he showed every appreciation of Rechberg and Metternich, in his heart he had rather the feeling that neither of them, especially the Ambassador, was anything like as enthusiastic about the matter as he was himself. Hence his efforts to exclude Metternich entirely, and Rechberg as far as possible.

The Archduke thereupon sent an answer to Gutierrez informing him of the visit of Almonte, who had been "so warmly recommended" to him by the Emperor Napoleon. At the same time, as if to defend himself, he wrote that it had been "urgently necessary" to include Almonte in the Regency, "since he possessed the confidence of Napoleon."

In the meantime the Mexican general had returned to Paris and handed Napoleon the Archduke's letter,³¹ as well as the memorandum drawn up at Miramar. In his letter Ferdinand Max showed himself gratefully conscious of the magnitude of his task, but added that he entertained no illusions, and did not hide from himself the enormous difficulties that awaited him; he therefore stood in need of the Emperor's benevolent support as the first condition of success. "It has taken all the confidence which I have in this support," wrote the

³⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Metternich, March 20, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

³¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Miramar, January 22, 1862; draft in the handwriting of Baron De Pont. V. N. A.

THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERVENTION

Archduke, "to prevent me from recoiling at the very outset before such a terrible task." The Archduke then thanked Napoleon for having enabled him to make Almonte's acquaintance, and pronounced himself in favour of the idea so warmly advocated by Gutierrez: namely, that of provisionally entrusting the supreme power in Mexico to Santa Anna, and of the necessity of a complete understanding between Santa Anna and the Conservative party. Almonte, indeed, had not opposed this idea, and had consented to include this proposal in the memorandum, but for the rest his attitude had been rather passive than otherwise.

On the whole, the Archduke received the impression that Almonte was also of the opinion that they were risking nothing in entrusting the reins of government to Santa Anna until the advent of the sovereign. Almonte's secret reflections were to the effect that the time had not yet arrived to reveal his own ambitious plans, and that for the present, in order to win the Archduke over completely, he must say amen to everything. When the decisive moment arrived in Mexico, he would soon manage to get into the saddle, and Gutierrez in Paris and Santa Anna in St. Thomas would find themselves out of the running. Shortly after his audience with Napoleon III, Almonte departed in the suite of General Lorencez, who was sailing with reinforcements for Mexico. The general had been detained for three days by Napoleon with the sole object of enabling the Mexican to join him on his return from Miramar and Vienna. His task was clear: he was the emissary and confidant of the Emperor, who merely desired that he should go about his work in Mexico discreetly and circumspectly.

At last, on January 16, 1862, Gutierrez succeeded in obtaining an audience of half an hour with the Emperor and Empress of the French.³² The whole matter was discussed. Napoleon declared that they must extend their occupation of the country "beyond the capital," spoke of the reinforcements which Lorencez was taking to Mexico, then inquired about the career of Doblado, Juarez's delegate in the

³² Report of Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, January 18, 1862; original and letter to Baron De Pont of the same date in V. N. A.

negotiations, and finally — as a trap for Gutierrez — asked about Almonte's influence in Mexico. The Mexican gave the very worst account of Doblado, and in answer to the question about Almonte he hesitated in a way that could have but one meaning.

"Not very great, is it?" said the Emperor, helping him out.

"No, really it is not," Gutierrez at last ventured.

Towards the close of the audience Napoleon asked the Mexican to wait a little; he wished to call his wife, who desired to see him. The Emperor himself went to fetch the Empress and then left her alone with Gutierrez. The latter had high hopes of this audience; he expected nothing less than to become the official representative of the Archduke at the Court of France, thanks to which he would have free access to it, like his fellow-countryman Hidalgo, whom he would then slowly but surely squeeze out.

But he was mistaken. When Eugénie asked what her husband thought of Gutierrez, the Emperor replied: "Nothing at all; he is a man who never stops phrase-making." Immediately after the audience the Emperor and Empress told Hidalgo how they disliked Gutierrez. With ill-concealed enjoyment Hidalgo at once communicated to him — as though in fulfilment of a confidential duty — what the Emperor and Empress had said of him after the audience.

Eugénie in particular was so impressed with the reactionary views of Gutierrez as to say that, if he arrived in Mexico, people would believe the Inquisition had returned with all its consequences. The impression made upon the Empress by his whole way of expressing himself was that Philip II had come to life again and was talking to her. Palmerston, she added, would never sanction such principles. Hidalgo must do everything to wean his fellow-countryman from such views. "There seems to be a perfect conspiracy against me," wrote Gutierrez to the Archduke, quite upset.³³

The result was that the diplomatist was kept away from the French Court, for they were frightened by the catchword

³³ Complaint of Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 9, 1862. V. N. A.



Nidalgo *Escandon* *Sigüenza* *Wall* *Landa*
Aguilar *Gutierrez de Estrada* *Miranda* *Vilaquez de Leon*

THE MOST PROMINENT MEXICAN EXILES IN PARIS,
WHO ORIGINATED THE ENTERPRISE

"clerical reaction," of which Gutierrez was the very incarnation, and which might dog the Mexican scheme from the outset and arouse malicious opposition. Napoleon did not care to disregard the Archduke's wish entirely, so he sent word that he would receive Gutierrez as often as he had a direct communication from the Archduke; but he made it quite plain that he had better not be given any. Rechberg, too, was a little hurt, and gave it as his opinion, in his own and Metternich's name, that Gutierrez was not the right intermediary for the increasing communication between Paris and Miramar, and was not qualified to maintain the dignity and prestige of the house of Habsburg, for the Mexican could see nothing but the interest of his native land. In spite of everything, he said, circumspection and reserve were advisable in dealing with Paris; so recently as 1859 they had been at war with the French, and there was nothing to prevent a repetition of this. The Imperial Cabinet did not yet desire to take up the negotiations on its own account; but Gutierrez was indiscreet, and the Archduke had better continue to put his confidence in himself (Rechberg) and Metternich, as before.³⁴

The Archduke³⁵ was annoyed that his protégé was not trusted in Vienna or Paris. Moreover, in the mean time the Viennese press had taken possession of the Mexican business, and this gave rise to every sort of unpleasantness for him; besides, he had already such a weakness for Gutierrez that he took reflections upon him almost as a personal matter. However, he declared that in future he would only occasionally entrust him with commissions. Nothing, the Prince considered, could have reached the public through Miramar, for several persons in his immediate entourage, such as the Marchese Corio, his chamberlain, and his aide-de-camp Count Karl Bombelles, were not yet informed of the affair, while the Countess Lützow (of whom the Archduke thought highly) had been taken into their confidence only when the arrival of Gutierrez,

³⁴ Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, February 1, 1862. V. N. A.

³⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Rechberg, Miramar, February 4, 1862. V. N. A.

who had married one of her daughters by her first marriage, had made this unavoidable. This remark was not entirely correct: Ferdinand Max ought to have known that the Countess had long since been initiated into the affair, even if she had not yet been informed of it by himself. Thus some remark of hers might easily have reached her relatives in Vienna, from whom it would then have spread.

The petty jealousies and rivalries which had already arisen in Europe among the few exiles resident there now spread to some of those Mexicans who were near their home or lived in their own country and took part in politics. Miranda's view that Mexico's condition was so complicated precisely because it had so many "saviours" was a very just one. Though he was initiated into Gutierrez's plan, he none the less disbelieved in Santa Anna, and told his father-in-law, Don Luis Vidal, that he would never regard the general as the ultimate solution of the Mexican situation, but only as a means to an end. Miranda also warned Gutierrez against Santa Anna, who desired to seize the supreme power by any means whatsoever, while deceiving Gutierrez and everybody else in Mexico, with the sole aim of making himself master of "the remnant of the finances" and avenging himself upon his enemies.³⁶

Such was the internal aspect of the "party" which felt it to be its mission to prepare the way for such a complete revolution in Mexico.

Moreover, the few adherents of this party were disillusioned by the undignified appeal to armed intervention and began to express doubts as to the success of the expedition.

By the middle of January it did not seem to Santa Anna that it was safe enough in Mexico, and he wrote to Gutierrez that he had not started, because he was "ill."³⁷ He had at first been afraid³⁸ that the three Governments, without whose material co-operation "no good" could be done, might let them-

³⁶ Miranda to Gutierrez, December 28, 1861. V. N. A. Sent on by Gutierrez to Baron Meysenbug on December 28, 1861, with a lengthy defence of Santa Anna, and sent by him to Baron De Pont on January 19.

³⁷ Santa Anna to Gutierrez, January 15, 1862.

³⁸ The same to the same, St. Thomas, December 31, 1861. V. N. A.

selves be misled by demagogues even at the last moment; and he could not make out what was happening; 8,000 men, he considered, were far too few. After leaving behind the most necessary garrisons, they could hardly march on the capital with from 3,000 to 4,000 men, in a country which could put 25,000 men into the field. Santa Anna thus expected a general resistance on the part of the whole country, in direct contradiction to the constant protestations of Gutierrez and his friends in Europe. The general prudently desired not to leave for Vera Cruz until the Allies had begun their march into the interior.³⁹

Moreover, Antonio de Haro y Tamariz, a former Mexican Finance Minister and a friend of Gutierrez, drew attention to the small value of the Mexican troops that would be necessary to support the weak forces of the powers. He also alluded to the difficulties which were bound to arise in the process of Mexico's regeneration, owing to the fact that a number of base ambitions and a crowd of people would have to sink back into obscurity, whose rise had only been made possible by the ruin of their country, and who had done it such terrible and lasting damage.⁴⁰

Direct warnings were not lacking from other quarters, all of which were communicated to the Archduke by Rechberg, but which made as little impression upon him as the previous ones.

Thus the Austrian Minister in Washington⁴¹ did not mince matters at all in describing the whole affair to Rechberg as a mere adventure, and assuring him that so far, when the newspapers had mentioned the Archduke's name, it had never occurred to him to take the plan seriously! He expressed his profound conviction that the three powers would meet with great difficulties, that it would be in the highest degree regrettable if the name and the very person of the Archduke, the Austrian Emperor's brother, were to become involved in this affair and exposed by its failure. Moreover the personal

³⁹ The same to the same, February 15, 1862. V. N. A.

⁴⁰ Antonio de Haro y Tamariz to Gutierrez, Havana, January 27, 1861. V. N. A.

⁴¹ Dispatch of Ritter von Hülseman to Rechberg, Washington, February 18, 1862. V. N. A.

position of the Most Serene Prince would entirely depend upon the good or ill will of the French general.

The minister saw more prophetically into the future than almost any of his diplomatic colleagues, but he was not listened to. At least the Archduke did not listen. Warning signs also came from other quarters. Baron Richthofen, the Prussian Minister at Hamburg, who had known Mexico for years, insisted that nothing could be done with that country by Europe, and that a constitutional form of government was simply an absurdity.⁴²

Count Crivelli had recently sent word from Madrid⁴³ that he was more and more convinced that there was danger underlying the affair, and that it was easier to go there than to return with honour and profit. The Spanish Marshal O'Donnell had said to him that he could not understand how the Archduke could want "to embark in that *aventureuse galère*," and that for his part he would never have heard of such a thing.

The Archduke continued steadfastly to work out further developments of his scheme. Towards the end of January he likewise communicated to his father-in-law the upshot of his conversation with the Emperor Francis Joseph.⁴⁴ In the letter he expressed the opinion that they must await the results of the European intervention in Mexico. "If the pressure is removed," he wrote, "which a small but audacious and noisy fraction of the population exert upon the passive majority, then the latter will be able to raise its voice freely and openly."

The effect of Gutierrez's and Almonte's visits was clearly to be recognized in this judgment.

England's reserve was becoming more and more marked, for even the small detachment of marines landed at Vera Cruz in accordance with the London Convention had not joined the French fighting forces, but had stayed behind in Vera Cruz. In accordance with Napoleon's wishes, the Archduke accord-

⁴² Baron Richthofen to Count Blome, Austrian Minister at Hamburg; Count Blome to Count Rechberg, February 15, 1862. V. N. A.

⁴³ Count Crivelli to Count Rechberg, February 3, 1862. V. N. A.

⁴⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Miramar, January 28, 1862. V. N. A.

ingly asked his father-in-law to use his "powerful influence" in England. This request was indeed very necessary just then, for English public opinion was beginning to take a keen interest in Mexican affairs. The Empress Eugénie also requested the intervention of the King of the Belgians through Metternich, for Lord Derby was showing an inclination to ask questions in Parliament. "We must, if possible, try to prevent a debate on the subject," she hastily wrote to the Prince.⁴⁵

King Leopold happened to be on a visit to his niece Victoria, the Queen of England, who, as he sent word, was "broken-hearted" at the recent decease of her deeply loved husband, Prince Albert. The King of the Belgians, as he wrote to his son-in-law⁴⁶ and also to the Emperor Napoleon, found opinion on the Mexican affair in England "not bad." But, he at once added, neither financial help nor guarantees for a loan were to be hoped for. Napoleon's motives were not altogether understood beyond the Channel, and so his efforts in Mexico were interpreted as meaning that he desired to offer Austria compensation for a possible cession of Venetia.

"Over here," wrote the King, "people are amazingly impressed with the difficulty of the affair." Even Prince Albert had not been in favour of the project. If in spite of all this the King found the general disposition "not bad," it was largely because he himself did not desire the plan to fall through. He rejoiced in the thought of seeing his son-in-law and daughter adorned with an imperial crown. It would be a glorious conclusion to his life-work of raising the house of Coburg to a position of world importance. He therefore sought for means of furthering the project. But his judgment upon the feeling in England was not correct. There were two conflicting tendencies at work in London with regard to the attitude to be taken up towards American affairs, but those in favour of prudence and reserve were by far the stronger party. Lord Russell, who was one of them, judged the whole course of events in Mexico

⁴⁵ The Empress Eugénie to Prince Metternich, Paris, February 7, 1862, copy. V. N. A.

⁴⁶ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Osborne, February 7, 1862; original in V. N. A.

very justly and with a clear and penetrating eye. "This sort of persons," he wrote with reference to the Mexican exiles in Paris to Lord Bloomfield, the British Ambassador in Vienna, "are notorious for their estimate of the strength of their adherents at home, and their exaggerated hopes of support, which are absolutely unfounded. If foreign help were withdrawn, the sovereign established by it might be driven out by the republicans of Mexico. Such a situation would be neither dignified nor secure."⁴⁷ Russell expressed himself in the same terms to the Austrian Ambassador in London. The question as to whether the Archduke's candidature would be supported by Austrian troops and war-ships was answered by the Austrian with "certainly not." There was no thought of such a thing; the affair was entirely foreign to Austria's political interests. Upon which Lord Russell remarked that he was surprised that the candidature could possibly attract the Archduke, for the success of the undertaking "bristled with difficulties." How could a monarchy be set up in the middle of so many republics? "However," he remarked, "the idea comes from Paris, and it is alleged that it is the Empress in particular who is interesting herself in its success. We shall see what Napoleon is ready to do in support of his handiwork." England would let matters take their course, and return to the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, Parliament would not permit any other procedure.

It was really the situation in North America that decided England's attitude. If, after receiving no concessions of any kind from Juarez, England was already thinking of returning to the principle of non-intervention, why had she taken any part in the London Convention? Apparently because at that time there had still been secret, if very uncertain hopes of the success of the Southern States in the War of Secession. But the months following the conclusion of the London Convention had in reality brought victory upon victory to the Northern States.

⁴⁷ Russell to Lord Bloomfield, beginning of 1863, printed by Léonce Détroyat: *L'Intervention française au Mexique* (Paris, 1868), p. 57. Rechberg and the Archduke Ferdinand Max apparently knew nothing of this letter; Détroyat does not say how it came to his knowledge.

The victory of General Polk at Belmont on the Mississippi on November 7, 1861 was followed by great successes, particularly in January 1862, as for instance at Mill Springs, and the capture of the Confederate forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. It was therefore considered more prudent in England to withdraw at the earliest opportunity from the Mexican enterprise, which was an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, and would, as the Government was well aware, be looked at very much askance by the United States, which had become far more self-conscious as a result of their victories.

When the powers declared in the London Convention that they were aiming at no political objects by their intervention in Mexico, the United States desired to guarantee Mexico certain facilities in order to render possible the fulfilment of the financial claims presented to her. But the Senate rejected the proposition; upon which the Union Government determined to abstain from all interference for the present and await developments. But now, after the recent successes, Seward, the Secretary of State, threw off his reserve. He did not conceal from Herr von Gerolt, the Prussian representative in Washington,⁴⁸ that "the setting up of a monarchy in the Republic of Mexico must have grave consequences and would, sooner or later, undoubtedly bring the powers concerned in it into serious conflict with the United States."

On March 1 Seward received the report of the American Minister in Vienna to the effect that the crown of Mexico had been offered to the Archduke, and that he showed a certain inclination to accept it. Seward therefore had a note to the representatives of England, France, Spain, and Mexico drawn up, as well as dispatches to all the American ministers, drawing their attention to the doubts and dangers closely involved in this question. He explained⁴⁹ that a monarchy set up upon Mexican soil in the presence of foreign naval and military forces had no sort of prospect of security or stability, especially if the person at the head of it were not of Mexican birth.

⁴⁸ Herr von Gerolt to Count Bernstorff in Berlin, March 5, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

⁴⁹ Seward to the American Ministers, Department of State, Washington, March 3, 1862; copy sent by Hülseman and in V. N. A.

Armed intervention in a monarchical sense must be regarded as an insult and a mark of practical hostility to the republican form of government, which was the most widely spread upon the American continent, and would mean the beginning rather than the end of revolution in Mexico. The sympathies of the United States would undoubtedly be on the side of the other American republics. According to the opinion of the President of the United States, the liberation of the continent from European control had been the leading feature in American history during the past century. It was, to say the least of it, very improbable that a revolution in the opposite sense during the next hundred years would be attended by success. This was quite a clear warning; but in Europe, and particularly in Paris, it was considered that the end was not yet come, and that, since the War of Secession was still going on, the fortunes of war might yet change. It was upon such hazardous and improbable considerations that Napoleon based his subsequent policy in the Mexican question.

The Archduke became more and more impressed with the fact that Napoleon now appeared to be almost entirely isolated. While all the other States were gradually withdrawing from the affair, scepticism was also growing in Vienna, and while the reports from Mexico began to speak in greater detail of the difficulties which had recently arisen, the Emperor of the French was, on the contrary, thrown more and more into the foreground. Although the Archduke was still thousands of miles from Mexico, a certain jealousy already began to stir in him with regard to the independence of his future sovereignty. This jealousy was directed against Napoleon, the sole support and partisan of his candidature.

"In my opinion," wrote the Archduke to Rechberg,⁵⁰ "the Emperor Napoleon wants to be master in Mexico, without directly seeming so in the eyes of Europe. To this end he proposed a prince upon whose entire devotion he thinks he can reckon, and whom he can in any case keep under constant pressure, owing to the fact that he will find in France the sole sup-

⁵⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, February 28, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

port of his throne." In all that Napoleon had done so far, the Archduke all at once saw nothing but the intention to preserve for himself "the role of sole promoter." The limits imposed upon the co-operation of the "so-called" reactionary party and the clergy — which Gutierrez during his visit to Miramar had shifted on to Napoleon's shoulders — besides the decision that the armed force at the personal disposal of the future sovereign should be limited to "five hundred life-guards," and other things, were now solely ascribed to the Emperor of the French's intention that "the future ruler of Mexico should not be able to dispense with his tutelage." He had feared this, said the Archduke, from the very beginning, and that was why he had insisted so much upon the country's decision and the co-operation of England. For this reason, as early as November he had sent a confidential agent to Rome, in order to ask for the sanction and assistance of the Holy See, since he did not want to be conscious of occupying his throne wholly and solely owing to the French bayonets, but also wished to base it upon "a moral foundation: namely, the conviction and devotion of the people," upon which it was well known that the Church in Mexico exercised an influence far greater than it had maintained to the same extent anywhere in Europe.⁵¹ Gutierrez, who even from a distance had acquired an increasingly predominant, and almost hypnotic influence over the Archduke, owing to his innumerable letters, was not exempt from blame for this outburst of bitterness against Napoleon. For as an ultra-clerical he was by no means in agreement with Napoleon; firstly, because the latter was personally anything but well-disposed to Gutierrez; and secondly, because he not only did not share the Mexican's ultramontane opinions, but had no desire to see them take root in Mexico under the French imperial flag. Immediately before this, Gutierrez had addressed a letter to the Archduke, blaming the Emperor of the French for his express intention of preventing the clergy from gaining greater influence over public affairs in Mexico.⁵² It was this which

⁵¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, February 28, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

⁵² Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, February 19, 1862. V. N. A.

had produced the sharp reaction to be seen in the above letter to Rechberg.

At the end of January, still under Almonte's influence, the Archduke had written to Pope Pius IX⁵³ asking permission, in case of need, to raise a mortgage of one hundred million francs upon the property of the Church. Next, on the proposal of Gutierrez, he asked for the return of the Mexican bishops and the appointment of a nuncio in the person of Alessandro Franchi, Bishop of Thessalonica, as well as the support of the supreme authority in the State in the matter of the workmen's organizations, and the reform of the clergy, part of which was entirely corrupt. The Archduke next developed to the Pope his intention of reigning in the first instance purely monarchically, and afterwards, when peace had been restored, of making concessions, but without making any rash promises; moreover, he did not propose to use the expressions "absolute" or "constitutional" monarchy, on account of the misuse to which they had been put.

It was a little short-sighted of the Archduke to speak to the Pope about reform and reorganization of the "corrupt" clergy in the very first letter containing concrete proposals. So the Pope in his answer passed over this proposition in silence, though otherwise the tone of his letter was most cordial.⁵⁴ He was quite prepared to discuss the mortgage in return for adequate compensation to the Church of Mexico; but the bishops were first to go to a "safe place," possibly in the next month, so that they could at once resume their work without disturbance. The nuncio would not be appointed till all necessary arrangements for the future peace of Mexico should be completed. For the rest the Pope would be delighted to have the Archduke and his wife visit him before their departure, in order to send them away with his blessing upon the task for which God appeared to destine them.

Labastida, who had brought the Archduke's letter to Rome

⁵³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Pope Pius IX, January 26, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

⁵⁴ Pope Pius IX to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 9, 1862; original in Italian. V. N. A.

in person, added ⁵⁵ that the Pope would agree to the mortgage, on condition that the new Government restored to the Church the property of which she had been deprived by recent laws, and guaranteed her compensation for whatsoever losses might arise in consequence of the projected mortgage. The sales of Church property must also be declared null and void. Labastida finally declared that the Pope had advised him not to go to Mexico for the present, until the troops of the powers had at least occupied Puebla; in that case he would have the honour of accompanying the Archduke.

The Bishop was prudent; he knew how to look after his worldly advantage as well as his safety, for he was personally very much interested in the restoration of the Church property. Pope Pius IX was unacquainted with conditions in Mexico; he had to depend upon the recommendations of the exiled bishops resident in Rome. He had simply said what Labastida had suggested to him. The latter had found it an easy task to win over the Pope by explaining to him what damage the Church in general had suffered under Juarez's regime. But facts and existing conditions had to be reckoned with. The path upon which the Holy See entered, on the advice of the Mexican bishops, was to prove a fateful one to Maximilian; but it was to be equally disadvantageous to the Church.

In the mean time Napoleon had learnt of the Preliminaries of La Soledad; and he and the Empress were absolutely furious. In the first outburst of wrath the Emperor wanted to recall Admiral Jurien de la Gravière at once; they had not sent an expedition to Mexico for it to parley with Juarez. What could come of this? Nothing, at any rate, which would square with the project of a Mexican empire and the candidature of the Austrian Archduke. Jurien must at once be disavowed. For Saligny had already taken care to make his opposition known in Paris, so that he himself should not be held responsible for the Preliminaries.

Napoleon's rage was directed chiefly against the Spaniards, for, in the Emperor's opinion, none but the Spanish commander

⁵⁵ Bishop Labastida to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 7, 10, and 17, 1862. V. N. A.

Prim, with his republican and irreligious views, could have had such an idea as to negotiate with a man like Juarez; and it must have been he who persuaded the French admiral. His first thought was to order the French commander to advance, even without the Spaniards, and to demand Prim's recall in Madrid. The Empress too, as Metternich reported to Vienna,⁵⁶ was infuriated, and spat fire and flame against her fellow-countrymen.

This being the case, Metternich commended the prudence of Austria in adopting a passive and waiting attitude, in contrast to the enthusiastic ardour (*fougue*) of Napoleon and his wife, with which they undertook to realize every silly whim (*lubie*) and chimerical idea.

Napoleon gave vent to his rage in an article drawn up by his own hand and communicated on his own responsibility to the *Moniteur* on March 7 — to the chagrin of Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs — in which the blame for all the blunders hitherto committed by the Allies in Mexico was ascribed to Prim.

In Spain, however, the fact seemed to be recognized that the ground lost in Mexico could not be regained. The Spaniards did not deny the "fraternal" hatred, as they called it, of the Mexicans for themselves, and, in spite of the Queen's personal wish, the whole policy of the Spanish Cabinet — which was, moreover, hard to fathom, owing to its vacillation between different tendencies — showed no trace of an intention to send a Bourbon to Mexico.⁵⁷ Calderón Collantes, on the other hand, quietly expressed his surprise that Austria should occupy itself with "such a problematical throne." Count Crivelli was still as convinced as before of the impracticability of the project, and considered that it was an experiment which could at best last only for a time. All information was at once sent to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, so that the difficulties of the task he had undertaken should not be concealed from him.

Napoleon, for his part, felt bound to write to the Archduke, for he also felt that he owed him an explanation of the

⁵⁶ Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, March 9, 1862. V. N. A.

⁵⁷ Count Crivelli to Count Rechberg, Madrid, February 25, 1862. V. N. A.

proceedings at La Soledad. He therefore requested Metternich to convey an autograph letter⁵⁸ to the imperial Prince, and took occasion to ask Metternich⁵⁹ whether the Archduke had opened a credit for Almonte.

In his letter Napoleon remarked that Prim, inspired by personal ambition, had led Admiral Jurien astray into a rash course of action, but fortunately the arrival of French reinforcements under General Lorencez would alter the situation once more. Instead of taking the lead and approaching Juarez's Government as a master, General Prim had, as it were, abased himself before it, and his aide-de-camp, who had been sent to Mexico City, had said, in answer to those who expressed a desire for a monarchy, that even in Europe there would soon be no more monarchies. And yet the monarchist party was making notable progress. At last, in a telegram which had just come to hand, Jurien had sent word that the expedition was about to start its advance. Napoleon assured the Archduke that he was inconsolable at Admiral Jurien's having allowed himself to be deceived by Prim. He was going to send out another general, to see whether Jurien ought not to be deprived of his command.

"Finally," concluded the Emperor's letter, "I have great hopes of the moral effect of General Lorencez's arrival, for, according to all the accounts I receive, the Spaniards are hated as much as the French are loved. I have attached importance to apprising Your Imperial Highness of these details, so that you may know that I am using every endeavour that the project we have elaborated may be realized."

The Archduke Ferdinand Max answered⁶⁰ in amiable terms that he was convinced Napoleon's power would master all the difficulties that had arisen, but in view of the whole situation, he felt bound on this occasion to lay special emphasis upon his "attitude of reserve."

Napoleon's hopes thus depended upon General Lorencez,

⁵⁸ Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 7, 1862; original in V. N. A.

⁵⁹ Napoleon to Metternich, March 7, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

⁶⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Miramar, March 15, 1862; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting in V. N. A.

who had been on the way to Mexico since January with his 4,500 men, and was expected to give a fresh turn to matters there. Such, at least, were his instructions, and at his farewell audience, in which Lorencez had been lavish with blood-thirsty aspirations and promises, Napoleon had seen that he was not lacking in goodwill.

On March 4 General Count Lorencez, who, through his marriage with Marshal Oudinot's daughter, was also closely connected with the circle of Napoleon I, arrived in Mexico with General Almonte and his troops. The latter had also been joined at Havana by a few other exiles belonging to the Conservative party, among them Miranda. Lorencez brought with him fresh instructions for Saligny and Jurien, recommending decidedly more drastic action, for in drafting them the Emperor could as yet have known nothing of the Preliminaries of La Soledad. When General Lorencez heard of them, he was very much annoyed, for, as he knew, this did not at all fit in with the Emperor's present plans, and he was not backward in expressing his views to Saligny and Jurien. Finding support for his opinions, the former now laid aside all discretion and came out into open hostility to Sir Charles Wyke and Prim. In his dispatches to Paris Saligny moreover reproached the two representatives with taking up an "incredible attitude," saying that Prim in particular upset and paralysed all his endeavours "out of personal ambition," and that both of them opposed French policy, as he put it, with the basest intrigues.⁶¹ Besides this, Almonte had made no secret of his intimate relations with Napoleon III and the intention which existed of setting up a monarchy in Mexico with the Archduke Ferdinand Max at its head; and shortly after his arrival he had paid a visit to Prim and spoken about it. Prim and Wyke both feigned astonishment, though they had naturally been advised of the project long since. The Spanish marshal did not wish Almonte to get beyond Vera Cruz; Saligny inquired about it, and received the reply that it was to be feared that if Almonte were once to reach the capital or its neighbourhood,

⁶¹ Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, May 3, 1862. It was the Empress Eugénie who had informed Metternich of this. V. N. A.

THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERVENTION

he would proclaim himself head of the Government, which Prim and Sir Charles Wyke must make it their aim to prevent. Saligny replied that if the two representatives were going to come out in this way as the protectors of the demagogical party, he for his part would take the Conservatives under his protection.

Moreover, Almonte and his companions had hardly landed in Mexico when Juarez addressed a request to the Allies that this "traitor to his country" should be handed over to him, a request with which neither the Spaniard nor the Englishman seemed entirely disinclined to comply.

Almonte's demeanour aroused justifiable suspicions even in the French, and in particular in Jurien de la Gravière. The Mexican gave himself far too many airs, as though he were Napoleon's lieutenant. Saligny went over to Almonte's side out of pique, and both of them now began intriguing against the Admiral with all their might.

An echo of this state of affairs is to be found in two letters which Almonte addressed from Vera Cruz to the Archduke at Miramar and Napoleon in Paris on March 18, the day before the march inland. Almonte asked the Emperor outright⁶² to recall Admiral Jurien de la Gravière as soon as possible, in the interest of the Emperor's dearest wishes, on account of his "incomprehensible attitude." After the unfortunate Preliminaries of La Soledad he had actually entered into negotiations with Doblado, which ought to have been carried on with the Mexicans banished by Juarez, of whom Almonte himself was one. Almonte was anxious when he heard of this, and blackened the Admiral to Napoleon for having asked advice of Prim or Charles Wyke instead of consulting Saligny. "I repeat, Sir," ran the letter, "that M. de Saligny is the only person who knows my native land; and if Your Majesty desires to see your wishes carried into effect, you have only to leave the whole direction of the policy which Your Majesty wishes to follow in Mexico to him."

⁶² General Almonte to Napoleon III, Vera Cruz, March 18, 1862; autograph copy by Almonte enclosed in his letter to the Archduke Ferdinand Max of the same date; original in V. N. A.

Almonte deplored in his letter the fact that the commissioners had lost time, for it would have been such a simple matter to reach the capital by a rapid march.

To the Archduke he spoke even more severely about the Admiral's weakness, saying that it was owing to the latter's bungling and the ill will of Prim and Wyke that he found the situation so different from what he had expected.

Admiral Jurien was naturally unaware of these letters at first; but Almonte's whole demeanour, and his incessant harping upon the favour in which he stood with the Emperor Napoleon, left the Admiral in no doubt that the Mexican would incite the Emperor against him. Yet he, who saw the great difficulties of any Mexican enterprise, and was opposed to the further prosecution of unlimited schemes in that land of anarchy, had thought that by his reserved course of action he would be acting for the best in the interest of his Emperor and country.

But now he had received clear instructions to protect Almonte, and must respect him as the agent of his Emperor. Napoleon's confidant and his party must be shielded by French arms. "Onward" was the word, and everything must be done to further the Emperor's far-reaching plans.

The Conservative partisans, who had at first maintained a reserved attitude in view of the weak and ambiguous policy of the allied powers, began to rally to Almonte in considerable numbers as soon as they heard of his arrival and the protection afforded him by the French bayonets. When on March 19 Almonte left Vera Cruz accompanied by Miranda and the minister Haro, in order to advance with a French battalion and his own adherents to Tehuacan, where he was to meet General Robles, he was received by the Mexican generals Don Leonardo Marquez, Don Thomas Mejía, Don Felix Zuloaga, and others who joined him with their men.

When Juarez learnt of these doings of his mortal enemy, he determined if possible to carry his death-dealing laws ruthlessly into effect against all who lent any sort of assistance to foreign intervention. And General Manuel Robles Pezuela, who intended to join Almonte in the Conservative camp under

French protection, was actually caught by Juarez's forces like a wild beast in a lasso, while on the way there, and on March 23 was shot in the back as a traitor without more ado.

The commissioners of the Allies had in the mean time all received their instructions. On January 27 Lord Russell had already empowered Sir Charles Wyke to re-embark the two hundred marines he had landed, as soon as the "unhealthy months" began.

Nor had Lord Russell made any secret of his ideas on the Mexican question. With an ironical smile he spoke to Count Apponyi in London about the negotiations of the commissioners with Juarez, and he laughed at the news that Napoleon was "in a rage" at the incidents which had thwarted his projects. "It is possible," said the minister in a warning tone, "that in the end Napoleon will be left alone in his enterprise as sole combatant, and will place your Archduke upon the throne; but in that case," said Russell, with a mocking smile, "I think the services he has done you will cost you dear; for you know that he never does a service for nothing."⁶³

It was easy for Lord Russell to prophesy that in the end Napoleon would be left alone. For the reasons mentioned above, it had long since been obvious to the English and Spaniards that they must withdraw from the course of action upon which they had started, but the French had instructions to pursue it more vigorously than ever. Lorencez is said to have written to the Emperor Napoleon on March 20 that it would take a certain definite number of days to reach Mexico, and that on the day of his arrival he would proclaim the Archduke Ferdinand Max Emperor. In any case Napoleon was very pleased with the general's vainglorious assertion. But if these were the views of the French, it was obvious what the outcome of the next meeting of the commissioners must be. In order to clear the decks, it was fixed for April 9 at Orizaba, for according to the Preliminaries of La Soledad the negotiations with Juarez's Government were to begin on the 15th.

As was to be expected, there was an immediate clash of

⁶³ Private letter of Count Apponyi to Count Rechberg, March 31, 1862; extract sent to the Archduke Ferdinand Max. V. N. A.

violently opposed views. For the English and Spaniards it was merely a question of how to arrange as dignified an exit as possible for their Governments. Admiral Jurien, who had as yet no idea that his recall had already been determined upon in Paris on March 20, and that instructions to that effect were now on the way, together with the appointment of General Lorencez as general of division and commander-in-chief of all the French forces by land and sea, now advocated the policy of intervention desired by Napoleon III, in opposition to that affirmed at La Soledad. England and Spain at once declared that France had no right to extend special protection to individual Mexicans upon Mexican territory (this was an allusion to Almonte). Almonte, they said, had roundly declared to Prim and the English Commodore Dunlop that he had come to Mexico in order to change the existing form of government, and had also spoken of the Archduke Ferdinand Max. This was contrary to the London Convention. Saligny answered with a malicious smile that Count Prim declared the Archduke's candidature to be absurd only because he desired to proclaim himself Emperor. Prim answered back in a rage. Sir Charles Wyke, who had all the time been secretly negotiating with Juarez, declared that the majority in the country was in favour of the latter's Government, and that it would be hard to find partisans for a monarchy. Jurien soothingly intervened with the statement that the scheme involving Maximilian was for the time being no more than a contingent one; but Saligny at once insisted that the French had received petitions from innumerable Mexicans, urging them to march to Mexico City; upon which Commodore Dunlop observed that, on the contrary, even the Frenchmen resident in Mexico would regard the French march on the capital with "extreme displeasure."⁶⁴

In these conditions an agreement was impossible. By that same evening an open breach had taken place. Spain and England withdrew their troops and ships, and the whole burden of the enterprise in Mexico now rested upon France alone.

Thanks to the victories of the Northern States in the War of Secession, Juarez had scored his own first success by cleverly

⁶⁴ From the *Procès-verbal de la conférence de Orizaba*, V. N. A.

exploiting the rivalries between the European powers: instead of three hostile great powers he had now only a single enemy — Napoleon.

Long before the Conference of Orizaba, Rechberg had already reached the right impression: that the fundamental condition originally laid down by the Archduke — namely, the assistance of *two* naval powers — had so far been only half fulfilled. He now declared⁶⁵ that the Mexican affair did not afford the securities and guarantees which he held to be indispensable, and that he must now recommend the greatest reserve to the Archduke. Count Rechberg discerned quite correctly that the fundamental reason for England's caution was the continued successes of the Northern States; and from the day on which England refused France's proposal to come to the help of the Southern States of North America by means of common intervention against the North, he was sure that this reserve "lay in England's disinclination on general grounds, and especially in view of the situation on the European continent, to involve herself in serious complications with North America." Metternich's dispatches had also had their effect upon the minister. On the arrival of the news of the Preliminaries of La Soledad, Napoleon's annoyance had been clearly visible, but it was plain that in spite of the attitude of England and Spain he was firmly resolved to pursue his project further. The Empress saw to it that he persisted in this. But Metternich considered that the time had now arrived to declare to Napoleon that the idea of the candidature was being abandoned.⁶⁶

But the Archduke was not to be discouraged so easily. In the middle of April he wrote to Gutierrez⁶⁷ that they must not give up hope that the matter might yet be happily cleared up. In Paris, too, the fairest hopes were cherished at court as before. General Almonte had written on March 23 that, since

⁶⁵ Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max on March 22 and to Metternich on March 23, 1862; original in V. N. A.

⁶⁶ See the dispatch and private letter of Metternich to Rechberg of April 1, 1862, extracts of which were sent for the Archduke's inspection. V. N. A.

⁶⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, April 12, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

the arrival of General Lorencez, matters had taken an entirely new turn; he assured them that by the end of April at the latest he would be in the capital, and that public opinion was becoming so favourable to the Archduke's candidature that there were those who thought that the Archduke would be able to come to Mexico towards the end of October. The domination of Juarez was generally regarded as being at an end.⁶⁸

Thus the most contradictory influences were brought to bear upon the Archduke from various quarters, and towards the middle of May 1862 he resolved to go to Brussels with his wife, in order to discuss the matter with his father-in-law "by word of mouth." The King of the Belgians considered the Mexican affair with his usual calm and deliberation, gave it as his opinion that they must proceed "with great circumspection," and "aim at ascertaining the truth," since the information of exiles and *émigrés* could not always be taken as a guide. But at the bottom of his heart he too was prejudiced in favour of the idea. And so Brussels was not the right place for dissuading the Archduke from his hazardous projects.

From that city he addressed a letter to Napoleon⁶⁹ to excuse himself for not being in a position to visit Paris. The news of the breaking off of the negotiations at Orizaba had just reached Europe. The Archduke remembered Rechberg's counsels that he should be cautious, and even King Leopold thought that in the circumstances of the moment he ought to exercise reserve.

In his letter to Napoleon, Ferdinand Max assured him that he was making a real sacrifice in abstaining from a fresh visit to the French Imperial Court when he was so near Paris. But such a visit, like a visit to London, where Ferdinand Max would gladly have visited the Great Exhibition, was not com-

⁶⁸ Extract from a letter of Almonte's from Vera Cruz, March 23, 1862. Given by the Empress Eugénie to Metternich and by him to Gutierrez for transmission to the Archduke. It is very possible that this "extract" only contained those passages in Almonte's letter which were favourable to the affair.

⁶⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, the Palace, Brussels, May 18, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

patible with the necessary reserve which he must maintain, and for similar reasons he had had to renounce the pleasure of seeing Gutierrez and Hidalgo. "Believe me, Sir," the letter concluded, "I am really in despair that it is not possible for me to follow the dictates of my heart on this occasion; and I hope that, if things take a more clearly defined turn, it will soon be granted to me to realize them."

In Paris the news of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops had been received with some resentment, and the Emperor and Empress were particularly angry at Prim's proceedings. On the other hand, the feeling that they would now be able to proceed freely, without having constantly to consider the other two powers in Mexico, caused a certain relief and satisfaction to their ambitions, which were also supported by their boundless confidence in the ability of General Lorencez. The opinion was that Spain would not be able to do much harm, that England would not want to, and that both of them would therefore let events take their course.

Rechberg was not at all of this way of thinking. In view of the new situation in North America, of Lincoln's declaration that he would tolerate no deviation from the fundamental principle of the Monroe Doctrine, of the conventions into which England and Spain had entered with Juarez, and of the withdrawal of these two powers, he was of opinion that the Archduke should give Napoleon to understand that he no longer regarded himself as bound by his preceding pledges. Rechberg thought the Archduke ought "delicately to restore to Napoleon his freedom of action, so that he might direct his policy accordingly."⁷⁰ In any case, however, he desired—and Metternich recommended the same thing—to "maintain" absolutely the personal and extra-official character of the affair, so that the Imperial Cabinet, which had "no sort of interest" in the question, might remain "entirely a stranger" to it. Metternich expressed the same opinion as before: namely, that the acceptance of the throne might in certain contingencies be a fine thing, but that it would always remain within "the domain of adventure, and that to face it in

⁷⁰ Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich, May 30, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

cold blood a man must have energy and character, and be ready to act at the right moment.”⁷¹

At last the Archduke, who had as yet received no answer to his letter to the Emperor from Brussels, yielded to this incessant pressure from Vienna. First he wanted once more to address a letter direct to the Emperor; then he began to hesitate about this, for, as he said, he knew Napoleon personally, and knew “how easily he feels hurt, owing to his sensitive temperament.” It was Rechberg’s wish that the Archduke should remind him of the conditions he had originally laid down, and he thought that such a letter of warning, which Napoleon would have to answer directly, might cause him embarrassment and annoyance.⁷² And so, to Rechberg at least, the Archduke advocated the “milder” form of a letter to Metternich, intended for Napoleon’s eye, and this was the course which he chose. But in reality he was afraid that now, when one of the main conditions had definitely fallen through — for he could have no doubt about this in view of England’s attitude — a fresh insistence upon this might make the whole question of the candidature problematical. But though the Archduke continued to lay stress upon his original stipulations, in his inmost heart the gaily coloured prospect had already become so dear to him, he had gone so far in dreams of its fulfilment, that if the worst came to the worst he was determined to accept, even if the conditions were not fulfilled.

And so a very involved letter was drawn up, which took great care not to revert too bluntly to the conditions formerly laid down. This letter must have cost the Archduke much trouble and sweat, for the draft was simply smothered with erasures, corrections, and further erasures.⁷³ It stated that the Archduke had seen in the London Convention a means of obtaining the guarantee of the naval powers, and of their co-operation, which “in his opinion” was indispensable; he hoped that the present abstention of England would only be “tempo-

⁷¹ Prince Metternich to Count Rechberg, May 22, 1862. V. N. A.

⁷² The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, Miramar, June 3, 1862. V. N. A.

⁷³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Metternich, Miramar, June 3, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

rary," and that she would once again give her material and moral support to the affair. None the less he had been agitated by what had occurred, for in view of the position in North America, which had pronounced openly against the setting up of the monarchy, the stipulation with regard to England's support was of incomparably greater importance. After a flattering reference to the "genius of the Emperor of the French" and the "noble sympathy" with which that great prince embraced all civilizing causes, and an expression of absolute confidence in him personally, the Archduke begged for information as to the measures which the Emperor contemplated adopting, in order to protect the cradle of the future monarchy from the attacks of its "colossal and covetous neighbour." He also wanted to hear something about the steps Napoleon would take to induce England to guarantee the integrity and independence of the Mexican Empire.⁷⁴

Thus the whole letter spoke of the empire in Mexico as of an irrevocably established fact, though the intention had been to say that the empire could never come into being unless the stipulations laid down conditionally were fulfilled. Ferdinand Max told Rechberg⁷⁵ that his letter must have removed all doubts at the French Court as to the fact that he regarded the active support of the English Government as a *sine qua non*. But to achieve this result, quite different expressions ought to have been used.

Meanwhile Napoleon had received yet another letter from Count Lorencez, full of high hopes. The Count thanked him for conferring upon him the rank of a general of division, spoke with pride and high satisfaction of his army,⁷⁶ declared that he felt himself absolute "master of Mexico," and was of opinion that by about May 20 or 25 he would be entering the capital.⁷⁷ The Emperor of the French was as yet unaware of the

⁷⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Metternich, June 3, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

⁷⁵ The same to the same, June 19, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

⁷⁶ According to modern ideas the strength of "my army" was one weak brigade.

⁷⁷ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, communicated by a letter of General Lorencez to Napoleon of June 5, 1862; here too it is possible that the position was purposely represented even more favourably than Lorencez had already represented it, in order to deceive the Archduke.

Archduke's letter to Metternich, which he did not receive till June 10. He now proceeded to thank Ferdinand Max in his own hand⁷⁸ for his letter of June 7 from Brussels, and to express his regret that a visit had then been impossible. Napoleon wrote that the news from Mexico sounded very good, since they were rid of General Prim's "fumbling and ridiculous advances" to the Mexican Government, and he hoped for decisive news by the next post, for "if the big city of Puebla declares itself for us, it is a hundred to one that the rest will follow."

The Emperor complained of the intrigues of Prim, who desired to wreck his plans, but he considered that the new turn things were taking would end in Prim's disgrace.

"I have always gone straight on my way," ran the letter; "I have not been willing to negotiate with the Mexican Government during a state of war, and have told my representatives that there is no intention of imposing any government whatsoever upon the Mexicans, but, on the other hand, of supporting a monarchy if it finds adherents in the country and a prospect of stability. This attitude was quite simple and straightforward, and in the meantime my intentions have been misrepresented and the character of the intervention distorted. The English will, I think, be very pleased if it succeeds, but they do not want to help us pick the chestnuts out of the fire."

In conclusion, the Emperor mentioned General Lorencez's communication, and his assumption that he would be in Mexico on May 25, and intimated that the prevalence of yellow fever on the coasts was the only obstacle to the dispatch of fresh reinforcements.

The Empress Eugénie at the same time wrote to the Archduchess Charlotte in reply to a letter of hers from Brussels.⁷⁹ The letter was composed immediately after the arrival of the Mexican post with General Lorencez's promising news, and

⁷⁸ The Emperor Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, June 7, 1862; original in V. N. A.

⁷⁹ The Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte, Tuileries June 7, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

shows what a rosy view the Empress took of the future. "General Lorencez," she wrote, "considers that as soon as he has crossed the Chiquihuite,⁸⁰ he will be master of the country. Generals and cities declare their adhesion to him daily, the land is tired of discord, and dreams of nothing but a stable government, which may give it a chance of development, and so their whole hopes are fixed upon the monarchy. Poor General Almonte has recently suffered greatly from the ill will of General Prim and Sir Charles Wyke. The former desired to work for his own ends, and the English commissioner encouraged him, for he knew very well that at the last moment it would be easy to play him a dirty trick; but Fate has decided otherwise, and now, thank God, we stand alone, without allies. It is a very significant fact that, so long as there were three parties to the proceedings, not a single Mexican was on our side, not even Juarez, for whom the Convention, or, I had better say, the Preliminaries, were a triumph; but since our activity has been freed from its shackles, the country feels secure enough to express its desires, and everybody is rallying round Almonte, the outlaw of yesterday, now the dictator over those provinces through which we have just advanced so fast. The next post will probably bring us news of his arrival in Mexico City. The Emperor is doubtless repeating the same details to the Archduke. Unfortunately many mistakes were made at first; but I have never doubted the success of the enterprise."

On June 10 Metternich sent the Archduke's letter on to Napoleon, adding in his covering letter⁸¹ that Ferdinand Max was anxious about the falling away of their allies, and wanted to know whether Napoleon would take efficacious measures to defend the new monarchy from the hostile ambition of North America. If, wrote the Ambassador, Napoleon would allow him once more to remind him of the most important points in the answer to the Archduke — namely, that money and troops should be easy to obtain, that the Archduke's Government must be freely accepted by the Mexican people, and placed

⁸⁰ A small stream and township near Córdoba on the Vera Cruz-Puebla road.

⁸¹ Prince Richard Metternich to Napoleon III, June 10, 1862, from the Ambassador's dispatch to Count Rechberg of June 10, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

under the protection of the two great European naval powers — he felt that this would go far towards setting the Archduke's mind at rest as to the outcome of the enterprise.

The Emperor quite approved of Metternich's letter, but delayed answering until the favourable news expected from Mexico arrived. But the rosy optimism of the Emperor and Empress was soon to be thoroughly disappointed.

The Conference of Orizaba had hardly broken down, owing to the utter lack of agreement between the Allies, when on April 3 Saligny, still acting, for the last time, in concert with Admiral Jurien, who had been repudiated, dismissed from the supreme command, and once more placed at the head of his naval division, issued a proclamation to the Mexicans which was equivalent to a declaration of war upon Juarez. The city of Córdoba, from which the proclamation was issued, now declared itself by a *pronunciamiento* in favour of intervention, and published a manifesto by which General Almonte was provisionally to have the position of supreme head of the Mexican nation. In accordance with the terms of the Preliminaries of La Soledad, Lorencez had begun by retiring with his troops, but had then availed himself of a pretext to declare these terms not binding, and started his advance along the great road leading by way of Orizaba and Puebla to Mexico City.

Although about 7,100 French had set out for Mexico, the general had now at his disposal an effective force of no more than some 6,000 men; for the murderous climate of Vera Cruz and the long marches had already caused heavy losses. The general was, however, urged on by Saligny as well as by Almonte; the advance was represented as child's play, since the "enemy was breaking up"; besides which, Lorencez knew how anxious his sovereign was for good news. So he resolved on advancing, and aimed at first taking Puebla. This was a city surrounded by low hills, defended by four thousand Dissidents and surrounded by strong fortifications. Lorencez, presuming upon the great military superiority of his troops, took the bull by the horns. On May 5 he attacked Fort Guadalupe, a strong fort standing upon a steep declivity. With des-

perate courage the brave troops advanced to the assault up the steep slope, but they were forced back after heavy losses. The weak numbers of the attacking force did not permit further attempts. The French general had to renounce his intention of taking the city, and Juarez's troops had gained an undoubted victory over the victorious forces of Sebastopol, Magenta, and Solferino. The general's proud dreams were shattered, and his first impulse was to retreat to Vera Cruz and wait for reinforcements.

It was only Saligny's urgent representations, and his appeal to the name of the Emperor, which succeeded in keeping Lorencez in Orizaba. He ascribed his ill success to the absence of the forces promised by the Conservative party, and to the fact that he had always been told—this was a direct hit at Saligny and Almonte—that he would be received in the cities of the interior “with nothing but flowers.”

On the other hand, the Conservative generals would not let themselves be discouraged by this reverse. Now, when they saw that Almonte really had France behind him, they determined to join him with their troops and remain at his side. Thus the defeat at Puebla was somewhat softened by the fact that on May 18 General Marquez, a very able soldier, with his own adherents and a French battalion, annihilated some troops of Juarez which had advanced from Orizaba under command of Tapia; while on June 14 the French routed an enemy brigade led by General Ortega. But this could not alter the fact that the despised “anarchical” troops of Mexico had inflicted a reverse upon the best soldiers in the world. Juarez well knew how to make the best of this fact. His cry of “War against foreign domination” went to the heart of the country, and the affair of Puebla created the greatest sensation throughout the whole world.

It was naturally at the imperial court of France that the incident produced the deepest impression. The Emperor and Empress felt it as a knock-down blow; the change from the highest hopes to depression had been too abrupt. In his first panic Napoleon thought he saw the expeditionary force already annihilated, and abandoned all hope of still being able

to save it.⁸² In speaking of it to Metternich he was unable to hide his deep sorrow. And the Empress too was extremely uneasy. In addition to this, those who had been involved in the reverse tried to blacken one another at court. Lorencez, who had quite thrown over Saligny and Almonte, blamed them both, on the ground that their inaccurate reports had been responsible for it all. For their part Saligny and Almonte alleged that the general had not followed the tactics recommended by them, which were simply to march past the fortifications of Puebla. Saligny's enemies informed the Empress that he was a drunkard. But Eugénie was still personally loyal to the minister, and answered that it must be admitted that he had managed to find plenty of energy and intelligence at the bottom of the bottle.⁸³ The Emperor sent for the plans of Puebla, and then, following his wife's example, threw over General Lorencez and upheld Saligny and Almonte. The general was instructed to pay better heed to their advice till further instructions followed.

It was a triumph for Saligny and Almonte that another general of higher rank was now to be sent out to Mexico. Hidalgo had had a good deal of hand in this too, for he was on good terms with Saligny, and had received detailed reports from him, in which Lorencez was adversely judged and the hope expressed that the Emperor and Empress of the French and the Archduke would not allow themselves to be discouraged, in spite of all.⁸⁴ Hidalgo, who had at that time been staying for nine days as a guest at one of the Emperor's country-houses, was credited by public opinion in Paris with the whole responsibility for the Mexican enterprise. He began to feel a certain bitterness, and gradually to become conscious of the appalling burden of responsibility which he had incurred by taking advantage of his influence over the Empress to press the affair. But it was only for a moment; then he put these thoughts aside, and took advantage of the small successes which had followed the reverse at Puebla to calm the

⁸² Metternich to Rechberg, July 7, 1862; original and copy in V. N. A.

⁸³ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, July 8, 1862. V. N. A.

⁸⁴ Saligny to Hidalgo, May 27, 1862; extract in V. N. A.

mind of the Archduke, with whom he was now in regular communication. He assured him that Napoleon had no idea of stopping half-way; he would send all necessary reinforcements.⁸⁵ In Paris preparations were being made for sending a fine army corps, and Mexico would certainly be occupied in November by 29,000 men.⁸⁶ Hidalgo was right: the honour of the French arms was at stake, the threatened landing-force had to be saved; there could be no doubt of that. On June 14, in a letter to Randon, the Minister for War, Napoleon had already issued detailed instructions for the dispatch of reinforcements.⁸⁷ Even the Corps Législatif voted the necessary credits unanimously in view of the critical situation. Jules Favre, it is true, did not miss this opportunity of attacking the Government violently for its Mexican policy. Almonte, he said, ought to be sent home. "We hate all tyrannies," he exclaimed significantly, "even those which appear in disguise."

In the meantime Admiral Jurien de la Gravière had returned to Paris, for he felt the necessity of justifying his Mexican policy to the Emperor. Napoleon was feeling the effect of the bad news from Puebla, which was a bad mark for Lorencez, who had replaced the more cautious admiral, and thus found himself greatly embarrassed as regards the admiral whom he had disavowed. For, as events had shown, Jurien's sole crime was the prudence and caution which should indeed have been necessary. Napoleon received the admiral in a very friendly way, heard his report with the greatest interest, and also swallowed Jurien's observation that Saligny's proceedings were much too drastic, but that Almonte too put himself forward far too much. In general the monarch considered that Almonte was much too precipitate in publishing to the world as his own and Napoleon's the whole project for setting up a monarchy, which was to have been so managed that the world should think it had come from the Mexican people. The admiral agreed, and declared that Almonte gave himself far too many airs on the strength of the Emperor's patronage; this

⁸⁵ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, July 4, 1862. V. N. A.

⁸⁶ The same to the same, June 22, 1862. V. N. A.

⁸⁷ Randon: *Mémoires*, II. 63.

had already played a part in the breach with Spain and England, and would continue seriously to compromise the undertaking.

Saligny was still too strongly supported by the Empress and her prompter. Moreover, the Emperor had previously had a great affection and liking for Almonte; but for the moment he began to feel a slight uneasiness as to whether he was not imperilling the whole affair by his rashness and vain-glory. The Emperor had moreover heard that Almonte had assumed, though only provisionally, the title of supreme head of the Mexican nation, which sounded altogether too autocratic.

When, therefore, in July 1862 he sent to Mexico General Forey, a commander who had won his laurels at Montebello in 1859, and had since enjoyed great military renown, he advised him to keep his eye on Almonte, and prevent him from showing his hand too openly, as the Mexican seemed inclined to do in putting himself forward so persistently. But in giving this advice the Emperor was far from wishing to withdraw his countenance from Almonte; indeed, in his official instructions he strongly recommended Forey to act in the friendliest way towards General Almonte and all the Mexicans who might place themselves at his disposal.

Forey took with him reinforcements which raised the originally small French expeditionary force to a strength of 28,000 men. This force was divided into two infantry divisions, one of which was commanded by General François Achille Bazaine, the son of an officer who had served with distinction under Napoleon I; while the other had at its head General Charles Abel Douay, who had distinguished himself in the Crimean War by his brave assault on the Malakoff redoubt.

Napoleon had recommended to Forey that he should continue to work hand in hand with Saligny in his further proceedings, since he had succeeded in holding high the flag of France better than all other Frenchmen in Mexico. Ambitious jealousies and bickerings had so far ruined everything in Mexico, and the Emperor wanted to hear no more of such things.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ See Émile Ollivier: *L'Empire libéral* (Paris, 1900), II. 410.

Besides these personal counsels, the general received from Napoleon very full official instructions, dated July 3, 1862, which were intended for publication and therefore appropriately embroidered.⁸⁹ They transferred to Forey the unlimited control of both military and political affairs, and referred Saligny to the general, after previously lavishing the highest praise upon the diplomatist's attitude. Forey was not to become involved in any party squabbles; he was to show respect for religion, but to calm the minds of the owners of the Church property already sold, by assurances that it would not be taken from them. The wish was also expressed that on his arrival Almonte should summon an assembly of Mexican notables "of all shades of opinion" who had "adopted the French cause as their own." This qualifying phrase naturally deprived the expression "of all shades of opinion" of all meaning, for those who had rallied to Almonte and intervention belonged to one shade of opinion only, the Conservative. Further, Napoleon expressly laid down in these instructions that if the Mexicans were to prefer a monarchy, it was naturally to France's interest to uphold them in this, and he even empowered the general to mention the name of the Archduke Ferdinand Max as the French candidate. As though to allay all uneasiness, he added that such a prince "would, however, always be compelled to act in the interest of France." The sovereign also gave his general military advice of a strategic and tactical order. With reference to the luckless attempt on Puebla on May 5 he recommended that such a policy of sudden attack should be used only in open country, when the enemy was exposed to a surprise; but in the case of fortified places, and if the enemy were forewarned, he advised prudence and "great circumspection." Forey read his instructions very carefully, and subsequent events will show how painfully he clung to them, though for that very reason he failed to win Napoleon's approval. Towards the end of these instructions Napoleon laid down on broad lines the objects of the intervention, the culminating point of which was that Mexico must be so organized as to form an "insurmountable

⁸⁹ Frequently printed; e.g., in G. Niox: *Expédition du Mexique, 1861-7* (Paris, 1874), p. 212.

barrier" against the encroachments of the North American Union, which was seeking to bring not only the countries surrounding the Gulf of Mexico, but also the territories of Central America and, beyond that, even of South America within the sphere of its domination — projects which it would not suit France to have carried into effect.

Napoleon thought that he might again speak out rather severely against the United States; for in June and July 1862 the fortunes of war had changed, and the army of the Southern States, under the gifted Lee, had won important successes at certain weak points not far from Washington, the capital of the Union. And so when, on July 26, 1862, the Southern envoy was received by Napoleon, he found the Emperor so well-disposed to him that he succeeded in inducing him to write to Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, then staying in London, that he was to sound opinion as to whether the moment had not arrived to recognize the independence of the Southern States. But England was prudently unwilling to go so far, though Palmerston too was a partisan of the South; for Lord Russell in particular was convinced that the greatly superior strength of the North would in the end overpower the Southern States. But England allowed herself to be so far influenced, both by the situation of the War of Secession and by the desire not to fall into open enmity with Napoleon, as not to ratify a treaty highly favourable to England which had meantime been concluded between Sir Charles Wyke and Juarez.

As regards the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Napoleon was somewhat embarrassed after the reverse at Puebla, on account of the sanguine letter which he had written him immediately before it. Hence he had not answered the letter recently addressed to Metternich, but intended for the Emperor's eye, for, as may be understood, it would have been awkward to find anything to say.

It was not till July 30 that he said to Metternich that he apologized for not having entered into the political questions in the letter, but it did not seem to him to be the right moment to develop them, since military problems engaged his full at-

tention for the moment.⁹⁰ He perfectly recognized the reasons which had prompted a recapitulation of the conditions originally laid down, but he assured the Ambassador *that the Archduke could entirely depend upon him* (*pouvait entièrement se reposer sur lui*). He grasped the Archduke's position too well not to surround his possible candidature with all the conditions which his dignity demanded. The Empress too talked to the Prince for a long time to the same purpose, and he reported the upshot of this conversation to Vienna, whence the Archduke was, as before, kept informed of all that was going on.

Gutierrez de Estrada continued to overwhelm the Archduke with a flood of letters full of flattering expressions of an absolutely Oriental stamp, and succeeded in worming himself deeper and deeper into the confidence of the Prince, who now never addressed him otherwise than as "*Mon bien cher et respectable Mr. Gutierrez.*"

A pause of several months now took place in the negotiations about the Mexican question. They had first to wait for the arrival of General Forey and his expeditionary force, the embarkation and transport of which naturally required much time and trouble. General Lorencez had received orders to do nothing till Forey's arrival.

The enthusiasm of the Emperor and Empress of the French was sobered for the time being; they no longer promoted the Mexican affair with such ardour as before Puebla. Moreover, it was to their interest that Mexico should not be too much discussed by the French public until they could come forward with a favourable *fait accompli* and so entirely efface the memory of the set-back at Puebla.

This long pause made the Archduke Ferdinand Max uneasy. Hidalgo had not written for six or eight weeks, and in the various conversations which Metternich had with the French Emperor and his wife during this period there was no word of Mexico. In short, the Archduke already began to cherish misgivings lest the whole matter should become dormant and

⁹⁰ Prince Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg from Fontainebleau, June 1862; copy of this private letter in V. N. A.

nothing come of it in the end. When a rumour reached him that Juarez had suggested to the Emperor Napoleon that they might come to terms, and that the French Cabinet was intending to recognize the Southern States as soon as Mexico City should be occupied, and open negotiations with a view to the incorporation of Mexican territory in the new Union of Southern States which was to be created, in return for the payment of a considerable war indemnity to France, the Archduke instructed the Baron De Pont to make inquiries of Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris. De Pont advised against this step, and declared that he would rather make unofficial and confidential inquiries.

Though it was not officially admitted, it was in practice no longer Rechberg and Metternich who acted as intermediaries between Paris and Miramar, but on the one side the Secretary of Legation, Baron De Pont, who had been a member of the Archduke's chancellery when he was Governor-General in Italy and had stayed with him, and on the other side, in Paris, Hidalgo and Gutierrez. Through Hidalgo the Empress heard of Maximilian's misgivings, and suggested that their Mexican friend Gutierrez should write to Miramar that, contrary to all allegations, Juarez had never written to the Emperor Napoleon.

King Leopold had also been surprised at the long silence about Mexico. He had been ill for a long time. But now, at the end of September 1862, he wrote to inquire of his son-in-law whether he had "done anything recently" in the matter. He considered that he could hardly ask Napoleon all he wanted to know directly, for the latter would at once think it was being done at his son-in-law's instance. In any case he held the opinion, which was hardly flattering to the Mexicans, that "Those who know them out there have unfortunately the worst idea of them."⁹¹ The same view appeared to be expressed in a private letter from Paris sent on to the Archduke by Rechberg, in which the writer gave an account of a conversation with the chief engineer and an officer on board the packet-

⁹¹ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 29, 1862; original in V. N. A.

THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERVENTION

boat sailing between Vera Cruz and the French harbour of Saint-Nazaire.

"Like all who know anything about it,"⁹² ran the letter, "they are both certain that the Mexican expedition is an unhappy, incalculable venture, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen, even after the occupation of the capital."

None of this made any impression upon the Archduke Ferdinand Max. In his answer to his father-in-law he assured him that he still stood by the conditions laid down in the beginning, of which he had "even" reminded them in Paris, and, for the rest, was leaving affairs to shape themselves. At the same time he requested the King to keep him informed of "all shades of opinion" on the question at the various courts, and also to send him the dispatches of the Belgian ministers to look at.⁹³

Meanwhile an important ministerial change had taken place in Paris. On October 7 Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, retired and M. Drouyn de Lhuys was appointed to this office for the fourth time since his first term in December 1848. Gutierrez was one of those most delighted at the change, for he knew very well that Thouvenel had not a high opinion of him, and had been largely responsible for the cool reception with which the Mexican had met at the Court of Paris. Through Drouyn de Lhuys he hoped for much easier and more intimate relations with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

It was said that the new minister was a warm partisan of the Mexican policy, and, in particular, of active support for the Southern States of America, which were then in a very good position from the military point of view and were winning many victories. Slidell, the envoy of the Southern States, was at last received in audience on October 20, his first attempt at being received by Napoleon having come to nothing. Napoleon gave him to understand that he would invite England and Russia to try to obtain, in concert with France, a proposal for mediation in America. A regular plot against the Northern

⁹² Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 13, 1862, enclosing a private letter dated from Paris, October 10, 1862. V. N. A.

⁹³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to King Leopold of the Belgians, Miramar, October 15, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

States was hatched, the soul of which was the King of the Belgians.

"Recently," wrote the King at that time to his son-in-law,⁹⁴ "I have attempted to take the initiative in the American affair. Public opinion, though so very timid, has since then made progress in England in the direction of recognition of the Southern States, which would be so much to her interest. For this end the most sincere co-operation of the Emperor Napoleon was indispensable, and he has promised it to me in the most definite terms. The form to follow would be an offer from England and France of their good offices, perhaps with the aid of Russia. If, as is probable, these good offices are refused, the logical result is the recognition of the Southern States. Lord Palmerston, too, saw things this way, but there were always *trembleurs* in England, and they are also afraid of the Americans' resourcefulness. That is all the more reason why they should use the present opportunity of working hand in hand with France, which will never perhaps offer itself so fully again. I have made Napoleon feel how important the recognition of the South is for his Mexican operations."

Things did not go quite so easily as the King imagined; his influence was indeed great, but the English ministers were very distrustful and bent on asserting their independence, especially in view of the relationship of the King of the Belgians to their Queen. This is why it so often happened that a thing was not done in England if Leopold was too persistent in his attempts to achieve it—it was regarded as interference from a foreign quarter. The question of the recognition of the South made no real progress. But the Archduke was all the more interested in the attitude, "views, and intentions of the London Cabinet," as he said. He wrote to his father-in-law⁹⁵ that he had for long past attached great importance to being able to draw up a horoscope for the following period with regard to matters of importance before the beginning of the winter sea-

⁹⁴ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand, Laeken, October 27, 1862; original in V. N. A.

⁹⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold I, King of the Belgians, October 29, 1862; draft in V. N. A.



THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF AUSTRIA
VISITING FERDINAND MAX AND CHARLOTTE AT MIRAMAR,
MAY 18, 1861

son, in order to shape his course of action in accordance with it; and he once more requested his father-in-law's services in order that he might know how he stood with "one of the most decisive factors": namely, England.

This question which he had put to him so frequently before, and now repeated, was always fully answered by the King, in a more or less depressing and unfavourable way. As recently as October 27 he had written to his son-in-law: "The idea is still held in England that nothing can possibly be done with Mexico."⁹⁶

But the Archduke wanted a favourable report about England, even, we are tempted to believe, if it did not quite correspond to the truth. His desire for a successful settlement of the Mexican question was so great that, in spite of all the answers he received, he went on asking, in the hope that he might perhaps in time receive an agreeable one. Ferdinand Max was so thoroughly enmeshed in the illusions fostered by Gutierrez and his friends that he did not notice what a contradiction there was in his words when he wrote to his father-in-law that all preliminary consultations had always been and were still based upon the condition "that the Mexicans should be afforded the chance of expressing themselves freely as to the ordering of their fortunes; that they should openly declare their desire for the introduction of a monarchical form of government, and offer me the crown." Still less, naturally, was there any question of merely replacing Juarez's supposed domination of the Mexican people by force by what would really amount to repression on the part of the French and a "free" expression of their will.

The Archduke, however, sought eagerly for arguments in favour of his desires, which were set upon the imperial crown. A dispatch was sent on to him from Brussels at this time from the Belgian *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, who was well aware of his sovereign's secret attraction towards seeing his daughter Charlotte Empress of Mexico, and therefore always reported "entirely in the sense of the monarchy, and of the

⁹⁶ Leopold I, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Laeken, October 27, 1862; original in V. N. A.

projects in view";⁹⁷ and this dispatch was highly acceptable to him. The Archduke was absolutely enthusiastic about it; it was the most interesting, he said, that he had ever read on the subject of that poor country, a prey to party passions. It was proof of the clear, dispassionate judgment of a sound, far-sighted man, who knew the country and the people thoroughly, and was led by duty alone to tell the truth to his Government unreservedly.

Kint von Roodenbeck, the diplomatist whose reports were thus estimated, was judged very differently in other quarters. He was actually accused of being deeply involved in the problems offered by Mexico, of being personally interested in the question of a Mexican loan, which was bound up with that of intervention, and, in general, of having always taken care to report only what his King's Government were glad to hear. The tone of his reports was therefore favourable to the undertaking, and that was enough for the Archduke. Nothing could now check the rolling stone.

⁹⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, November 6, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

CHAPTER V

FOR AND AGAINST THE CANDIDATURE

Forey Commander-in-Chief — General Almonte removed — Metternich and Rechberg attempt to dissuade the Archduke — The part played by the Archduchess Charlotte — Dubious elements are consulted — Lord Russell's obstinacy — England seeks to divert the Archduke from the project by offering him the crown of Greece — Ferdinand Max's refusal — Forey's advance — Kint von Roodenbeck as adviser — Almonte and Hidalgo's intrigues against Forey — Bazaine pushed into the foreground — Capture of Puebla and Mexico City — Napoleon as happy as a child — His letters to the Archduke — A fresh interview with Gutierrez opposed by Rechberg — The Assembly of Notables in Mexico — "Election" of the Archduke — The Emperor Francis Joseph and his brother at Schönbrunn — Warnings from all quarters of the globe — England's ironical attitude — Sir Charles Wyke's scepticism — The hornet's nest — Maternal anxiety — The Archduchess Charlotte tries to remove it — Her visit to King Leopold and consultations with him — The King shares the responsibility for the acceptance — Palmerston's views — No Bourbon worth a fig — The Emperor Francis Joseph refuses any Austrian guarantee — Reception of the deputation at Miramar — Controversy between the two brothers as to the answer to be returned — Demande instead of exige — The Archduke abides by his decisions.

MEANWHILE, ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1862, GENERAL FOREY and his troops had arrived at Vera Cruz after a stormy voyage, which did severe damage, especially to one shipload of horses. Bearing in mind his Emperor's admonitions, and impressed with the idea that he must proceed with more circumspection than the imprudent Lorencez, whose rashness had led him to burn his fingers at Puebla, he took his time over the military operations. First the disembarkation had to be carried out without fuss; then ample provision had to be made for the transport and material well-being of the troops; then, and not till then, was he prepared to proceed to the military mission entrusted to him. In his desire to manage better than Lorencez, the general bade fair to go to the opposite extreme. He immediately availed himself of the full political powers by which even Saligny and Almonte were subordinated to him. In two proclamations he assured the Mexican people that his Emperor was not making war upon them, but upon the Government, and used all those phrases which, as we know from experience, are always available on such occasions.

Immediately upon his arrival the general dissolved Almonte's Government, and made the Mexican resign the title of "head of the nation" which he had assumed, thus showing unequivocally that he suspected Almonte of trying to turn the enterprise to his own personal and selfish advantage. He was not so far wrong, for Almonte was at any rate firmly resolved to play the chief part in the State immediately after the sovereign, instead of leaving it to Santa Anna, as Gutierrez was trying to arrange in Europe. Santa Anna had written to Gutierrez¹ that he was waiting patiently till the call came, for he did not wish to be a miserable pretender. He already thought it very "remarkable" that Almonte had ordered the officials in Mexico to treat him merely as an ordinary individual (*simple particulier*) if he came to the country. A little later,² Santa Anna's strictures were still more severe. He called Al-

¹ Santa Anna to Gutierrez, St. Thomas, September 19, 1862; original letter sent on to the Archduke. V. N. A.

² The same to the same, October 13, 1862; letter sent for the Archduke's inspection. V. N. A.

monte a "traitor," however much he might be under the Emperor Napoleon's patronage. He meant, it is true, a traitor to his own, Santa Anna's, cause, and in this he was certainly right. Each of them wanted the supreme power in the State for himself. Santa Anna insisted that what was then going on in Mexico would only make the Archduke ridiculous.

"It is above all urgent," he wrote, "to aim at the dictatorship of a Mexican, who would have a friendly reception from the people on the strength of his good past record."

Almonte and Santa Anna each considered himself to be the one and only fit person to rule. Their actions were calculated accordingly. The former had made the Archduke's acquaintance, and obtained the impression that he would be able to manage him easily in Mexico; and so, when he wrote to him in August³ asking for money for his Mexicans, "who were so ragged and starving beside the well-equipped, well-fed Frenchmen," he said that Ferdinand Max ought to make arrangements with a view to coming to Mexico in December at the latest.

Napoleon was certainly very well-disposed towards Almonte, and Hidalgo, through the agency of the Empress, took pains to keep him so. But the Emperor had heard from many other quarters, and especially from Admiral Jurien, of Almonte's proceedings in Mexico, and for a moment had even feared that the latter might suddenly take the whole control of the Mexican enterprise out of his own hands. It was this which had prompted his secret instructions to Forey. But when, on the very day after his arrival, Forey issued a peremptory order that the Government set up by Almonte "without the participation of the nation" should be dissolved, and that thenceforward Almonte was not to issue any laws or decrees, but to confine himself within the limits in which his activity might be developed in harmony with the new instructions, Napoleon felt that his general was taking him at his word a little too literally.

The Mexican had no other course open to him but to accept

³ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Orizaba, August 9, 1862; original in V. N. A.

the situation with a good grace, for, after all that had happened, it was impossible for him to abandon the French cause. In an extremely embarrassed manifesto to the nation, and an equally sheepish letter to the Archduke, he tried to explain the reasons for his removal and the loss of his title, which he had assumed only "as a means by which he might the better fulfil the Emperor's wishes." As we have said, General Forey's action had gone beyond what Napoleon had intended. After all, Almonte had till then been the Emperor's confidant and entrusted with highly important tasks.

But by acting in this way Forey had turned Almonte into a bitter, vindictive enemy, and a dangerous one, as subsequent events were to show, owing to his skill in intrigue. In the nature of things Saligny was another, since, in spite of Jurien and Lorencez, he had so far kept the political control of the enterprise more or less in his own hands, for, owing to his many years' experience of Mexican affairs, he considered himself quite competent to do so, and was now highly indignant at again seeing himself subordinated to a general who had hitherto known about as much about Mexico as he might have learnt at school.

But Forey remembered his sovereign's warnings about the necessity for harmony between those taking part in the enterprise, and at once tried to get on as good terms with Saligny as possible, while allaying, at least temporarily, the deep distrust of the French officers who had fought at Puebla and felt that they had been driven into an impasse by the minister.

The landing of troops was completed by the middle of November 1862, and Forey joined Lorencez at Orizaba, where he and his little force had been waiting since Puebla in a most critical situation. Forey and his troops did not venture out of Orizaba at first. Though he heard that on the plateau of Anahuac the army could easily live on the country, for the time being he had all supplies laboriously brought by sea.

On the other hand Saligny and Almonte, who were both vexed about the general, were pressing for an advance. And so dissensions began to arise between Forey and Saligny, for the latter acted as if he himself were not affected by the orders

issued by the general to Almonte. Even before this, Saligny could not tolerate any rival, and Forey's somewhat high-handed proceedings were not at all to his taste. Forey was already the third commander-in-chief since the beginning of the expedition, and at last he too complained bitterly of Saligny to the Emperor; but, thanks to the patronage of the Emperor's half-brother, the Duc de Morny, who was financially interested in intervention in Mexico, Saligny was now firmly in the saddle. He had an influential advocate in Paris in the person of Hidalgo, besides other good connexions. But the harmony which was so much to be desired in Mexico was still entirely lacking.

Meanwhile the Mexicans profited by Forey's excessive prudence and dilatoriness. It was obvious to them that the French would first attack Puebla, if only out of a desire to avenge their defeat of May 5. Fresh fortifications were hastily thrown up round the city. Juarez did his best to represent it as a national war against intruders and oppressors. He proclaimed that freedom, humanity, and the cause of civilization were at stake. He did all he could to increase his military strength. He appointed General Ortega commandant of Puebla, placed the former President Comonfort at the head of an auxiliary force, and threatened all Mexicans who had joined Almonte with the severest penalties, as traitors to their country. The phrase "defence of our national independence" awoke an echo in large sections of the country, so that the French intervention drove into the camp of Juarez many Mexicans who before it would have recognized anyone rather than him. Many of the victims of his draconian laws were guilty of no crime save belonging to the opposite party. Moreover, he posted up everywhere a letter of Victor Hugo, the great poet, who was a bitter enemy of the Second Empire, and the speeches made by Jules Favre in the Paris Chamber, for both of them had used strong language in opposition to the Emperor's Mexican policy.

Victor Hugo's pamphlet *Napoleon le petit*, filled with hatred of Napoleon III, which he wrote while in exile in Brussels, was reprinted and distributed in Mexico, in the hope that it would also fall into the hands of the French soldiers. Everything conceivable was done which an ardent desire to resist to the

utmost could suggest to a man of energy pursuing a conscious aim and deeply convinced of the righteousness of his cause.

Meanwhile things in Europe had not made much progress. The pause in the French operations in Mexico, and the attitude of England, suggested to Prince Richard Metternich — who had never been very enthusiastic about the Mexican idea — that now was a favourable moment, which might not recur, for the Archduke to withdraw from this hazardous enterprise. He quite justly concluded that, in spite of the assertions of the Mexican exiles, who had their own axes to grind, it would really not be possible to collect enough votes to produce even the “appearance” of a plebiscite in favour of the Archduke. It was evident that England was no longer ready to give any guarantee, and that Austria could not be satisfied with a guarantee from France alone, which was, moreover, “also very problematical.”⁴ In cautious terms he counselled a contingent withdrawal under a discreet pretext. A little while later he also reported⁵ that the Emperor Napoleon had been much upset by the heavy losses which Forey had suffered from malaria during the march from Vera Cruz to Orizaba. It seemed to have been almost like the crossing of the Beresina. In one regiment only 900 men were left out of 1,800. The cavalry squadrons had been decimated, and, to crown all, the naval squadron lying off Vera Cruz had been damaged by storms. “The whole of this hazardous expedition,” wrote the Ambassador, “is a great source of anxiety to the Emperor and Empress, and confidence will not return till Mexico City has been reached.”

The Archduke Ferdinand Max, however, informed Rechberg that he had sent Baron De Pont to Paris with an “intimation” that he adhered to his original intentions with regard to the throne of Mexico, but that he did not want to cause “any embarrassment” to the Emperor of the French, should his projects have undergone any modification owing to fresh developments. So Puebla and the French reverse had made an impression upon Ferdinand Max. This “feeler” was intended to secure his “initiative in a withdrawal,” which would naturally

⁴ Prince Richard Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, November 18, 1862; V. N. A.

⁵ The same to the same, Paris, December 9, 1862; copy in V. N. A.

follow if France also withdrew her intervention in Mexico. But De Pont received the definite answer that Napoleon's projects remained the same as they had been a year ago, and that he was determined to strive for their realization even without the assistance of his two former allies.

"If, then, the conditions formulated by me in October of last year, sanctioned by His Majesty, and fully approved by Your Excellency, are fulfilled," ran the end of the Archduke's letter to Rechberg⁶ — not very logically, for owing to the withdrawal of England and Spain they had as a matter of fact not been fulfilled — "for my part, as a point of honour, I hold it to be a duty not to withdraw from further negotiations, in accordance with the contingent assent which I then expressed."

The Archduke did not want to renounce the enterprise, and could therefore see no reason for acting as Metternich advised, which would abruptly have ended his dream. He therefore joined issue on the point that, if they were to withdraw now, Napoleon might feel injured. The Emperor had given them no grounds for mistrust, and such a proceeding must strike him as a "capricious whim," and call forth "a certain justifiable sentiment of revenge."

And so things remained as they were. But in other quarters little confidence was felt. At the Archduke's request the Pope had appointed Bishop Labastida Archbishop of Mexico. The bishop had been recommended to him by Ferdinand Max's evil genius, Gutierrez, and was a cold, domineering, rather unprepossessing person of rigidly ultramontane opinions. The Pope took the opportunity of advising all the bishops to adopt a waiting attitude for the present, until it should be possible to see their way clearly.

The Archduke was so eager for Gutierrez's letters that he instructed De Pont to tell him that he was always "extremely sensible" of Gutierrez's trouble in keeping him in touch with things.⁷ A rumour had just sprung up that one of Napoleon's conditions of peace with Mexico was the cession to France of

⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, Lacroma, November 27, 1862; draft in V. N. A.

⁷ Baron De Pont to Gutierrez, January 1, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

the Mexican province of Sonora, with its mineral wealth. The Archduke did not credit the rumour, but he declared that if it proved true, it would be a very "annoying piece of news," for in that case there would be no object in his candidature, since he could never lend his hand to such a mutilation of the country. He felt that in such a case his position would be quite impossible; but no such project was seriously entertained. The Archduke received a report from Almonte, who harangued him from Mexico, just as Hidalgo, and particularly Gutierrez, did from Paris.

The Mexican hoped that by the end of January the French army would reach the capital; meanwhile the country was showing itself increasingly favourable to a radical change in the political situation.⁸ Ferdinand Max replied that he was delighted by Almonte's confidence, and hoped for the success of the enterprise, guided by "the genius of the Emperor Napoleon."⁹

The Archduchess Charlotte at first looked at things from a more practical point of view. She wrote to her father¹⁰ that, like her husband, she wanted to hear an "impartial exposé" of the state of affairs in Mexico from somebody belonging to no party. Neither Sebastian Schertzenlechner, whom they had at one time wished to send to Mexico, nor De Pont could be considered, for, owing to their missions to Paris, both of them were well known to the Conservative Mexicans, and in particular to General Almonte; and the envoy whom it was now proposed to send must remain an entire secret. For the Archduchess justly recognized that she and her husband had not heard a single report on Mexico which had not "passed through the channel of the Mexicans in Paris," the numbers of whom she held to be too small to represent the opinion of a nation of eight million souls.

In spite of this wise consideration, she proposed in the same

⁸ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 25, 1863; original in V. N. A.

⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Almonte, January 30, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

¹⁰ The Archduchess Charlotte to Leopold I of the Belgians, February 1, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

breath to send on the projected mission a correspondent of *The Times*, a certain Mr. Bourdillon, who had been recommended to her by — Gutierrez, and who, having been expelled from Mexico by Juarez for his Conservative views, had declared, immediately after his arrival in Paris, that it would be possible to set up the monarchy within four or five months. And this man was to give an impartial report! But this was only a suggestion made by Charlotte to her father; she left him free to choose the man.

"For the rest," she said, "we are not, thank God, bound by any sort of engagement in this affair, and, however things turn out, we shall be able to withdraw in time." She closed with the remark that they must show a certain interest in the affair, and for this reason she and her husband desired to be well-informed as to the conditions and opinion of the country.

This letter of the Archduchess's crossed one from her father.¹¹ In it he informed her that the Emperor Napoleon held firmly to his idea, and had just written to him in the friendliest terms "about Max," and this not at the King's prompting. Leopold considered that Almonte had been rather a failure, since there were really no political parties in Mexico in the true sense of the word, but, as the King clearly recognized when it came to the point, everything was decided by personal interests. The King had also been exposed to the solicitations of Bourdillon, a naturalized Englishman of French origin; for the correspondents of that great political power *The Times* had constant access to the sovereign. The King of the Belgians considered that Bourdillon knew Mexico inside out, perhaps even better than the Mexican politicians themselves! How could the King, who had never been in Mexico himself, express such a judgment? But though Bourdillon was interested in the exploitation of Mexican mines, he had none the less inspired great confidence in the King, and Leopold considered that his explanations "probably covered the matter fully."

Bourdillon declared that the French army must stay in the

¹¹ Leopold I, King of the Belgians, to the Archduchess Charlotte, Laeken, February 8, 1863; original in V. N. A.

country until the new sovereign was in a position to organize things. In the King's opinion it would be difficult to introduce order among the bands constituting the armed force. Those who had been dragged away from their houses and farms would be glad to go home, but the rest would have to be scattered, imprisoned, "I fear even hanged," wrote Leopold.

Moreover, Bourdillon had spoken enthusiastically of the country's wealth in silver, and drawn a brilliant picture of its capacity for development, if it were possible to re-establish order. In conclusion, the King promised to try to obtain all possible information. From Brussels Bourdillon went straight to Vienna, where he had an interview with Count Rechberg. Rechberg liked him very much personally, but Bourdillon gave him the impression of being over-sanguine and full of illusions.¹² From Vienna the journalist betook himself to Miramar, where he had three conversations with the Archduke and his wife, the substance of which was committed to paper by Charlotte's own hand.¹³

The picture sketched by *The Times* correspondent was very typical of the idea of the country and people of Mexico formed by Europeans who had visited it. Bourdillon was of opinion that the Mexicans had no mind of their own in anything, and that not the slightest trace of liberal ideas was to be found among them except upon paper, in their proclamations and constitutions; but the sole morality of the people consisted in thieving, which every party regarded as its object. It was true, he said, that Mexican servants did not steal; it did not become the custom till they got into the government. Money, in his opinion, had such power that he was convinced that, supposing a Mexican who had made the finest protestations of patriotism were taken into the next room, and you were to say to him: "Here are five hundred dollars, now unsay all that you said in the other room," he would take the money without a word, and make the desired declaration. Education was non-existent,

¹² Baron De Pont to the Archduke Ferdinand Max; Vienna, March 3, 1863. V. N. A.

¹³ Autograph memorandum of the Archduchess Charlotte entitled *Conversation avec M. Bourdillon*, Miramar, February 12, 13, 14, 1863. V. N. A.

their ignorance was portentous, the race was rotten to the core, and only a considerable immigration would produce any improvement. The soldiers were fairly brave, but the officers for the most part cowards. Doblado, Uruga, and Ortega were exceptions. The Indians, said the journalist, did not know what went on round about them. If anyone asked them under what government they were living, they could not answer. It would therefore be hard to carry out a plebiscite. Nobody in Mexico had any conception of liberty, and hence revolutions were much more frequent than in other formerly Spanish lands. The great landowners naturally desired a monarchy, solely on financial grounds, as the only salvation from the incessant disorders threatening the quiet enjoyment of their possessions.

The Archduchess asked Bourdillon what he thought France would demand in the end "for her pains," for it was unprecedented that a country should do anything for another for nothing; the correspondent said with a smile that he hoped Mexico would be purged by the strict government of the French of her bad elements and dangerous character. In most cases this would be effected by banishment. Miramón, for example, ought never again, in Bourdillon's opinion, to set foot on the soil of the Republic. The ambitious and self-seeking Santa Anna ought also to be left in quiet and oblivion in St. Thomas. It should be a *sine qua non* of the acceptance of the crown that the land should be occupied for a considerable time and the protection of France and England made sure of. Bourdillon declared that the task was certainly not an enviable one, and that the Archduke and his wife were "too good" for Mexico. It is true that the Mexicans were very conceited and susceptible to flattery, and therefore easily won over. Bourdillon thought it his duty to show them all the darker aspects of the question as well; it might not happen in his day, but he had no doubt that the land was destined one day to become a flourishing empire. By this final remark he at once undid all the effect of his warning criticism, and once more conjured up the mirage of a glorious empire before the impressionable souls of the Archduke and Archduchess. Shortly after his visit to

Miramar Bourdillon returned to Paris, where he was received in audience by the Emperor.¹⁴

According to his own accounts, he represented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico to Napoleon as "an absolute necessity." Personally he was bound to be ardently in favour of it, for the far-sighted journalist had already taken care that in such a case his relations with the new sovereign were not such as would be likely to damage his mining enterprises.

The Archduke and Napoleon both requested him to approach Palmerston and create an atmosphere in England favourable to a Mexican monarchy. But on his own admission Bourdillon had not been successful in this.

He was even less fortunate with Russell than with Palmerston. "He is as obstinate as ever," he wrote about Russell,¹⁵ who was disinclined from the outset to have anything to do with the Mexican affair. Characteristically like those who are prejudiced in favour of a cause, discouraging though his reception was, he concluded that England would none the less join in, if France were successful, for Palmerston's sympathies would be sure to be with Napoleon.

Gutierrez had seen with an envious eye that Bourdillon, who had, after all, been originally introduced by him, was well received everywhere, and even allowed access to Napoleon, whereas since his first audience, at which he had made such a bad impression on the Emperor and Empress, he himself had been kept completely at a distance. He therefore hastened to hint to Schertzenlechner that Bourdillon was only playing for his own hand,¹⁶ and perhaps also for that of England, which, as Gutierrez said, was after all bound up with "our aim."

In spite of all that had happened, the Mexican felt not the slightest compunction in again deluging the Archduke with letters, always representing things in the rosiest light, and advis-

¹⁴ Bourdillon to Baron De Pont, March 3, 1863, on his audience with the Emperor Napoleon. V. N. A.

¹⁵ The same to the same, March 14, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁶ Gutierrez to Schertzenlechner, March 29, 1863. V. N. A.

ing him to accept the crown. It was otherwise with Hidalgo, who was scared at times — and especially when things were not going very well in Mexico — at the magnitude of the responsibility which he had taken upon himself in initiating the Mexican enterprise. Now, when things were at a deadlock in Mexico, and England's policy remained as negative as before, he felt extremely uncomfortable in his conspicuous position. Hidalgo himself said: "Let us be candid: not one of my predictions has been realized; and for a man of honour that is a real moral torture."¹⁷ It is true that the responsibility did not rest upon Hidalgo alone, but upon all the others as well. After Puebla men were asking throughout the whole of France why they had gone to Mexico at all. It was a matter of course that many should turn to Hidalgo with this question, for in court circles at least it was very well known that he had influenced the Empress in this "mad enterprise."

One day, as Hidalgo was talking with Constantine Nigra, the Italian *chargé d'affaires*, Primoli, the husband of one of the Bonaparte princesses, came up to them and said with a smile, pointing at Hidalgo: "There is the ruin of France," upon which Hidalgo answered rather impudently: "Do you think you are addressing Prim or Lorencez?"

On another occasion a young lady came up to Hidalgo during an evening party and suddenly said straight out to him: "Sir, I am the niece of Colonel Mancel, who has just fallen in Mexico." Such incidents produced an impression upon the young Mexican; but at the first piece of good news all his doubts vanished, and pride and the ambition to be the originator of so great an enterprise again asserted their sway.

Even Marshal Randon was ill pleased with the Mexican campaign, for after the unlucky engagement at Puebla he too recognized that the military honour of France was at stake. The thing to do was to make haste and strike a great blow, to wipe out the disgrace of Puebla, and then retire from the whole enterprise as safely and speedily as possible. Such was the view of the French Minister for War.¹⁸

¹⁷ Hidalgo to the Baron De Pont, February 24, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁸ See *Mémoires du Maréchal Randon*, II. 81.

Meanwhile England did all she could to induce the Archduke to desist from his purpose. It was quite well realized there that the Prince's thoughts were bent upon a wider sphere of activity and a crown. But owing to the fact that the Emperor was still in the full vigour of youth and had only recently married, that of Austria could in all human probability hardly fall to his lot. The idea in London was to offer him a crown elsewhere, and thus, if possible, to prevent him from hankering after Mexico. And an opportunity now arose.

In October 1862 a revolution had broken out in Greece, owing to the fact that King Otto I, the second son of King Louis of Bavaria, could not come to terms with the promoters of liberal reforms, and opposed them in every way. The rising ended in the expulsion of the King and Queen from Greece, and though, to the end of his life, King Otto would not consent to a formal abdication, the powers were looking for a new ruler for the country, and England in particular was searching for a candidate acceptable to her. It was thought in London that they would be killing two birds with one stone if they were to succeed in settling in Athens the son-in-law of the King of the Belgians, with his close connexion with England, especially as it was peculiarly difficult to find a suitable prince for that country, and several had already declined the invitation extended to them.

This time King Leopold was engaged by the other side to act as intermediary and ascertain the Archduke's views on the subject. Palmerston wrote to the King asking him to use his influence with his son-in-law to persuade him to accept the crown of Greece; and remarked that he considered the Archduke "the fittest person" to rule there. King Leopold declared himself in agreement with this.¹⁹ Soon afterwards the King received letters both from Queen Victoria and from Lord Russell, in the name of the Cabinet, in which he was requested to ask the Archduke whether he would take over the government of Greece. They had already made sure that his election would

¹⁹ Leopold I, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Laeken, February 16, 1863; original in V. N. A.

be confirmed by the country. The King drew attention to the incomparably greater importance of this crown to Austria than that of Mexico, and remarked that on account of the French a sovereign in Mexico would have a very difficult position, the consolidation of which might, with the best will in the world, drag on for a very long time. To King Leopold, who had himself nearly become King of the Hellenes at one time, and had cherished a certain predilection for that country ever since, the thought of seeing his son-in-law established so much nearer, in Greece, was very pleasing. He was not precisely keen upon Mexico; the chief thing in his eyes was that his dearly beloved children should have some sort of crown, and thus receive a position in the world worthy of such an exalted pair.

But the Archduke Ferdinand Max would not agree to this plan on any account. "I can only," he wrote,²⁰ "explain to myself such a lack of tact on the part of the man at the head of the English Cabinet as is to be found in this almost offensive proposal, by the embarrassment in which he has been placed by the repeated refusals of the throne of Greece. Even if it had been lawfully vacated by the death or abdication of King Otto, and had not, moreover, every kind of objection against it, I should indeed be the last to feel inclined to accept a crown which has been hawked round unsuccessfully to half a dozen princes. Moreover, I am too well acquainted from personal observation with modern Hellas and its present corrupt state not to have been convinced for a long time past that that crafty and morally degenerate people is incapable of offering a firm foundation for an independent State. And so to me, too, be it said in passing, King Otto's tenacious clinging to his rights after the experiences he has had is a mystery."

It was a pity that the Archduke was not as well acquainted with conditions in Mexico from personal observation as he was with those in Greece. But the Emperor Francis Joseph also rejected the English offer. A week before the letter of the King of the Belgians arrived he had received a proposal to this effect, transmitted through Lord Bloomfield, upon which he

²⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, February 10, 1863. V. N. A.

telegraphed to the Archduke:²¹ "Since existing rights,²² dignity, and opportuneness are opposed to it, I have at once definitely declined."

Though Lord Bloomfield had held out a prospect that, in case of acceptance, the seven Ionian islands would be annexed to Greece, the Emperor Francis Joseph would not hear of the plan; for he considered it unseemly that a crown which had already been hawked round the whole of Europe should be offered to an Austrian archduke; and, in his opinion, the acceptance of the crown by his brother was out of the question, owing to his relations of kinship with the royal house of Bavaria.

If one candidate only had declined it, it would have been rather more possible to give the question closer consideration. But, as Rechberg wrote dejectedly, a regular "drive" had been carried on in order to fill the Greek throne — which was, moreover, not lawfully vacant. The Archduke considered that Palmerston's good opinion was very flattering, but that he might have done better to display somewhat greater complaisance in the Mexican question.²³ The thought of Mexico entirely dominated the Archduke; no other considerations had any weight beside it. He at once informed Hidalgo of his refusal, and sent word to him that he was far too seriously occupied with the prospect of Mexico to allow himself to be diverted from it by any other projects. The Emperor and Empress of the French must not think that he had even considered the proposition which had been made to him.²⁴

So far, the French Court had not been very pleased with Forey's dilatory attitude. The Empress was of opinion that proceedings should neither have been conducted as slowly ("*si doucement*") as Forey had done, nor as hastily as Saligny and Almonte desired. Remembering his instructions to the

²¹ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, in reference to the latter's letter to King Leopold of February 20, 1863. V. N. A.

²² King Otto had not formally abdicated; the Empress Elizabeth was a Bavarian princess.

²³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold I, King of the Belgians, February 20, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

²⁴ Baron De Pont to Hidalgo, Miramar, February 23, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

general, Napoleon endeavoured to defend him to his wife, and cited as an example the Italian campaign, in which he had had such difficulties in provisioning the troops; and insisted that in Mexico they were in a far worse position with regard to transport. Map in hand, he explained that he approved the plan announced to him by Forey of a slow advance on Puebla, since, as he said, a fresh defeat on this occasion would be irreparable. Napoleon then said — if the account sent to Miramar by Hidalgo was true — he had read in the newspapers that it was thought he would withdraw the army from Mexico on account of the insurrection that had just broken out in Poland; he had accordingly at once written to General Forey that, whatever happened in Europe, he would not withdraw it. Forey could tell this to the Mexicans so that they should not lose courage.²⁵

But now, early in March, news reached the Imperial Court at Paris that General Forey's advanced guards had set out on the march to Puebla. This excited great joy in the Empress; she hastened to send the news to Metternich, adding that she was consequently "in the best of tempers (*d'une humeur charmante*)."²⁶ As Metternich said, the Empress once more allowed herself to be carried away by her characteristic ardour ("*fougue*"). "Sentimental policy (*Gefühlspolitik*)" is what the Ambassador called this.

When Forey's advance from Orizaba became known, hopes rose high on all sides in the quarters interested.

Santa Anna now wrote to Gutierrez in Paris that he would support the Prince with all his influence; he understood that Ferdinand Max desired a formal appeal from the nation, but this must be brought about by a national Government, with a citizen of sufficient distinction at its head. He would embark

²⁵ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, April 3, 1863. V. N. A. I am quite aware that Hidalgo in his reports to Miramar sent only such information about what went on at the Imperial Court as the Archduke was intended to hear. So as far as possible the reader should receive the full impression of the effect of such premeditatedly misleading reports. Moreover, in this case, in view of the trend of his ideas at the time, Napoleon may quite well have made this pronouncement.

²⁶ The Empress Eugénie to Prince Richard Metternich, March 2, 1863; copy in V. N. A.

as soon as Mexico City was taken. By "a citizen of sufficient distinction" he naturally meant himself. But Santa Anna had a secret enemy at the French Court in the shape of Hidalgo. On one occasion when the Emperor mentioned to the young Mexican that Gutierrez regularly sent Drouyn de Lhuys the letters of General Santa Anna, who was heart and soul for the great scheme, Hidalgo replied that if he kept his word, all would go well, but that since 1822 he had never kept it.

"Yes," said the Emperor, "but he will not be able to make any *pronunciamientos* against the French army."

"That is true, Sir," replied Hidalgo. "But we ought to find out whether the country has confidence in him. I am not his enemy, Your Majesty, he was always friendly to me; he has excellent qualities, but he has others as well. . . ."

Hidalgo had subtly accomplished what he desired. The Emperor smiled, and saw exactly what he was driving at. It was incredible what a position Hidalgo had acquired at the Imperial Court. On Holy Thursday, for instance, he happened to be taking a letter to the Tuileries, when, as he passed through the courtyard, he saw three veiled ladies standing there, quite simply dressed. One of them was the Empress. She came up to Hidalgo, and said that she wanted to visit seven churches, but if possible did not want to be recognized, and invited him to accompany her. Then she walked about the streets of the city for two hours unrecognized, mingling with the crowd, and everywhere obeying the directions of the vergers; she remained standing for more than a quarter of an hour in St. Sulpice, until her turn came round to kiss the crucifix, and she did not shrink from pressing it to her lips, though a negro in livery had done so immediately before her.

Hidalgo took a pleasure in reporting such matters to Miramar at once, so that it should be seen how familiarly the Empress treated him and how she kept him at her side. Gutierrez was filled with jealousy, and because, out of enmity to Santa Anna, Hidalgo espoused Almonte's cause, Gutierrez wrote to the Archduke that Hidalgo felt himself to be a regular power, and neglected no opportunity of making this felt. A regular coalition, he said, had been formed against the return of Santa

Anna. General Almonte, who was coming into prominence, had neither the political insight nor the energy of character which affairs required.²⁷

These jealousies and rivalries would have repelled any unprejudiced person, but Ferdinand Max had by now fallen under the influence of Gutierrez, and since his eyesight was troubling him, the Archduchess wrote for him to Gutierrez, saying how much they both valued his character and burning zeal for the cause of his country, and how this feeling increased daily.

The letters of Gutierrez and Hidalgo bulked the largest in the Archduke's correspondence on the Mexican question, filling whole bundles, and, in the case of Gutierrez especially, often assuming the proportions of reams of fine phrases.

About this time a new personality began to play a part in the business; namely, the former Belgian *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, Kint von Roodenbeck, who had just arrived in Paris. The Emperor knew that he enjoyed the especial confidence of the King of the Belgians, and so received him in audience. Kint began his description of Mexican conditions by declaring that there were no political parties there at all, but only armed bands, which went about the country burning and plundering under various pretexts. They ought to take their stand upon the support of the rich or industrious section of the population, regardless of all political opinions. When the Emperor asked whether the foundation of a monarchy was possible, the diplomatist answered: "Yes," but with the reservation that in any case difficulties would arise.²⁸ Kint was strongly opposed to all those belonging to the party of Juarez. The so-called Liberals were merely striving to annex the wealth of others, ruin the most distinguished families, and destroy the basis of society. In four months Juarez had squandered the Church property, without any benefit to the nation; he had destroyed the books, pictures, and statues belonging to the convents, dissolved charitable institutions: in short, treated the

²⁷ Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, memorandum on Santa Anna, April 30, 1863. V. N. A.

²⁸ From Kint's dispatch to Leopold, King of the Belgians, of April 18, 1863. V. N. A.

country with appalling ruthlessness and irresponsibility, and at the same time despotically. After the withdrawal of the Spanish and English, Kint related, Juarez had declared those two powers to be his allies, thereby persuading the population that he stood for the national independence of the country, with powerful foreign support.²⁹

At the beginning of May Kint had another audience with the Emperor Napoleon, followed by one with the Empress. Gutierrez and Hidalgo hastened to send word to the Archduke at Miramar of all that was favourable to the cause in these conversations. Gutierrez reported that when Kint said he was next going to Miramar, the Emperor replied: "That is most satisfactory. In that case I request you to assure Prince Ferdinand Max from me that my wishes and plans are unchanged. If I have not written to assure him of this myself, it was owing to unexpected difficulties having arisen. We must not divide the lion's skin before he is slain."³⁰ Hidalgo reported that after his reception by the Empress Kint had told him that if he had not already been devoted to the Mexican cause, he certainly would be as a result of his audience. The Emperor, the Empress, and Drouyn de Lhuys were firmly resolved not to give up the enterprise.

Towards the end of May a former Mexican Minister of Finance, Don Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz, visited Miramar, with an introduction from Hidalgo; and his visit was followed by one from Kint. He went there by order of King Leopold, in response to a request from Charlotte. At Miramar Kint told the Archduke and Archduchess very much what he had told Napoleon in Paris. He also added that it was of the utmost importance that intervention should rest upon the support of the Catholic element, though it was impossible that the property confiscated from the clergy should be restored to them after the number of times it had already changed hands, etc. A Government must be formed of entirely new persons, belonging to no party. It would indeed be a crown of thorns

²⁹ From Kint's dispatch of September 24, 1862. V. N. A.

³⁰ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, May 9, 1863. Kint's second audience took place on May 8. V. N. A.

that awaited the Archduke, but it was a great and glorious work.

Kint's reports, in spite of many reservations, were on the whole in favour of the enterprise. Once more a spokesman had arisen to whom far more attention was paid than to other persons who judged things more soberly, because he was in favour of the affair.

The Archduchess Charlotte again wrote to her father ³¹ full of enthusiasm about Kint; here at last was, perhaps, the man whose co-operation was so important for the success of the Mexican venture, the only one who, if his advice was taken, could give French intervention a decisive turn and the attitude of France a direction which it had hitherto lacked. She finally asked her father to counteract as far as possible the intrigues against Kint of which she had heard from Gutierrez.

Meanwhile General Forey had arrived before Puebla, and on March 19 he began the siege of the town, which was defended by 18,000 Juaristas under General Ortega. The Mexicans had taken advantage of Forey's dilatoriness to put the town in a very good state of defence, and in general to strengthen and discipline their army. In view of the experience of General Lorencez, who had tried to take the bull by the horns, Forey decided upon a plan of attack which, though longer and more systematic, should be more certain to end in success.

Repeated small attacks having led to no result, owing to the stubbornness of the defence, Forey even thought for a moment of leaving Puebla on the left, and marching on Mexico City. But this plan was at once given up.

Once more weeks passed by. Almonte had now heard from Hidalgo that the Empress had been uneasy for a long time, and that even the Emperor began to give signs of impatience. He at once grasped the fact that here was an opportunity ready to hand for avenging himself on Forey, who had deprived him of his title of "head of the nation" and publicly exposed him. It might perhaps be possible to bring about his

³¹ The Archduchess Charlotte to Leopold, King of the Belgians, June 2, 1863. V. N. A.

recall. The general resolved to write letters to Paris, ostensibly intended for intimate friends only, but which, as he very well knew, would come to the knowledge of exalted circles, and in which Forey cut a poor figure. As early as the beginning of May Almonte had written to the Archduke that he regretted to be compelled to draw attention to General Forey's incapacity, in having once more allowed himself to be turned aside to Puebla, instead of going straight to Mexico.³² A month later he wrote to Hidalgo,³³ this time from the camp before Puebla, that he turned hot with despair at the sight of such bungling. "Forey does not understand anything; he is an ass, literally an ass, and nothing else. He will listen to nothing, and acts on the inspiration of Billard,³⁴ that precious *directeur de la politique*, who is very pushing." In Almonte's opinion the army was making a laughing-stock of itself before Puebla. The docile Hidalgo showed the letter to the Empress Eugénie, and sent a copy to the Archduke! But Almonte was exaggerating, for the situation at Puebla was approaching a fortunate solution.

Comonfort had concentrated his auxiliary force of 5,000 men so as to attack the French beleaguering army in the rear. Forey learnt of his plans through a spy. He formed a strong detachment, which he placed under Bazaine's command, with instructions to make a surprise attack on Comonfort by night. Bazaine carried out his task admirably. Comonfort was taken quite unawares; all his artillery, transport, and munitions were captured, and his force utterly routed. Thus Bazaine had quickly made his name in the French army. Everybody was talking about him, nobody about Forey. The Mexicans in Puebla began to lose heart when they heard of this battle. Munitions and supplies were already running short. In the middle of May General Ortega offered to open negotiations with General Forey for the capitulation of the town. On May

³² Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, May 3, 1863. V. N. A.

³³ Almonte to Hidalgo, Cerro de San Juan, in face of Puebla, April 19, 1863. Copy of letter enclosed in a letter of Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, June 4, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁴ An officer of the General Staff to whom Forey entrusted the political side of the business.

19, after a siege of sixty-two days, Puebla was in the hands of the French, with 12,000 prisoners, among whom were 1,500 officers and 25 generals. By this means the chief leaders of the Juarista forces were removed. Many of them were sent to Paris as prisoners; but Ortega and Escobedo, and later, too, Porfirio Diaz, managed to escape from the French. These were precisely the most able leaders of the Juaristas. This carelessness was to meet with a severe punishment later.

For the moment, however, Juarez had sustained a very heavy blow, and though he none the less at once proclaimed his unshaken determination of pursuing the war ruthlessly and by every means to the bitter end, the fall of Puebla had deprived him of the flower of his army. He could no longer hope to defend the capital. All in all he had only 14,000 men left, and they were scattered in all directions. War with a regular army had to be given up, and a bitter, vindictive guerrilla warfare began.

Juarez left the capital and betook himself to San Luis Potosí with the members of his Government. There were voices raised in his own camp in favour of placing other men at the head of the State. But disagreement as to who it should be made these attempts idle. Juarez was and remained the head of the State. But the road to the capital lay open to the French. Forey sent General Bazaine on ahead with his division, which entered the capital on June 7. Thus once more Forey unconsciously paved the way for the general who was only too soon to succeed him in the supreme command. It was already being said on all sides that the fall of Puebla was due to Bazaine alone, and now this smart general was the first to enter Mexico City. They forgot that any other general would have been equally successful by following Forey's orders. But a legend began to spring up around the name of Bazaine.

When the news of the capture of Puebla reached Fontainebleau, where the Emperor and Empress happened to be staying, it gave rise to great rejoicing. All the anxieties and uneasiness they had gone through in the last year, reported the Emperor's orderly officer, the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre,

were at once forgotten. The Emperor was as merry as a child, and the fall of Puebla had made him ten years younger. Hidalgo drew the Comte's attention to Bazaine's prominent role, and now began to take part in the intrigues against Forey planned by Almonte. The Comte fell into the trap; he wrote that in his opinion there was only one man in Mexico, namely Bazaine.³⁵

The news had all the more effect because of the great anxiety through which Napoleon had recently passed. As Metternich said, "for the last week he simply had not lived." For news had arrived from North America, which was watching the whole affair with a hostile eye, that the French had been compelled to raise the siege once more.³⁶ So when they now heard of the capture, the reaction was immense. Metternich testifies that the Emperor wept for joy, and when the Ambassador rose at dinner to propose the health of the valiant French army in Mexico, Napoleon answered in a voice quivering with emotion. At five in the afternoon arrived a telegram from the King of Prussia with cordial congratulations on the "new and glorious successes of the brave and valiant French army." Napoleon could hardly believe it, for he had never expected such a thing from such a quarter. He inquired in utter astonishment whether it was really from the King of Prussia, and not, as he had at first supposed, from the King of Württemberg. But deep down he was delighted.

At the Court of Paris the capture of Puebla produced none but a joyful effect, but at Miramar it gave rise to mixed feelings. On the one hand the Archduke was enthusiastic, and was only restrained, as he wrote to Gutierrez,³⁷ from telegraphing his congratulations in accordance with "his heart's desire" by the reserve which he still felt that he must impose upon himself. In the capture of the city he thought he might see the prelude to further material and moral victories which should lead to

³⁵ Letter of the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre sent to the Archduke Ferdinand Max from Fontainebleau, June 18, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁶ Metternich to Rechberg, Fontainebleau, June 12, 1863; private letter in V. N. A.

³⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, June 18, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

that goal towards which, he "ventured" to say, he was working as assiduously as Gutierrez himself!

The Archduke too congratulated the Emperor Napoleon at once. This success, he wrote, had given the world a fresh proof of what the Emperor's firmness and superior intelligence was capable of doing in spite of the most vigorous opposition, and by their means, too, the Emperor would doubtless triumph over the last obstacles which lay in the way of Mexico's salvation. Then perhaps England too would shake off her "lethargy" and recognize that it was to her own interest to support a work which would set a limit to the encroachments of her ambitious neighbour, the United States.

But in secret the Archduke became more and more uneasy as to whether, in view of the "difficulties which increasingly presented themselves—the growing dimensions of the transatlantic campaign, its constantly swelling cost, the unexpected opposition within the country, the absence so far of any trace of monarchical aspirations among the people, and the rising disinclination for the enterprise in France, the opposition of influential ministers, England's disfavour, and finally the growing complication of affairs in Europe—the Emperor Napoleon might not renounce the full execution of his original plan and be content to redeem his military honour by a conclusion brilliant in a different way, and as advantageous to France as possible."³⁸

The Archduke was evidently well aware of the difficulties. But this did not lead him to the right conclusion with regard to his own attitude; it merely made him painfully anxious to find out whether Napoleon might not withdraw from the whole affair. He therefore commissioned Metternich to sound the Emperor on this point. Metternich replied³⁹ that this exalted commission was not an easy one, for "no earthly creature, not even the Emperor, knows what they can and will do beyond the *Tierra caliente*."⁴⁰ "The confusion on this point," wrote the Ambassador, "exceeds the height of the famous Mexican

³⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Metternich, June 13, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

³⁹ Metternich to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, June 26, 1863. V. N. A.

⁴⁰ The name given to the hot, unhealthy climatic zone in Mexico.

mountains, and can be explained only by the fact that, beyond the military operations, which are very difficult and troublesome, there has been a resolute refusal to enter the labyrinth of the political parties. . . . Your Imperial Highnesses must have noticed that the internal question is far from having entered upon such a stage as to satisfy Hidalgo and cheer Gutierrez. The latter abandons himself to wild despair, while the former, as the active principle, redoubles his efforts at Fontainebleau with rare persistency. I have always kept to the sphere of generalities, and since my last official explanation with the Emperor have settled that we intend to leave this delicate matter to mature with the greatest quietness and patience." In conclusion Metternich laid down that the Emperor Napoleon was trying to induce the Mexicans to choose an ordered, civilized government, and carry through the plan with which they were acquainted; and that he intended to make the integrity of Mexico the chief condition of recognizing the Southern States of America. It is true that the Ambassador would not himself venture to come to any decisive conclusion as to how far these plans could be carried out, as he dubiously added, in view of the varying opinions that prevailed.

Meanwhile the Emperor Napoleon's answer to the Archduke's congratulations had arrived; ⁴¹ it was very short, though cordial, and the Emperor expressed his joy at the recognition of the bravery of his Frenchmen. "I hope," he wrote, "that the party of order in Mexico will now raise its head, and that our projects will at last be realized." But there were still various obstacles to be overcome, for which England's support would be very useful. Napoleon therefore invited Ferdinand Max to request the King of the Belgians to exert his "legitimate" influence in London to this end.

At the same time a letter arrived from the Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte. She wrote most cheerfully ⁴² that the many vicissitudes of the affair had so far made it difficult to

⁴¹ The Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, June 21, 1863; original in V. N. A.

⁴² The Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte, Fontainebleau, June 15, 1863. V. N. A.

see ahead; but she now hoped that the capture of Puebla was a good omen for the realization of "our wishes." She added that she wished the bishops would soon go back to Mexico, for there was no longer any personal danger to them; the great influence which they possessed over the people would have a very good effect.

The Archduke was now far more easy in his mind. In his letter of thanks to Prince Richard Metternich⁴³ he declared his agreement with the latter's views; he too would remain neutral and watch events quietly and patiently. "I remain," he said, "as free as on the day when Count Rechberg surprised me with the first overtures at Trieste. I have not departed a jot from the principles then enunciated, and I may ascribe it to this that Napoleon has preserved his respect and sympathy for me, and, as regards his attitude towards me, has remained consistent as far as the fundamental principles of his transatlantic project are concerned. The difficulties against which the Emperor has to contend are immense, and for that very reason he must be given quiet and time; it is his own friends and admirers who cause him his greatest embarrassments; the excellent and worthy Mexicans in Paris are undeniably too violent and impatient of delay, they want to rush the Emperor into steps which would be untimely and would merely arouse a justifiable mistrust in Europe and in Mexico itself."

This was all very fine, but in his heart of hearts Ferdinand Max was on the side of the "excellent and worthy" but over-violent Mexicans. He too would have preferred to hurry everything on, though he spoke of quiet and patience to Metternich, whom he knew to be thoroughly sceptical about Mexican affairs. But he could not conceal his satisfaction with the three dots added by Metternich at the end of his letter.

After the capture of Puebla, Almonte had also grown bolder in his counsels. He had previously advised December as the time for the Archduke's arrival; but he now wrote to him

⁴³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Prince Richard Metternich, Miramar, June 30, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

twice ⁴⁴ that he ought to make preparations to start next October, for there could be no doubt that the Mexican nation would invite him, public opinion being more and more in favour of the monarchy.

Saligny and Almonte were afraid that the capture of Puebla would cast a halo round Forey, whom they had opposed and hated in France, and that this, combined with the occupation of Mexico City, would end by frustrating their vehement desire to see the general recalled. They were also very much prejudiced against the officer commanding the second French division, General Douay, who was watching events in Mexico in general, and Saligny's attitude in particular, with an unusually critical eye; for Saligny had heard that Douay kept a friend of his in Paris very exactly informed as to events in Mexico, and his reports reached the Emperor's ears.

The campaign of calumny which now began to be carried on against the two generals was joined in by the Marquis A. de Radepont, who was devoted to Saligny. The go-between was naturally Hidalgo, who had to contrive that the letters should come to the Empress's knowledge. Radepont's letter was particularly severe.⁴⁵ The level of Forey's intelligence, it said, was far below what was requisite for his position; he was a complete nonentity, at most no more than a worthy fellow. The capture of Puebla was preceded by "quite unnecessary" street-fighting, and the enemy had been allowed far too much time to fortify the city. For Douay he had an utter contempt. It was Douay who had proposed to negotiate with Juarez, and in so doing had made remarks about the Emperor and Empress that he, Radepont, would blush to repeat! The cause would not be so unpopular in France if the leadership of it were entrusted to men worthy of the Emperor's admirable and heroic soldiers, etc., etc.

Saligny did not intend to be outdone by his party associate. He wrote to Hidalgo that, barely five days before the fall of

⁴⁴ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, May 20 and July 2, 1863. V. N. A.

⁴⁵ Hidalgo first sent this letter and Saligny's (from Cholula, May 20, 1863) to the Empress Eugénie, and, as soon as she had returned them by post, to Baron De Pont, to be shown to the Archduke. V. N. A.

Puebla, Douay had declared the city to be impregnable, and the whole expedition an utter absurdity "born of a woman's whim"; that the only thing to be done was to raise the siege, negotiate with Juarez, and go back to France. Saligny then spoke in the most gushing terms about Bazaine, who was, he said, a "true general," clear-sighted, full of energy, activity, and tact, who understood the Emperor's ideas and served him devotedly. At the instigation of Billard, an officer of the General Staff who was principally concerned in the control of political affairs, and in spite of the representations of Saligny and Almonte, Forey had determined to declare war upon the Conservative and monarchist party, but had so far fortunately allowed himself to be checked on this perilous incline.

The first success won by Almonte's incessant complaints was the dispatch of orders from Paris that Billard was in future to be employed on military duties alone. In order to belittle Forey's services, Saligny wrote to Paris ⁴⁶ that if the general had only listened to him, Puebla could "easily" have been taken as early as December. Santa Anna must still be treated with the greatest distrust. Saligny hoped that, backed up by the confidence of the army, he would be able to carry everything through, but Forey was far from being as he would wish him to be.

It was a supreme piece of impudence to make such an allusion to the confidence of the army, for it was absolutely opposed to Saligny. The allegations in such letters could not be tested for months, if at all, so that they must have had a misleading, indeed a poisonous effect. Hoping to win a wider sphere of activity, Saligny said in conclusion that he was far from having given up hope of ultimate triumph, but that in order to lead things to the goal desired, he was awaiting news from Paris which should unfetter his hands and restore his freedom of action. "I have good hopes," he wrote, with no little conceit, "if only things are left to me."

In laying this letter before the French Emperor and Empress, Hidalgo had a vague feeling of the baseness of his

⁴⁶ Saligny to Hidalgo, June 2, 1863. V. N. A.

conduct in causing the generals who were bearing the brunt of the affair out in an unknown land to be calumniated behind their backs in this cowardly way from his safe retreat at the Imperial Court. He even attempted to excuse himself in a letter to De Pont for being brave enough to say such things to the Emperor and Empress, while others hushed up all that was unpleasant. He was in despair, he said hypocritically, but the truth must be known or they could not improve matters. . . . In the same letter Hidalgo openly admitted that he had demanded and obtained the supersession of General Lorencez and the removal of Billard, Forey's political agent, but, as he said, this was not till after the reverse caused by these gentlemen's proceedings. He could not now, however, he said naïvely to De Pont, demand Forey's recall outright ("*carrément*") for it would look like a mark of disfavour at a moment when a brilliant triumph was about to put an end to the previous unrest. "But," hinted Hidalgo, "the person who is working in Their Majesties' entourage"⁴⁷ and I have hopes of success, all allowance being made for the delicate position in which events have placed us. If Forey is created a marshal, things will be much easier for us, since in that case there would not be enough troops in Mexico for such a high rank. As regards General Douay, things are moving faster; it is noteworthy that General Bazaine is as much beloved by the French as by the Mexicans; expressions of the highest praise are indulged in with regard to his abilities as a soldier and statesman. It is he whom we should like to see at the head of the army. Shall we succeed? God will decide."⁴⁸

This letter is a highly important document for estimating the magnitude of the influence exercised upon the decisions of the Emperor and Empress by "subterranean forces," among which Hidalgo must be reckoned as the most important. For barely a fortnight had gone by when, on July 14, Metternich had actually to telegraph to Rechberg that exalted quarters in Paris intended to supersede Forey and entrust the direction

⁴⁷ Perhaps Morny.

⁴⁸ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, July 1, 1863. V. N. A.

of Mexican affairs to Bazaine. But in the case of General Douay, contrary to Hidalgo's opinion that matters were moving quickly, they were in fact not moving at all. For, like many crowned heads before and since, it was a foible of Napoleon's to accept information from unauthorized sources for preference, so as to serve as a check upon the responsible persons to whom he ostensibly gave his "confidence." In so doing, princes forget that unofficial, uninterested parties, free from all responsibility, usually think, speak, and judge of matters quite differently from what they would do if they bore the burden of responsibility for success or failure. Douay's unofficial, private reports interested Napoleon, and so the matter remained, in spite of all the outcries of Saligny, Radepont, and Hidalgo.

Meanwhile Gutierrez had not been idle. He had never ceased to pay his court to the Archduke, and sent him word through Schertzenlechner how Miranda had written that Ferdinand Max was winning more adherents daily, and that he already ventured to say that the Archduke was beginning to be loved in Mexico. A young monarchist general, Roelas, who had just arrived from Mexico, also wrote that he had heard the highest eulogies of the Archduke among the best society in Mexico and had himself been filled with enthusiasm at the sight of his portrait!⁴⁹

Gutierrez sought an opportunity of meeting the Archduke again, in order to involve him still further in his toils by the power of the spoken word. Rechberg had expressed himself as decidedly opposed to such an interview, even if, as the Archduke proposed, Meran, which he proposed to visit incognito, were chosen as the meeting-place instead of Miramar. Ferdinand Max said that "there are now no foreign visitors in Meran, so the danger of being compromised is not great." He had therefore received Gutierrez, "the invitation to whom it would have been hard to cancel," under an Italian name.⁵⁰ On the other hand, he had put off the proposed visit of the Archbishop of Guadalajara and the Bishop of San Luis Potosí in Mexico, and would also meet Hidalgo elsewhere. At his

⁴⁹ Gutierrez to Schertzenlechner, June 20, 1863. V. N. A.

⁵⁰ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, July 20, 1863. V. N. A.

meeting with Gutierrez at Meran, the Archduke declared that he no longer demanded the united vote of the nation, but that a section of it, or the capital alone, would be too little. He desired a vote of the large majority of the nation, for a Habsburg could not ascend a throne as a usurper or adventurer.⁵¹ For the rest, they had already discussed the conditions of a possible constitution for the newly projected empire.

Meanwhile the consummation so long desired in Paris had been realized in Mexico. Three days after Bazaine's entry into Mexico City on June 7, Forey rode into the capital, where the Conservative party had already risen and pronounced in favour of intervention, between his two bitterest enemies, Saligny and Almonte.

When the entry into Mexico City became known at the Court of Paris, the enthusiasm of the interested parties in the entourage of the Emperor became even greater. Hidalgo was beside himself with joy; according to his account, he and the Empress (*sic*) were radiant as they read the good news from Mexico. Hidalgo's mother had written an ecstatic letter from Mexico City on the subject of Forey's "triumphal entry," and the cheers given for Napoleon, and especially for the Empress, whose picture was to be seen on every side in the city of Mexico. She was, he says, much flattered at this.⁵²

Hidalgo himself swelled with pride.⁵³ In early days he had always been scoffed at and despised; now his hand was shaken and he was congratulated everywhere, and those who had blamed him now said quite openly that he had been justified by the event. They said they might now tell him frankly that it had taken some courage even to mention his name aloud in Paris. But now things had suddenly changed.

The turn taken by the affair was regarded somewhat enviously in Spain. Both the Queen and the ministers felt a certain annoyance at the fact that it was now France who would found the monarchy which ought by right to have belonged to a Spanish Bourbon. However, Marshal Serrano did not allow himself

⁵¹ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, July 24, 1863. V. N. A.

⁵² The same to the same, July 20, 1863. V. N. A.

⁵³ The same to the same, July 24, 1863. V. N. A.

to be led astray, and continued to maintain that a monarchy in Mexico was an absolute impossibility, unless some Indian or mestizo adventurer were to assume a crown which the accompanying risk rendered far from enviable.⁵⁴

Immediately after his entry into the capital, General Forey took in hand the organization of internal political affairs.

The Emperor Napoleon had written to the general⁵⁵ that it was necessary for him to be master in Mexico, though without showing any outward signs of it. He must first form a provisional Government, in which Almonte must have a place, and then take suitably adroit measures to ascertain what form of government the nation desired. It must appear as if the Mexicans were being allowed a free choice, while in reality the plan long since hatched in Paris was to be carried out in its entirety: namely, the monarchy and the Archduke Ferdinand Max! Napoleon attached the greatest importance to "keeping up appearances." The world must believe in all seriousness that it was far from being the liberal Napoleon's intention to impose an alien domination upon the Mexicans. And so everything must be skilfully led up to in a manner befitting the Emperor's plans.

Saligny was of a different opinion. In the eyes of this out-and-out conservative this state of affairs had already lasted too long; he could no longer expect that his ideas and principles would prevail in Mexico in the end. He did his best to influence Forey, till finally the general, who was an honest soldier, and absolutely incapable of a subtle, cunning policy such as Napoleon required of him, began with no warning to handle things far too bluntly.

He had already issued from Puebla a drastic decree by which the property of all those who took up arms against the intervention might in certain circumstances be confiscated. This could easily be construed as meaning that all the Juaristas were to lose their property. In Mexico City he at once framed

⁵⁴ Private letter from the Austrian *chargé d'affaires* in Madrid, La Granja, July 14, 1863, sent on by Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max on July 30. V. N. A.

⁵⁵ See Paul Gaulot: *L'Expédition du Mexique*, 1861-7, I. 132.

ordinances for muzzling the press. On the other hand, in the proclamation issued by Forey on June 12, Napoleon's liberal instructions were followed in everything but what concerned Juárez and the monarchist plan. In particular, religious liberty was to be protected, and former Church property acquired by lawful purchase was to remain in the possession of the purchasers or their heirs. Those who rallied to the Government which was to be formed by "free election" would share in the general amnesty, but all others would be subject to ruthless persecution. Moreover, on June 20 a decree ⁵⁶ was issued, according to which all members of the numerous armed bands of "malefactors" which were wandering about the country were declared outlaws and made liable to trial by courts-martial with unlimited powers. There was to be no appeal from the decisions of these courts, which were to be carried out within twenty-four hours. This was the prelude.

Forey next nominated a supreme governing junta, the thirty-five members of which were for the most part drawn from the ranks of the Conservative party, there being only a few moderate Liberals among them. Moreover, the latter declined the nomination, so that the assembly consisted for the most part of former adherents of Santa Anna and Miramón. This junta proceeded to elect a provisional regency, as had long been the established custom in Europe, consisting, as previously agreed, of General Almonte, Pelagio Labastida, Bishop of Puebla and Archbishop-elect of Mexico — represented, owing to his absence in Europe, by D. J. Ormaechea, and General Mariano Salas.

Almonte reported to Napoleon with great satisfaction the state entry into Mexico and the formation of the Regency. "The Assembly of Notables," he wrote, "will be summoned in five or six days, and Your Majesty will receive by the next Saint-Nazaire boat the news that this body has declared in favour of the monarchy and the Archduke."

It was significant that before the Assembly of Notables had been summoned, Almonte was already informing the Emperor

⁵⁶ Printed in full by E. Lefèvre, *op. cit.*, I. 315.

of its decisions. He further expressed the wish that the Emperor would leave Bazaine in Mexico as commander-in-chief, and Saligny "as sole controller of policy"; then everything would go splendidly. Moreover, the Emperor should make Saligny a senator, for Almonte thought "it is time to reward him."

At the same time Almonte wrote to the Archduke.⁵⁷ He boasted that he had not been mistaken as to the true state of affairs, announced the arrival of a deputation at the end of August which should offer the Archduke the crown, and expressed the hope that if the Archduke accepted it, he would be able to start at the end of October or the beginning of November.⁵⁸

At last they proceeded to form the National Assembly. This task was also placed in the hands of the junta. The assembly was to consist of two hundred and fifteen persons of distinction, mainly citizens of the capital. Remembering the composition of the junta, it will be understood that the choice fell exclusively on those of Conservative tendencies, who showed themselves in every respect accommodating to the wishes of France. By this means they imagined they would draw nearer to the goal indicated by Napoleon. But this was not the way which the Emperor had meant. Instead of a piece of subtle intrigue they had staged a farce.

The bodies thus nominated were given the right of deciding upon the future form of government. And so it was determined, in accordance with the wishes of Paris, that a hereditary monarchy should be introduced into Mexico and the imperial crown offered to the Archduke Ferdinand Max; likewise that it should be reserved to Napoleon III to propose another prince in case the Archduke should not accept. This latter decision must have been most humiliating to all Mexicans; moreover, Napoleon had not agreed to it, and thus Forey's enemies were provided with a dangerous weapon by his own hand.

⁵⁷ Almonte to the Emperor Napoleon, Mexico, June 26, 1863; autograph copy enclosed in Almonte's letter to the Archduke Ferdinand Max of the same date. V. N. A.

⁵⁸ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, June 26, 1863. V. N. A.

Juarez continued to regard himself as the only regularly elected President and head of the Government, and now made a solemn protest against French intervention and the acts of violence committed by the troops. The "individuals" forming the two juntas, he declared, had as little right to decide the form of government as the triumvirate nominated by the French Commander-in-Chief. The monarchy did not exist either *de jure* or *de facto*; it was merely the offspring of these "lawless individuals." Moreover, in the middle of August Juarez issued a decree that all property of any kind belonging to Mexicans who rallied to the intervening powers should be confiscated for the benefit of the republican State Treasury.

It was recognized even in Europe that Forey and Saligny had set to work too brusquely. There was great joy at the influence they had apparently attained in Mexico, but the decree confiscating property, and a prohibition of the export of money from Mexico issued at the same time, met with no approval from the Emperor Napoleon. He considered that his plan was being carried out somewhat naïvely, and thought of recalling Forey in accordance with Almonte's wishes; but, contrary to Almonte's desire, Saligny was to meet with the same fate. It was known through Douay what an inflammatory part he had played in all that had occurred recently. Hidalgo learnt of these projected measures. He took it as a personal victory that Forey should be removed, but protested to both the Emperor and the Empress against the provision affecting Saligny, though this time in vain.

Napoleon frankly admitted that all that had taken place so far was a declaration from part of the citizens of the capital, but not from the country of Mexico; while the Empress expressed the hope that this movement would extend to all the territories freed from the Juarista troops. Hidalgo took care not to forewarn Saligny or Almonte of the former's recall, lest he might "discourage them." But really it was because he was ashamed that for the first time Napoleon had failed to listen to him, so that he had not been in a position to prevent this measure. The language used by Hidalgo in a letter to De Pont, intended for the Archduke's eye, was most nauseating, and

his allusions to himself were excessively and consistently vain. He said, for instance, that the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre had written to him from Vichy, where the Mexican had sent his congratulations to Napoleon on the occasion of the capture of Mexico City, that Hidalgo's ears must have tingled, for the Emperor had spoken so much and so handsomely about him. Again, he said that he had had "his own little ovation" from those about the Court, and so on. The Empress's mother, who was staying in the château of St. Cloud, and whom Hidalgo visited there daily, was full of enthusiasm.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max was still staying at Meran, where he was visited by his brother-in-law Philip, the younger son of the King of the Belgians. He availed himself of the latter's departure for Paris to send a letter of congratulation to Napoleon⁵⁹ on the capture of Mexico City. This and the taking of Puebla, wrote the Archduke, were a fresh triumph for that will-power which shrank from neither human nor natural obstacles, and had always been one of the most salient features of the Emperor's history. He simultaneously informed Napoleon that, in accordance with the advice in his letter of June 21, he had hastened to ask his brother-in-law to bring influence to bear upon the English Government, and request their co-operation in favour of the monarchical establishment beyond the ocean, which could not dispense with the aid of the two great naval powers, especially at the outset.

As further news came in of events in Mexico, the feeling grew somewhat more sceptical, at any rate in the immediate entourage of the Archduke. It was all very well, wrote De Pont to Hidalgo,⁶⁰ but in all that had so far happened in Mexico there was too little trace of the will of the whole nation. The greater majority of States at least must declare in favour of the monarchy. A sham vote could produce nothing but a phantom monarchy. They might, he wrote — contrary to his own personal opinion, but obviously at the Archduke's dictation — count upon the co-operation of England, which

⁵⁹ Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, Meran, July 12, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁶⁰ Baron De Pont to Hidalgo, August 5, 1863. V. N. A.

was indispensable, but in the event that the election of the sovereign was not supported by a majority, it was "highly probable" that this would be refused. It was all the more likely to be the case since, in view of the successes of the Northern States, the North American Union might be re-constituted, and the new Government in Mexico might consequently find itself suddenly "at the mercy" of an army of half a million men, for whom the United States would gladly find employment away from home. Hidalgo communicated these doubts to the Empress, who exhorted her husband to write the Archduke a soothing letter.

As a matter of fact, the French were in possession only of the main road from the sea to the capital, with the towns through which it passed, the most important of which were Vera Cruz, Córdoba, Orizaba, and Puebla, and from the outset this could not have been otherwise. It was moreover important that ex-President Miramón, who had long refused to hear of a monarchy, and was known to be of the opinion that there were no monarchists in Mexico, was now placed by the capture of the capital in a state of embarrassment as to which way to turn, and therefore adopted the monarchist cause and came out upon the side of intervention. No other course was open to him, for, owing to his past record, he could never attach himself to Juárez, and all his former friends and adherents were now to be found in the interventionist camp. Places directly subject to the French armed forces naturally declared in favour of the invaders and the monarchy: by the middle of June some forty-five of these "acts of adhesion" were forthcoming. The rest of the country, incomparably the larger part, continued to recognize President Juárez.

But the Council of Regency disregarded this. They and the juntas which they had nominated, though consisting exclusively of inhabitants of the capital, regarded themselves as representatives of the Mexican nation as a whole, announced their decisions as though proceeding from it, and on June 12 sent a letter to the Archduke Max, inviting him to accept the crown.⁶¹ The Council of Regency at the same time appointed a deputa-

⁶¹ Printed by Schmit von Tavera, op. cit., I. 173.

tion, of which Gutierrez de Estrada was to be president, and Hidalgo a member, to convey the invitation in person to the Archduke at Miramar.

When this news reached Paris, Napoleon telegraphed to the Archduke as follows:⁶²

"Just as I was on the point of writing to Your Imperial Highness, I received the news of your proclamation as Emperor in the city of Mexico. I am happy at this first result and hope that the whole of Mexico will soon follow the example of the capital and summon Your Imperial Highness to regenerate her. The Empress joins her congratulations with mine."

Ferdinand Max was radiant with joy at this telegram, and immediately communicated it to his brother Francis Joseph in Vienna, thanking the Emperor Napoleon for his congratulations with the utmost cordiality. The Emperor knew, he said, how to reach men's hearts and had given fresh proof of it on this occasion. His joy at the Emperor's telegram had been redoubled by the fact that it plainly showed that he had remained true to his original plan of calling upon the notables not only of the capital, but of the whole country, to decide the matter. For a moment they had had cause to dread a sort of rashness in political matters which might have led to evil results; but the program which the Emperor had announced in a few words again gave every surety for a wise conduct of affairs. "The sentiment of attachment," continued Ferdinand Max,⁶³ "with which Your Majesty inspired me from the very moment in which I had the good fortune to see you for the first time, will never fade, and I shall be happy, Sir, to prove this to you if things so shape themselves as to allow my brother the Emperor and myself to lend a hand in the work of regenerating Mexico. The most serious difficulty which will oppose itself to the realization of this task seems to me to come from North America, the latest news from whence would seem to imply a

⁶² The Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, August 8, 1863; telegram in V. N. A.

⁶³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, August 10, 1863; draft, V. N. A.

revival of the Union — that Union which is as bent upon expansion as it is hostile to the monarchical principle of the other hemisphere. The armed support of France will be the firmest bulwark of the new empire against the encroachments of this bitter foe, which will doubtless be unable to await its own internal stabilization before proceeding to the overthrow of the throne erected at its gates.”

The Emperor Francis Joseph had hardly received Napoleon's telegram, which had been sent on to him, when he telegraphed to Miramar that he urgently desired to speak with Ferdinand Max with a view to clearing up the Mexican affair, and therefore requested him to come to Schönbrunn.⁶⁴ The Archduke at once responded to the summons, taking his wife with him. At Schönbrunn the sovereign first confirmed the agreements arrived at in Venice, and especially the one concerning the enlistment and recruiting of volunteers;⁶⁵ but the Emperor did not conceal from his brother that he would on no account permit of any departure from the reserved and passive role and attitude of the Austrian Government towards the whole question. It was moreover agreed that the Archduchess should go to Brussels in order to arrange with her father to exert his influence in promoting the Mexican affair.⁶⁶

The next subject to be discussed was the impending arrival of the Mexican deputation; upon which the Emperor mentioned the point laid before him by Rechberg: namely, that a deputation coming from an assembly which had not been recognized by the Imperial Government “could not well be recognized as possessing an official character.”⁶⁷

In spite of this, the Archduke wanted to receive the deputation. It was therefore decided that the reception was to be of a

⁶⁴ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, telegram of August 9, 1863. V. N. A.

⁶⁵ Alluded to in the Archduke's letter to the Emperor Francis Joseph of September 10, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁶⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Baron von Meysenbug, August 19, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁶⁷ Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, September 24, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

private nature, in order, as Rechberg put it, "that no opening should be given for drawing the conclusion that this deputation had been considered competent to give expression to the wishes of the Mexican nation." The Archduke further pledged himself to make only a contingent declaration to the deputation: namely, that he was prepared to accept the crown after a pronouncement had been obtained from the "nation as a whole," after the various obstacles still existing in Europe had been surmounted, and also after obtaining his imperial brother's sanction. It was also to be made known that in the event of his election, he was resolved to govern on constitutional principles, following the example of the august head of his house. Finally, the deputation was to be recommended to send one or the other of its members to the English Government, in order to obtain a guarantee of that active support which was so necessary for the proposed monarchy, thereby removing one of the difficulties mentioned. Although the points in his answer to the deputation were severally agreed upon at this audience, the Archduke had also to pledge himself to submit the rough draft of it to Schönbrunn for approval.⁶⁸

From the result of the conversation between the two brothers, it is clear that the Archduke wanted the business to go forward, whereas the Emperor, though not entirely averse from it, betrayed unmistakably in his whole attitude his misgivings with regard to what was happening in Mexico, which were fostered by Rechberg's grave representations.

Nor was King Leopold altogether content with the "Mexican *pronunciamiento*," since it would not represent the unanimous or, as he put it, "quasi-unanimous" decision of the country. He recommended wisdom and prudence, for the "party of anarchy" would not be so quickly vanquished as they had thought at first, and they ought to try to find out "where the defenders of Puebla came from." The provinces ought also to declare themselves, so that the basis of government should not be too narrow. For the King also desired the realization of the project, and it was his fault if at Miramar

⁶⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max from Rechberg, August 27, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

they still hoped that anything was to be done in England. After all that had passed, he ought to have felt bound to say: "Abandon all hope; England cannot and will not help you." Instead of which he wrote guardedly, and yet in such a way that if anybody so *wished*, he could read into it encouragement with regard to England's attitude. "As regards England, I believe that she would be pleased to see Mexico in a good position, if only as a sort of support for the South of what used to be the United States. She is well-disposed towards the idea of an orderly government, and the establishment of one would certainly excite sincere satisfaction there (i.e., in England)." ⁶⁹

This meant nothing definite, and the Archduke Ferdinand Max could therefore read into it anything he liked.

Very different were the dispatches from the Austrian Ambassador in London.⁷⁰ According to these, the election of the Emperor in Mexico had produced the most unfavourable impression imaginable there. People were astonished that an Austrian archduke should consent to become a satrap of France. Nobody believed that such a monarchy could last, and it was considered that the party rivalries and republican tendencies in the country would overthrow such an artificial edifice as fast as it had been set up. Austen Henry Layard, the famous Assyrian explorer, who had won world-wide fame by his excavations at Babylon and Kuyunjik (Nineveh) and by publishing the cuneiform inscriptions which he had deciphered, was at that time Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. When he heard of the Mexican election, he asked Count Apponyi ironically whether he could give him any information about the new Emperor of Mexico.

"I believe," reported the Count to Vienna, "that I am not going too far in asserting that the English Cabinet, which is daily congratulating itself upon having withdrawn from the Mexican affair in time, will do absolutely nothing to support the foundation or maintenance of the new throne, and will thus leave the whole responsibility and all the embarrassments of

⁶⁹ King Leopold to the Archduchess Charlotte, Ostend, August 9, 1863. V. N. A.

⁷⁰ Count Apponyi to Rechberg, London, August 13, 1863; copy sent to the Archduke at Miramar. V. N. A.

the affair to France, just as it has gladly left France all the honour and glory. I therefore believe that we should be wrong in counting upon the support, or even sympathy, of England in this matter, and the less active the part we take in the affair, the more grateful the British Cabinet will be to us."

A copy of this dispatch was immediately sent to the Archduke, but he had scarcely begun to arrive at any ideas on the subject when letters arrived from the Mexicans who were hunting him to his doom, and all doubts were again forgotten. This was primarily due to a letter from Almonte which arrived about then,⁷¹ and held out a prospect of the arrival of the deputation which was to offer the Archduke the imperial crown. Almonte wrote of the state of anxiety in which he was living; how, in the absence of Bishop Labastida, he had nobody save Saligny, and must do everything himself; and he urgently begged the Archduke to hurry his departure as much as possible, so as not to succumb to the countless intrigues that would be set on foot both in Mexico and in Europe to distract his attention and discourage him.

In his letter Almonte addressed the Archduke as "Sir" and "Your Majesty," a detail which made an immense impression upon Ferdinand Max. Almonte knew very well what he was about in using this style long before it was even settled whether the Archduke would accept the crown.

Gutierrez also endeavoured to mislead the Archduke still further. He had called upon Count Mülinen, the Austrian Secretary of Legation, and was quite upset because Mülinen kept on insisting on the necessity of leaving the Cabinet of Vienna entirely out of the question.⁷² When Mülinen objected to Gutierrez that England, after all, had entirely withdrawn, Gutierrez sophistically gave it as his opinion that she might not be giving material support, but was giving moral support, and that public opinion would soon force the Government's hand; it was a sort of neutrality, which might in exceptional circumstances almost amount to a moral co-operation! The Mexican took advantage of his report of this conversation to the

⁷¹ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Mexico, July 12, 1863. V. N. A.

⁷² Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, August 11, 1863. V. N. A.

Archduke to give another little dig at Hidalgo and the Mexican financier Arrangoiz, who, it would appear, in their desire to see Almonte sole regent, were purposely postponing the departure of the Mexican bishops, who were still staying in Europe. In these rivalries which were rife among the Mexican exiles in Paris, they did not spare one another at all. Thus Hidalgo and Arrangoiz were just as anxious as Gutierrez to prevent any other Mexicans who did not belong entirely to their coterie from pushing themselves forward with the royal personages concerned. Thus when there was a question of the Mexican Murphy going to Miramar, where he too wanted to offer his services, a letter was at once communicated to the Empress by Hidalgo, purporting to be written by Murphy, in which he expressed himself about her in unbecoming terms. He actually succeeded for a time in preventing Murphy from being received at Miramar, though Murphy protested that he knew nothing about the matter. Similar means were employed by Hidalgo and his associates in their attempts to undermine and plot against each other. It was into such hands as these that Ferdinand Max delivered himself, in spite of all warnings.

Gutierrez recommended to the Archduke that in receiving the deputation he might at least declare his conditional acceptance of the crown, for Napoleon was "very set upon it"; he was convinced that the slightest hesitation, and even the appearance of a refusal, would produce the very worst impression in Europe no less than in Mexico.⁷³ So Gutierrez said. In reality European opinion was quite different. Of Spain and England we have already spoken, but even in Germany, where the Frankfurt Diet of Princes was sitting, a bitter feeling was universal at the acceptance by an Austrian prince of a crown from Napoleon, which he could wear only as a French prefect.

The misgivings which the Archduke Ferdinand Max had caused to be expressed in Paris shortly after the arrival of the news from Mexico, were answered by communications from the minister Drouyn de Lhuys, conveyed by Hidalgo, who had left for Austria on a visit to the Archduke. They stated that Napoleon was entirely of the Archduke's opinion that they

⁷³ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, Paris, August 19, 1863. V. N. A.

must wait for a vote of the *whole country*. Any interference on the part of a foreign country, or from the Mexican side, would be vigorously resisted, as befitted the dignity of France, so long as the French flag waved in Mexico. It was further stated emphatically that France claimed no part of Mexican territory for herself, and would withdraw her troops by agreement with the Emperor of Mexico, though the time for this could not be determined, since it depended upon circumstances.

Hidalgo had gone to Austria in order to introduce himself to the Archduke. Napoleon sent with him the protocol of the resolutions of the Assembly of Notables at Mexico and Vera Cruz, and a private letter to Ferdinand Max.⁷⁴ It stated how delighted the Emperor was at the large numbers who had rallied to the Archduke, and further expressed the wish that the people could be summoned to ratify the choice of the notables, so that the will of the Mexicans should be even more manifest.

"My minister," wrote Napoleon, "informs me that Doblado and Comonfort have asked to be allowed to come to Mexico City, and seem to want to rally to the party of intervention. I therefore hope that, in spite of the great difficulties, the summer will not go by without the pacification and reorganization of Mexico."

The information about Comonfort was untrue. He had indeed fallen out with Juarez, but had no idea of rallying to the party of intervention. Moreover, shortly afterwards, on November 14, 1863, he fell in battle during an attack by the imperialist troops.⁷⁵ Doblado continued to fight, as he had always done, on the side of President Juarez.

The Archduke thanked Napoleon for sending him the monarchist votes of the Assemblies of Notables of Mexico and Vera Cruz, and laid stress on the fact that the kindly words of the Emperor's which accompanied them had, if possible, still further increased the sentiment of devotion which he had long cherished for Napoleon.

"Your intention, Sir," wrote Ferdinand Max, "of having

⁷⁴ The Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, St. Cloud, August 15, 1863; original in V. N. A.

⁷⁵ For details see Bancroft: *Mexico*, IX. 119.

the whole nation summoned in order to ratify the pronouncements of these two great cities is an indubitable proof that Your Majesty, in his exalted wisdom, is aiming at setting up a solid and lasting edifice in Mexico. The national will will convince the Government that this is a question of creating an important moral force both internally and externally.

"This moral force will be of great value, though it naturally requires a sufficient material force to guarantee the new empire against the attacks to which it will be exposed. On this account I too have held from the outset that we ought to request not only the moral, but also the material, support of the two great naval powers. In order to be effective this support ought, in my opinion, to take the form of a treaty of alliance with the Mexican Empire, in which a pledge should be given to defend it from all armed attacks during a period of from fifteen to twenty years. If the newly-created monarchy were thus protected from the dangers which it would be unable to resist by its own strength, it would be in a position to pursue the welfare of the country and to work conscientiously at a task to further which would above all become the august monarch who by his noble initiative has placed the sword of France at the service of order and humanity."

Such was the answer which the Archduke sent to Napoleon by the hand of Hidalgo.⁷⁶ The letter also expressed a wish for a treaty of alliance and guarantee with England and France, extending over a long period. In such conditions the enterprise would certainly have been far less dangerous. But by the very nature of things such a project belonged to the realm of dreams. England would never have entered into such a treaty, and even Napoleon could not help seeing what incalculable consequences it might have for France in certain circumstances. Napoleon therefore sent no answer to this letter, which somewhat chilled Ferdinand Max.

But now came a letter from Almonte, just in time to revive the Archduke's wishes and hopes. Almonte spoke of the empire as an established fact, and recommended him to bring

⁷⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon, Miramar, August 26, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

from ten to twelve thousand German volunteers, but at the very least three thousand men, so that they might "soon become independent of the French troops," which were so expensive. Negotiations should next be opened for a loan, the Pope should be asked to appoint a nuncio, and new negotiations should be opened with the signatories of the London Convention in order perhaps even now to obtain a guarantee of Mexico's independence and integrity. For the rest, Almonte considered that things were going splendidly in Mexico. Juarez's adherents were indulging in mutual recriminations, and the Emperor (Ferdinand Max) should not let himself be daunted by the intrigues of Spain and America.⁷⁷

The arrival of the letter was particularly timely, for an address had just reached Miramar from Richard Hildreth, United States Consul at Trieste, who asserted that he knew the Mexicans had a desperate and innate antipathy for kings and aristocrats. If Napoleon did not withdraw his army of his own accord, an American army of experienced veterans would be landed in Mexico, strong enough to enable the Mexicans to drive out the intruders. The Gulf of Mexico would be blockaded, and connexions with France cut, "and besides," concluded the Consul, "allow me to add that anyone aspiring to the throne of Mexico, if he really attains it, ought to be extraordinarily happy if he escapes with his life."

The Archduke saw nothing in this but the American's ill will. He would not let himself be daunted, and remained true to the opinions he had already expressed in the letter ⁷⁸ in which he had given thanks for the address of the Council of Regency, which ran as follows: "If the votes of the whole country confirm the desire of the capital, and if the other conditions are realized upon which the fulfilment of this desire depends, I shall not allow myself to be daunted by the difficulties of this great and splendid enterprise."

He was now enthusiastic about Almonte's latest letter. He

⁷⁷ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Mexico City, July 27, 1863. V. N. A.

⁷⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon III, Miramar, September 12, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

determined to send it to Napoleon and ask his approval of the proposals contained in it, with the exception of a few "shades of meaning (*nuances*)" to which he alluded in his letter to the Emperor.⁷⁹ One of these shades of difference was that Almonte regarded the vote of the capital as an expression of the will of the nation, whereas Ferdinand Max desired to see it supplemented by a pronouncement of the whole country, or at least of the large majority of States. Democratic disturbances, the Archduke considered, would cease when the arrival of the Franco-Mexican troops calmed the population and made it possible for it to express its opinion freely.

The Archduke was not conscious of the contradiction contained in this remark, for he was absolutely convinced by the constant statements of the Mexican exiles that the people there were only waiting for a "liberator." Ferdinand Max further mentioned the corps of volunteers, which was to start with a strength of four thousand men, and, as it was gradually increased by Mexicans from the native army, would allow Napoleon gradually to decrease the establishment of the auxiliary troops. And, as Almonte had suggested, he asked for a joint guarantee for a loan from England and France, in order that the support which had hitherto been conceived of as only moral should be converted into a material form. In conclusion, the Archduke warmly advocated Almonte's demand for a treaty by which the signatories of the London Convention, and particularly France and England, should guarantee the independence and integrity of the new empire. He had explained to the Emperor in repeated letters the reasons prompting him to insist upon this point, which he had also laid down from the outset as a condition of his acceptance.

"Almonte," wrote the Archduke, "like a good patriot, has recognized from his standpoint that a monarchy in Mexico, until it has won the strength that time alone can give, would be incapable of maintaining itself without European support, in view of the dangers threatening its northern frontier."

Hidalgo had set his mind at rest on this point so far as

⁷⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon III, Miramar, September 12, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

France was concerned, and, as regards England, Ferdinand Max was not without hope that King Leopold, who was shortly about to visit his niece, the Queen of England, would be able to effect something. . . . To this end Charlotte was to go to Brussels, in order to see her father before he left for England.

While the Archduke was turning over in his mind the means by which England might be influenced, England was at pains to save him from the adventure. The former *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, Sir Charles Wyke, was staying at Karlsbad, from whence he wrote to his friend Prince Karl zu Solms that he would very much like to have a talk with him on Mexican affairs. He hoped the Archduke would not run his head "into such a hornets' nest" as he would do if he were to accept the crown offered him by the clerical party in the capital of Mexico, which had the majority of the nation against it. The Archduke must have been deceived as to the true sentiments of the people, for that party only existed, politically speaking, where it was supported by French bayonets, and this was only the case on the line from the coast to the capital, nowhere in the interior of Mexico.⁸⁰ Thereupon the Archduke Ferdinand Max sent to Sir Charles Wyke a former naval officer, Stefan Herzfeld, who had seen service in his entourage and won justifiable confidence by his sagacity, manly uprightness, and unbounded devotion to the Archduke's person, in order to obtain more detailed information. Herzfeld was to convey an invitation to the Englishman to come to Miramar, but the latter had first to ascertain Lord Russell's views on the subject.

Wyke related⁸¹ how, on returning to Europe after many years' residence in Guatemala and Mexico, he had stated, not only to Palmerston, but to Napoleon, that the country of Mexico could be set on its feet again only through a monarchy. This, however, could be done only with the help of the moderate Liberals, but never by the aid of the Radical-Liberals or the Radical-Conservatives, who represented the very scum of the population. Sir Charles asserted that immediately before

⁸⁰ Extract from a letter from Prince Karl zu Solms to Count Rechberg, sent by him to the Archduke on August 28, 1863. V. N. A.

⁸¹ Stefan Herzfeld to Baron De Pont, Karlsbad, September 7, 1863. V. N. A.

the intervention it had been agreed upon with Napoleon that if Juarez did not at once duly comply with the demands of the three powers, they would regard it as a *casus belli* and prepare the way for a monarchy. Lord Palmerston had indeed consented to the Archduke's candidature, which had already been projected at that time, but he did not wish it to be brought forward before the capture of the capital; he wanted it to emanate from the moderate Liberal party, and to be the outcome of the initiative of the people alone. He had already uttered a warning at the time against allowing the effete and demoralized exiles belonging to the clerical party to take the lead, and asked that it should be intimated to Count Saligny that he must break off the relations into which he had entered with these crime-stained men, who battered on plunder and were in no way superior to the most despicable of the Juaristas. On his appointment as British plenipotentiary after the opening of operations by the allied armies, Wyke had given Admiral Jurien the most categorical assurances that the Mexican army would yield without a blow, that Comonfort and Doblado could be won over, but would remain hostile if Almonte, Marquez, Miranda, and their like did not at once leave the allied armies. It was to be expected that the operations of such weak troops would miscarry if they were not supported. And so they had arrived at the Convention of La Soledad, which had been approved by Palmerston, but rejected by Napoleon. He assured them that a military occupation of the country was as impossible now as before: "it would be like drinking the sea (*c'est la mer à boire*)."¹ Almonte's clerical *coup de main* had annihilated England's last hopes and exasperated the Moderados intensely; it was not by such ways as this that the French would attain to results which he himself (Wyke) most earnestly desired, and this, and this alone, was at the bottom of his and England's indifference.

The sagacious diplomatist entirely forgot to allude to the influence of the North American Union upon England's attitude; and intentionally so, since it was far finer to put forward the noble pretext of protecting liberal interests throughout the world as the motive for his action than to admit that it

was uneasiness and anxiety with regard to the incalculable complications which might ensue with the North American Republic which had induced England to extricate herself from her original interference in Mexico.

A little while after this conversation Wyke sent word to the Archduke that he could not come to Miramar. Palmerston did not wish to send a member of the diplomatic service, and thereby create an impression in Paris that England was officially running counter to Napoleon's plans; and he desired to avoid all semblance of interference.

He was therefore all the more active unofficially; for Sir Charles Wyke went to Vienna and communicated to Rechberg letters from Mexicans in which was described the growing agitation of the population at the French occupation and the proceedings of the provisional Government. Juarez was successfully arming for a guerrilla warfare which would cause the French the utmost difficulties. The domination of the latter was confined to the places they had occupied. All the rest of the country was hostile. According to Wyke's opinion, the French would be able to maintain themselves and establish an effective occupation of the country only if they sent out a further sixty thousand men to Mexico. He counselled prudence, and also requested that they would collect information as to opinion in the country from other parties, for the French reports were partial, and the French cause in Mexico was really a lost one.

Count Rechberg listened to Sir Charles Wyke most seriously; he had already arrived at similar conclusions before Wyke's visit, and he therefore hastened to report to the Archduke the substance of his conversation with the Englishman.⁸² But it was not only Rechberg who was no longer inclined for the Mexican enterprise. To the great annoyance of the Archduke the newspapers were once again busying themselves with the subject, and great uneasiness was felt in the Reichsrat. Ignaz Kuranda, the publicist and deputy, remarked to Herzfeld that a demonstration was imminent in the Reichsrat; let them therefore make it clear that there was not to be an

⁸² Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, September 25, 1863. V. N. A.

unconditional acceptance. He assured him that there would be insistence in the Reichsrat on the Archduke's renunciation of his rights as a member of the imperial house and that the Government would have to yield on this point. The greatest offence was taken at the small importance which the Archduke seemed to attach to being an Austrian, at his contemptuous treatment of his connexion with Austria, and at the fact that "certain possibilities" of succeeding to the throne were of less value in the Archduke's eyes than the crown of a land which had sunk so low.

These doubts ought to have produced all the more impression upon the Archduke, since at this time Seward had recently given notice to Count Drouyn de Lhuys through the American Ambassador in Paris that opinion in the United States was very uneasy about the proceedings of France in Mexico. It was also interesting that Wyke informed Herzfeld that it was in no way to England's interest "to clear the way" for France in Mexico, for Napoleon was projecting a campaign on the Rhine for next year, and it was therefore desired that he might send as many troops overseas as possible. These unfavourable reports even reached the ears of the Archduchess Sophie, Ferdinand Max's mother, while she was still under the impression of the recent expulsion of the Bavarian prince Otto from the throne of Greece. She therefore resolved to inform her son of her alarm at the thought that the same thing, with even more terrible consequences, might happen to him in Mexico, a distant and still less civilized country.

The Archduchess Charlotte, on the other hand, who had meantime become almost more involved in the glittering dream of empire than her husband, could not and would not drop the matter. Convinced that it would be extremely painful to her gentler-natured husband to take a firm stand in face of his mother's misgivings, she took it upon herself to answer the letter, and in an extraordinarily detailed composition⁸³ attempted to set forth the difference between the situations in Greece and Mexico. Nothing could exceed the optimism with

⁸³ The Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduchess Sophie, Miramar, September 1, 1863; draft in V. N. A.



THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE
IN MILANESE COSTUME

which she estimated the situation in order to allay her mother-in-law's anxieties.

"It is far from being the case," she wrote, "that matters are worse now than before; on the contrary, they are moving towards a favourable and dignified solution." Charlotte's opinion was that she could not understand why their views should be different now from what they were before. In seeking to regain Mexico as part of her dynastic possessions, Austria was in a very different position from that of Bavaria in Greece, on both historical and dynastic grounds. It was a matter of asserting a historical right and accepting a crown on the basis of a national election. She therefore could not see how there was any question of foreign influence and foreign conquest. Without outside support it would be a superhuman task to require a population groaning under terrorism and anarchy to regenerate itself. In Belgium also it was the French army which in 1830 had helped to make the establishment of the country possible. As regards the charge of outraging the sentiment of nationality, those who identified the Mexican nation with Juarez — who was on the one hand betraying his country to the United States, and on the other attacking the religion professed by the whole population — must admit that the idea of nationality was no more than a "hollow sham and a bitter irony."

In Greece the dynasty had had to adopt a schismatic religion; in Mexico they had the Catholic faith as a basis. In any case, a country three times the size of France, which could double and treble its existing population of eight millions, and hid within it all the treasures of the globe, could not be compared with Greece, which had an utterly corrupt race, whereas in Mexico both the Spanish and the Indian elements possessed admirable qualities capable of development on a basis of unity and peace. In the special case of Mexico the task of the sovereign must consist in *rendering foreign support superfluous as soon as possible*. In Greece the king had been able neither to maintain his position nor to fall gloriously. "In Mexico," wrote the Archduchess, "that would not be the case, and Max adds that even if, in spite of all the guarantees that have been

obtained, and contrary to all probability, Providence should desire to bring to a premature end a work which it has so far seemed to favour, it could not be lacking in dignity or honour, and could contain nothing that . . . should cause a blush to the family from which he was descended, whose traditions he would maintain unimpaired, whether in good or evil fortune."

The Archduchess Sophie had also expressed a fear lest the military forces out there might be too weak to be adequately "imposing." Her daughter-in-law countered this with the phrase that the love of the people alone would effect this, and without it no bayonets were of any avail. She concluded her letter with the request that her mother would not pain Max and her by being of a different opinion from theirs, *although in any case that could not alter his decision if he were determined to form one.*

So from this quarter too no protest and no warning was of any avail; they had both sunk deeper and deeper into their dreams of a phantom empire and had linked up their destiny more and more closely with that of distant Mexico.

Meanwhile, in his convulsive efforts to win over England, Ferdinand Max had determined to send a Mexican agent to London who was well acquainted with conditions there, in order "to develop the germs of a better state of feeling in English government circles in the most convenient way, and in particular to represent the matter in an advantageous light to public opinion there." For this purpose he had chosen Don Francisco Arrangoiz. The Archduke held that if "the great nation of shopkeepers" could promise itself commercial and financial profit from the foundation of a monarchy, then it should be more readily won over in favour of the new arrangement.⁸⁴ He still hoped for a revulsion of opinion, while Rechberg was writing to him that the Austrian Imperial Government would maintain an attitude of opposition to any attempt

⁸⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Baron Meysenbug, August 19, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

to influence England; for any steps of this nature might compromise it, whereas the Imperial Cabinet could not depart from the passive attitude which it had hitherto adopted.⁸⁵

Arrangoiz, who had been selected for this mission, had been Mexican Minister in London. Before his departure he received a memorandum handed to him by De Pont in which the Archduke's views were briefly summed up. The Mexican was above all to draw attention to the point that as regards religion the Archduke was far from entertaining any "fanatical ideas or reactionary tendencies in a political connexion," but desired, on the contrary, to give his sovereignty a constitutional basis. The Archduke thought that by this means he would win over the Liberal English ministry. Arrangoiz was further to inform them that Comonfort and Doblado had given their assent to a moderate monarchy in Mexico; next to point out the trade advantages which would accrue to England, to mention King Leopold's desire that the empire should be established, and in this connexion to indicate the disadvantages that would arise if another candidate came to Mexico who was neither a relative nor a friend of the Queen's. In conclusion he was to declare that, in case England were so far to mistake her own interests as to refuse her help, the Archduke would refuse the crown, but not without making it clear both to Napoleon and to the Mexicans that the responsibility for this rested with England. The Archduke Ferdinand Max gave Arrangoiz a letter of introduction to the Emperor Napoleon,⁸⁶ declared the Mexican's financial ideas to be very plausible, and also gave the Emperor some information about his mission to London, the aim of which was to induce England to adopt a policy on the same lines as France, a course which her own interests ought in any case to dictate.

King Leopold also gave Arrangoiz a letter of introduction to the Belgian Minister in London, who at the Mexican's request arranged for an interview with the Prime Minister,

⁸⁵ Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, August 21, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁸⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Miramar, August 31, 1863; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting in V. N. A.

Palmerston, which could otherwise only have been managed with the greatest difficulty.

Palmerston's reply to Arrangoiz's question whether England would recognize the Archduke as Emperor of Mexico was that this would not be possible till the Archduke had accepted the crown and arrived in Mexico. Even the regency could not be recognized, for this "implicitly" involved the recognition of the Archduke. "It is my opinion," said Palmerston, "that we shall recognize the regency as soon as the majority is in favour of it. But this is merely my personal view, which will, however, I believe, be listened to." Palmerston appeared to be satisfied with the Archduke's principles, and expressed the hope that he would grant "some sort of constitution." The English Prime Minister also declared that he did not believe in a reunion between the northern and southern portions of the North American Union. For the time being, therefore, there was nothing to be feared in that quarter. On Arrangoiz's observing that, if the Archduke declined, a Bourbon would probably aspire to the throne, the answer given by Palmerston, the old enemy of Louis Philippe and the house of Bourbon in general, was: "A Bourbon! There is not one of them worth a fig."⁸⁷

When King Leopold heard this dictum, he laughed heartily. He was also amused at Palmerston's never having doubted that the Archduke would grant "some sort of constitution." As regards the Prime Minister's remark that the Northern and Southern States of America would never be reunited, he said sarcastically: "Naturally not, for he does not want them to be."

But however much Arrangoiz and Gutierrez might strive to represent the result of this conversation in a favourable light, the fact could not be concealed that in spite of all Palmerston's undoubtedly genuine personal sympathy for Napoleon and his enterprises, they had not really obtained the slightest real promise, and recognition had been politely refused for the time being. It is true that in their reports this was expressed

⁸⁷ Reports on the interview by Arrangoiz to De Pont, September 13, 1863, and Gutierrez to De Pont, September 14, 1863. These accounts are to all appearance given a colour favourable to the enterprise. V. N. A.

only in very veiled terms, and the Archduke Ferdinand Max only too readily allowed himself to be duped as to the real outcome of the interview.

A second and more important step was now undertaken. In accordance with the plans adopted at Schönbrunn, the Archduchess Charlotte set out for Brussels, where she arrived on September 11, 1863. On the very first day the father and daughter discussed the Mexican question for hours, and this was repeated on the remaining days of the week which Charlotte spent in Brussels.⁸⁸ King Leopold was most anxious for information as to the Emperor Francis Joseph's views upon the Mexican question; for on the occasion of the Emperor's meeting with Queen Victoria at Coburg he had alluded to the "great difficulties." The Archduchess Charlotte replied that she had recently been at Schönbrunn with her husband, and that the Emperor had said nothing which could have led them to doubt his assent; on the contrary, he had approved of everything; only he laid stress, above all things, on the guarantee from England, and that King Leopold should at once use his influence in that direction, as was also the ardent desire of Napoleon.

When the King asked in what this guarantee was to consist, his daughter replied, on the lines of Almonte's last letter, that the London Convention ought to be renewed, and that Austria and Belgium must also associate themselves with it, in so far as the latter could do so without infringing her neutrality. The King promptly replied that, owing to the press and dread of the Reichsrat, Austria was the very last Government of which this could be expected. Nor could any guarantee be expected from England; but they could certainly look to her for "moral support and perhaps also for a frigate to escort them on the voyage." The Archduchess Charlotte replied that this would fully satisfy her husband; it was only the Emperor who took up such a stand on this point, and that was why they both turned to her father, so as to smooth away this difficulty, which

⁸⁸ The account of these conversations is taken from the Archduchess Charlotte's exhaustive autograph account entitled "*Conversations avec cher Papa*, September 12-19, 1863." V. N. A.

might end by bringing the whole Mexican project to nothing. The King smiled, but did not refuse, and promised to use his influence. He then alluded to the vital necessity for a loan, to which his daughter answered: "A loan of five hundred million piastres is being spoken of for the preliminary expenses of the State, and in order gradually to refund the expenditure of the French expedition."

"I approve the scheme for periodical repayments," replied the King. "This is all the more important since it gives a hold over France. It is absolutely indispensable that that country should guarantee the loan; England cannot, for it would strongly resemble a material guarantee, which she would not venture to give, out of fear of the United States. With regard to them, England is certain to end by going to war with them, hence the establishment of the State of Mexico to the south is of all the more importance to her. The Confederate privateers, built in the English shipyards, are exasperating the hatred of the North far more than any possible (English) recognition of the Government at Richmond, which I have never ceased to advocate to the British Cabinet."

The Archduchess Charlotte next touched upon the constitution which it was proposed to give Mexico, the outlines of which had been sketched by the Archduke with the Mexicans at Miramar. Upon this the King gave a little nod, as if to say: "Very good, but that must be set about prudently." He then said briskly: "Yes, I am quite in favour of this, but a constitution must be very elastic, and points which are capable of change or emendation must be passed over in silence. It was a great mistake here (in Belgium) to have crammed a mass of things into the constitution that ought never to have been there; for instance, all those detailed regulations with regard to the press, which ought to have formed the subject of a law."

After this remark of her father's, the Archduchess quoted the first paragraph of the constitution: namely, "The Mexican nation is free, sovereign, and independent."

"Very good," said the King.

Next came: "Every citizen is equal before the law."

"That goes without saying," he remarked.

With regard to the press there were two draft provisions: one short, simple, and vigorous, which was approved by Charlotte, and the other involved, longer, and more meticulous. To his daughter's great delight the King also greatly preferred the former.

"It must," he said, "be stated unreservedly that the press is free — but with laws to restrain it; there is no contradiction in that, for it recognizes the liberty of the good only, not of evil."

The Archduchess agreed whole-heartedly.

"I am in favour," continued the King, "of Max's proclaiming himself a constitutional emperor, and also of his causing the constitution to be voted by the national Congress, instead of promulgating it himself (*octroyer*). Besides, it is quite a good thing to adapt himself a little to the wishes of the Mexicans, and very natural that they should demand it.

"A State religion as here projected also exists in Brazil, but it must next be seen what can be done for the toleration of other forms of worship. For the rest, one can deal with the Catholic Church just as well as with the Anglican. Hence I am not in favour of a single chamber."

The Archduchess, though inwardly of her father's opinion, defended her husband's draft proposals, as in duty bound, by bringing forward the argument of the origin of the separation of the two chambers in England. She readily allowed herself to be convinced, for she was herself an outspoken adherent of the two-chamber system.

"I think," resumed the King, "that a senate on the American plan would meet the case better, for that is really conservative. I recommend provincial and communal institutions, and the creation of a permanent audit department nominated by the sovereign. This would exercise an important check upon ministers, to whom no sum could be paid out without a decree signed by the head of the State. *The tendency of ministers is always to emancipate themselves from the sovereign, if care is not taken on this point; it is so even in England.*"

The Archduchess next spoke of the unrest and unfavourable criticisms aroused by the Mexican candidature.

"That was always the way," observed the King. "When I was offered the throne of Greece, and afterwards that of Belgium, a general cry went up that, since I had a sufficiently independent position in England, I was being sacrificed, that it was infamous, a result of the vanity of the ministry. It was even discussed in Parliament. As a matter of fact, all beginnings are always difficult. Have you read Colonel Huybrecht's book?⁸⁹ It is the absolute truth. Part of the army was treacherous, the rest ran away; there was a bridge in the neighbourhood of Malmis which I could hold only by *sitting on it*. Even the feeling for decency and morality had sunk very low; everything had to be gradually created, and the national spirit, so to speak, organized, for at the beginning it was no more than a spirit of antagonism and a desire for separation from Holland.⁹⁰ It was possible to achieve all this, mainly because pains were taken meticulously to observe the constitution, and that not only in general terms and in the spirit, but literally and word for word."

The King could not resist this opportunity of pointing out how cleverly he had managed in Belgium. He further remarked on the fact that the Indians in Mexico were hard-working, which was a great advantage, for the Greeks, for instance, were not; this had always been their most dangerous stumbling-block. He was also entirely in favour of allowing no right of association in Mexico, for he declared that to grant this to peoples of Latin race was absolutely impossible.

Immediately after this interview Gutierrez, who had come to Brussels, visited the Archduchess. As the result of her conversations with the King, she could give him no more positive information than that the English would provide ships — she used the plural to the Mexican, though the King had spoken only of an escort of one frigate. But Gutierrez was "enchanted" at this meagre feast; he considered it "entirely satisfactory, beyond all his hopes," and held that "the rest"

⁸⁹ *The Belgian Campaign*, 1831.

⁹⁰ From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 till the revolution of 1830 Belgium was combined with Holland in a single State.

must be left to time, and to the consideration that England had always recognized her own interest!

On the next day the conversations between father and daughter were resumed. The King thought it would not make a good impression if the Austrian volunteer corps were to arrive at the same time as the sovereign. The presence of the French troops was sufficient to protect his arrival in Mexico. Three powers must recognize the new Government by common consent; France must maintain her occupation of the country for a certain time, and guarantee the loan. On these conditions the enterprise could be undertaken.

"Guarantees," said the King, "are rather illusory, and they are only obtained from England when it is clearly and obviously to her interest. A good quality of English guarantees is their trustworthiness; hence they are not very lavish with them. In the case of Mexico, she is deterred only by fear of the United States. Moreover, the position of England in this respect is subject to change, for the following reason: that since she cannot avoid a war in the not very distant future, it would be to her advantage to create herself a bulwark and *point d'appui* in America. If in the mean time the Union were to be reconstituted, I do not think that this could be for a long time to come, which would, moreover, give Mexico enough time to start her life. The good thing about the business is that there is nothing that can damage Max's position, but I do not doubt that everything possible will be done to induce him to refuse; there will be no lack of ill will. The more independent he becomes, the more advantageous to him this will be in Mexico. It is necessary that the Mexicans should be thoroughly convinced that it is they who need *him*, not *he* who needs them, and should regard the whole thing as a sacrifice on his part."

The Archduchess Charlotte assured her father that the Mexicans were already imbued with this idea, and that everything would be done to confirm them in it.

Finally she asked: "Is it a misfortune for us to leave Austria?"

To which the King replied: "It would certainly not be a misfortune at all!"

The Archduchess was enthusiastic about the character of Gutierrez, which the King answered by remarking what a fine thing it would be if one could have a nation composed of such people! So far had even the venerable, worldly-wise King of the Belgians allowed himself to be ensnared by that man's flatteries. Finally, even the smallest subsidiary matters concerning the Empire came under discussion. The Archduchess mentioned the sum of three million francs for the civil list.

"Yes," said the King, "but that is the least that can be accepted, for it is easier to arrange this at the beginning than afterwards. Take only a small household, no more than three or four menservants. The Emperor Napoleon had far too many; he found himself forced to have them in order to reward those who had served him."

The Archduchess now mentioned the castle of Chapultepec, close to Mexico, and was of opinion that it could be fortified. "Very good and advantageous," answered the King. "I did not do so here, on principle, but I cannot deny that in many cases, when all kinds of inopportune decisions have been demanded of me, it has had a most useful and calming effect when they have had to come some distance to find me. It has often, indeed, obviated difficulties. Nor is the foundation of a monarchy in Mexico in contradiction to the Monroe Doctrine, for it is not a question of an American State; but if it is interpreted in a republican sense, how can that be reconciled with the existence of Brazil? I am only glad that Max was not called upon to rule over Poland; that would have been terrible, for Russian national sentiment would never allow it, and Prussia has never given back what she possesses."

"Greece," said the Archduchess to her father, "came at the eleventh hour, when they had felt the pulse of everybody else; and there, above all, there was the religious question."

"The dynasty could quite well have remained Catholic," rejoined the King, "but I grant that the Greeks were hostile to it, and by that time the question had already sunk to the level of an absurdity."

"Shall I go to Mexico with Max?" asked the Archduchess Charlotte.

FOR AND AGAINST THE CANDIDATURE

"It is your duty. The French are rather vain of their chivalrous sentiments when it is a case of defending women, but they proved it at Gaeta in the highest degree in the case of the Queen of Naples.⁹¹ Besides, there is the effect of certain memories which have not died out in the French army — that you are no foreigner to them.⁹² Those who are now superior officers still remember their youth with pleasure, the name of your dear mother, who was revered in France, myself, for I was very well known in France and they always showed goodwill towards me; all these would be useful elements in your position with regard to them, and consequently for Max too. So far I have done nothing in England, for I did not know the Emperor Francis Joseph's views, and did not know how far you yourselves desired to venture. But now I will try to work in that direction, and cherish an ardent desire for the success of the enterprise, which I hold to be a noble and meritorious one. Above all things I recommend a good administration and justice, since these two things together are certainly the things to which the Mexicans are least accustomed, and which they value the most."

The outcome of these conversations was that the Archduchess Charlotte was more than ever confirmed in her views. She telegraphed enthusiastically to her husband: "Enchanted, everything splendid."⁹³

King Leopold's vision had been clouded by the ambition to see his children exalted. This otherwise sagacious and experienced sovereign, who had piloted Belgium to prosperity through so many storms, who had raised the house of Coburg to almost unprecedented heights by wisely planned alliances, and, in spite of the smallness of his country, had acquired the

⁹¹ King Francis II of Naples had retired to Gaeta at the end of 1860 with his wife and the remains of his army; he was surrounded by the Piedmontese troops and, on February 13, 1860, forced by treachery to surrender. A French fleet had been protecting Gaeta from an attack from the sea, and later on a French ship carried the King and Queen to Terracina, from whence they reached Rome.

⁹² The King was alluding to his second wife, Charlotte's mother, who had been a daughter of King Louis Philippe of France.

⁹³ The Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, September 12, 1863. V. N. A.

influence of a great power in Europe, saw everything in Mexico through the rose-coloured spectacles of his desires, encouraged his children rather than otherwise; and from what has gone before we must assign to him a good share of the blame for the ill-omened resolve to venture upon this hazardous enterprise in Mexico.

The Archduchess Charlotte's telegram gave her husband a totally false impression. For what positive result had she achieved, or what had she heard from her father, save a number of wise counsels, and *perhaps* the possibility of being escorted by a British frigate? Though she had assured her father that the Emperor Francis Joseph was wholly in favour of the project, this was in reality only the case within considerable limitations. This was to be apparent when Ferdinand Max reported to him about the letter which he had again written to Napoleon III on September 12, though the Emperor of the French had not yet answered the Archduke's letters of August 26 and 31.

The Archduke sent a copy of this communication to his brother with a covering letter⁹⁴ in which he informed him that, on the basis of Almonte's last letter, he had once more desired "emphatically" to state to Napoleon the points upon which his acceptance depended. In his letter to Napoleon, in view of the "difficulties which might possibly crop up with regard to this at home," he had passed over in silence the joint guarantee of the stability and integrity of the new empire on the part of Austria desired by General Almonte, but had allowed himself to remark that if Spain would guarantee them, a similar proceeding on the part of Austria could not be at all damaging to her policy, and would be desirable for the honour of the imperial house as well as for the question of the succession. He also ventured to touch lightly upon the point whether, after the French and English guarantees, it might not be possible to obtain a purely nominal guarantee of the loan from Austria. The Archduke also mentioned that he had sent his wife to Brussels, and was of opinion that they ought not

⁹⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, September 10, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

to give up hope of ultimately attaining their object. Francis Joseph's answer to this information, with the enclosed draft of the letter to the Emperor Napoleon, was an autograph letter ⁹⁵ written from Vienna by return of post, to the effect that he could sanction the proposed explanation with Napoleon as to the measures to be settled only after the impending arrival of the deputation of notables at Miramar, but that he wished the full importance of the Austrian standpoint in this matter to be emphasized. "For this reason," ran the letter, "it appears to me important not to pass over in silence in the letter to the Emperor Napoleon the point that in no circumstances can Austria undertake a joint guarantee for the stability of the monarchy which is to be set up in Mexico, and for the integrity of that country. As to this point, you have for long been acquainted with my convictions and resolves, and know that I could never bring myself to undertake or impose upon my country a guarantee which, should occasion arise, it might be impossible to support with that force which the dignity and might of Austria undoubtedly demand, owing to the circumstance that no adequate means of assisting in transatlantic enterprises are at the disposal of Austria. This point should therefore be expressly emphasized in the letter to the Emperor Napoleon. Moreover, with regard to the proposal that my country should undertake to be a guarantee for the loan operations projected in aid of Mexico, you will, my brother, be conforming to my intentions if you leave no room for doubt, either to the Emperor of the French or to General Almonte, that Austria cannot undertake any such guarantee. Quite apart from the important objections which this question presents in itself, such a pledge would in any case have to be submitted to the Reichsrat, and, in view of the sentiments which you are known to cherish in this matter, it would be impossible to prevent unpleasant discussions and arguments in the Reichsrat, while, in any case, the result would remain very questionable. As regards the letter which you desire to send to the Emperor Napoleon, I think I ought further to observe to you that I

⁹⁵ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, September 16, 1863; original in V. N. A.

should consider it proper if you were on this occasion also to insist emphatically upon your unqualified adherence to the stipulations from which your acceptance of the Mexican throne has from the first been inseparable." Francis Joseph approved of the project for the formation of an Austrian volunteer corps submitted to him by his brother, and entered into further detail with regard to this corps.

But the Archduke Ferdinand Max had not so much as waited for his brother's reply to the enclosed draft of his letter to Napoleon. By the time he received the answer quoted above, the letter to the Emperor of the French had already gone. The Archduke therefore replied to the Emperor Francis Joseph⁹⁶ that he would at once send a fresh letter to Napoleon, containing the desired modifications, for the first had already gone.

Meanwhile Hidalgo had conveyed to the Emperor at Biarritz the Archduke's letter of August 26, besides a draft constitution for Mexico, and lastly Ferdinand Max's letter of September 12 intended for Napoleon's eyes and communicated to him by Baron De Pont. On the following day Napoleon summoned Hidalgo to his study, where the draft constitution was examined in consultation with the Empress Eugénie, and the import of certain articles, which, according to Hidalgo,⁹⁷ seemed to bind the new Mexican sovereign's hands too much, was deliberated upon for two hours and a half. Above all, Napoleon saw in it a danger that only a single chamber was to be created; and the provisions dealing with the franchise seemed to him particularly open to objection. The Emperor and Empress had already been occupied all day with Mexican affairs when Hidalgo announced to them that Arrangoiz had just arrived from London with the latest news as to England's attitude. Napoleon at once granted him an audience for ten o'clock next morning, while the Empress, in answer to Hidalgo's question as to when *she* would receive him, replied that he was to present Arrangoiz to her at the time when the band played on the beach. This was done, and Eugénie conversed

⁹⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, September 22, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁹⁷ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, September 20, 1863. V. N. A.

with the Mexican there in public for more than an hour, after which he was invited to dinner, followed by another interview of two hours.

Hidalgo accompanied these details with the justifiable comment that they clearly showed the Emperor and Empress's great interest in the Mexican question. "I am quite embarrassed (*confus*)," he wrote on one occasion,⁹⁸ "by Their Majesties' kindness, when Mexico is in question."

If Arrangoiz had been honest, he ought not to have brought good news as to the feeling in England with regard to the proposed monarchy in Mexico; but he only reported, both to the Emperor and Empress and in his letters to the Archduke, such of his experiences on his visit to London as he knew they would be pleased to hear. Thus he gave them to understand that he had found on the whole a favourable disposition. It had made a good impression that the Archduke had attached importance to the expression of the popular will, and intended to carry on the government in a liberal spirit; and, besides this, English trade had an interest in a lasting and well-ordered government in Mexico, Arrangoiz also reported that England appeared inclined to recognize the Southern States of the Union, in so far as they were in a position to produce evidence of sufficient strength to maintain their independence.

Arrangoiz belonged to the coterie of exiles with monarchist leanings; he was also extremely clerical, and even ultramontane in his views, and had therefore become a mortal enemy of Juarez. He anticipated that the monarchy and Maximilian would tend wholly in a clerical direction, and had therefore become an adherent of the monarchical idea. From such a man no impartial reports were to be expected. Moreover, Hidalgo took care that as far as possible no impartial critic should come anywhere near the Emperor and Empress of the French at all.

Napoleon now sent the Archduke an answer to his last letter.⁹⁹ He emphasized the point that in order to achieve their

⁹⁸ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, September 16, 1863. V. N. A.

⁹⁹ Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Biarritz, September 19, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

aim Mexico must be pacified by military operations, and men of worth attracted to the Government without recourse to any reactionary measures. "When once the country is physically and morally pacified," wrote the Emperor, "Your Imperial Highness's Government will be recognized by all, and the guarantee which it is so hard to obtain from the naval powers would scarcely contribute towards its stability. The United States are quite well aware that the new establishment in Mexico is the work of France, and that they cannot attack it without at once making an enemy of us." The Emperor next mentioned that the chief banking-houses in London and Paris were interesting themselves in the loan, and that as soon as a stable government was formed, the loan was bound to succeed.

He further offered to the Archduke to lend him the Foreign Legion for ten years, and to set up recruiting stations for it everywhere. Thus the nucleus and the cadres would be provided for further development, and it would not look as if Maximilian had come to Mexico with a foreign armed force.

The latest news from Mexico had aroused some misgivings in Napoleon, particularly as regards further developments in internal politics. He desired always to be taken for a national emperor, and it was by no means to his taste that the regency in Mexico, which, as everyone knew, owed its power to the Emperor of the French, should reveal itself as undisguisedly despotic. Yet all accounts agreed on the point that the clerical Almonte and the bishop, who were members of the regency, were trending in that direction. And so one day the Emperor and Empress sent for Hidalgo, and, after two hours' discussion of the situation, it was resolved that he should summon a meeting of the Mexicans resident in Paris who were initiated into the affair, and impress upon them to urge their friends in Mexico to proceed in the "liberal and conciliatory manner desired at the Court of Paris."¹⁰⁰

A flood of light was thrown upon conditions under the regency in Mexico by a dispatch from General Forey which arrived at this moment. He complained of Almonte, who, if not a reactionary, was, he said, at any rate an extremely weak

¹⁰⁰ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, September 22, 1863. V. N. A.

man, always ready to be prompted to regrettable measures, which the general could not agree to. Thus decrees had been issued as to the way of observing Sunday rest, and as to certain measures concerning Church property, which were in direct contradiction with the assurances contained in Forey's proclamations. The Council of Regency was threatening all Juaristas who should return to the localities occupied by the French with arrest and imprisonment unless they declared themselves in favour of the new regency, and thus the sequestration with which Forey had menaced the property of such persons as had taken up arms against the intervention was to be extended to all Juarez's adherents. It was in the question of Church property that the tendencies of the regency found particular expression: in his own manifesto Forey had promised undisturbed possession of such property to all those who had acquired it lawfully in accordance with the decree which Juarez had previously issued; the Council of Regency, on the other hand, maintained an absolute silence upon this point. Forey did not believe the new Government could possibly succeed in maintaining itself if it withheld from the purchasers of national (formerly Church) property the confirmation of their title.

The general had therefore urged upon the Council of Regency that they should issue a declaration to meet this case, and appoint a commission which should confirm purchases lawfully made and declare all others null and void.

But the clerical majority in the Government, and especially Almonte and the bishop, declared that the matter must be referred to Rome for decision, and that Archbishop Labastida would doubtless report upon its solution on his arrival, which was expected shortly.

Forey was most dissatisfied with this answer from the leader of the party which had attained to power, and which was in reality far more reactionary than it gave itself out to be; and when, in view of the attitude of the Council of Regency, a newspaper formulated a doubt as to the value of the statements made in Forey's manifesto, the general addressed an open letter to the editor, reaffirming his promises. Forey informed Napoleon that he saw with apprehension that the

Council of Regency was falling into too great dependence upon the clergy. "It is to be feared," he wrote, "that, whereas the Government which has been overthrown went too far in plundering and ill-treating the clergy, the present Government is going too far in the opposite direction. If it placed itself under the heel of the clergy, as it appears to want to do, it would become reactionary, and fail to attract to it moderate men who were truly religious, though in a simple way."

Napoleon sent an extract from this report to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, adding in plain language ¹⁰¹ that if a perfectly binding guarantee were not issued with regard to the validity ("consécration") of purchases of national property, he would regard the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico as impossible.

Napoleon's letters crossed the communication from Ferdinand Maximilian in which, in accordance with his promise, albeit with a heavy heart, he informed Napoleon of his brother's refusal with regard to the Austrian guarantee.

The Emperor, he wrote, ¹⁰² had once more emphasized his benevolent intentions with regard to the formation of a volunteer corps, but had informed him that he could not give the Austrian guarantee of the integrity and independence of Mexico desired by Almonte, in addition to that of the signatories of the London Convention, since he did not possess the naval resources for oversea expeditions, and could therefore not support them on a scale in keeping with his dignity and power. Even participation in the loan would meet with a stumbling-block in the fact that the Chambers would have to sanction it, and would apparently refuse any such assent.

Ferdinand Max also sent the Emperor the draft of his address to the Mexican deputation which was coming to offer him the crown, and hoped it would entirely fall in with Napoleon's views. He also expressed his anticipation that England would take up a position favourable to recognition of the Con-

¹⁰¹ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Biarritz, September 25, 1863; original with extract from Forey's dispatch annexed to it in V. N. A.

¹⁰² The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Miramar, September 27, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

federate States, and announced that, on her return from Brussels, the Archduchess Charlotte had brought with her the most gratifying news as to the determination of her father, the King of the Belgians, to press the Mexican affair in London as vigorously as possible.

Meanwhile the deputation of notables from Mexico, of whom, to the great satisfaction of the Archduke Ferdinand Max, his friend Gutierrez¹⁰³ was to become president on its arrival in Paris, was on its way. They were shortly to arrive at Miramar, and Almonte in Mexico and Hidalgo in Paris had done all they could to prepare the way for them with the Archduke.

The former besought the Archduke to believe in their assurances and turn a deaf ear to all other, lying reports which might be set in circulation with the object of dissuading him from his noble purpose. He complained that Forey would listen neither to him nor to Saligny, that this was the sole reason for all the delays; and once more concluded by exhorting the Archduke to hurry on his departure as much as possible.¹⁰⁴ Hidalgo, for his part, sent assurances to the Archduke¹⁰⁵ that it was believed, in both Mexico and Paris, that what the Council of Regency would never manage to effect would be achieved by the Archduke's mere presence — namely, to rally round them well-disposed persons of all parties and put an end to the fighting. This was the general conviction and everybody was talking about it.

Napoleon answered the Archduke's letter of September 27 by return of post. "My brother," he wrote,¹⁰⁶ "I was most happy to hear the good news that Your Imperial Highness was so good as to give me. That which I have most recently received from Mexico is favourable, but there is constant

¹⁰³ The Archduke wrote to Gutierrez apropos of the choice of him as president of this assembly that he was enchanted at it, that it did the greatest credit to the character of the Mexicans to have chosen the man who had displayed the greatest zeal and tenacity in pressing the work of regeneration. September 5, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

¹⁰⁴ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, August 12, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁰⁵ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, September 3, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁰⁶ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 2, 1863; original in V. N. A.

bickering between the Council of Regency and the Commander-in-Chief of the army of occupation. The great question is that concerning the national property. The words in which Your Imperial Highness is to reply to the Mexican delegates are noble and to the point, and I have no doubt of the good impression which they will produce in Europe. But allow me to call your attention emphatically to one point: a state which is sunk in anarchy is not to be regenerated by parliamentary liberty. What is wanted in Mexico is a *liberal* dictatorship. I mean a strong power, which shall proclaim the great basic principles of modern civilization, such as equality before the law, civil and religious liberty, an honest administration, and an equitable system of justice. As regards the constitution, that must be the work of time, and I believe that even if it has been promised and elaborated, it should not be really applied until several years have passed, the country is pacified, and the Government in good working order."

The Emperor further added that he was happy to hear the Archduke's news regarding the benevolent intentions of the English Government towards the Confederate States, but at the same time intimated that he was still very doubtful of any decisions in that sense. This was how Napoleon disposed of the draft constitution submitted to him, with its evidence of liberal ideas, which, in view of the state of affairs in Mexico, inspired him with a variety of misgivings.

As had been settled at Schönbrunn, the Archduke had also sent the draft of the reply which was to be made to the overtures of the Mexican deputation at Miramar to the Emperor Francis Joseph. While Napoleon had on the whole formed a favourable judgment upon it, at Schönbrunn and at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, exception was taken to various points. Thus the very beginning of the draft ran as follows: "The Emperor, as the august head of our house, and I are deeply moved . . ." As a matter of fact, the Emperor Francis Joseph felt no such emotion, and therefore required the omission of his name from the opening sentence. Further, the Emperor desired that consent to a contingent acceptance of the crown of Mexico should be communicated in a less defi-

nite form than that he found in the draft, and that the conditions should be emphatically and repeatedly stressed.¹⁰⁷

The Archduke was at that time in dread of a painful discussion of the Mexican affair in the Reichsrat, and, in order to prevent this, wanted it to be made plain above all things that the whole question would be solely a private affair of the imperial house. Rechberg promised to do his best to avoid such a discussion. But it was desired at Vienna that the Archduke should give the reception of the deputation at Miramar a private rather than a ceremonial character. It was also expressly ordered by the Emperor Francis Joseph that the Ministers of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs should *not* be represented at the reception of the delegation, so as to show that Austria maintained her passive and waiting attitude. It must not be possible for Europe to assert that the Imperial Government was taking part in the project of setting up a monarchy in Mexico.

Meanwhile the deputation had arrived in Paris; Gutierrez announced its arrival to De Pont, adding that, in the event of the acceptance of the crown not taking place very soon, he prophesied an alarming development of events in Mexico. He broke into flattery, reporting among other things that the Mexicans, in their awe, would approach the portraits of the Emperor and Empress which had been distributed throughout Mexico only hat in hand!¹⁰⁸

Shortly after this letter Gutierrez placed himself at the head of the delegation and arrived with it at Trieste on October 2, 1863. According to program, the delegation was received by the Archduke alone in a simple manner. In an interminable, carefully elaborated speech full of fine phrases and flatteries, Gutierrez depicted the unhappy state of Mexico under a republican constitution, and its longing for a sovereign of such personal perfection as the Archduke, and begged him to accept the crown of Mexico, which they thereby offered him.

The Archduke answered briefly. As he had been commanded, he omitted his brother's name from the opening sentence, and

¹⁰⁷ Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, September 2, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁰⁸ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, September 22, 1863. V. N. A.

mentioned in quite general terms "the guarantees indispensably necessary" for Mexico's liberty and independence, though without expressly naming the naval powers which were to guarantee them.¹⁰⁹ The rest of the speech made it only too clearly felt how joyfully disposed the Archduke was towards accepting the crown which beckoned him. The tenor of the reply produced a painful impression upon the Emperor Francis Joseph. He promptly telegraphed to his brother: "From your reply to the deputation and from Napoleon's letter I see that you do not explicitly adhere to the guarantee of the three powers, and particularly England. I must remind you in the most decided way of this condition as originally laid down. You cannot place yourself in a state of dependence upon France alone."¹¹⁰

The Archduke defended himself, alleged that he had insisted upon the indispensability of the guarantees with such emphasis that it had even produced a depressing effect upon the deputation. England and Spain were left unmentioned solely on account of Lord Russell's "touchiness," and still more so that of Spain, and because the negotiations were not yet so far advanced as to exclude the possibility of protests against some of them.¹¹¹ The Archduke quite overlooked the fact that he ought not to have said that England would guarantee, but only that he would not accept if England did not guarantee. Nobody in England would have been able to object to this. So the Archduke was merely prevaricating, in order to conceal the fact that he was beginning to drop one of the conditions that had been put forward at first as of capital importance. King Leopold, on the other hand, considered the speech "*extrêmement bien*,"¹¹² since he too was prejudiced in favour of a positive solution of the question.

¹⁰⁹ Gutierrez's speech and the Archduke's answer are printed by Schmit von Tavera, op. cit., I. 177-81. The latter also by Niox, op. cit., p. 326; extracts of it are also given in Gaultot, op. cit., I. 168.

¹¹⁰ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 4, 1863; telegram in V. N. A.

¹¹¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, October 4 and 5, 1863; telegram and draft letter in V. N. A.

¹¹² King Leopold to the Archduchess Charlotte, Como, October 26, 1863; original in V. N. A.



RECEPTION OF THE MEXICAN DEPUTATION AT MIRAMAR,
OCTOBER 3, 1863

But in the confidential deliberations, which were chiefly carried on with Gutierrez, Hidalgo, and a member of the deputation from Mexico, Aguilar by name, the Archduke gave way to grave apprehensions. He had drawn up and written out a sort of memorandum¹¹³ with a view to these conversations, which he now used. He represented to Gutierrez that so far only the capital, Puebla, Vera Cruz, and a few occupied points on the coast, with the villages in their immediate neighbourhood — according to Forey's dispatch, sixty-six places in all — had declared for him: that is to say, by no means a majority. Moreover, the Assembly in Mexico City lacked any actual legal basis, the opposition offered by Puebla was ominous, and Juarez had still the greater part of the country in his power, since the Council of Regency possessed authority only in those places over which the French flag waved. He, the Archduke, could therefore not expose himself to the risk that the majority of the population might declare for the Republic while he was in the country.

Gutierrez, with his flood of rhetorical phrases, now came into his own. Backed up by Hidalgo, he once more managed completely to bemuse the Archduke with the surge of his oratory, and talked him out of all his misgivings. The Archduke was only too willing to be persuaded, and in a short time every shadow of a doubt was swept clean out of his mind. He was determined more firmly than ever to carry his project into effect, and though the stipulations were always upon his lips, he was already inwardly resolved to do so even if they were not entirely realized.

In conclusion he discussed with the deputation the conditions of a loan of 150 millions, the projected purchase of arms for the army that was to be raised, the Church question, the settlement of the indemnity for the costs of the war which would be demanded by France, the necessary duration to be expected for the French occupation which would presumably be necessary, even the position of his wife as empress-dowager in the event of his decease without an heir, all matters which necessarily implied acceptance.

¹¹³ Contained in the V. N. A.

On October 9 the Archduke Ferdinand Max accordingly announced to the Emperor Napoleon ¹¹⁴ that the reception of the Mexican delegates had taken place, and touched quite cursorily upon the remarks contained in Napoleon's last two letters. Thus he defended the allusion to a constitutional regime made in his address to the delegates, on the score of the consideration which he was bound to show for public opinion in England and Austria; and as regards Forey's dispatch, which had been sent on to him, he declared that he recognized the great importance of the question of the Church property, and had therefore given instructions that authentic information on the subject should be obtained for him. But for this purpose he made use of Arrangoiz, a reactionary clerical, from whom he could naturally obtain none but extremely one-sided reports.

Napoleon had observed the Archduke's demeanour towards the Mexican deputation with interest, and read his answer with minute attention.

One slight detail in connexion with the publication of the answer to the delegates in the *Moniteur*, the French official gazette, was highly characteristic of Napoleon's ulterior intentions in the matter of the guarantees asked for by Ferdinand Max, which the Emperor of the French knew quite well to be unobtainable. In the fourth paragraph of his speech the Archduke had said: "*Il faut que j'exige . . . les garanties indispensables* (I must insist upon . . . the indispensable guarantees)." Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, altered this by order of his sovereign to "*il faut que je demande* (I must ask for)," and this is how it was printed in the *Moniteur*.¹¹⁵ By way of explanation to Gutierrez, the minister expressed the view ¹¹⁶ that he did not see what the Archduke could "insist upon" from France, for instance, in the matter of the guarantees, in view of what Napoleon had al-

¹¹⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, Miramar, October 9, 1863; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting in V. N. A.

¹¹⁵ Schmit von Tavera, op. cit., I. 181, gives both versions, whereas Gaulot, op. cit., I. 169, gives the expression "*il faut que j'exige*," actually used by the Archduke, without further remark.

¹¹⁶ Copy of a letter from Ciutrat (of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs) to Gutierrez, of October 5, 1863, sent on by Gutierrez to the Archduke. V. N. A.

FOR AND AGAINST THE CANDIDATURE

ready done and was continuing to do to win an empire for the Archduke, to defend the work when achieved, and to help him, the new Emperor, to maintain his position. In France, where it was well understood how much the realization of the project meant to the Archduke, they were already beginning to adopt the manners of a gracious patron, and to assume a somewhat more peremptory attitude towards the Archduke. The seed of unending discords had already been sown. But Ferdinand Max and Charlotte were already too deeply enmeshed in the idea of the Empire beyond the seas. Nothing could now avail to check the rolling stone.



CHAPTER VI

ACCEPTANCE OF THE CROWN

Fresh turn of events in Mexico — Napoleon's "underground" sources of information — Bazaine directs the intervention — Conflict with the Archbishop of Mexico — The Empress Eugénie and the Queen of Spain — The Empress's conversation with Gutierrez at table — Fantastic plans — The projected marriage of the Archduke Ludwig Viktor — Almonte's persuasion — Gutierrez's flatteries — England's warning — Napoleon intends to evacuate Mexico as soon as possible — Progress of the campaign in Mexico — The Archduke drops his conditions — King Leopold's exhortations — Part played by Kint von Roodenbeck — Last communications to Napoleon — Napoleon's attitude — The Empress Eugénie's pertinacity — The Santa Anna incident — King Leopold's mistrust of Napoleon — The Emperor and Empress of the French fall out — Ferdinand Max and his consort in Paris — The military convention and the question of the loan — Effect of personal influence upon Napoleon — Metternich's opinion of the "colossal" undertaking — Palmerston's scepticism — Renunciation of the right of succession in Austria — The Archduke refuses to renounce — The Emperor Francis Joseph demands a withdrawal — Ferdinand Max decides to give up Mexico and leave the country — Panic of the French Emperor and Empress — Metternich summoned from his bed

ACCEPTANCE OF THE CROWN

— *The Emperor Francis Joseph stands firm — Ferdinand Max and Charlotte try every expedient — Frossard's mission and Napoleon's letter — The Archduke yields — The Emperor Francis Joseph visits Miramar — Acceptance of the crown of Mexico — Sudden physical and moral collapse of the new Emperor — The voyage to Mexico.*

MEANWHILE IMPORTANT PERSONAL CHANGES HAD TAKEN place in Mexico, in both the military and the political control of the French intervention. The incessant differences of opinion between the French leaders, as well as between them and the Mexicans composing the Council of Regency, had irritated Napoleon. Forey's proceedings, in particular, had been too dilatory for the impatient Empress, who was also spurred on by Hidalgo and Almonte's unremitting agitation and intrigues against the general. They each believed that Forey's fall was to be ascribed exclusively to their personal influence, but they were not altogether right. Chance had come to their assistance, though they did not know it.

As we have already mentioned, Napoleon was fond of obtaining information from irresponsible private sources as well as from official reports, and he was all the more inclined to do so in Mexico since the remoteness of the country made it hard for him to form a clear idea of what was happening. He fell into the not uncommon error of paying more attention to this underground information than to that which came to him from persons fully accountable for their reports.

There was a captain in the French army of occupation named Loisillon,¹ who kept up a correspondence with Napoleon III's godmother, Madame Hortense Cornu, at Versailles. He now wrote her a letter full of attacks on Forey and Saligny's clerical and reactionary proceedings. He well knew how to play upon the weak side of Napoleon, who always wanted to be taken for a liberal. The Liberals in Mexico, he wrote, were saying that, for all her pose of liberalism, France was in reality using her agents to pave the way towards the blackest reaction. Lastly, as the sole way out of the growing

¹ For the text of this letter, see Gaulot, *op. cit.*, I. 180-5.

complications in Mexico, he recommended that the control of military and political affairs should be entrusted to General Bazaine, who was conspicuous for his valour and resolution, and would advise the new Emperor in a liberal spirit; while Forey, and especially Saligny, a "universally detested ultra-reactionary and clerical," should be removed.

Madame Cornu at once communicated the letter to Napoleon III, upon whom it made the deepest impression. Forey's undoubted services in connexion with the capture of Puebla and Mexico City were forgotten, and likewise the far-reaching confidence that had so far been reposed in Saligny.

What is more, Loisillon's reports on Saligny were in entire agreement with those of Jurien de la Gravière. And lastly, Saligny's prophecies that they would be able to march on Mexico City with a handful of men, and find the powerful monarchist party rallying to their side at once, were far from having been fulfilled. The policy of intervention had now gone on for nearly two years, and after one reverse the original body of French troops, consisting of 2,000 men, had had to be increased to almost 40,000.

Napoleon therefore resolved to recall both General Forey and Saligny. He prudently did not send Loisillon's letter to the Archduke, but he did send a copy of it, without mentioning the writer's name, to Bazaine, who was thus able to see how very accessible Napoleon was to such irresponsible influences. The general should have realized that, though he was in favour at the moment, a similar letter from the underworld might do him equally serious damage with the Emperor in the future.

Hidalgo and Almonte regarded Forey's recall, which was softened by the receipt of the field-marshal's baton, as a personal triumph; but Saligny's fall did not suit either of them. Hidalgo had known for a long time past that Saligny's fall was impending, but he flattered himself that his influence would suffice to keep the minister in his place at least till Maximilian's arrival. But when he saw that the Emperor's mind was quite made up, he was careful not to prejudice his own position at court by pressing his suit on behalf of a friend, to whom, incidentally, he owed a great deal. He observed, how-

ever, that a "regular crusade" was on foot against Saligny in the French army in Mexico.²

Almonte, who was in close connexion with the clerical party in Mexico, felt the recall of Saligny as a severe blow. He felt instinctively that it was indirectly aimed against him too. On August 25, he had written a letter³ to the Archduke, in which he first mentioned the cause of the Empire, the ever-increasing number of declarations in its favour, and the fruitless exhaustion of the enemy's resources. "The interior of the country," he wrote, "*will be pacified with absolutely no difficulty*, as soon as the Franco-Mexican army begins to advance, which will take place early next month, especially now that Bazaine is Commander-in-Chief and Forey has been recalled to France." But he bitterly lamented the recall of Saligny, which had produced a regrettable impression throughout the whole country. "If," he wrote, "the Emperor goes on in this way, no further course will be open to the Council of Regency but to leave the country, for no chance of saving it will be left." Saligny's recall, he said, was a public calamity, and he urgently requested the Archduke to support the request, which he was also sending direct to Napoleon, that the diplomatist might be allowed to stay, so that their task might be completed by his aid.

Almonte also sent an urgent communication to Napoleon,⁴ in which he first requested the Emperor to excuse the non-attendance of the Council of Regency at the Te Deum which had been sung on August 15 in honour of the Emperor's birthday, on the ground that the Council of Regency could not have given precedence to the French Commander-in-Chief, since it in fact represented the sovereign. As regards Saligny, Almonte besought the Emperor to leave the diplomatist in Mexico, for he was the only person who knew the country, inspired him with confidence, and was also on good terms with Bazaine; and his departure was of such grave moment that it might imperil the

² Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, Paris, October 23, 1863. V. N. A.

³ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Mexico, August 25, 1863. V. N. A.

⁴ Almonte to Napoleon III, copy in Almonte's writing enclosed in his letter to the Archduke Ferdinand Max of August 25, 1863, and of the same date. V. N. A.

realization of the project which so far had gone on "so prosperously."

Ferdinand Max was already aware of the revulsion of opinion against Saligny at the Court of Paris. So, in spite of Almonte's request, he did not intercede for him with Napoleon, for he was particularly anxious not to fall out with the Emperor. Almonte was annoyed, and wrote to the Archduke⁵ a little later saying that Saligny had won the confidence of the clergy, and the immediate result of his recall would be that the clergy would refuse to help as much as had been hoped.

Saligny's recall was the first decided step taken by France to counteract the excessive influence of the clergy. It was to be followed by others.

To Almonte and Hidalgo the fall of Saligny involved a decided loss of prestige, for so far the Emperor of the French had given the most far-reaching sanction to the projects and suggestions which they had submitted to him in a roundabout way through the Empress Eugénie. The Marquis de Montholon, who had been born at St. Helena and was a son of the well-known general of that name who had followed Napoleon into exile, was appointed to succeed Saligny.

General Forey knew nothing of what had been going on behind the scenes, and could not explain his sudden dismissal. He rightly regarded Napoleon's announcement of the news — in which, after appointing him field-marshal, he went on to say that such a rank was too high for the number of troops stationed in Mexico, so that he had to be recalled — as a mere pretext. He was the victor of Puebla and the conqueror of Mexico City, and had, as he considered, done his very best by untold exertions to prepare the way for the empire desired by Napoleon, besides which he was neither reactionary nor clerical in his opinions; so that he could not make out what it all meant. He therefore delayed handing over his command till October 1, always in the expectation of different instructions which might throw light upon the matter.

Saligny too did not want to leave Mexico on any account, especially as he was just on the point of marrying a young

⁵ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 27, 1863. V. N. A.

Mexican lady, who was said to be a good match. It took all Napoleon's repeated and urgent summonses and the pointed representations of Forey's successor, Bazaine, to decide the diplomatist to accept his recall, which almost amounted to an order of expulsion.

Bazaine — the fourth Commander-in-Chief since the intervention had begun — was now placed at the head of the expeditionary force. Napoleon expected of him not only a more vigorous pacification of the country by military measures, but also a more liberal procedure in political affairs. This was clearly apparent in his first confidential letter to Bazaine,⁶ in which he expressed his fear that the triumvirate was too reactionary, and gave Bazaine orders not to annul the sales of Church property which had once been effected. This was the second serious step towards turning the clergy into a bitter enemy of intervention, and — since Maximilian was to follow the same procedure — completely alienating it from the new monarchy.

At the same time Bazaine received characteristic instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys.⁷ Since the Corps Législatif was not very much in favour of the Mexican expedition, and, in common with public opinion in France in general, wanted it to be brought to an end as quickly as possible, he expressed to the general the Government's desire to limit as much as possible the extent and duration of the occupation of Mexico by the French troops. He also alluded to France's "direct interest" in, and necessary "control" of the financial administration. For this purpose French special agents with financial experience were to be sent out. France desired first to secure her claims and expenses, and then, in addition, as many financial and commercial advantages as possible. Among these might be reckoned Napoleon's favourite idea of exploiting the famous mines of the Mexican province of Sonora in the French interest.

⁶ Napoleon III to Bazaine, Vichy, July 30, 1863, printed in full by Gaulot, *op. cit.*, I. 144.

⁷ The instructions, dated August 17, 1863, are printed in full by Schmit von Tavera, *op. cit.*, I. 186.

The situation as General Bazaine found it was at first fairly clear. The Northern States of America were still at war with the South, and left no doubt of their dislike of what was going on in Mexico; but they had not yet sufficiently emerged from their own difficulties to be able to risk a war with France, which would naturally support the insurgent South, war with which was still raging with unremitting fury. In the autumn of 1863 Seward wrote to the representatives of the United States in Vienna, Paris, and London that the American Government would maintain strict neutrality in the French war in Mexico for the time being.⁸

Thus no danger threatened from that quarter, and they had only to reckon with the fighting forces which Juarez had meanwhile scraped together.

The plebiscites in favour of the monarchy which Forey had collected and placed at the disposal of the first deputation of Mexicans to visit Miramar had been considered too few in number, and in many cases came from places which, as Sir Charles Wyke said contemptuously, "were possibly inhabited by two Indians and a monkey."⁹

A fresh campaign was therefore necessary, to gain control over more extensive regions and so to collect fresh votes in favour of the monarchy. Bazaine was full of confidence, and promised Napoleon a prompt and successful issue for the campaign which he was to undertake.

Meanwhile serious misunderstandings had arisen as a result of the attitude towards the clergy and their claims which had been recommended from Paris. The clergy had come out so strongly in favour of intervention only because they expected that under a new regime, with a prince belonging to a strictly Catholic dynasty, all the decrees against the Church issued by Juarez, and especially that relating to the confiscation and alienation of the rich Church properties, would at once be annulled. When they saw their expectations disappointed by Bazaine, the clergy began to offer opposition wherever they could. The situation was still further exacerbated by the attitude of

⁸ Bancroft, *op. cit.*, IX. 99.

⁹ Sir Charles Wyke to Herzfeld, October 19, 1863.

Labastida, the Archbishop of Mexico, who landed at Vera Cruz on September 17, and whose early departure had been pressed on in Paris and Miramar for the very reason that he and his influence upon the population were expected to advance the cause of the monarchy.

Labastida took his seat on the Council of Regency, and it was at once apparent that at the instigation of Rome he was taking up the same uncompromising standpoint as the rest of the clergy. In the question of the Church property he, too, insisted upon complete restitution and the annulment of all the decrees so far issued by Juarez. Labastida had already demanded this in his conversations with the Archduke Ferdinand Max.¹⁰ But they had parted without any definitive pronouncement upon this highly important subject, for the Archduke was afraid it might be prejudicial to his candidature.

Though Almonte was personally well-disposed towards the clergy, yet, since his whole power was based upon Napoleon and the French army, he could of course not afford to disregard the point of view of the French higher command, and so opposition at once sprang up within the Council of Regency, which soon almost crippled its activity. At last nothing was left to Bazaine but to propose to the other two members of the Council of Regency, Almonte and Salas, to exclude the archbishop from it, which was finally done, under protest from Labastida.

When, on November 18, Bazaine left the capital and rejoined the army, the bishop even went so far as to excommunicate the French troops and cause the churches to be closed to them for divine service on Sundays. The commandant of the city, General Neigre, sent word to the bishop, however, that if the cathedral were not open to all by next Sunday, he would have the doors blown in by the artillery.¹¹ This was effective.

¹⁰ Baron De Pont did indeed write to Gutierrez on December 7, 1863 (V. N. A.) that the bishop did not raise the question of the Church property at Miramar; but this was not in accordance with the truth. The Archduke merely wished to say nothing about the differences of opinion which had become apparent on this occasion.

¹¹ Colonel Charles Blanchot: *L'Intervention française au Mexique* (Paris, 1911), p. 113.

The archbishop gave way. But the incident illustrates the relations between the forces of intervention and the clergy, which subsequently developed into an often bitter and vindictive hostility, though it was not always displayed openly. But one thing was sure: namely, that from that time onwards clerical power and influence could no longer be actively counted upon to support the interests of the interventionist policy, and, later on, of the Empire, though it had been so much reckoned upon in Europe, and such extraordinary results were anticipated from it.

But though, owing to his knowledge of Mexican conditions, Almonte was perfectly well aware of the far-reaching consequences of these proceedings, he brushed them aside as of quite minor importance in the letters which he wrote to the Archduke with intent to mislead him. He alluded to them as a "little crisis," a "storm in a teacup," which had not excited the country in the least.¹² His unscrupulousness was positively fiendish.

But the Archduke had long since written to Almonte, immediately after the reception of the deputation on October 10, in such a way as to make it plain that in spite of all his reservations the Archduke had at last come to a definitive decision. His letter¹³ crossed one from Almonte,¹⁴ which assured the Archduke that the population in the interior was only awaiting the approach of the army of intervention to declare for the monarchy. So far it had been impossible to induce Forey to move, but now everything would be different; the south was already in open revolt against Juarez, and he, Almonte, was so confident of success that he was bringing his family to Mexico. "Your Majesty," wrote General Almonte, who employed this title incessantly in his letters, "may come in full security; no reverse is to be feared, not even a fresh turn in Napoleon's policy can make any difference. Your Majesty will hurry on

¹² Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Mexico, November 27, 1863. V. N. A.

¹³ Printed in full in Schmit von Tavera, I. 183, which agrees with the draft in V. N. A.

¹⁴ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Mexico, September 12, 1863. V. N. A.

your arrival as much as possible." There could not, he added, be the shadow of a doubt as to their ultimate success.

The Mexicans chiefly concerned now began to pester and urge on the Archduke more than ever. Even Gutierrez wrote to Miramar at the end of September¹⁵ that the spirit of the times demanded "that the Emperor should appear" and "act on his own responsibility (*da se*)."

The idea sprang up at this time that France and Spain ought to make an official protest against the Monroe Doctrine. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to this as childish and arrant nonsense, a meaningless provocation and insult to the United States; moreover, a purely theoretical doctrine was not a fit subject for a protest. France had proved sufficiently by her proceedings against Juarez how much she troubled about this doctrine.¹⁶

Soon Gutierrez considered he had so far involved the Archduke in his toils that he could propose to him outright to drop the stipulations which he had made with regard to the guarantee from England and Spain, so as "not to expose himself to a refusal and its vexatious consequences." The best guarantee would consist in as solemn a recognition as possible by the great European powers. It was with such phrases as these that Gutierrez successfully endeavoured to lull the Archduke's misgivings. Drouyn de Lhuys struck the same note when he alluded to any fresh request for guarantees from these powers as waste of time, and even sent word to the Archduke that France could not pledge herself to leave her troops in Mexico for any definite period, for the Chamber would rise against it as one man, and the Government could not act in opposition to the whole of France.¹⁷ The minister was interested in getting the Archduke to Mexico as soon as possible, so that he might take over the burden; this, in Drouyn de Lhuys's opinion, would be a great relief to France, which might soon perhaps be unable

¹⁵ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, Paris, April 23, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁶ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont on his conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys, October 28, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁷ Gutierrez to Baron de Pont on his conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys, October 30, 1863. V. N. A.

to dispense with her troops. He therefore asked Gutierrez to use the influence of the Foreign Minister's name so as to win over the Archduke more easily.

About this time the Empress Eugénie went to Spain, in order to persuade that country to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the Mexican cause. She too was naturally unable to obtain a guarantee. She had even to listen to friendly and discreet complaints from the Queen, who thought it odd that they had not had a Spanish princess in view for the throne of Mexico — her daughter, for instance, who might then have married a foreign prince. The Empress replied that the fate of Cuba depended upon that of Mexico; if the foundation of a monarchy in Mexico were a success, it would soon find imitators in South America, which would open up a wide field for the noble and just aspirations of Spain; and meanwhile the Queen of Spain's daughter would have grown up.¹⁸ The Empress did at least succeed in persuading Spain not to take up an actively hostile attitude, and during what followed, Spain merely played the part of a passive and disinterested onlooker. But in reality both the Queen and the Government remained averse from the whole affair, and Arrangoiz, who had been sent to Madrid in November, could only report that the Queen was as hostile to the project as ever, and had never given up hope that in the end the Archduke would not go there after all, so that the way would be left free for a Bourbon. If, however, this was not to be, Spain would recognize Maximilian, but not till he was in Mexico — that is to say, when she could no longer do anything else. Such was the form assumed by the desired Spanish “guarantee.”

England, the other country whose guarantee was a “condition,” continued to send indirect warnings to the Archduke through Sir Charles Wyke. The English diplomatist had recently written to Herzfeld¹⁹ that the whole of the Mexican people, with the exception of the clerical party, would have

¹⁸ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont on a conversation at dinner with the Empress Eugénie, November 5, 1863. V. N. A.

¹⁹ Sir Charles Wyke to Herzfeld, October 19, 1863. V. N. A.

nothing to do with the French intervention, and that he kept receiving letters from Mexico to the effect that the Archduke ought not to become compromised in this affair. Gutierrez, who was at once informed of Wyke's proceedings from Miramar, naturally did his very best in his letters to combat these "false imputations and judgments obscured by passion." But it ought to have occurred to them at Miramar that Sir Charles Wyke had but lately returned from Mexico, whereas Gutierrez had been far from his country, the conditions in which he was so fond of describing, since 1840; that is to say, for a good twenty-three years. Hidalgo, who also heard about it — and who had also been away from home since 1848; i.e., for fifteen years — chimed in to the same effect, and wrote to De Pont that one unanimous desire prevailed throughout the whole of France and Mexico: namely, to see the Archduke on the throne of Mexico; his appearance would count for more than sending out fifty thousand men. In short, the Mexicans interested in the affair redoubled their efforts, lest at the last moment they should see their prey escape them.

Gutierrez went even further. On October 22 the Mexican deputation was received by Napoleon on its return from Miramar, and afterwards invited to dinner at the château of St. Cloud. Gutierrez, as president, sat on the left hand of the Empress, who described to him her visit to Spain. Her interest in Mexican affairs was apparent in every word. But as soon as they came to more detailed explanations, there was again a clash between the Empress's modern ideas and the ultra-reactionary views of the old Mexicans.

The Empress Eugénie held, among other things, that a reconciliation between the parties in Mexico was one of the chief conditions for the future prosperity of the country. Gutierrez, as a crabbed Conservative, would not grant this. "How can a good *modus vivendi* and brotherly concord be possible," he said, "if the parties contemptuously reject the advances made to them?"

When the Empress pointed to the political system then in force in France, which, in her opinion, had reconciled the most

widely different parties, Gutierrez replied that France had already surmounted the crisis, which was still at its height in Mexico; while the Mexican one was far more terrible, since it was both political and social at the same time. The future alone could bring with it a solution more fitted to the idiosyncrasies of the Mexicans. By this he naturally meant a return to the unlimited influence of the clergy, and to all the principles of the ultra-conservative party in general.

"But," answered the Empress excitedly, "one ought not to surround oneself with old pictures and portraits; I mean, to live in a world which no longer exists." Gutierrez replied in the same tone that there were no old pictures in Mexico, that their usages, institutions, and society were not old; Mexico had had no Middle Ages, everything there was new, until a position arose which had compelled Europe to do for Mexico, "in the name of humanity," what it had never done before for any people. Such were the views of the Mexican. But fearing that he might still further ruin himself in the eyes of the Emperor and Empress — though he says that it was "out of respect" — he merely replied: "We ought to have had a dictatorship on the pattern of that established in France and everywhere else."

This remark, with its allusion to Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état*, made the Empress really angry. "Yes," she retorted, "but a dictatorship which should bring liberty, and a man able enough to maintain them side by side."

"As for liberty," replied Gutierrez, "we have had only too much of that, unfortunately without finding a dictator of the desired ability."

Conversation next turned upon General Santa Anna. Eugénie asked Gutierrez about him, but on obtaining none but the very best accounts of him, she exchanged a meaning glance with Hidalgo, who had always told her that Santa Anna was a traitor, who was working only for himself, and that Gutierrez was hopelessly under his thumb. The two Mexicans now began to fall out in the presence of the Empress; Gutierrez stood up for his friend Santa Anna, Hidalgo came out as the champion of an agreement with the Juarista minister Doblado, whose at-

titude seemed at the time to be encouraging.²⁰ The Empress listened with a smile.

After dinner the Emperor turned to Gutierrez, and asked him whether the Archduke had made up his mind to go to Mexico. Gutierrez answered, according to his own account,²¹ "in the most categorical and conclusive way," that his boxes were already packed; the Archduke was only waiting for the people to declare their will, and required only "assurances, not guarantees — a word which sounded altogether bad!"

By this sophistical phrase Gutierrez announced to Napoleon, not altogether against the Archduke's will, the final abandonment of one of the most important conditions laid down by the Archduke as a *sine qua non*.

Meanwhile, on October 18 and 19, the Archduke Ferdinand Max had been to Ischl and discussed the whole Mexican question with his parents and his uncle, the aged Archduke Ludwig.²² They were entirely opposed to the adventure, having been, as Ferdinand Max considered, "led astray," and had, as he expressed it, given utterance only to "prejudiced views."²³ The Archduke took the greatest pains to allay their anxieties by indicating that "his calm and consistency, as well as his dignity, had been maintained from the beginning, and would be maintained on all occasions." The Archduke had the same experience at Salzburg with the Empress Caroline,²⁴ but he managed to dissipate all anxieties in this quarter far more quickly.

But the Archduke Ferdinand Max had become so involved in his fantastic plans that his mother's advice seemed due only to over-anxiety and feminine timidity. His thoughts went far further than anyone dreamt, and he cherished ideas which

²⁰ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, November 8, 1863. V. N. A.

²¹ The same to the same, November 5, 1863. V. N. A.

²² The Archduke Ludwig, a son of the Emperor Leopold II; under the Emperor Ferdinand he was in particular, with Metternich, the strongest advocate of the policy of "stability."

²³ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, Miramar, October 27, 1863. V. N. A.

²⁴ The Empress Caroline Augusta, the fourth wife of the Austrian Emperor Francis I, was living as a widow at Salzburg.

involved practically boundless schemes. The Archduke was indeed very much in favour of an idea which did not meet with entire disfavour even from Rechberg, who was usually so prudent: namely, that the Emperor's second brother, the Archduke Ludwig Viktor, who was not over-endowed with ability and was therefore all the more easily led, should marry one of the two daughters of Dom Pedro II, the Emperor of Brazil, who had no male heirs, thus founding a new branch of the house of Habsburg in South America. The Archduke Ferdinand Max was particularly in favour of this project, for he hoped in consequence to acquire powerful support in South America for his empire in Mexico, and he even had an idea that in time the various weak republics lying between Mexico and Brazil might be absorbed, thus founding two powerful Habsburg empires, extending over the whole of Central America and a considerable portion of South America!

Before going to Salzburg, the Archduke inquired of Rechberg whether, since he was going to meet the Archduke Ludwig Viktor, he should once more turn the conversation on the Brazilian project. Ferdinand Max received a "most affirmative" reply by telegram, went to see his brother, and tried to sound his views.

"My conversation with Ludwig," wrote the Archduke to the Emperor at Vienna,²⁵ "showed me clearly that he is still anything but pleased with the idea, but, as it appeared to me, on somewhat frivolous grounds; he cannot imagine an existence for himself beyond the ocean, is afraid that he will suffer from home-sickness, and so on. Meanwhile I have, however, accomplished this much: he told me he would obey a formal command from Your Majesty, though only, as he expressed it, 'as a martyr.' Owing to Ludwig's nature, it is just such an order that would be most suitable; it is not to be expected that he should of his own accord tear himself away from his surroundings in Vienna, which are so harmful to him. It would take a powerful initiative, an authority such as is possessed by

²⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, Miramar, October 27, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

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Your Majesty alone, to prompt him to such a resolution, the advantages of which he does indeed feel instinctively, but has not the strength to grasp of his own accord. I know the Emperor of Brazil, and believe him to be the man who will be able by his intelligently directed energy to lead Ludwig into serious, sane, and active ways, which, moreover, he would certainly consider incumbent upon him if it were a question of his own son-in-law.

"Your Majesty in your wisdom will do what you recognize to be best for Ludwig and most advantageous to the family."

At the same time, in order to excuse himself for having expected the Emperor and the Minister of the Imperial House to contemplate such an order, he wrote further to Rechberg on the same day ²⁶ as follows: "Such a direct command as has often before been forthcoming in similar circumstances (for instance, the marriage of the Archduchesses Leopoldine ²⁷ and Marie Louise ²⁸) seemed to me to be particularly indicated in this case and with such a personality. All who know my brother well must desire that he should be removed from the aimless existence which he has led hitherto in the atmosphere of Vienna, which is not good for him, and be made a man of. I am convinced that under the strong and judicious, though cold and possibly selfish governance of the Emperor of Brazil, his character might be given a healthful direction and his decided abilities and lively intelligence turned to a profitable purpose."

But the Emperor Francis Joseph would not lend himself to such a thing. He rightly maintained that he neither could nor would give such a command to his brother. But Ludwig Viktor would not voluntarily fall in with the project, and so it came to nothing. ²⁹

²⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Rechberg, October 27, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

²⁷ Daughter of the Emperor Francis I, who married in 1817 Dom Pedro I de Alcantara, Emperor of Brazil.

²⁸ Wife of Napoleon I.

²⁹ The two daughters of Pedro II de Alcantara, Emperor of Brazil, were married in 1864, the elder, Princess Isabella, on October 15 to the Count of Eu, and the younger, Princess Leopoldine, on December 15 to Prince August of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha-Koháry. When these marriages took place, the Archduke Ferdinand

The idea of extending Mexico southwards, which Ferdinand Max had already conceived before he had even seen his empire, was not abandoned. We shall recur to it later.

Shortly after these incidents the Archduke wrote a letter to the Emperor Napoleon,⁸⁰ in which he first thanked him with deep emotion for the friendly words about Mexico which Napoleon had pronounced on the occasion of the opening of the session of the Corps Législatif. He welcomed in particular the ideas then expressed as regards the reconciliation of all parties in Mexico and the necessity of a non-party Government, for these agreed with his own deepest convictions. Ferdinand Max also thanked him for offering to leave the Foreign Legion in Mexico for a definite period.

Almonte's instructions to Gutierrez, as president of the Mexican deputation, to press for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Mexico and the three powers which had signed the London Convention, were quite Utopian enough; but his letters to the Archduke on the condition of Mexico were full of deliberate lies. He reported⁸¹ that the correspondence of the Juarista leaders intercepted from time to time showed that, owing to the ill will of the people towards Juarez's cause, any serious resistance had become impossible. "They will leave the country," wrote Almonte, "taking as much loot with them as possible. By the time this letter is in Your Majesty's hands, the submission and adhesion of the whole land will be an accomplished fact." The general once more earnestly besought the Archduke to hurry on his arrival as much as possible, for it would do more for the pacification of the country than a hundred thousand men. By the end of December or the beginning

Max, who was then already Emperor, wrote from Mexico to his brother, Archduke Karl Ludwig (Chapultepec, December 26, 1864, draft in V. N. A.): "How I regret that the Brazilian marriages are already a fact and that Ludwig could not make up his mind! He would have had a good future, in which he might have been able to do something useful. I hear from Rio that they are much disappointed that Ludwig did not accept."

⁸⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon III, November 7, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁸¹ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, October 8, 1863. V. N. A.

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of January the political adhesion of the country would be complete, with a few rare exceptions. "All resistance will cease," he went on, "and all that will be left to be solved will be an administrative problem, a question of the organization of a *gendarmerie*; in a word, the creation of a guarantee for public security; *but it is certain that no sort of political struggle will have to be undertaken.*"

Hidalgo wrote from Paris in the same urgent tone³² and Gutierrez from Rome in his unctuous, poetical, and rhetorical style.³³ "All classes of society," ran his letter, "without distinction of sex or age, all Mexicans, wherever they may be, on one continent or the other, call upon God for that sovereign whom he has bestowed upon them, and no other." Let the Archduke but say: "I start at the first report of the capture of an important city," and all would be saved. The land was devoted body and soul to its sovereign. "For how," he wrote flatteringly, "could a reproach of ambition or rashness rise so high as Your Imperial Highness, a prince who has already proved himself, and is so well known and admired in Europe for his youthful but profound wisdom, his high courage and purity of heart?"

Since their rosy accounts of the situation in Mexico and all their flatteries seemed to be without effect, and even now the Archduke had not made up his mind to throw overboard all his stipulations and set sail for Mexico, Gutierrez and Hidalgo changed their tactics. They decided to write to the Archduke in such a way that it should look as if his whole candidature and dream of empire were threatened if he did not at once start for Mexico. Gutierrez first wrote³⁴ that Drouyn de Lhuys was much dissatisfied, that according to Bazaine's own accounts the situation in Mexico was getting daily more acute, and that everything seemed about to fall into ruin. This state of affairs could be combated successfully only by the Archduke's own presence, and even Napoleon urgently desired his departure. Three days later Hidalgo followed him up to the same effect.

³² Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, March 11, 1863. V. N. A.

³³ Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 15, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁴ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, November 17, 1863. V. N. A.

He wrote from the royal château of Compiègne,³⁵ after a conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys, saying that in view of the condition of affairs the Archduke could not hurry on his departure too soon. The question of his departure was the chief subject of interest, and the Archduke's presence could alone save the situation. The adherents of the monarchy were gradually losing heart, and it was beginning to be believed that the Archduke would not accept. He wrote with the utmost levity about the United States, which in his opinion would take good care not to provoke a war with France rashly, since they would soon find themselves faced with England and Spain, which, without sending a single soldier, could master the Union merely by supporting the insurgent South with their fleets! The United States might, indeed, have no sympathy for a monarchy in Mexico, but "fundamentally it was a matter of complete indifference to them." They dreaded that France might recognize the South, and would therefore avoid all interference in Mexico, in order to secure France's neutrality.

Rechberg, on the other hand, held the only sound view with regard to America, and further sent word to the Archduke³⁶ that his unprejudiced general impression, derived from official sources, was that the United States could not join in for the moment, but would formulate objections and reservations with regard to events in Mexico, valid enough to enable them to intervene actively when they had consolidated their position and were so situated as to be able to do so.

The reason why the Mexicans in Paris had become so urgent and pressing was that the Mexican cause had become increasingly unpopular in Paris, and they were afraid that Napoleon would ultimately be driven by public opinion to abandon the enterprise. There was already some uneasiness felt in the French Senate, which had asked the spokesmen of the Government whether the Archduke would soon be starting for Mexico, and whether he had received guarantees. The answer had been that his departure would take place in a fortnight, and that guarantees would *not* be given!

³⁵ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, November 20, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁶ Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 20, 1863. V. N. A.

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In reality, Napoleon too would gladly have been relieved of his Mexican anxieties, and it was these which Maximilian was to accept. Hence the Emperor of the French also desired his speedy departure, however much he might tell Metternich³⁷ that he could not take it amiss if the Archduke did not wish to start before things were a little more advanced, and that he would have done the same in his place. But at heart he hoped that the Archduke's presence in Mexico would solve the problem there, and enable him soon to withdraw the French troops and get rid of all his embarrassments. And so he too was anxious when the report went round that the Archduke would not accept after all.

In his efforts to drive Ferdinand Max into an irrevocable step Gutierrez even went so far as to propose that he might at any rate sail for Mexico, for even after arriving there he could always say that the vote of the country was not forthcoming and that he could not accept.³⁸

De Pont quite justly wrote on the margin of this letter the remark that in that case the Archduke would be playing a pretty part out there.

The anxieties cherished in all quarters lest the Archduke might break it all off at the last moment had no foundation. He himself had no doubt that he would accept, but this sudden change of front on the part of the Mexican exiles in Paris, who kept suddenly changing from the rosiest to the most gloomy accounts, none the less irritated him.

He wrote to Gutierrez³⁹ that he could not understand it. He had sought in vain in his and Almonte's latest letters for any symptoms of a change in the situation which should suddenly have increased the difficulties so much that he must abruptly abandon the fundamental conditions of the undertaking if he did not want to see it rendered entirely abortive. People might talk of his hesitation, but he was unremitting in his endeavours to obtain from the European Governments the assurances required for the monarchy in Mexico.

³⁷ Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, December 14, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁸ Gutierrez to Baron De Pont, December 1, 1863. V. N. A.

³⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, November 30, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

"If," he wrote prophetically,⁴⁰ "the Empire is brought into being on the lines laid down in my address of October 3, I shall probably have only too many opportunities of *proving to my adopted country that I shall not shrink from sacrificing myself (payer de ma personne) when necessary*. I have not hesitated to look danger in the face, and shall not hesitate in future when duty calls me, but it cannot be expected that I should go in search of adventures or appear as the chief of a party, and it is very doubtful whether I should accomplish anything in Mexico if I did so."

The letter suited the situation perfectly, but unfortunately the Archduke did not himself abide by his own entirely correct words which we have just quoted. They were merely a result of the utterly disgraceful lengths to which the Mexicans in Paris had gone, and it was only for a moment that any doubt of their straightforwardness stirred in the mind of the Archduke, who was otherwise quite blind to their faults.

About that time Sir Charles Wyke arrived in Paris and, obviously under unofficial instructions from his Government, obtained an audience of the Emperor Napoleon. He first requested that he might be allowed to speak quite freely about the Mexican business.⁴¹ Immediately after this he called attention to how badly the policy of intervention had been managed, so that the whole country was by now opposed to the clerical party. Napoleon replied that mistakes had certainly been made, but that he desired no colonies or anything of the sort, only to aid in the triumph of right; he put the question to the Englishman whether the Archduke would be received willingly. Wyke rejoined frankly: "Under present conditions, no, owing to the Archduke's connexion with the clerical party and the ridiculous Council of Regency in the capital. This is my personal opinion." Napoleon objected that he had now recalled Forey and Saligny and hoped for better things from Ba-

⁴⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Gutierrez, November 30, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

⁴¹ The following description of his audience is based on a letter from Sir Charles Wyke to Herzfeld, London, November 27, 1863, and a letter from Herzfeld to Baron De Pont of December 12, 1863, both in V. N. A.

zaine and Montholon. He did indeed acknowledge that he had been mistaken about the state of opinion in the country, but none the less he still cherished the conviction that a strong monarchist party existed, which had, however, been frightened off by the tactless proceedings of the leaders of the expedition, and, now that its property was threatened, had in part fallen away and in part held timidly aloof from participation in the monarchist movement.

"I realize," exclaimed Napoleon, "that I have got myself into a tight place; but the affair has got to be liquidated." The Emperor hoped that on the arrival of the Archduke the whole affair would take a favourable turn; he would withdraw the troops, and by leaving a small nucleus behind, round which the monarchist troops might rally, he would be in a position to relieve the French flag of its burden. Such was the desire of France, which was also his own.

Sir Charles expressed himself to the effect that he did not think so: the new Emperor's power would extend no further than the barrels of his defenders' muskets; the Emperor Napoleon assured him that he had the greatest confidence in the Archduke's talents, that the idea of supporting the sovereign with French troops was far from his mind, that in any case such support was worthless, and that a sovereign could find no guarantee for his throne other than in the will and the well-being of the people; such were also the Archduke's views, and the latter neither could nor would demand a permanent garrison. Sir Charles replied that Ferdinand Max's answer to the deputation was in absolute contradiction to this, for there was an actual mention of guarantees, but only from France, since England would never give any. After pondering for some time, Napoleon replied that the Archduke was exactly informed as to France's attitude towards the affair; he knew that his accession would mark the winding-up of France's task and that that of the sovereign would then begin. It would be possible to be the allies of the new State without necessarily giving pledges for its stability. The main task left to the Archduke was the reconciliation of conflicting opinions and the formation of a powerful State in alliance with France out of his own resources.

But Napoleon's task was now to get rid of his responsibilities, which would already be hard enough to bear in the face of the public opinion of all France. And the new Emperor would then certainly count upon the friendship of England, as soon as she saw that conditions were stable and rights protected.

Sir Charles replied that it was hardly credible in England that the Archduke should venture upon such a hopeless enterprise, and even if he did so, he would not bring it to a successful conclusion. He could only advise that the Council of Regency should be dissolved, and that, in order to make sure whether the country desired a monarchy or not, a real and free expression of the will of the people should be arrived at by means of a congress summoned in accordance with the fundamental laws of the country.

"That," replied Napoleon, "would amount to admitting a mistake, and in France it is no longer permissible to make mistakes." The Emperor expressed the intention of carrying the matter through to the end according to the program hitherto adopted, and in the event of the Archduke's making stipulations *that could not be fulfilled*, he would turn to Spain. Spain still had deep roots in the country, the Indians were entirely devoted to her, an independent monarchical solution would be secured, and in case of need that power would be able to spare the troops necessary for the maintenance of order. Sir Charles Wyke subsequently learnt from Fould, the Finance Minister, that this possibility had been quite seriously considered, and in that case the Prince de Joinville would be the candidate. Fould, who seemed entirely opposed to Ferdinand Max's candidature, expatiated upon the great advantages of this scheme. Wyke thought he might assume from Fould's and Napoleon's statements that they felt sure of the Prince's acceptance, and that Spain was even prepared to make great efforts to bring about this result. Fould also said that the Archduke must be pressed for a candid statement, that he must be brought to the point ("*qu'il fallait le mettre au pied du mur*"), and that this was already happening. He had also made it quite clear to the Empress, to whom, with her "palace clique," the whole blame for the present disastrous state of affairs must unfortunately

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be ascribed, that the pressure which must at once be brought to bear upon the Archduke came from an influential quarter, and by this means a decision in one sense or the other must be forced from him.

In the further course of his conversation with the Englishman, Napoleon gave utterance to grave misgivings as to the position of the Americans on the Rio Grande: "If raids were to take place on Mexico from Texas, I might suddenly find myself at war with the Americans — a war which would spell disaster to the interests of France and would have no possible object. Unfortunately Europe will not believe that I desire nothing but peace; but my address to the Corps Législatif will make this clear. Pray assure Palmerston and Russell that it is only peace I desire and nothing but peace."

Upon which the audience was at an end. Sir Charles Wyke begged Herzfeld urgently for an assurance that the Emperor Napoleon should never hear what an exact account he had given him of this audience. In conclusion the diplomatist, who had been present at a Cabinet council on the Mexican question in London, shortly stated the views of the British Government: neutrality, complete disinterestedness in all that should take place, a secret pleasure at Napoleon's difficulties in Mexico, and the desire to see them continue, since England saw in them a fresh security that Napoleon would in future desire peace in Europe. On the other hand, Sir Charles declared to Herzfeld that the British Government held it to be a duty not to allow the Archduke to fall into an obvious trap without warning him, and had therefore repeatedly drawn the attention of the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Archduke to the dangers that would threaten them; but that by so doing it had discharged its duty. It was no business of England's to support a Utopian enterprise, built upon unsound foundations and promising nothing but fresh convulsions, never peace or protection for English interests.

This was plain-spoken and to the point, in the best British manner. It was at once communicated to Ferdinand Max, and he ought to have been able clearly to gather from it both Napoleon's real way of thinking and England's attitude. But he

considered that Wyke was prejudiced, and therefore saw everything in a different light. Napoleon's remark on the Spanish candidate was a bitter blow to him. He already saw someone else competing with him for the crown; and what ought to have been a warning and a deterrent had absolutely the opposite effect; it confirmed him still more strongly in his desires and intentions.

The Archduke did not give up hope that he might yet win England over. He had now hatched a fresh scheme. He wanted to send an official of the press bureau of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to England, one Baron Thierry. He was to act as the director of a regular plan of campaign in England, with a number of agents, who were to influence the press, get up meetings and addresses from Mexicans to the English Ministry, and induce those who had subscribed to the Mexican loans to approach the British Government in favour of the Mexican monarchy. Similar steps were also to be taken to influence parliamentary circles in favour of recognizing the Southern States in their struggle against the North. This scheme, which was planned with an entire misunderstanding of English psychology, which is the last in the world to let itself be influenced by anything coming from abroad, was not carried into effect; it only proved that so far all warnings and communications from England had fallen on barren ground so far as the Archduke was concerned.

Only one of Sir Charles's counsels met with a cordial reception: namely, the recommendation that they should pay less regard to the ultra-Conservative party and more to the moderate Conservatives. This is clear from a letter from the Archduchess Charlotte to Eugénie,⁴² in which she took as her model the liberal sentiments of the Empress and expressed the opinion that the "reactionary" Gutierrez could not be consulted in the affair of the Church property, for he was too much of a partisan. She also enclosed a letter of Wyke's, in which it was recommended that the moderate Conservative party should be kept in view if they wanted to arrive at any results in Mexico.

⁴² The Archduchess Charlotte to the Empress Eugénie, Miramar, November 30, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

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In conclusion, she expressed her regret that it had been impossible to realize her husband's wish of welcoming Wyke to Miramar, owing to the fact that Lord Russell had forbidden it.

The Empress replied, in a lengthy communication,⁴³ that she had just been talking to Kint, who was on the point of starting for Miramar; she lamented that the immense remoteness of Mexico had as its consequence that a certain freedom of action had to be allowed to those in command there, but she hoped that Bazaine's vigorous and bold spirit would sensibly lighten the task.

"Unluckily," she wrote, "it may be said that that fair land contains none but partisans, who burn to satisfy their hate and malice, who have dropped the word 'conciliation' from their vocabulary, and are incapable of sacrificing their past to the interest of their country. Meanwhile we hope that the news we shall soon receive will be of such a kind as to hasten on the departure of Your Highnesses, for none but a strong and vigorous hand can carry the work of regenerating the country to a successful end."

They must indeed hope for better news, for what Bazaine had so far reported to Paris, especially with regard to the reckless proceedings of Bishop Labastida since his arrival in Mexico City, was not calculated to please the Emperor and Empress, or to justify those Mexican exiles who, like Gutierrez and Hidalgo, had recommended the bishop for the Council of Regency. In particular, Bazaine had reported in great indignation⁴⁴ how Labastida had said to him in a very excited tone that if the French were well received in Mexico, they had only the clergy to thank for it, and that if France wanted to rule the country she would have to send another twenty-five thousand men, for — here the bishop broke off, with a significant gesture which implied: "Do not count on us any longer."

Hidalgo was thereupon invited to luncheon in the Empress's apartments; Napoleon joined them and read out Bazaine's letter with great annoyance. At the next great dinner, at which

⁴³ The Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte, Compiègne, December 9, 1863; original in V. N. A.

⁴⁴ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, December 3, 1863. V. N. A.

eighty people were present, the Empress had Hidalgo placed on her left, in order to discuss the matter with him. As he himself admitted, she told him a number of unpleasant home truths. He felt just as if he were in the pillory, but had at least wits enough to admit that the Empress was right in everything she said.⁴⁵

One of the guests, who had known beforehand what was to be said to Hidalgo, said to him afterwards: "*Sapristi!* I admire you; you didn't turn a hair."

"No, but I have hell within me," replied Hidalgo.

The Empress commanded him to inform Labastida, who, she had hoped, would have advocated ideas of religious toleration, what an impression his attitude had produced in Paris. Gutierrez, who had endeavoured in an interminable letter to justify his attitude towards the bishop,⁴⁶ was entirely on Labastida's side, and Hidalgo took the opportunity of giving another little dig at his former lord and master by writing to De Pont that everybody said Gutierrez's ideas belonged to the seventeenth century.

In truth, however, Gutierrez had more character, for while Hidalgo at once dropped Labastida entirely, in consequence of the Empress's disfavour, Gutierrez stood by his opinions and convictions from first to last, and championed them against everybody, even the Emperor and Empress.

In general, however, the Labastida incident had been regarded in Paris merely as an episode. Bazaine had announced that his campaign in the interior was about to begin, and its success was now hoped for. In reality the military operations were all they could build upon, for in Mexico everything had to be accomplished by arms. Bazaine's forces amounted roughly to 40,000 Frenchmen, with the addition of about 13,000 Mexican auxiliaries. Juarez had at his disposal, roughly, 20,000 men. The French forces also included the so-called counter-guerrilla troops led by the French Colonel Dupin, a desperado who had been cashiered at home for various irregularities, and

⁴⁵ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, December 31, 1863. V. N. A.

⁴⁶ Labastida to Gutierrez, October 23, 1863. V. N. A. Sent to the Archduke Ferdinand Max.

had now regained his rank by volunteering for service abroad. It was his task to proceed ruthlessly against the bands which marched through the country fighting against the forces of intervention, and engaged in every form of robbery and murder. He did this so thoroughly as to gain the worst of reputations for his horrible cruelty and many unjustifiable executions.

It was naturally impossible for Bazaine even to approximate towards occupying the whole vast territory of Mexico with his comparatively limited forces. He had to confine himself to the most populous regions situated nearest to Mexico City; and determined to extend his sphere of action, first by an advance towards the north-west, so as to safe-guard his flank, and next by bringing within his power as much as possible of the more thickly-populated regions north of the province of Mexico.

And so things happened. The French General Berthier and the Mexican Marquez advanced against Morelia, took the city, and by the middle of December routed the Juarista General Uruga not far from there. Douay, the Frenchman, and the Mexican Mejía took Querétaro in the middle of November, while the Juarista General Doblado retired on Guanajuato. Soon this town also fell into the hands of the imperialists, and President Juarez, who was at San Luis de Potosí, had once more to flee and fix his seat of government far away to the north at Saltillo. But the sullen, tough, and vigorous Indian was far from throwing up the struggle. Even if he were to be hunted from village to village through the whole country up to the borders of the United States, he would never give up his governing authority. Secretly supported by the United States, and conscious of the fact that wide areas of the country, which would otherwise have been in favour of another candidate, now saw in him the defender of their liberty from foreign invasion, he confidently awaited the day when the foreigners should succumb beneath the vastness of the task they had undertaken.

For the moment, however, things were going badly; the gifted former President, General Ignacio Comonfort, who had remained a faithful adherent of Juarez, had met with his death in November in a guerrilla engagement. The Juarista

General Vidaurri appeared to have started negotiations with the invaders, and at the end of December General Negrete met with a serious defeat at San Luis de Potosí at the hands of the imperialist Mejía. Moreover, the important harbour of Tampico had been in French hands since August, and the peninsula of Yucatan voluntarily rallied to the invaders. These were heavy blows at the Juarista regime, delivered by Bazaine during a campaign of barely ten weeks.

The result was that many people declared for the monarchy in all the conquered territories. It was naturally the representatives of the Conservative party who raised their heads, even in places where they formed only a small minority, and in a very short time provided the French with the desired pronouncements. But there was also no lack of military "invitations," which remarkably resembled orders. By this means a very large number of these "addresses" was collected, adorned with innumerable signatures, declaring in favour of the monarchy, which might very well produce upon a person far away in Europe, who had been misled as to the state of affairs, the impression that a numerous party would be on the side of the sovereign when he made his appearance in Mexico.

The campaign conducted by Bazaine appeared very brilliant. But in reality it had by no means all the importance which one might have been inclined to attribute to it at first sight. For the weak French troops ought not to have been split up into innumerable garrisons; and as soon as Bazaine evacuated a place, it was immediately reoccupied by the Juaristas, who hardly waited for the French to go before springing up again like mushrooms.

Besides, it was never possible to speak of a thorough defeat of the Juaristas,⁴⁷ for wherever they were defeated, they apparently scattered in all directions, only, in reality, to gather together again as soon as circumstances allowed. Thus the war was endless; it was a bottomless well, an everlasting campaign, which was bound in the end to weary and exhaust the bravest troops. But the Mexicans were careful to conceal these conditions from the Archduke.

⁴⁷ Also known as Dissidents in Mexico.

Count Rechberg, who felt to a certain extent responsible for the step taken by the Archduke, saw through Napoleon as well as through the Mexicans in Paris, who had engineered the whole affair. He gauged the situation clearly and with perfect justice, and did not delay to inform the Archduke of his views without beating about the bush.⁴⁸

He wrote that though the stipulations appeared incapable of fulfilment, the Archduke was none the less being pressed for a decision. Napoleon was doing this in order to escape from the embarrassments into which his foreign policy had led him, and at least to obtain the satisfaction of settling the Mexican question in a manner flattering to French national sentiment. The monarchist party was pressing impatiently because it was only in the presence of the Emperor that they could see anything approaching a prospect of success. It was evident from the papers that there could be no question of any free expression of opinion from the Mexican people under existing conditions.⁴⁹ Moreover, never and in no circumstances would the English Government undertake any binding pledges for the future in any respect. Hence the fundamental conditions laid down from the outset had not been fulfilled, and the Archduke had a perfectly free hand as regards Napoleon, who had no cause to complain of any lack of loyalty on his part. At most, he might possibly feel offended by the Archduke's non-acceptance, and give characteristic expression to his feelings. In the Mexican question, as in all others, France was playing a game which was hard to understand. Her intervention in Mexico was entirely contrary to North American policy; on the other hand, Paris was coquetting with the United States in view of certain eventualities, in particular the maintenance of existing relations between England and France, and was therefore refusing the recognition of the Southern States which had originally been projected, and which would so materially further the Mexican cause. It was to be feared that the Archduke would fall into a state of dependence upon France, for Spain, too, would not afford any material support. North America was completely

⁴⁸ Count Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, December 7, 1863. V. N. A.

⁴⁹ The Archduke made a question-mark in the margin at this point.

hostile, hence the external situation was not very encouraging; it was only internal consolidation that could give any support against foreign countries. But the internal situation, too, was a depressing spectacle, for conditions in Mexico were far from being settled, and the Archduke would have to support a hard and unpromising struggle. In a country so devastated and demoralized by internal party feuds, it must be hardly possible to find trustworthy elements by the aid of which such a struggle might be waged successfully without considerable military forces from Europe. And even if these were at his disposal, the Archduke would enter Mexico as a conqueror; that is to say, in quite a different position from that of the elected ruler of the land, which had been originally contemplated. "Your Imperial Highness," concluded the sagacious, manly, and honourable minister, "will perhaps accuse me of seeing the dark side of things, and being ill-disposed towards the acceptance of the crown under the present changed conditions. But I think myself bound to express my personal opinion with all the sincerity which I feel to be incumbent upon me in addressing a member of the exalted imperial house."

Metternich, who was a little irritated at always being ignored by the Archduke in his negotiations, continued to express himself cautiously and sceptically, and said with a touch of pique that, since he was no longer concerned in the business, he did not exactly know how matters stood; he merely noticed great uneasiness in Paris, which might have awkward consequences.⁵⁰

For a moment the Archduke Ferdinand Max hesitated. He saw, on the one hand, that the warnings of Rechberg were justified, and that he was disinterestedly and impartially anxious for the welfare of his Emperor's brother; but, on the other hand, on no account did he mean to refuse the crown of Mexico, and he was determined in certain circumstances even to abandon the stipulations he had originally laid down, especially when the good news of Bazaine's campaign had arrived, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent one of his offi-

⁵⁰ Prince Metternich to Count Rechberg, Paris, February 8, 1863. V. N. A.



THE AUSTRIAN IMPERIAL FAMILY

BACK ROW, LEFT TO RIGHT

The Emperor Francis Joseph.—The Archduke Max.—The Archduchess Charlotte.

The Archduke Ludwig Viktor.—The Archduke Karl Ludwig

FRONT ROW, LEFT TO RIGHT

The Empress Elizabeth, with the Crown Prince Rudolf and the Archduchess Gisela.

The Archduchess Sophie.—The Archduke Franz Karl.

cials, Debrauz by name, to Miramar to press the Archduke to accept the crown and start.

But the Archduke was ashamed to admit his inmost wish to Rechberg, and so began his answer to him⁵¹ with the sentence: "I take my stand firmly upon the basis of a free pronouncement from the country, just as I continue, on the other hand [*sic!*] to make my consent dependent upon obtaining those guarantees which are indispensable to the stability of the new empire which we have to found." But later on in the letter, in spite of this preamble, his abandonment of the fundamental principles was already apparent. He adduced the statements of the journalist Bourdillon as a pronouncement of the country in favour of the monarchy! England, it is true, would give no guarantee.

"In view of this state of affairs," he wrote, "we must now ask ourselves whether it was in fact such a guarantee which was in view when the demand for effective support from England was made a condition of my acceptance, or whether it was not rather that the concessions which, by a wise policy, and especially by granting commercial advantages, the new empire would be able to extend into an intimate alliance with England might not be regarded as sufficient at the outset — always providing that the proclamation of the Assembly of Notables in Mexico were confirmed by an unequivocal expression of the will of the great majority of the population, and the stability of the new throne secured by the requisite financial measures, and by a sufficient body of troops at the personal disposal of the sovereign, as well as by moral and material support." A military convention would at once have to be concluded with France to the effect that the French auxiliary troops of thirty thousand men should be reduced only as they were replaced by members of the Foreign Legion and volunteer units; ten thousand men must be left in the large towns, the purposes for which the troops were to be used must be left for the Emperor of Mexico to determine, French war-ships must be stationed at certain ports, English at certain others. Finally, the voyage

⁵¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, December 16, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

must take place under the escort of English and French ships. "For my part," continued the Archduke, "in these circumstances I should be ready to devote my powers to the difficult task of founding a monarchical regime beyond the ocean. . . . It seems to me that it is neither prudent to aim at the unattainable, nor honest to continue to hold out to the Emperor Napoleon the prospect of acceptance under conditions which one has recognized to be chimerical. I do not want it to be possible for the least shadow of a doubt to prevail as to the entire purity of my intentions. I have given *fair play* to all sides from the very beginning of this affair, but as soon as one or the other of the conditions originally laid down is shown to be incapable of fulfilment, my attitude, if I stood firmly by the original program, would justifiably appear in a different light in future. But Your Excellency will see, as I do, that such a course would not be without its dangers, owing to the ease with which the distrust of the French Court is aroused."

All that was necessary was for a decision to be obtained from the Emperor Francis Joseph, and then, and not till then, would the Archduke write to the Emperor Napoleon.

On the very same day Ferdinand Max sent King Leopold this letter to Rechberg, the object of which was, he wrote, "to define more closely the form" in which, according to his view, "the stipulation as to support from France and England, which had so far been framed only in general terms, should henceforward be conceived."⁵² It had been most prudent to frame these stipulations in "general" terms at the time, but now that they were not being fulfilled, it was possible "closely to define" how they were to be interpreted! And yet Ferdinand Max grasped the situation quite clearly—at least we are bound to assume this, for he went on to write to his father-in-law as follows: "I am being urged from two quarters to hasten on my definitive acceptance of the crown and my departure for Mexico as much as possible: by Drouyn de Lhuys, for whom it would naturally be a success if I were willing to help France out of a great embarrassment by at once assuming the govern-

⁵² The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, Miramar, December 16, 1863; original and draft in V. N. A.

ment; and by the Mexicans of monarchist and clerical opinions, who count upon obtaining support against the Liberal party from my presence in the country. On the other hand, there can now be no further doubt as to the fruitlessness of trying to obtain one of the guarantees originally desired: namely, that of England.

Yet inwardly the Archduke did not struggle against recognizing this; he longed for the crown and still only dreamed of his heart's desire.

A week after receiving the Archduke's letter, Rechberg, by order of the Emperor Francis Joseph, telegraphed defining the latter's opinion on the Archduke's communication.⁵³ The Emperor had understood the stipulation as to the guarantees in the sense that the moral and material guarantee of England and France was to protect Ferdinand Max from falling into unconditional dependence upon one of these two Governments. Any departure from them would have as its effect an undesirable state of dependence upon France. The Emperor considered that they ought above all to wait for news as to the progress of Bazaine's expedition and the outcome of the debates in the Corps Législatif at Paris, which might possibly compel the Emperor Napoleon to throw over Mexico.

The King of the Belgians had followed the further developments of the Mexican candidature with assiduous interest. At the beginning of December, acting upon information he had himself obtained, he gave his daughter Charlotte certain advice, and in particular stated his views with regard to Charlotte's complaint that the Catholic party was so reactionary.⁵⁴ "I do not doubt," he wrote, "that this is the case; it is only natural; but it is a party which, if once it is devoted to anyone, remains true to him, which the Voltairians do not. Spanish and creole Voltairianism is a very sorry affair; there are those adhering to it who are always in pursuit of personal interests.

⁵³ Rechberg to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, December 25, 1863; telegram in V. N. A.

⁵⁴ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduchess Charlotte, Laeken, December 7 (?), 1863; original in V. N. A.

The Holy See ought to be invited to send out an intelligent man to guide the Catholics in accordance with their true interests. Obedience is still the rule in that Church and in that lies its strength."

The King laid the greatest stress upon the country's vote, which the French ought to promote by every means; and warned them against looking at men and things out there "*à l'européenne*." Leopold entirely approved of the letter to Rechberg;⁵⁵ he repeated that no guarantee was to be obtained from England. It would actually have been given, he considered, if the Southern States had been recognized in London, the neglect to do which was a "piece of cowardice (*poltronnerie*)" of which the English would yet repent, for it would have been to England's interest to have two republics in North America instead of one powerful one. As regards the part played by Napoleon in the Mexican question, the King's judgment was very much to the point. "If you take over this business," he wrote to his son-in-law, "you will do the Emperor an enormous service, for otherwise he will find absolutely no way out of the affair. A binding arrangement must be made here as regards the period of time for which the French troops are bound by treaty to remain there. In a short time strong pressure will be brought to bear upon the Emperor to withdraw his troops from Mexico; and if he cannot then say to himself and to the French public: 'I am bound by my engagements,' it is far from certain that he will not yield to it. His chief concern is *naturally for his popularity in France, and everything else must give way to this*; any illusions upon this point would be fatal, but I also believe that if he has *pledged himself by a binding arrangement* to leave the troops out there for so long, he will abide by it. As regards the parties, none of them is much good; the Catholic party is the only one that can be relied upon, but it may be remarked — without being too Machiavellian — that they are in a hole, and that it is *only* through you that they have any chance of a future, so that willy-nilly they must be devoted to you. In any case, it is desirable to win over to your cause

⁵⁵ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Laeken, December 21, 1863. V. N. A.

the heads of the other parties." The King knew his Napoleon, and therefore closed his letter with the admonition that the Archduke should be very careful in drawing up the conventions; that many things might be obtained before his acceptance and departure which it would be impossible to obtain afterwards.

This advice was in perfect accordance with the facts, and was therefore followed as far as possible. As regards Church matters, the Archduke felt it necessary to have some sort of explanation with Labastida. He wrote him a letter which evaded the question of the Church property by its vague phraseology, but drew attention to the harm that would be done to the Catholic Church by the opposition of the clergy to the forces of intervention. They ought, on the contrary, to do everything to promote the success of the monarchical idea. Anything might have been read into the end of the letter, which ran as follows: "If this result is achieved, and the elected sovereign takes the reins of the Empire into his hands, then, and not till then, will it be possible to devote ourselves to a final settlement of the religious question in concert with the Holy See."⁵⁶ Thus Labastida was bound to think that Church affairs would not be dealt with until the Emperor's arrival; but how the Emperor would then settle the matter still remained an open question.

Meanwhile the Belgian diplomatist, Kint von Roodenbeck, who had been placed at the Archduke's disposal for the negotiations by King Leopold, arrived in Miramar. He was received by the Empress Eugénie at Compiègne before his departure, and given her instructions as to what he was to say to Ferdinand Max. With this Belgian, who was strongly in favour of setting up a monarchy in accordance with his monarch's views, the Archduke discussed in detail what ought to be done first; the Archduke also thought of sending him on a mission to Vienna, to the Emperor Francis Joseph, and to Napoleon in Paris. Kint's views, and, in particular, the good news which was arriving of the successful progress of General

⁵⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Labastida, December 26, 1863; draft in V. N. A.

Bazaine's campaign in northern Mexico, confirmed him in his resolve to accept the crown of Mexico. And so the cautions and admonitions of the Emperor Francis Joseph and Rechberg were fruitless, and the Archduke wrote to the latter that he must make his preparations in case the majority in the country actually declared for him.⁵⁷

"Is it possible," he wrote, "to go on putting off the Mexicans with vague promises? Can one honourably continue to keep them in suspense about the future? . . . Ought we not now to say honestly and straight out to the Mexicans and the Emperor Napoleon that England and Austria do not wish it? If it is impossible to make any impression upon England, let us calculate what forces we can then dispose of, in order to make our position in Mexico honourable and solid."

Thus, though he was expecting the non-fulfilment of his original stipulations, the Archduke had no idea of withdrawing from his candidature. Kint was to discuss the matter with the Emperor Francis Joseph and Rechberg, and give them a plan to be communicated to the Emperor Napoleon, which Kint also was to take to Paris.

F. Kint von Roodenbeck arrived in Vienna on December 28, 1863, and at once had an interview with Count Rechberg. The latter was well aware that the King of the Belgians was prejudiced in favour of the Mexican enterprise, and could therefore foresee what would be the line of procedure of a diplomatist whom he had placed at the Archduke's disposal. The minister therefore listened sceptically to Kint's description of Mexican conditions and his remark that the majority of the population desired a monarchy, but were deterred by fear of the minority. He then asked ironically whether Kint thought that this sound element of the population of which he spoke would be able to protect the monarchy from the elements of disorder and the dangers caused by the proximity of a strong power which would invade Mexico, and whether it could guarantee her stability. Kint took pains to represent things as favourably as possible. He considered that even if the United

⁵⁷ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Count Rechberg, December 26, 1863. V. N. A.

States, which were their most real danger, were to conquer the South, they would have their hands full keeping it in subjection—and many other remarks to the same purpose. Kint finally ventured to appeal to Rechberg's monarchical sentiments, and gave it as his opinion that the European monarchies were bound to take an active interest in the restoration of order in Mexico, for, if the present situation continued, the northern democracy would intervene.

"America," Kint alleged, "might then expand unduly, and recognize no further limits to her spirit of conquest, which would have a fatal reaction upon Europe and its institutions, whether in the immediate or the remote future."

Rechberg, however, was not to be convinced. He mentioned the absence of any guarantees from England, and finally remarked that it was the Archduke himself who had stipulated for such a guarantee; but now, when it proved incapable of realization, he must leave it to the Archduke's own wisdom to arrive at a decision on the subject.⁵⁸

The day after this interview Kint was received in audience by the Emperor Francis Joseph,⁵⁹ who inquired whether it was really the majority who so earnestly desired the monarchy; to which Kint replied in the affirmative. The question whether Juarez still had a considerable army was answered in the negative; the Emperor's anxiety about the United States was allayed in the way with which we are familiar; and Kint added that immigration would in time create a new population, which would raise a "bulwark" against the menace to Mexico's independence from the rest of America! Kint next painted the wealth, resources, extent, and fertility of the country in the rosiest colours.

On the following day he had a second interview with Rechberg.⁶⁰ The minister again pointed out all the bad aspects of the question, especially the menace from the United States, which would either conquer the South or arrive at a settlement with it, and next employ the army so set free against Mexico.

⁵⁸ Kint to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, December 28, 1863. V. N. A.

⁵⁹ The same to the same, Vienna, December 29, 1863. V. N. A.

⁶⁰ The same to the same, Vienna, December 30, 1863. V. N. A.

Kint again endeavoured to calm his misgivings, and also declared that he did not believe the Union would be reconstituted.

"But," replied Rechberg, "the United States declared in Paris that they would never tolerate a monarchy in Mexico." Kint was again equal to the occasion, and tried to represent to Rechberg how alarming it would be if the American democracy were to end by ordering even Europe to modify its institutions in accordance with the republican principles of America, and if the Americans set to work to undermine the fundamental principles of the old social order in Europe in conjunction with the revolutionaries. "I recognize the interest of Europe," rejoined Rechberg, "but I cherish a great and deep attachment to the august prince who is the Emperor's brother, and I am rather inclined to foresee the difficulties, lest His Imperial Highness come to grief in this most difficult enterprise."

Kint replied that every great enterprise was difficult, and so all the more attractive to the noble ambition of the Prince, who was born and bred for such a task. But Rechberg would not let himself be put off with phrases, and still clung to his misgivings, all the more so since, as he said, he had learnt that in Paris they were intending to leave nothing but the Foreign Legion out there. Kint once more endeavoured to represent everything as feasible and capable of a solution in accordance with the Archduke's views, but Rechberg continued to shake his head, and again did his best to dissuade the Archduke, to give him a warning and lay the whole situation clearly before him. If the Archduke would not listen, nothing could be done. He could not restrain him by force, and at last he said to himself that a man's heaven is the attainment of what he wants.

From Vienna Kint von Roodenbeck set out on his way to Paris, taking with him an autograph letter ⁶¹ from the Archduke to Napoleon, in which he was informed that Kint was empowered to discuss with the Emperor the various points upon which depended the definitive acceptance of the throne.

In accordance with his instructions, Kint informed the Emperor that the Archduke had made all his arrangements for

⁶¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, December 26, 1863; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting in V. N. A.

departure; as soon as the Mexican cities of Morelia, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and Guadalajara had also declared themselves, he would consider that the large majority of the population was won over, an opinion which he had also expressed in a letter to the Council of Regency. If the Emperor of the French would then declare that the necessary guarantees had been obtained, Ferdinand Max would sail at once. These essential guarantees consisted, naturally, in the solution of the financial question, the material support of France, and the accompanying "recognition and moral support" of England and Spain. The material guarantees of these two countries originally asked for had thus been transformed into the quite illusory conception of "moral support." It would not be possible, the Archduke went on, really to dispense with the material support of France until the French troops should be replaced by a corresponding number of men from the Foreign Legion and of European troops, yet in any case the cities of Puebla, Orizaba, and Córdoba (all on the road from Mexico City to Vera Cruz), and the other points necessary for the joint protection of French and Mexican interests, would require to be occupied for six years by from eight to ten thousand French.

In his answer Napoleon first touched upon the question of the "nationalized" Church property. The Emperor observed that the confiscation of the property of the clergy many years ago was a *fait accompli*. Any change would be harmful. The Pope and the clergy must be induced to renounce their claims, and the clergy must in future be paid by the State. It would be expedient to find a solution for the religious question before the departure of the Archduke for Mexico, but any communications with the Pope regarding Church property would be a delicate matter. With regard to guarantees, he could count upon France's material support. The French troops would leave Mexico only gradually, and in proportion as the organization of Mexican and foreign forces proceeded. Even when they had evacuated Mexico, he would leave the Archduke the Foreign Legion, with an establishment of six thousand men, which could remain in Mexico from six to eight years. The Emperor added that the Archduke might rest assured that

he had every interest in not leaving his work unfinished, and that the French troops would not be withdrawn so long as any danger to the stability of the Government remained; but Ferdinand Max must realize that, in view of the opposition of public opinion in France and of the Corps Législatif, the Emperor could not promise in advance to leave the troops in Mexico for a definite period.

It was, Napoleon declared, very probable that England and Spain would recognize the Archduke as Emperor of Mexico as soon as he arrived there, and Napoleon would do all he could to hasten this recognition. As regards the loan, the Emperor indicated that nothing had been done about it so far, as the Archduke's presence in Paris and official acceptance would be necessary, otherwise the loan would meet with no success. Moreover, a few days before the interview with Kint, the Emperor had sent off the draft of a military convention to the Archduke. For the rest, he promised Kint to examine everything that was desired in a friendly spirit, and discuss it with his ministers.⁶²

It now looked as if Ferdinand Max's demands with regard to the adhesion of the "great majority of the nation" — ultimately whittled down to the support of a few of the larger cities in northern Mexico, which he knew Bazaine would shortly capture — were on the eve of fulfilment. Almonte continued to represent the situation in the most favourable light possible.⁶³ The population everywhere was only awaiting the arrival of the Conservatives, or rather of the army, to "pronounce" for the monarchy. Out of the eight million inhabitants of Mexico, six million would be prepared to declare for the monarchy by the time the Archduke should read this letter. S. Vidaurri, the Juarista general and governor, who had his headquarters at Monterey, had entered into an alliance with the forces of intervention and was going to join them. "In view of the powerful movement of public opinion which is mani-

⁶² Our account of Kint's mission to Napoleon is based on his reports to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, one without date, the other dated January 3, 1864; both in V. N. A.

⁶³ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, November 27, 1863. V. N. A.

festing itself on all sides, and the adhesion of the richest, most populous, and most important cities," wrote Almonte, "I am more than ever inclined to regard the Empire as an accomplished fact, and I hope to be able to place it in Your Majesty's hands." The flight of Juarez and his friends was becoming general and assuming the proportions of a regular panic. Nothing would be open to them but to leave the country. Almonte next enumerated a long list of cities and provinces which were already imperialist, or would shortly be so. The enemy was retreating precipitately in every direction, and the rest was only a question of marching. The States enumerated formed three-quarters of the total territory, and included four-fifths of the whole population. "I soon hope, therefore," Almonte concluded, "to hear that, trusting to the whole nation, which awaits you impatiently and with eager unanimity, Your Majesty will hasten on your departure here as much as possible, and start upon that work of regeneration and reorganization which will raise us up once more, and show the world a great ruler at the head of a great nation."

This letter was entirely misleading. Bazaine's successes were considerable, but it was already patent that they rested upon a weak foundation, and that the country could be induced to declare its adhesion only in places where the French bayonets made themselves directly felt. The figures quoted were entirely incorrect; there was no question of three-quarters of the total territory being in the hands of the forces of intervention; these controlled at the outside a seventh of the whole territory, with perhaps three million inhabitants, who might by the aid of a strong dose of optimism be estimated as being under their influence.

Thus Almonte was as bad as his colleague Gutierrez in Europe in misleading the Archduke; but though they were aiming at the same thing, they were far from well-disposed to each other. Gutierrez had kept an unusually sharp watch upon Almonte since the latter had been forced into such sharp opposition to Bishop Labastida in order to maintain his own power, which was of more importance to him than the clerical interest, whereas to Gutierrez the latter was sacrosanct. Gutierrez at

once resolved to use his influence with the Archduke against Almonte wherever possible. He was a practised hand at every sort of subtle diplomatic intrigue, and in reporting a conversation with Marshal Forey to the Archduke he took this opportunity of attacking Almonte. The marshal had used severe language about the Council of Regency, and Gutierrez reported only what the Archduke was pleased to hear. According to him, the marshal had said that he deplored the fact that the Council of Regency were the only rulers and were too anxious to govern, when they ought to have concerned themselves only with administrative functions. This was particularly applicable to the question of Church property. Two members of the Council of Regency had "radically" weak characters: namely, General Salas and Almonte. The latter was intoxicated by his power, he was very comfortable in his position and enjoyed playing at authority. The parties were irreconcilable with one another. They would bow to the Archduke, but to him alone!

This was what Gutierrez was pleased to report of this conversation; in his eyes Bishop Labastida, the third member of the Council of Regency, naturally had not a weak character. Forey's whole conversation was touched up and skilfully presented to the Archduke, interwoven with subtle flattery. The Archduke would have been very glad to discuss matters with Forey in person. He sent a request to Napoleon that the marshal might be given leave to come to Miramar. The Emperor, however, forbade this, for he was afraid that the Archduke would hear too much of the truth from Forey, and might in the end be dissuaded from his project. So the visit did not take place, and once more the Archduke missed an opportunity of hearing authentic information about Mexico from a serious person. Ferdinand Max had come to distrust Almonte; for this, too, Gutierrez was to be thanked, as we shall soon show.

At the beginning of 1864 Marshal Bazaine had returned to the capital on account of the political situation; but such portions of his army as remained in the field under General Douay, as well as the Mexican monarchist troops fighting on the interventionist side under the Conservative party leaders and Generals Marquez, Miramón, and Mejía, carried on the

struggle with Juárez and his adherents. The interventionist forces and their Mexican auxiliaries lay in an immense curve to the east and north of Mexico City. General Marquez commanded the district ⁶⁴ from Los Reyes to Morelia on the east, his opponent General Uruga had been thrown back on Colima, a French column under General Douay with some Mexicans under Miramón was advancing by way of Aguascalientes against Zacatecas, driving before it the Juarista General Ortega; another column, under Mejía, was advancing against General Doblado, feeling its way forward as far as Matehuala after occupying San Luis de Potosí. At the end of May Mejía succeeded, with the aid of a surprise attack by the French General Aymard, in striking such a severe blow at General Doblado that his army was utterly routed, and Doblado himself fled to the United States.

Almonte was right in one respect: the position of President Juárez, harried and fleeing from place to place, was no enviable one. In January two of his generals, Doblado and Ortega, proposed that he should resign. Juárez refused, saying ⁶⁵ that the forces of intervention were not attacking him, but the republican form of government. At the end of February Juárez found himself forced to take very strong measures against Vidaurri, one of his generals and provincial governors, who joined in opposition to him and was openly negotiating with the interventionist party, only to find himself hunted down by Juárez and finally forced to flee to Texas. Moreover, in March General José Lopez Uruga sent messengers to negotiate with Bazaine. The latter was clever enough to flatter the Mexican general by negotiating with him on equal terms, so that on Maximilian's arrival Uruga went over to him and became one of the most faithful adherents of the Empire.

Though many of Juárez's subordinates were not very trustworthy, a few of them remained entirely faithful to him. Among these was Porfirio Díaz, who had his headquarters at Oaxaca, to the south of Mexico. Moreover, everywhere that the arm of the French could not reach, or had ceased to reach,

⁶⁴ See map at end of Volume I.

⁶⁵ Bancroft, *Mexico*, op. cit., IX. 129.

the population remained in his favour. To this was added the moral and secret material support of the United States, and the tough, tenacious will of the President to hold out during this difficult time. His position was by no means so desperate as it sometimes appeared. The incessant movements of his bands and the unremitting surprise attacks to which the French troops were exposed as soon as they began to advance in small detachments forced Bazaine to resort to harsh measures. This was the cause of those summary sentences of the French courts-martial which were to produce such a deplorable effect upon the feeling of the whole population.

On New Year's Day 1864 the Emperor Napoleon thanked the Archduke⁶⁶ for the good wishes brought him by Kint, and sent him his most cordial New Year's greetings. The Emperor was no longer so enthusiastic about the Mexican enterprise, and made this very plain at times to the Empress Eugénie, who had so ardently promoted the whole scheme. But she had by no means come to see things in the same way, and still hoped for a successful solution.

"You will see," she said soothingly to Hidalgo one evening, when even he was becoming a little alarmed at the appalling moral responsibility which weighed upon him, "how nasty they will be when this business is discussed in the Chamber; but I am sure that the Archduke will succeed, so that all the enemies of the expedition in France will be turned into admirers."⁶⁷

Loliée relates⁶⁸ that about this time the American Minister said to the Empress: "Madame, the North is going to win. France will have to abandon her project, and things will end badly for the Austrian." The Empress at once fired up and said excitedly: "For my part, I assure you that if Mexico were not so far off, and my son were not still a child, I should want him to place himself at the head of the French army, in order

⁶⁶ The Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, January 2, 1864; telegram in V. N. A.

⁶⁷ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, December 29, 1863. V. N. A.

⁶⁸ Frederic Loliée, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

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to write with his sword one of the fairest pages in the history of this century."

"Madame," rejoined the American phlegmatically, "you may thank God that Mexico *is* so far away, and that your son is still a child." The Empress was annoyed, and was about to answer angrily, but Napoleon intervened and put an end to the scene. But neither the minister nor his daughter was invited to court again.

Though this story cannot be vouched for, it faithfully reflects the prevailing atmosphere. Eugénie was still full of the grandeur of her idea; she could hardly wait to see Maximilian Emperor. She therefore asked Hidalgo early in January whether, when the Archduke came to Paris, it would be as Emperor, as in the case of the Prince of Denmark, who, before he was King in Greece, had appeared as such in Paris. Hidalgo communicated the inquiry to De Pont as a *ballon d'essai*,⁶⁹ afterwards inquiring significantly whether he might not order the Archduke a Mexican general's uniform from the tailor who usually made them, and put in hand orders for the seals of the Imperial Cabinet and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the writing-paper necessary for the Emperor's use. Hidalgo, who was in close touch with Almonte, also hinted that he thought the general was displaying an absolutely heroic patience. They did not neglect even the most absurd means of putting pressure upon the Archduke.

But since good news had recently been arriving from Mexico, he required no urging, and was firmly resolved upon acceptance; but, remembering the wise counsel of the King of the Belgians, he intended to get as much out of Napoleon as possible first. For Napoleon was the only person from whom anything was to be got. Thus on January 19 the Archduke resolved once more to write to Napoleon,⁷⁰ saying that he hoped that, as a consequence of the recent triumphs in Mexico, the wish of the large majority of the population to offer him the crown would soon be made known in Europe, so that the first

⁶⁹ Hidalgo to Baron De Pont, January 4, 1864. V. N. A.

⁷⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon III, January 19, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

stipulation should thus be fulfilled. He informed him that the Emperor Francis Joseph had been zealous ("*a mis de l'empressement*") in fulfilling the requests addressed to him, and had already given orders that the frigate *Novara* should be fitted out for the voyage. The Archduke requested that arrangements for the loan should be concluded, and that in the draft of the military convention to be entered into with France should be inserted the condition that the debts owing to France should be paid back in ten increasing annual instalments, and that the Foreign Legion, which had been raised from six to eight thousand men recruited in France, should still fight under the French flag. In the event of the Emperor Napoleon's agreeing to these modifications, he was determined definitely to accept the throne.

This letter had been submitted to the Emperor Francis Joseph before it was sent off, and, according to the Archduke's own statement, he appears to have approved it. The Emperor may have said to himself that he had done all he could to point out the difficulties and dangers to his brother, but since the Archduke insisted upon having his own way in spite of everything, he would put no obstacles in his path.

In his letter to Napoleon, Ferdinand Max had also expressed a wish for a sort of treaty of neutrality for Mexico, on the lines of the Belgian one; but since Kint had not written to him on the subject, he had abandoned the idea, though reluctantly. Practically only such things were included as were fairly likely to be accepted, lest new difficulties might arise.

At the same time the Archduke wrote to Almonte⁷¹ that in two or three weeks' time he would issue his declaration definitely accepting the crown, should the conditions have been fulfilled, as was to be anticipated. He also asked him to start at once making arrangements for his journey and arrival at Vera Cruz, and requested Almonte and his wife to meet him there. About the same time as the Archduke sent off this letter from Miramar, Almonte wrote⁷² that it might be said without exag-

⁷¹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Almonte, January 22, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

⁷² Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, January 27, 1864. V. N. A.

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generation that the whole country, and not only the majority of it, was calling out for its sovereign. But his proposals with regard to the arrangements to be made for the journey made it plain that he really knew perfectly well how different the situation really was. For he wrote to De Pont ⁷³ that it was absolutely necessary that the Archduke should not stay in Vera Cruz, where no state reception could take place; the dinner must take place on board ship, and they must at once start on the journey to Orizaba by way of La Soledad. He requested that up to this point the arrangements for the journey, which were settled down to the details of the times of departure and of meals, should not be altered in any respect. "For," he wrote, "we know the danger better than anybody, and the Emperor will not despise the precautions due to our experience, and expose Her Majesty the Empress, himself, and his household to a useless and at the same time inglorious risk."

Since the only danger in Vera Cruz could be the yellow fever, this was hard to reconcile with the assurances contained in his other letters.

Almonte expected that, after the arrival of the Archduke in Mexico, he himself would continue to occupy the first position in the State after the monarch. He reckoned that, as the Emperor's chief counsellor, he would be the most influential person in the country, and could tolerate no other Mexican near him who might cherish the same aim. Hence the struggle which he and his friends carried on, silently, but all the more actively, with Santa Anna, who was always being put forward by Gutierrez.

When Almonte heard that Napoleon had apparently given instructions that Santa Anna was to welcome the Archduke at Vera Cruz, he strongly opposed this in a letter to the Archduke.⁷⁴ Almonte had also tried to undermine Santa Anna with Bazaine when, in the middle of February, at a time when the internal dissensions in the Council of Regency were raging, Santa Anna showed signs of coming to Mexico. Almonte alleged that the old man, who had so often played the leading

⁷³ Almonte to Baron De Pont, February 8, 1864. V. N. A.

⁷⁴ Almonte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 27, 1864. V. N. A.

part in Mexico, would hurry there before the Archduke's arrival, in order to seize the control of political affairs. His protestations that he was ready to serve the future Emperor faithfully were a mere pretext to mask his selfish plans.

So that when, on February 28, 1864, Santa Anna did actually land at Vera Cruz so as to place himself at the disposal of the regency as the oldest veteran of the army, and, a few days later, published a manifesto in favour of the monarchical form of government, Bazaine, under pressure from Almonte, chose to regard these proceedings as officious and not in keeping with Santa Anna's promise to avoid all political agitation, and sent orders to him to leave Mexico at once. Almonte had triumphed; the ex-President had probably at first wanted nothing but what Almonte wanted on his own account: namely, the first position after the sovereign, perhaps with an eye to ultimately succeeding him. This had now been checkmated by Bazaine's action, inspired by Almonte. Almonte knew very well what he was about in supporting Bazaine's appointment in Paris through Hidalgo. He had seen to it that the general should hear about it. Now Almonte was demanding his reward, and this rebuff to Santa Anna was the first instalment. So long as he could maintain his position unchecked by any competitors, Almonte did not care in the least that he had thus created a bitter enemy for the policy of intervention, and therefore for Ferdinand Max—an enemy who, as a result of his past record, his extensive connexions in Mexico and the United States, and his great wealth, might at any time be a danger.

Santa Anna retired once more to St. Thomas, his island in the Antilles, and followed the subsequent development of events with a vigilant and hostile eye.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max had sent his father-in-law his last letter to the Emperor Napoleon, adding, in his covering letter,⁷⁵ that he was only waiting for his consent to start for Brussels and Paris at once.

The Emperor did not keep him waiting long for a reply. In

⁷⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Leopold, King of the Belgians, January 31, 1864. V. N. A.

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a communication ⁷⁶ dated January 30, 1864, he informed him of the guarantees to which France would consent. The French army would not leave Mexico until it could do so without endangering the existence of the new Government, and on its departure it would leave behind the Foreign Legion, with its numbers increased from six to eight thousand men by either Indian or European recruits, for another six or eight years. The French naval detachments in the Antilles and the Pacific should be instructed to show the flag of the French navy frequently in Mexican ports. As regards the repayment of the expenses of the expedition, the French Government would grant Mexico the most favourable conditions. Napoleon once more insisted in this letter that the loan convention was the most important point, and that the Archduke's presence was indispensable for its speedy settlement.

"I think, therefore," wrote the Emperor to the Archduke, "that it is urgent for you to come to Paris, from whence you could easily go to Brussels and London. As regards your visit to Rome, allow me to observe that I foresee great danger from it. The Pope will ask for pledges, and if Your Imperial Highness grants them, you will not be well received in Mexico; if you refuse them, the Holy Father will be offended. Besides, time is going by, and since Rouher's speech [in the Chamber, in favour of the Mexican enterprise], which has produced a great effect in France, public opinion is very favourable to negotiating a loan, and everything that may be useful to your Government."

The letter was accompanied by a copy of the draft military convention. Thus Napoleon too was beginning to put pressure on the Archduke. He too saw the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of satisfying all parties in the question of the Church property, and, fearing lest, when he found this out, Ferdinand Max might be deterred from accepting, he advised him not to broach the subject.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max at once communicated

⁷⁶ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, January 30, 1864; original in V. N. A.

Napoleon's reply to King Leopold, who immediately answered ⁷⁷ that he was of the same mind as the Emperor; that any communication with the Holy See on the subject of the Church property would be a delicate matter, since the Church justly viewed it as "spoliation," and could not possibly make any such concession voluntarily. He would only be exposing himself to a refusal from Rome, which was to be avoided. The Revolution was the cause of it all, and must bear the sole responsibility. Ferdinand Max was only too much inclined to follow Napoleon's advice, and, ostrich-like, to hide his head in the sand.

As regards the guarantees, however, King Leopold was of quite a different opinion. He knew the Emperor Napoleon, and had a long-standing mistrust of him, at times even amounting to hatred and hostility. He now found it hard enough to make up his mind to accept a gift for his children from his enemy and political opponent, and desired to safe-guard it by the most effective written undertakings that he could.

"It is you," wrote the old King to his son-in-law, "who are acting as cat's-paw for the Emperor Napoleon, and for this very reason no step ought to be taken without full safe-guards as to his leaving you the troops. You must at all costs get something done about this officially and in writing, signed by the French ministers in the name of the Emperor, and by your plenipotentiaries, and *ratified* by you and the Emperor. It is a trying (*pénible*) business to negotiate anything of this kind. Yet it is *indispensably necessary*, if only to enable the Emperor to say to the Corps Législatif and to the country: 'It is an obligation of honour upon which is based a reciprocal engagement, which I can in no case violate (*c'est un engagement d'honneur sur lequel est basé un engagement réciproque que je ne puis violer dans aucun cas*)!' If nothing of this sort existed, pressure would be brought to bear on him, and he is by nature always very much inclined to regard his own position as the most important thing. Do not allow any phrases to turn you aside from this important and indispensably necessary matter,

⁷⁷ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 4, 1864; original in V. N. A.

the guarantee for which must have the force of a treaty; the period for which the real trustworthy French troops are to remain in the country must be *clearly stipulated, the longer the better*; they constitute your *chief support!*" The King declared the French Foreign Legion to be brave and good; but care must be taken in recruiting and accepting volunteers for it, that too much riff-raff was not included. Moreover it was very much to be recommended that the Foreign Legion should fly the French colours even in Mexico. The King also counselled prudence with regard to questions of a financial nature, and drew attention to the necessity that the communications between the port of Vera Cruz and the interior of the country should be kept secure and defended by fortifications at points of importance.

"To sum up (*pour résumer*)," concluded the King, "the Emperor Napoleon is bent upon withdrawing his troops from Mexico, for if things go badly, then he is exonerated; and on this account there must be something definite in writing, a document; and also about the gradual process by which the French troops are to be withdrawn. It is of absolutely no use to let yourself be put off with polite phrases. It is to be desired that all this should be settled before you bind yourself definitively; it is hard, but there can be no mistake about it, it is indispensably necessary."

The King of the Belgians further added in a postscript: "It is my intention to go to England, where I am eagerly expected, about the end of the month. This would give me the opportunity of being of some practical use there in the matter, which it is hard to manage by writing. In any case, you two must go to England. Feeling is good there, and it is only from North America that communications are arriving full of hostility. When Texas split off from Mexico years ago, the United States approved this step, and there are documents in existence, dating from that time, saying that every American State desiring to set up a new organization *will be* recognized by the American Government." King Leopold considered that the United States would be bound by this to recognize the monarchy of Mexico; but he forgot that they would always declare that this State

had not chosen the new form of government itself, but had had it imposed upon it.

The Archduke Ferdinand Max thanked his father-in-law cordially for his letter,⁷⁸ alluded to his project of visiting Paris and London, and asked for a thousand Belgian soldiers, with the necessary officers, "for the especial protection of the Empress, their fellow-countrywoman," and also for the good offices of the King in connexion with his visit to England, in order that that country might recognize him as reigning Emperor from the very moment of his assumption of the crown. The Archduke was stubborn; although his father-in-law had so far effected practically nothing, in spite of his niece Queen Victoria and all his other connexions in England, he kept on hoping and asking for fresh efforts in this direction.

King Leopold again answered by return. From this promptitude it was evident that he had begun to feel uneasy lest Ferdinand Max might end by allowing himself to be led astray by Napoleon into sailing for Mexico without adequate guarantees.⁷⁹

"In order to carry through the business with some security," he wrote, "one must be able to take a firm stand, and *definitely declare* that if the conditions are made worse, there can be no acceptance. It is very much to the interest of the Emperor Napoleon — one may say it is *most* to his interest — to settle the matter, for he is *in it*, whereas the newcomer *still stands outside* the difficulties. In such an awkward position it is desirable to come to as close an agreement as possible; I will do my part, but only on condition that *you fulfil yours*. The position has obviously changed very much since the first beginnings. Originally, as was most comprehensible, everything depended upon the occupation by the French troops, and even in England this was thought desirable. The attitude taken up by the Corps Législatif has obviously aroused a desire in the Emperor to withdraw the French troops from Mexico as soon as possible;

⁷⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to King Leopold, February 10, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

⁷⁹ King Leopold to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Lacken, February 17, 1864; original in V. N. A.

but this is the chief basis of security, and must therefore be clung to as long as possible. . . . Without a loan your *departure is impossible*. . . . In the Greek settlement of 1830 the three powers, England, France, and Russia, each undertook to guarantee twenty million francs, with uncommon *reluctance*, and only forced to it by my declaring that I should renounce the crown. One must beware of all illusions; nobody is forced to do the impossible (*à l'impossible nul n'est tenu*). This should be all the more taken to heart since the blame for non-success due to an utter lack of the indispensable elements will be laid upon him who has undertaken the business; and nothing could be so unjust or so painful as to be reproached with incapacity, even if it be only the result of a lack of the necessary means. I made delicate inquiries about the possibility of English recognition. The answer was that the announcement must be made out there.

"Victoria is very anxious to see me, but the weather is vile, and when one has been so ill, one's self-confidence suffers; none the less, God willing, I want to start for England on the 29th. My presence may be useful. You will naturally be welcome here as always. Now one thing more . . . without a loan, without a convention, I should move ['Not' seems to be omitted. *Author*]. *They are in your hands, you are not yet in theirs*. May Heaven protect you! Ever, my dear son, your faithful father Leopold."

After accomplishing his mission Kint had once more arrived in Miramar, bringing with him further details of the guarantees announced in Napoleon's last letter. The Archduke now sent him back to Paris with a letter to the Emperor,⁸⁰ in which he asked for a few amendments to the military convention, and laid stress on the fact that he too was convinced of the necessity of his presence in Paris with a view to arranging for the loan; and that he and the Archduchess were longing with all their hearts for the moment when they might wait upon the Emperor and Empress. He wished to arrive in Paris incognito,

⁸⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, Vienna, February 12, 1864; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting with autograph in the Archduke's hand. V. N. A.

and already alluded in his letter to their sailing for Mexico after he had definitively accepted the crown.

Among the requests made to Napoleon by the Archduke had been one to the effect that the future Emperor of Mexico, on his arrival in the country, should assume the command of all the purely Mexican troops. The Emperor had conceded this, but Marshal Randon had raised objections,⁸¹ proposing that these troops should continue to be under Bazaine's command. Metternich⁸² had happened to be present at the Tuileries when the Emperor and Empress had a sharp dispute upon the subject. For, as the result of Randon's representations, the Emperor, whose pet theory was "unity of command," had conceived such misgivings that his previous decision was shaken. The Empress, however, insisted that the Archduke would be right in giving up the whole business if it were even proposed that he should yield in the matter of command. Metternich significantly added the laconic observation: "I think the Emperor will yield." The second point upon which the Emperor and Empress were in disagreement was the demand that the Foreign Legion, which was staying behind in Mexico for six years, should keep the French flag. The Empress was against it on political grounds, whereas the Emperor seemed to be more inclined to concede this. All this was to be decided on the impending arrival of the Archduke in Paris.

At the end of January Count Rechberg had mentioned to the Archduke in conversation that, in the event of his accepting the Mexican crown, it would be necessary for him to renounce his rights of succession in Austria.

Ferdinand Max was deeply moved by this; he had absolutely no intention of consenting to such a renunciation; for who could tell how fate would shape matters, and how greatly he might regret such a step? He tried to elucidate his point of view in a memorandum.⁸³ "Why, then," it ran, "is it desired

⁸¹ See Randon's views as expressed in a letter to Bazaine of February 29, 1864. Gaulot, *op. cit.*, I. 273.

⁸² Richard Metternich to Count Rechberg, February 28, 1864; private letter in V. N. A.

⁸³ Dated Miramar, February 10, 1864; draft corrected in many places by the Archduke himself. V. N. A.

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to exclude me for no reason from the rights of legitimacy inherited from our forefathers, and always held in high honour by them? Why is it already desired to declare my as yet non-existent heirs — and I have, moreover, small hopes of having any — to have forfeited the rights of their forefathers in principle?

“On the point of entering for many years upon a dangerous position — for that of sovereign of Mexico is certainly dangerous — I hope, none the less, that the aid of Providence will crown with success my endeavours to convert it into a brilliant and glorious one.”

On February 12 the Archduke Ferdinand Max had yet another exhaustive conversation with the Emperor Francis Joseph, at which the quotation of a possible Mexican loan on the Vienna bourse was agreed upon. On the other hand, the renunciation of the Archduke's rights of succession in Austria had not yet been definitively discussed by the two brothers. The Emperor Francis Joseph had heard from Rechberg that, even on that passing reference, the Archduke had already protested against it so far as he was concerned; and he wanted to raise the question even before the Archduke went to Paris; but Ferdinand Max declared that it was still uncertain whether he would accept the crown, and that it would be better not to speak of it before his return from Paris. He postponed this delicate interview, since he already knew that it would mean a terrible scene. The Emperor consented, for he had commissioned the historian Alfred, Ritter von Arneth, to draw up a memorandum on the question, which he wanted to send to Ferdinand Max before a decision was arrived at.

Meanwhile two reports, dated February 20 and 29, on Napoleon's attitude to the Archduke's various demands had come in from Kint,⁸⁴ who had returned to Paris. They explained that, on account of the Chambers, Napoleon could not give any binding promise to leave the French troops in Mexico, and that he also wished the chief command, even over the Mexican army, to be left to Bazaine. Achille Fould, the son of a

⁸⁴ Kint to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 20 and 29, 1864. V. N. A.

Jewish banker, who had formerly been Minister of Finance under Louis Philippe and was now in charge of the same department under Napoleon, was to draw up two projects for a loan; but it would be impossible to examine the various proposals thoroughly without previously arriving at an agreement with the Archduke on certain fundamental points. Since it was not convenient to do so by correspondence only, it would be necessary for the Archduke to come to Paris.

Metternich had already sent an inquiry from Paris as to whether the Archduke would not like to travel incognito, not revealing himself until the moment of his arrival at the Tuileries; he recommended⁸⁵ this in order to avoid possible street demonstrations. He also informed him that it was the intention in Paris to receive and entertain the Archduke with imperial honours. The Ambassador could not, however, refrain from writing the following significant words to the Archduke: "I await the arrival of Your Imperial Highness in Paris with the most joyful sentiments at this meeting, which is highly gratifying to me, and at the same time with sincerest sympathy for the destiny which awaits Your Imperial Highness in the far West as a result of this magnanimous enterprise."

Ignoring this observation, the Archduke replied⁸⁶ that he must visit Paris even before receiving the deputation, for he regarded the question of the loan as a most important one; but that he would first go to Brussels. He desired no imperial honours, and would prefer to arrive in Paris in morning dress, as he had done at Buckingham Palace. As to his reception at the Tuileries, Napoleon must decide how far this was compatible with his incognito. He would be all the more touched if the reception had the character of a friendly meeting.

On the day before his departure for Paris he received Ar-neth's memorandum,⁸⁷ autographed by the Emperor Francis Joseph. It first established the point, by the aid of historical

⁸⁵ Richard Metternich to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 14, 1864. V. N. A.

⁸⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Richard Metternich, February 17, 1864. V. N. A.

⁸⁷ Entitled "Notes on the dynastic question"; in V. N. A.

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examples, that every time the inheritance handed down by the Habsburgs had been divided, the reunion of the whole of its territorial possessions under one ruler had been kept in view. In the present case, owing to the position of Mexico, the impossibility of such a reunion must be taken into account; the Tuscan practice with regard to the second son could therefore not be adduced as a precedent, as in that case a possibility of union with Austria had never been excluded. Turning to other dynasties, the succession of Louis XIV's grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, offered an excellent analogy, for in that case also there was only one person standing nearer to the succession,⁸⁸ and there was likewise no question of union. Thus the condition then imposed upon the Duke that he should renounce all the rights of a French prince, rights of succession and regency as well as his apanage, also applied to the case in point, that of the Archduke Ferdinand Max. This was demanded both by his interest and by that of Austria, for in the event of the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, how would the Archduke perform the functions of a regent from Mexico? Would he in that case abdicate the throne of Mexico? He might in the meantime have become a perfect stranger to affairs in Austria. No, out of love for Mexico and its inhabitants he must devote himself entirely to them, and would find no better way of proving this devotion than by renouncing his most cherished rights.

Such was the gist of this unsigned memorandum. The Emperor Francis Joseph handed it to his brother without further comment immediately before his journey to Paris, and hoped that a perusal of it would effectually prepare him for the demands which the Emperor would later have definitely to put to him.

Ferdinand Max thought that the memorandum dealt with his possible resignation in "vague and infelicitous terms";⁸⁹ he undertook to examine them in detail, and to draw up an exhaustive answer based upon historical and legal grounds.

⁸⁸ In the present case the Crown Prince Rudolf, son of the Emperor Francis Joseph, then six years old.

⁸⁹ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, March 22, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

On March 5 the Archduke arrived in Paris with his wife. In spite of their reluctance, they were received with imperial honours. Gala performances at all the theatres, great entertainments at the Tuileries, and a reception of all the Mexican residents in Paris at the Austrian Embassy signalized the solemn occasion which had called the future Emperor to Paris. All the members of the diplomatic corps present in Paris took part in the court celebrations, but it was significant that the representative of the United States was not present at any of them. The Emperor Napoleon was in the best of spirits. He hoped that by accepting the crown the Archduke would free him from his Mexican embarrassments, and enable him shortly to withdraw from Mexico with financial and commercial advantages for the future. It was very opportune for Napoleon that he had just received a glowing report from Bazaine, who wanted to remain in the Emperor's good graces. He at once showed it to the Archduke, painted the situation in Mexico in rosy colours, and declared to him that he would find the country entirely pacified, so that the loan would serve mainly for building railways and other works of development. He rejoiced that the Archduke had been successfully deceived into thinking that his election was due to the national will; as can be seen from one of his letters to Bazaine,⁹⁰ the Emperor had never wanted anything more than that "it should appear to the eyes of Europe" that such was the case.

He was therefore inclined to accede to some of the Archduke's wishes. The Archduke again used all his charm, delicate tact, and skill to win Napoleon over. The financial part of the projected military convention had been drawn up by Fould, the Finance Minister, and the Archduke had a hard struggle to modify it in accordance with his wishes. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, met him in a sympathetic spirit. The Archduke accomplished much, though not everything; in the financial arrangements especially, many causes of future trouble were left. But if the convention, which consisted of two sections, an official and a secret one, were loyally observed, it was possible that things would turn out satisfactorily.

⁹⁰ Napoleon to Bazaine, February 15, 1864; printed by Gaulot, *op. cit.*, I. 256.

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The first part of the convention⁹¹ provided that 25,000 French troops and the Foreign Legion should remain in Mexico until replaced by fresh formations; the latter corps, with a strength of 8,000, was to remain in Mexico eight years. The relations between the commands were regulated, but not too clearly, and nothing at all was said about the command-in-chief, except in Article V, which provided that, in garrisons composed of both French and Mexican troops, or in expeditionary forces so composed, the French officer was always to have the command. So it was not clearly stated whether the Emperor of Mexico was to be supreme war-lord in his own country; for practical purposes the Frenchman was always commander-in-chief, with the exception of those few cases in which the Mexican imperialist troops were operating alone. Even this was detrimental enough to unity of action. The financial stipulations made by the crafty minister Fould were ominous. The Archduke Ferdinand Max did not understand much about it, and therefore set his signature to demands which, at the very least, would lay impossible burdens upon the financially overloaded State. Mexico had in the first place to pay 270,000,000 francs for the expenditure on the French expeditionary force up to July 1, 1864, after which date the Mexican Government was to pay 1,000 francs per annum for each soldier of Napoleon's; and, finally, she had to compensate all those French subjects the loss of whom had formed the pretext for the expedition.

Of the loan to be issued, 66 millions were to be paid at once to the French Treasury at the price of issue, as an instalment of the 270 millions and of the compensation which was due. As far as possible Frenchmen were called in to regulate financial matters, and every possible precaution was taken that the interest of France should be the first consideration in dealing with the most important financial questions in Mexico.

In the secret articles of the convention it was laid down that "*however events in Europe might turn out, the assistance*

⁹¹ The convention is reproduced in Schmit von Tavera, op. cit., I. 235, in full and quite accurately; in Le Fèvre, op. cit., I. 360, in full, sometimes defectively and not word-perfect; in Gaulot, op. cit., I. 288, extracts only.

of France should never fail the new empire," and that the new Emperor should recognize all the acts of the French Commander-in-Chief and the Council of Regency. The French army was to consist of 38,000 men, and was to be withdrawn only gradually; in such a way that 28,000 men should still remain in Mexico in 1865, 25,000 in 1866, and 20,000 in 1867.

Besides this, a commission was created in Paris, composed of Mexicans, Englishmen, and in the main Frenchmen, which was in general to represent the interests of the creditors of the Mexican State in their dealings with it.

Prince Metternich saw⁹² only that the main stipulation had been fulfilled—that the French troops should stay in Mexico for at least three years. He was quite surprised at how much the Archduke had achieved, and said that it was a fresh proof of what he called his pet theory (*Steckenpferd*, hobby-horse): namely, the *enormous, almost all-powerful effect of personal influence upon the Emperor Napoleon*.

The Archduke at first hesitated about negotiating a loan for the Mexican State when he was not yet really the Emperor-elect of Mexico, and could not yet consult his counsellors and the National Assembly of his future country. But the French and English financiers, who were already counting in advance upon devoting a considerable portion of their loan to meeting the demands of their countries for interest on earlier loans, etc., talked him out of his doubts. In addition to this, the Archduke had shortly afterwards to meet very heavy expenses in connexion with the acceptance of the crown, which had also to be met out of the 8,000,000 francs to be paid to him out of the loan. He therefore agreed to the issue of a loan of 201,600,000 francs at six per cent, to be issued at 63.

But there was one demand of Napoleon's which the Archduke refused. The Emperor had had his attention drawn by a certain Senator Gwyn, who had represented California in Congress before the War of Secession, to the fact that there were rich mines of every kind of metal only awaiting exploita-

⁹² Prince Metternich to Count Rechberg, Paris, March 14, 1864; private letter. V. N. A.

tion in the Mexican province of Sonora, situated upon the Gulf of California. Gwyn asked for Napoleon's support for this purpose, submitted a scheme for colonization to him, and dropped open hints to the effect that Napoleon might make the province into a sort of French colony. His idea in this was to lead Napoleon, and consequently France, into such a course of action in Sonora as should be bound to bring them into conflict with the Northern States, which clung jealously to the Monroe Doctrine, and thus to bring the struggling Southern States the desired recognition and armed assistance on the part of France.

Napoleon committed himself very deeply with Gwyn, with the result that the French Minister in Mexico, the Marquis de Montholon, was charged to conclude a convention with the Council of Regency by which, though the province still belonged officially to Mexico, it was placed for fifteen years under the "direct and sovereign protection" of France, and France was granted all rights of prospecting for metals, etc., in return for the payment of a ten per cent royalty to the Mexican State Treasury.

It was true that, looked at from the purely political point of view, this was not a cession of territory, but it gave openings for justifiable suspicion, and Ferdinand Max did not feel inclined to inaugurate his reign by selling a province to a foreign power — not even to France.

He therefore refused to consider himself bound by this act of the Council of Regency, though Napoleon was rather unpleasantly affected by this. But Napoleon's sole desire was to get everything settled as quickly as possible, and he therefore took the Archduke's refusal good-humouredly. For the moment no more was said about this condition, but Napoleon intended to revert to the plan at a favourable opportunity.

On the evening of March 12, the convention was initialled by Napoleon and the Archduke Ferdinand Max, a quarter of an hour before the departure of the Archduke and his wife; it was not to be finally signed till after the acceptance of the crown at Miramar. Metternich reported that the secret article of the convention had been obtained by the Archduke

Ferdinand Max "at the point of the sword," and very cleverly.⁹³ Later on, as Emperor-elect of Mexico, Ferdinand Max entrusted Count Zichy, who was resident in Paris, with the negotiations for the loan of 200 million francs, and empowered him to sign the convention. The loan was effected; the Archduke signed the necessary documents, and had them countersigned by two Mexican exiles whom he had in view as ministers without portfolio.

It was significant that Zichy succeeded in negotiating the loan with a London banking-house, though on highly unfavourable terms. In view of England's political position this appeared odd at first sight, but was explained by the fact that the English at once obtained money from the proceeds of the loan for the temporary satisfaction of Mexico's British creditors. For the time being, nothing was to be expected from Mexico, and the loan furnished a favourable and unexpected opportunity for meeting dubious claims of British subjects on Mexico out of French money, for, thanks to the propaganda of Napoleon and his Government, the unfortunate subscribers to the Mexican loan were almost exclusively French.

The parting between the Archduke and the Emperor and Empress was most cordial; the Empress presented him with a little gold medallion with an image of the Madonna. "It will bring you luck," she said. The Archduke also took leave of Napoleon most warmly. He then continued his journey to England by way of Calais.

Prince Richard Metternich considered that the Archduke and his wife had not only increased the friendship of the Emperor and Empress for them extraordinarily, but also made themselves very popular, both at court and among all classes of the great public. The Parisians had even planned to give the Archduke and Archduchess a great ovation at the Opéra, but this was prevented by mourning for the King of Bavaria,⁹⁴ whose death occurred just at the time of their visit to the Opéra. "Whoever knows the Emperor whom France has

⁹³ Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, March 14, 1864; private letter in V. N. A.

⁹⁴ Maximilian II, King of Bavaria, March 10, 1864.

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given herself," reported Metternich,⁹⁵ "can have no doubt that great events often have their origin in small politenesses and intimacies, and I should not be surprised if the week's visit of the Archduke were to exert a certain effect upon the foreign relations between Austria and France."

But all the Archduke's brilliance and personal success, and all the advantages he had succeeded in gaining, failed to affect the opinion at which the sagacious and cautious Metternich had already arrived upon the Mexican adventure.

"I admit," he wrote privately to Rechberg,⁹⁶ "that the more closely I am enabled to look into the matter, the less confident I feel in holding out favourable prospects for the future. It is beyond doubt that this is a colossal undertaking, whose prospects of success there is as yet no possibility of testing. The nearer we get to the great ordeal, the more rooted become the doubts even of those who are in favour of the 'monarchizing' of Mexico. The destiny held out to the young Prince and the high-spirited Princess appears to be surrounded by so many clouds that even the Empress [Eugénie] is a prey to feverish excitement, which may be attributed to the responsibility which she feels weighing upon her.

"The public has frequently manifested its sentiments of sympathy for the daring displayed by the princely travellers, and on the evening of the departure of Their Imperial Highnesses I myself heard a group of people in the street call out: *"Bonne chance, Madame l'archiduchesse d'Autriche!"*

Metternich likewise considered the prospects of the loan very unfavourable, though the arrangements for it had been greatly facilitated by the personal intervention of the Archduke with the capitalists. "The burdens involved," wrote Metternich, "are enormous, and the finances will have to be very well regulated if the weight of these monstrous demands is not to prove crushing. That is indeed one of the reverse sides of the medal."

After France and England a visit of the Archduke to Spain was also under consideration. But by the advice of the Empress

⁹⁵ Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, March 14, 1864; official dispatch in V. N. A.

⁹⁶ The same to the same, March 14, 1864; private letter in V. N. A.

Eugénie he resolved to omit this visit. She had made confidential inquiries in Madrid as to how the Archduke would be received there, and whether a Spanish frigate would escort him to Mexico. The Spanish Cabinet had answered that, since Spain had followed the same policy as England in 1861, she would await England's decision on this occasion too.

The Empress therefore begged the Archduke not to go to Madrid. "No frigate as escort, no visit," was her opinion.

There even seems to have been an idea that the Archduke might visit Washington. When the representatives of the Union called upon Drouyn de Lhuys during the Archduke's visit, and inquired whether it was true that the Archduke had made it a condition of his departure that the insurgent Southern States should be recognized, Drouyn de Lhuys answered with "discreet indiscretion" that there was not a word of truth in it; if time had not pressed, the Archduke would even have visited Washington.

Since such a visit could not possibly have been considered, the minister's remark can only be described as a polite phrase, which had an ironical ring.⁹⁷

Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, while doing justice to the Archduke's courage and initiative, did not believe he would find it possible to cope with this great and noble task. He feared that the Prince might succumb beneath the ordeal. Palmerston's main argument was that the Mexicans were a degenerate race, rotten to the core, without courage or strength, at once slavish and rebellious, with no stability and no future. "When one raises the pall which weighs upon the breast of this effete people," said the English Prime Minister, "one can have no doubt that it is destined to be devoured by the Anglo-Saxon race, before which it will disappear sooner or later, as the redskins did before the white man."

Meanwhile Ferdinand Max had himself left France for England. From London he wrote Napoleon an extraordinarily cordial letter,⁹⁸ in which he expressed his thanks for all the

⁹⁷ Hidalgo to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 17, 1864. V. N. A.

⁹⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon III, London, March 14, 1864; draft in Baron De Pont's handwriting in V. N. A.

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kindness with which he had met, and assured the Emperor that he would always find in him a true and devoted friend.

This letter crossed one from the Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte,⁹⁹ in which the Empress's good wishes for their enterprise were expressed, together with her conviction that hearts capable of taking such difficulties upon themselves would also be strong enough to surmount them. The Empress next laid stress on the fact that the news from Mexico which had arrived by the last post was all excellent, and that private letters had been shown to her and her husband from which it was clear that "the whole country is waiting impatiently for a better future, and that the expedition into the interior has been one long demonstration in favour of the monarchy." The Empress Eugénie went on to speak about the attitude of Spain, which seemed to be entirely dominated by England, and prepared to follow her in every respect; it was, however, to be hoped that Spain would even now abandon this attitude.

Napoleon answered the Archduke's amiable letter in even more cordial terms.¹⁰⁰

"*I beg,*" he wrote, "*that you will always count upon my friendship, and believe that I esteem at their true worth the noble sentiments which prompt Your Royal [sic] Highness to accept the throne of Mexico. The regeneration of a nation, and the foundation of an empire upon principles approved by reason and morality, are a fine task worthy to arouse a noble ambition.*"

"*You may be sure that my support will not fail you in the fulfilment of the task you are so courageously undertaking.*"

Napoleon was expressing his true feelings. He was filled with the desire that the foundation of the Empire might be achieved; he considered that the danger from the United States had been removed by the War of Secession and the victory of the Southern States, which he still expected. He was still far from realizing fully that which was threatening himself

⁹⁹ The Empress Eugénie to the Archduchess Charlotte, Tuileries, March 16, 1864; original in V. N. A.

¹⁰⁰ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 18, 1864; original in V. N. A.

from Prussia. He therefore thought that he might promise the Archduke his support, the more so since he still had illusions as to the feasibility of the task, owing to the false and lying reports of the Mexican exiles, but also to the glowing reports which were coming in from Bazaine, and above all to the favourable turn taken by the Mexican operations, which had at first been so difficult. He was, it is true, also influenced by the desire to transfer to the Archduke's shoulders the heavy task which France had assumed too hastily and without mature consideration, so as to withdraw from the affair gradually himself. But Napoleon was far too easily convinced of the possibility of an empire in Mexico, and therefore pledged his word as Emperor in this letter, so that Maximilian justly considered that he might count upon it. Later developments will show what reasons ultimately determined Napoleon to break his word, and how far his action must be ascribed to overwhelming compulsion as an extenuating circumstance.

The letter was received by the Archduke while he was still in England, and made him deaf to all the warnings which reached him there. In order to evade them as much as possible, he avoided detailed discussion. But the Archduchess Charlotte's venerable grandmother, the former Queen of the French, Marie Amélie, the wife of Louis Philippe, who was living in exile in England, would not be deterred from speaking the truth to the young people, still intoxicated as they were by the brilliance of the imperial honours paid them in Paris. She deeply regretted the decision, foretold a gloomy destiny for them, and is even alleged to have said prophetically to the Archduke: "They will murder you."¹⁰¹

But the young people cast even this experienced woman's warning to the winds. On March 19 they arrived back in Vienna, firmly resolved to continue without faltering in the path upon which they had entered. But now a great difficulty once again arose, which nearly upset at one blow the edifice which had taken years of care to construct.

In Vienna, too, imperial honours were paid to the Archduke

¹⁰¹ Ollivier, *op. cit.*, VI. 579.

le voyage de Wintellup
l'anglais a été bien court
mais il a suffi pour nous
l'un de vous regrets et
pour nous faire apprécier
le charme et les hautes qualités
de celle qui partage vos
destinées. L'âme pure et
saine reglée et son caractère
je lui conserverai toujours
le plus sincère attachement.
Je renouvelle à Wintellup
avec l'assurance de votre
de sentiments de haute
et de votre

am ~~the~~ avouloz
gms
De Willelme Tugine
de l'empire

Voyez

Pard le 18 Mars 1864.

and Archduchess. All that was most brilliant and distinguished at the Court of Vienna was assembled together at a state dinner, followed by a reception. But on the following day the reverse of the medal appeared; Count Rechberg waited upon the future Emperor of Mexico and requested his signature to a document entitled "Family Pact," in which was contained the complete renunciation on behalf of the Archduke and his heirs of all rights of succession in Austria, so long as any other male representative of the imperial house should be living, however distantly related to it. The renunciation also extended to all other rights arising from their exalted birth, especially those of a financial kind, and, with some small reservations, to their share of the family heritage. Even the rights of guardianship over any imperial prince who might succeed to the throne as a minor had to be renounced.¹⁰²

The Archduke Ferdinand Max was cut to the heart. The necessity for this renunciation first showed him the full import of the step which he was on the point of taking. At first he firmly refused to sign the document at all. The minister thereupon declared, in accordance with his orders, that in that case the Emperor Francis Joseph, as head of the house, would never give the requisite consent to his acceptance of the crown, and reported his brother's refusal to the sovereign. The Emperor saw that they would never make any progress with oral negotiations, and determined to notify his brother of his will in writing. He demanded a copy of the Family Pact from Rechberg, and sent it to his brother with the following letter:¹⁰³

"Sir, my dear brother, Archduke Ferdinand Max! Since, according to the information I have received, you are disposed to accept the throne of Mexico which has been offered to you, and to found an empire there, God helping you, I find myself compelled, as Supreme Head of the House of Austria, and after the most mature and earnest consideration of the duties

¹⁰² See the copy of the Family Pact at Miramar. V. N. A.

¹⁰³ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, March 22, 1864; original in V. N. A.

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

which are incumbent upon me as sovereign, to notify you that I can grant my consent to this grave and momentous act of state only on condition that you previously draw up and solemnly confirm the deed of which I enclose a copy, renouncing your and your heirs' rights of succession and inheritance in Austria. Should you be unable to consent to this, and prefer to refuse the crown of Mexico which is offered you, I would take it upon myself to notify foreign countries of your refusal, and in particular the Imperial Court of France.

“Francis Joseph

“Vienna, March 22, 1864”

The Emperor, who knew how ambitious his younger brother was, was afraid that, in the event of his own death, the question of a regency during the minority of the Crown Prince Rudolph might become a practical one, and lead to grave complications which would be dangerous to the welfare of the Empire, consisting as it did of so many nationalities with disruptive tendencies. In accordance with the advice of his ministers, and the wishes of the other members of the imperial house, besides his own convictions, he was firmly resolved on no account to abandon his demand. The Archduke Ferdinand Max received his brother's letter on the same day, while he was still in Vienna. He answered it immediately. He was indignant, he wrote,¹⁰⁴ at the proposal made to him, and with a bleeding heart he must abide by the statements which he had made at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Archduke complained that not the slightest intimation of this condition had been given him before he received the first deputation; and even before his visit to Paris it had only been alluded to cursorily at the last moment. He had now concluded a convention, granted authority to contract a loan, etc., and if these proceedings were suddenly cancelled, they might give rise to the gravest complications. He concluded bitterly: “On October 3 of last year, on the advice of Your Majesty, I pledged my word of honour, which is respected throughout all Europe,

¹⁰⁴ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, Vienna, March 22, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

to a population of nine million persons which had appealed to me, trusting in a better future and in the hope of seeing an end of the civil war which had been raging for generations past; I did so at a time when I was entirely unaware of any such condition as you have now imposed upon me, and could, indeed, have had no knowledge of it; I was bound to act in good faith, as I really have done, and find myself under the sad necessity of clearly, honourably, and frankly explaining the reason for my withdrawal to the above-mentioned people."

Two days later the Archduke returned with his wife to Miramar. The Archduke's indignant opposition to such a natural claim, which, since the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph was always implied in the very fact of the succession, could not possibly be ascribed to personal motives, but purely to considerations of reasons of state, was noteworthy in more than one respect. He was principally concerned, not with his rights of inheritance, the renunciation of which was naturally unpleasant to him, but with the question of the succession in Austria! But we are forced to ask why, at the very moment when he was on the point of accepting an imperial crown, the Archduke could attribute such importance to the question of renunciation. It was an obvious sign that Mexico represented to him only a *faute de mieux*, that his confidence in the success of the enterprise was not so unbounded as his previous demeanour might have led one to suppose, and that he was going to Mexico half-heartedly, with the mental reservation that, if fate should grant him the opportunity, he would leave Mexico and hasten home to place upon his head the venerable crown of the Habsburgs.

Since the Archduke had returned to Miramar without clearing up the question of the Family Pact, Francis Joseph sent his cousin, the Archduke Leopold, to Trieste to inform Ferdinand Max that the Emperor absolutely insisted upon the signing of the document.¹⁰⁵

The Archduke Ferdinand Max thereupon sent a written

¹⁰⁵ The Archduke Leopold, son of the old Archduke Rainer, born in 1783, to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 26, 1864. V. N. A.

reply¹⁰⁶ to the Archduke Leopold. "Since," it ran, "I am resolved for my part on no account to renounce my birthright so far as I myself am concerned, I must put this question to you, dear cousin: do you regard the question as so far settled that I am bound to announce to the Mexican deputation my refusal of the crown, adducing this as my sole reason, and also to inform the commandant of the frigate *Themis*, which has been placed at my disposal by the French Government, that I am not disposed to avail myself of it? In this case I must of course refuse all responsibility for the consequences that may arise. I await most anxiously the favour of your reply, for I have no right to keep the Mexicans in uncertainty any longer."

The Archduke Leopold at once telegraphed to Vienna asking for the Emperor's orders, and, on receiving the answer, informed the Archduke Ferdinand Max that he must answer his question in the affirmative. He therefore regarded his mission at an end, and would take leave of him in person that evening before his departure for Vienna.¹⁰⁷

Beside himself with emotion and indignation, the Archduke composed a letter to his brother¹⁰⁸ in which he informed him that he had communicated his refusal to the two quarters concerned, giving as his motive the substance of his letter to the Emperor of March 22. He would next avail himself of the leave granted him for an indefinite period from January 22, to leave with his wife on March 28 by a private boat for Civit  Vecchia and Rome, by way of Lacroma, for he was anxious to explain the matter to the Holy Father in person.

Meanwhile the Emperor Francis Joseph, who as yet knew nothing of these latest events, was seized with apprehension lest the Archduke might say things to the Mexican deputation that were not in accord with the Emperor's views. He therefore hastily wrote an autograph letter to the Archduke Leo-

¹⁰⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max in a letter from Miramar, March 26, 1864, to the Archduke Leopold; draft in V. N. A.

¹⁰⁷ The Archduke Leopold to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 27, 1864. V. N. A.

¹⁰⁸ Draft letter of the Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, undated, but written on March 27, 1863, and obviously not sent. V. N. A.

pold,¹⁰⁹ as follows: "The address to the deputation concerns not only my brother's acts, but mine as well. I can therefore not permit any address to be made that has not been agreed upon with you. I cannot expose myself to the necessity of being forced from my point of view to correct public utterances of my brother's. The reception of the deputation must therefore be postponed until you have come to an agreement about the terms in which the address is to be drawn up." The Archduke Leopold at once wrote a very cold letter to Ferdinand Max, saying that he hoped the draft of the address would be given such a form as — to use his words — "may make it appear to be in keeping with the honour of our house, which we all have equally at heart, with the wishes of His Imperial Majesty, and your own position and dignity."

When it became clear that the Archduke would take up an entirely negative attitude to the question of the succession, the Emperor Francis Joseph sent a request through the French Ambassador, the Duc de Grammont,¹¹⁰ that Napoleon would intercede with the Archduke; he would render him a great service by so doing. On March 27 the Ambassador telegraphed his sovereign to this effect. On the same day that this telegram reached Vienna, Napoleon received a telegram from Hidalgo, who was staying at Trieste with the Mexican deputation, to the effect that the Archduke had authorized him to announce his final acceptance to the Emperor Napoleon. Upon this the Emperor of the French told Metternich that he had no idea what was going on.¹¹¹ It was simply impossible for the Archduke to refuse the throne; he, Napoleon, would be in the most terrible embarrassment with regard to France, especially now, when the arrangements for the loan were complete. The question of the succession ought to have been settled three years before; he could not understand how such a difficulty

¹⁰⁹ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Leopold, Vienna, March 28, 1864. V. N. A.

¹¹⁰ I follow here, *passim*, Ollivier, op. cit., VI. 581-4, who had access to General Frossard's dispatches with regard to his mission.

¹¹¹ The account follows Richard Metternich's dispatches to Rechberg of March 27 and 28, 1864. V. N. A.

could still exist. It would be too horribly embarrassing for him to have to announce to France that she would be left to bear the burden of the whole Mexican expedition. If they had had any idea of these obstacles, they would never have made such sacrifices in men or money. The Emperor also declared excitedly to Metternich that now, when a convention had been signed, and, thanks to his own moral intervention, a loan had been negotiated, he felt himself to a certain extent responsible to the English and French bankers; and it seemed hard to him that the Austrian imperial family should not feel this question to be a delicate point for them. Moreover, he had just stated to the Finance Minister at the Council of State that the Budget Commission could count upon the impending payment of fifty-four million francs ¹¹² as the first instalment of the indemnity for the Mexican war, which was so unpopular in France. "Public opinion," said Napoleon to the Austrian Ambassador, "would see in this nothing but an obstacle placed in our way by Vienna, and I fear I must admit that hostile demonstrations will consequently take place, which might lead to a regrettable tension between the two countries."

If the Emperor was already uneasy, the Empress, in view of her great responsibility in the Mexican affair, was even more excited, and tearfully besought Metternich to do all he could to surmount the difficulty.

At two o'clock in the morning ¹¹³ Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to wake Metternich and take him the following letter from the Empress Eugénie:

"March 27, evening

"My dear Prince, I have just received Hidalgo's answer. The Archduke has decided to decline with thanks the offer of the Mexican deputation on Tuesday, and immediately afterwards to set out for Rome, and leave Austria, abandoning his dreams. I say nothing of the appalling scandal which this will cause to the House of Austria, but, as regards ourselves, you must admit that there can be no excuse, whatever may be the

¹¹² Out of the proceeds of the Mexican loan just negotiated.

¹¹³ During the night of March 27-8, 1864.

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obstacles which have arisen in various quarters. The fact remains that you had time to consider everything and weigh it well, and you cannot, at the very moment when the arrangements for the loan have been concluded, and the conventions signed, put forward a family matter of no importance compared with the confusion into which you throw the whole world. Let us know your last word; it is a most grave business. Will you notify your Government this very evening? Believe me, yours, in a most justifiable ill temper,

“Eugénie”

The Emperor's communication was in much the same terms: they had got to find a way out.

On the following day, March 28, Metternich hurried to the Tuileries as early as possible. He hastened to give assurances that his Government desired nothing better than a solution, that it bore them no sort of ill will, and so on. The family laws forbade the acceptance of a foreign throne without a previous renunciation of the rights of succession.

“But the Archduke must have known that beforehand,” interrupted Napoleon, “I must really say that I have no luck with Austria; it looks as though I were being purposely left in the lurch at the last moment.”

The Empress expressed herself in similar terms, full of bitter irony; but at heart neither she nor her husband really believed in a final rupture. Metternich himself was seriously worried. “For my own part,” he wrote to Rechberg, “I feel bound to affirm, upon my own responsibility, that it is most important in the interest of our own peace that the matter should be settled. Really, the scandal of his leaving the country and the ‘*brouille mortelle*’ between the two brothers would be too great. I am already ashamed enough at being dragged into a controversy before a tribunal so ill suited to give a judgment on matters of right or wrong. The affair seems to me so undignified that it makes me groan.”

On the morning of March 28 Napoleon also telegraphed to the Archduke at Miramar: “I am in consternation at the news which has reached us. Your Imperial Highness is

bound in honour to me, to Mexico, and to the subscribers to the loan. Family quarrels cannot prevent Your Imperial Highness from fulfilling more exalted tasks elsewhere. Only think of your own reputation. A refusal now seems to me impossible. Napoleon.”¹¹⁴

At the same time the Emperor sent General Charles Auguste de Frossard, his aide-de-camp and inspector-general of artillery, to Vienna and Miramar, to ask for an interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph and convey an autograph letter to the Archduke. Furthermore, he telegraphed to the Archduke imploring him to come to no decision contrary to the conventions until he had received his letter.¹¹⁵

This letter¹¹⁶ expressed the great agitation which Napoleon felt at the surprising turn taken by affairs. The Emperor saw himself suddenly left alone to face all the difficulties in Mexico, and, what is more, blamed before the whole world.

“I am writing to Your Imperial Highness under the impression of the profound agitation which the news received yesterday evening from Vienna and Trieste has excited in me.

“It is not my business to enter into the family questions which may have been under discussion between you and your august Brother, but I must draw your attention to the fact of how serious the future situation appears for you, as well as for me.

“By the convention which we have concluded, and which is mutually binding upon us, by the assurances given to Mexico, and the agreement arrived at with the subscribers to the loan, Your Imperial Highness has entered into engagements which you are no longer free to break. *What would you really think of me, if, when Your Imperial Highness had already reached Mexico, I were suddenly to say that I can no longer fulfil the conditions to which I have set my signature!*

¹¹⁴ Telegram from the Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, March 28, 1864. V. N. A. A similar version was printed by Ollivier, op. cit., VI. 581.

¹¹⁵ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, undated telegram, obviously also of March 28, 1864. V. N. A.

¹¹⁶ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Paris, March 28, 1864; original in V. N. A.

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"No, it is impossible for you to give up going to Mexico, and admit before the whole world that family interests compel you to disappoint all the hopes that France and Mexico have reposed in you. In your own interests and those of your family the matter must be settled, for the honour of the house of Habsburg is in question.

"I beg your pardon for these somewhat strong words, but the circumstances are so grave that I am bound to speak the whole truth."

This was acute of Napoleon. He knew that there was nothing upon which the Archduke Ferdinand Max was so sensitive as upon the point of honour. Strictly speaking, he was not entirely in the right; the conventions had indeed been initialled in Paris, but the final signing was not to take place till after the acceptance of the crown at Miramar. Things had indeed gone further as regards the loan, for binding pledges and signatures had been given in connexion with it, but in any case it went without saying that they were contingent upon acceptance of the crown. All the same it would have given rise to great difficulties if it had had to be cancelled.

The Emperor Napoleon little thought how one passage in his letter might one day be turned against himself. He further impressed upon General Frossard that he was to press the Archduke on the point of honour, and induce him to carry out his promises without fail.

At the last moment Napoleon also gave Frossard another letter dealing with the loan, for, though they imagined everything had been satisfactorily settled, difficulties had arisen on the part of the English financiers. The Finance Minister therefore considered it of the utmost importance that Mr. Gwyn's proposals respecting the province of Sonora and the mining concessions should be given a hearing. Thus the opposition displayed by the Archduke in the interests of the independence of all the provinces of Mexico with regard to such conventions, which could so easily be misunderstood, was also to be broken down by Frossard if possible.

This again, however, presupposed the acceptance of the crown, which was precisely what was threatened; and, in order

to lose no time, Napoleon likewise telegraphed to the King of the Belgians, requesting him to use his influence with his son-in-law to the same effect.

On the evening of the 27th and on the morning of the 28th of March 1864, the Archduke was assailed by the Mexicans, who now saw all their soaring plans collapsing at the last moment, with the request to yield even now, and not to risk everything by his opposition to a demand which was in any case fruitless, in view of his position in Mexico.

Charlotte, too, had composed a sorrowful letter of refusal to the Empress,¹¹⁷ but now arrived the Emperor Napoleon's telegram, which touched the Archduke on his most sensitive spot, his honour. Filled with the dignity of his house, himself exceptionally honourable and saturated with the best Habsburg traditions, the Archduke could not bear that anyone on earth should doubt his honour, or find the least stain upon his spotless escutcheon.

The decision had been very hard for him. He at once telegraphed to Napoleon in the following terms:¹¹⁸ "The reception of the deputation is postponed, negotiations are proceeding; out of sincere loyalty to Your Majesty I shall go to the extreme limit of what my personal honour will allow. On the evening before my departure for Miramar, a document was presented to me for signature which I was unable to accept, and which had never been shown to me before. I have all the proofs in my hands to establish my good faith."

He now yielded in part, though unwillingly, and sent Count Zichy to the Archduke Leopold, who had stayed on in Trieste in the hope that Ferdinand Max would yield at the last moment. Count Zichy was charged to tell the Archduke Leopold¹¹⁹ that Ferdinand Max was prepared to renounce the succession in Austria in favour of the male line of the remaining branches, but requested that the apanage should still be his, and that the

¹¹⁷ Letter of March 28, 1864, from the Archduchess Charlotte to the Empress Eugénie; original, which was never sent, in V. N. A.

¹¹⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to Napoleon, undated telegram. V. N. A.

¹¹⁹ This can be seen from the answer of the Archduke Leopold to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Trieste, March 29, 1864. V. N. A.

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assurances given him with regard to the recruiting of volunteers would be carried out. At the same time Ferdinand Max appealed direct to the Emperor ¹²⁰ with the same proposals, adding a further request for an "entirely secret additional article, to be kept most strictly secret, especially from the Mexicans," in which alone he could "find a secure protection against possible future contingencies." This additional article was to run as follows:

"Very secret additional article: His Majesty the Emperor in his brotherly love promises, in the event of the Archduke Ferdinand Max's either voluntarily renouncing the throne of Mexico or being deprived of it, that, upon his request, he will allow the agreement signed today to lapse, and reinstate the Archduke in his former rights. His Majesty likewise promises the Archduke's widow and children, in case they have to give up their position in Mexico, that they shall be reinstated in all the rights appertaining to the Austrian archdukes."

The Archduke also sent the Emperor a telegram in cipher in which he complained that Baron Meysenbug, who had been attached to the Archduke Leopold on his mission by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was intriguing against him, and added the request that he might draw up the answer to the deputation without assistance. The Emperor Francis Joseph telegraphed back by return: ¹²¹

"I cannot believe that Meysenbug is making mischief. I must most peremptorily desire you to prepare your answer to the deputation in concert with the Archduke Leopold, for otherwise the consequences might be most dangerous for us both, and lead to the most serious misunderstandings. I implore you, do not be too hasty."

Such was the state of affairs when, early on the 30th, General Frossard arrived in Vienna. He at once called upon Rechberg, who had previously, on March 28, informed Metternich in Paris why they were bound to insist upon an unconditional

¹²⁰ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, March 29, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

¹²¹ Telegram from the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 28, 1864. V. N. A.

renunciation.¹²² Rechberg feared that, if the renunciation did not take place, the Austrian Reichsrat would get hold of the matter, and, if it were to decide against the Archduke, the Hungarian Diet might also demand the right to give its opinion, which would undoubtedly be contrary to that of the Austrian Reichsrat. They were thus faced with a fresh apple of discord between the various parts of the Empire. Rechberg naturally did not mention such delicate points of Austrian politics to the French general. He told him it was not admissible that, in the event of the Archduke's leaving heirs in Mexico, they should one day come to Europe to dispute the crown with their cousins who had remained in Austria. Nor would he hear of a conditional renunciation. "Do you think," he asked Frossard, "that Austria would consent to being ruled by a prince who had just been driven from a foreign throne?"

Frossard at once waited upon the Emperor Francis Joseph, who appeared greatly upset by what had happened, and expressed the opinion that it was to some extent his own fault; he ought to have insisted upon the Archduke's renunciation before his visit to Paris; but he hoped that they would be able to settle the whole matter now. When Frossard hinted that it was a question concerning the Archduke's honour, the Emperor answered:

"Yes, a question of honour for us all; it must be satisfied; I am making every effort; my brother must submit to the consequences of this new situation, in so far as they concern his own native land."¹²³

Frossard touched on the point that a proof of brotherly love, and a kindly promise in case of "certain eventualities" — by which he doubtless meant the miscarriage of the whole adventure in Mexico — would relieve the whole situation. The Emperor gave the general no definite promises, but shortly after Frossard's audience he made up his mind to respond to his suggestions.

¹²² Count Rechberg to Metternich, March 28, 1864. V. N. A.

¹²³ General de Frossard to Napoeon III, Trieste, April 1 and 5, 1864; Ollivier, op. cit., VI. 583.

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He accordingly wrote his brother three autograph notes.¹²⁴ The first of them stated that, in order to give a fresh proof of his brotherly affection, and to render the Archduke's resolve to found an empire in Mexico as feasible as possible, the Emperor was prepared to secure to his brother the continued enjoyment of his apanage of 150,000 gulden a year, in the following manner: that 100,000 gulden should be paid down annually in Vienna, while 50,000 gulden should be devoted to meeting the debt which he had incurred to the family fund for the building of Miramar and his expenditure upon the Mexican affair. When these had been paid in full, further payment of these 50,000 gulden should cease.

In the second letter the Emperor Francis Joseph informed him that he had issued instructions to the Ministry for War to set on foot recruiting for a volunteer corps of about 6,000 men and 300 sailors.

Lastly, the third and most important note ran as follows: ¹²⁵

"Sir, my dear brother, Archduke Ferdinand Max! In the event—which God forbid—either of your voluntarily renouncing the throne of Mexico, or of circumstances arising which should decide you to leave that land again, I now feel impelled by my brotherly love to give you the assurance that, in such an unexpected event, it shall remain my care to take all such measures to safe-guard your position in my Empire as I shall find compatible with its interests; I shall likewise not fail, in such a case, to extend this my brotherly care to your wife, the Archduchess Charlotte, and your heirs also.

Vienna, March 31, 1864

Francis Joseph "

Thus the Emperor continued to insist upon renunciation, and merely promised the Archduke and his wife that in the event of their return he would create a suitable position for them in the State.

¹²⁴ The first is dated March 31, 1864; the second April 1, 1864; autograph letters of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Max; originals in V. N. A.

¹²⁵ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, March 31, 1864; original in V. N. A.

Meanwhile General Frossard had arrived at Miramar, and on April 1 handed over Napoleon's momentous letter to the Archduke. In the conversation which followed, Ferdinand Max allowed General Frossard to read the Family Pact, and protested that his honour as an Archduke and as a husband would not have permitted him to act otherwise. In accordance with his orders, Frossard pointed out that, besides his private honour, the Archduke had also his political honour, which was engaged towards the Emperor Napoleon, France, and the whole world. The Archduke replied that he was bound to be anxious about the fate of his wife and the children whom he hoped to have in the future, and that this was the key to all his actions. In reply to the letter from the Emperor of the French which Frossard had handed him, he telegraphed to the Emperor that he would go as far as his dignity would allow him.

In reply to Frossard's urgent and emphatic representations that the honour of the Archduke, which he had pledged to France, took precedence of personal dignity, the Archduchess Charlotte, recalling the observations so frequently made by her father, joined in the conversation and exclaimed: "We know perfectly well, General, that we are doing the Emperor Napoleon a service in going to Mexico!" Whereupon Frossard, laying aside all deference, retorted that the service was at all events mutual.¹²⁶

On April 2 the Emperor Francis Joseph's three autograph letters arrived. The Archduke and his wife read them carefully, but did not consider them satisfactory, for the main point remained unchanged. With regard to the third letter in particular, Ferdinand Max wanted to stipulate for a few more alterations in the text. He informed Count Zichy of this, who at once appealed to Rechberg by telegram. The minister was thoroughly annoyed. The Archduke had refused to listen to him before, when he had seriously pointed out to him the dangers of his enterprise, and he was now acting in the same way when a question of such importance to the internal peace and prosperity of Austria was under consideration. He reluctantly

¹²⁶ Ollivier, *op. cit.*, VI. 585.

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wrote to Count Zichy:¹²⁷ "The three autograph letters were the outcome of His Majesty's graciousness and brotherly feeling. Now that the Emperor has spoken, there can be no question of haggling or bargaining. I can therefore only regret the loss of time involved in further correspondence. . . . I can only advise that the patience of His Imperial Majesty, who has gone to the utmost limits of concession, should not be too much abused or put to the test by fresh difficulties."

Meanwhile the Archduke Ferdinand Max had again determined to write straight to his brother.¹²⁸ He first thanked him for all his concessions and proofs of brotherly affection, and asked that the Emperor would grant him an assurance, in some form or other, that, in case the monarchy in Mexico did not prove of long duration, he should be reinstated in his rights. If the form of a secret additional article were not suitable, he would be satisfied if this were included in any form whatsoever in the third autograph letter which he had already received from the Emperor. If the Emperor knew of any other issue from the labyrinth into which an unhappy misunderstanding had led the brothers, the Archduke would accept it with joy, in so far as it was compatible with his personal honour, in order to obviate those consequences which, in view of the Emperor Napoleon's state of mind, might involve a disturbance in Austria's foreign relations.

At the same time the Archduchess Charlotte, who had followed all the negotiations with feverish anxiety, had started for Vienna, in order to lend the necessary weight to her husband's requests by her urgent personal intervention. While she was using her best endeavours in Vienna to arrive at some result with her brother-in-law, Ferdinand Max was left alone with his cares and uneasiness. Deprived of his wife, who was infatuated with the Mexican project, and had gradually become his indispensable support, the Archduke had a glimpse of that world-weariness and disgust characteristic of many rather gentle natures when faced with a great decision,

¹²⁷ Count Rechberg to Count Zichy, April 2, 1864. V. N. A.

¹²⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Francis Joseph, April 2, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

especially when impediments have arisen. There were moments in which he would gladly have heard no more about it, but retired to the blooming solitudes of Lacroma, and there lived for Nature and her beauties.

But he was no longer sole master of himself. Napoleon would on no account let his prey give him the slip again. The negotiations in Vienna and at Miramar had already lasted too long for the growing uneasiness and nervousness of himself and Eugénie.

"A decision is indispensably necessary," Napoleon telegraphed to Frossard;¹²⁹ "the news of this indecision will lead to complications in Mexico. The English Stock Exchange is already raising difficulties about the new loan. All these family questions ought to have been settled before. A great nation cannot be kept in suspense with impunity, nor can we be left to face the great difficulties involved in leaving the escort waiting in the tropics, exposed to the danger of yellow fever."

In spite of her great efforts, the Archduchess Charlotte had obtained no material results from the Emperor Francis Joseph. In order to meet the Archduchess half-way, he did indeed concede the point that, if the Archduke returned from Mexico, the full apanage of 150,000 gulden should again be paid, and gave assurances for this in an autograph document;¹³⁰ but in the main he maintained his demands. Charlotte had harassed her brother-in-law for three whole hours, and, in her own opinion,¹³¹ "forced him to abandon all his arguments." She found him frank and honourable, but "he grasps things with difficulty," and had therefore failed to yield so far. While in Vienna, the Archduchess received a letter from her father, who did not wish his son-in-law on any account to be deprived of the prerogatives appertaining to his position and birth. His letter was also to this effect:¹³²

¹²⁹ Napoleon to General de Frossard, Paris, 7 p. m., April 5, 1864; telegram in V. N. A., already printed by Ollivier, *op. cit.*, VI. 585.

¹³⁰ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, April 7, 1864. V. N. A.

¹³¹ Telegram of the Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, April 4, 1864. V. N. A.

¹³² King Leopold to the Archduchess Charlotte, Windsor Castle, March 31, 1864; original in V. N. A.

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"My beloved child, I am sending a messenger to Miramar to hear all that has happened and is going to happen. From a distance it does not make a good impression that such important matters, which there has been so much time to discuss, should not be touched upon till the last minute. I hope that this will be realized in an exalted quarter, and that matters will be arranged in a seemly way. I naturally know no details, but, as you will remember, I have *never varied* on the point that *nothing ought to be given up* of the position which is his birthright, and I still remain unchanged in my opinion. Philip V renounced his, but it was to a certain extent the case that his new crown had been won for him by France, and so they aimed at making it impossible to unite the two crowns. Austrian princes have possessed States at a distance from Austria without renouncing their rights. The Emperor Leopold, my godfather, was for some time sovereign of a State completely separated from Austria, and went back home from there. My refrain is *to give up nothing*, no consent on your own part to *anything of the kind*. Confiscation need not be feared, for it is not in keeping with the spirit of the age, it is only *one's own careless consent* which may rob one of everything. I have had ample experience of that myself.

"In the next place, the undertaking is in the nature of things a risky one, which may miscarry, in spite of the greatest courage and talent, because it is impossible. In such a situation, which one was in no way bound to accept, it would be the greatest blindness and imprudence not to keep whatever means belong to one. It is no longer possible to withdraw, for matters have gone too far, and it would lead to boundless confusion."

King Leopold further requested that he should be kept informed of all steps that were taken, and apologized for his failure to obtain the offer of a British frigate as escort. He had indeed discussed the subject with the Duke of Somerset, who had said he could see no difficulty about it, and Arrangoiz had also negotiated with Lord Palmerston, who had, however, flatly refused to place one at their disposal. They were always "extremely stubborn" upon all such points in England, though in no wise "hostile." "This letter," concluded the King, "is for you and Max, and can be summed up as follows: *give up*

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nothing, no promises in this sense. *Do not give up the Mexican business, however*, since it will lead to endless confusion."

Immediately upon receiving this communication, Charlotte telegraphed the essential points of its contents to her husband at Miramar, and on April 5 resumed her efforts, to such effect that, by midday, she expressed the hope that she might dissuade the Emperor Francis Joseph, who, as she said, had "a strong sense of justice," from demanding the renunciation. "He is, moreover, very anxious," she telegraphed to her husband, "for you to go to Mexico."¹³³ On the evening of the same day, however, "in spite of the apparent goodwill of the Emperor," she met with insuperable opposition.¹³⁴ She wanted to leave Vienna on April 6, but received a telegram from her father,¹³⁵ which he had sent at the request of Napoleon.

"It is now almost impossible," it ran, "to break with the Mexicans, and would cause appalling confusion. We must attempt to find a middle way."

So Charlotte stayed on in Vienna, and attempted to induce her mother-in-law, the Archduchess Sophie, to use her influence on her side; but even she could do nothing with the Emperor, all the more so since she herself was not entirely convinced that Mexico would bring good fortune to her son. Charlotte reported this to her husband,¹³⁶ adding that the Emperor had made his conscientious scruples a pretext, though indeed showing no ill will. Moreover, Francis Joseph himself explained this to his brother in a letter.¹³⁷ In answer to his letter of April 2 the Emperor explained that his duty towards his house and people would not allow him to yield to the Archduke's demands, since to admit them would be incompatible with the well-being of the monarchy entrusted to his care. The

¹³³ Telegram from the Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, April 5, 1864, 12.05 p. m. V. N. A.

¹³⁴ Telegram from the Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, April 5, 1864, 10.30 p. m. V. N. A.

¹³⁵ Leopold, King of the Belgians, to the Archduchess Charlotte, telegram, April 6, 1864. V. N. A.

¹³⁶ The Archduchess Charlotte to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, telegram, Vienna, April 7, 1864. V. N. A.

¹³⁷ The Emperor Francis Joseph to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, Vienna, April 6, 1864. V. N. A.



A CORNER OF THE PARK, MIRAMAR

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matter called for a prompt solution; the Archduke was bound to decide quickly, for reasons of external policy, as well as of his peculiar position with regard to the Emperor of the French. The Emperor informed the Archduchess Charlotte that he intended to come to Miramar himself, and try to induce his brother to accept the demands submitted to him.

The Archduchess could but yield. She returned to Miramar in a resigned frame of mind. She at once gave her husband an account of her painful experiences, and made it plain to him that there was nothing more to be hoped for in that quarter: the deed of renunciation must be signed; otherwise the whole of their proud plans for the regeneration of Mexico would come to nothing. She dispelled the weakness which had come over the Archduke's spirit in her absence, and at last, on the evening of April 18, he made up his mind to the renunciation. In an extremely cordial letter of this date ¹³⁸ he announced his momentous decision to the Emperor Napoleon. He thanked the Emperor most sincerely for his last kind communication, and also for sending General Frossard, who, with the French civil commissary, d'Herbet, would shortly convince the Emperor that the Archduke had kept his plighted word and, out of personal loyalty to the Emperor, would make every sacrifice compatible with his honour. On his impending arrival in Mexico he would have opportunity enough to prove his gratitude to Napoleon for the kindness which the Emperor had never ceased to heap upon him.

This letter not only announced that he was at last about to yield, but it was also a startling proof that the Archduke was utterly unconscious of the part for which he was destined by Paris in the Mexican affair, and continued to believe that Napoleon had acted towards him with nothing but nobility and goodness; though King Leopold had already drawn his attention repeatedly to the fact that it was he, on the contrary, who was extricating the Emperor Napoleon from an embarrassment. The extreme anxiety and uneasiness which had seized the Emperor of the French when threatened with the

¹³⁸ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, Miramar, April 8, 1864; draft in V. N. A.

Archduke's refusal owing to the question of renunciation ought to have made it clear to him that even if, as Frossard had said, services had been mutually rendered, they were by no means of equal value. The service rendered by the Archduke and Archduchess, who were giving up a fine and enviable position in Austria and risking their health and lives in a strange land, far outweighed the services of Napoleon.

But as a member of an old imperial race, he was irresistibly attracted by the splendour of a crown, the desire for power, and the craving for domination which he had sucked in with his mother's milk. The same sentiments were potent with the Archduchess Charlotte, the docile daughter of the ambitious King of the Belgians, who from being a modest member of a petty German princely house had succeeded in rising to a commanding position in Europe.

On April 9, at eight o'clock in the morning, the Emperor Francis Joseph arrived at Miramar, where his brother was waiting for him at the private station used by the palace. No sooner had he arrived than the two brothers shut themselves up in the great library to mature their plans. Their explanation, which lasted for hours, was vehement and agitated, and both the princes showed traces of deep emotion and tears when at last they entered the great saloon where their two brothers, the Archdukes Karl Ludwig and Ludwig Viktor, with several other members of the imperial house,¹³⁹ the ministers Schmerling, Eszterházy, and Rechberg, the three chancellors of Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania, Field-marshal Benedek, and other high dignitaries of the Empire were assembled.

The die was cast, and the way to acceptance of the crown lay open.

The Emperor Francis Joseph left Miramar directly afterwards. As he was on the point of entering the imperial train, a presentiment seemed to come over him; with tears in his eyes he suddenly turned and walked quickly towards the Archduke. "Max," he exclaimed, and stretched out his arms to his brother. They kissed each other with tears. This was the last time that they were to see each other.

¹³⁹ The Archdukes Karl Salvator, Wilhelm, Joseph, Leopold, and Rainer.

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On the following day, April 10, 1864, the members of the Mexican deputation, and after them the other Mexicans who happened to be present in Trieste, were driven to Miramar in the archducal state carriages, headed by Gutierrez and Hidalgo, who now saw themselves at their goal.

The Archduke and Archduchess, surrounded by a large and brilliant suite, were awaiting them in the state reception room of the palace. Ferdinand Max, wearing the full-dress uniform of an admiral, which lent still greater majesty to his tall, slender form, was standing, pale and with restless eyes, before a table, upon which lay the acts of adhesion sent from Mexico, intended to prove that what was now to take place was the will of that country.

Gutierrez de Estrada, to whose zealous and seductive arts the fact that this moment had arrived was chiefly due, but who had no idea of standing at the Prince's side to help him with the delicate task into which he had urged him, once more, in the safe position of president of the deputation, indulged in those rhetorical phrases with which he managed to produce the illusion that it was the whole Mexican nation that was offering the Archduke the imperial crown.

Never had any man so little justification for speaking at such a momentous time in the name of a country and a nation as this Mexican, who had been away from his native land for nearly a quarter of a century, and now took it upon himself to promise in the name of the Mexican people "unending love and unshakable fidelity" to the Archduke, who was deceived as to the true state of affairs. Gutierrez harped upon the Catholic and monarchical tendencies which he attributed to Mexico, alluded to the duties arising out of them, and went so far as to say that the finger of God was visible in the work which was there being accomplished. In countless passages of his speech he alluded to the renown which the enterprise was to bring to the young Prince. This undoubtedly clever flattery was calculated to send the blood to the head of a listener even less feverishly interested in the subject.¹⁴⁰ In a voice trembling with emotion the Archduke read out in Spanish his answer to

¹⁴⁰ The speech is printed word for word in Schmit von Tavera, *op. cit.*, I. 227.

Gutierrez's address, which had been in French.¹⁴¹ Thanks to the pronouncement of the notables in Mexico, he said, he might justly regard himself as the elect of the Mexican people. The first condition was thus fulfilled. Thanks to the magnanimity of the Emperor of the French, the guarantees which he had mentioned at the time of the deputation's first visit had now been provided. He was, therefore, now able to accept the crown, and would endeavour, once it was his, to work indefatigably for the freedom, order, greatness, and independence of Mexico. Once more the prospect was held out of basing the monarchy upon constitutional laws.

It was now apparent why, in opposition to the wish of his brother and Rechberg, the Archduke had touched only briefly upon the question of guarantees, without naming England and Spain. He would not now have been able to say so lightly that they had been fulfilled; for both States were standing aside as disinterested observers.

When Ferdinand Max had finished, the breathlessly attentive gathering was seized with the greatest enthusiasm. The solemn setting and great significance of the occasion had not failed to produce their effect upon this audience, few of whom were acquainted with the inner details of the affair. Enthusiastic and heart-felt cries at once went up of "Long live the Emperor Maximilian! Long live the Empress Charlotte!"

The Mexican imperial standard was simultaneously hoisted on top of the flagstaff of the palace, and saluted by the thunder of artillery from the war-ships lying in the harbour. Nor was the celebration at an end; for a telegram arrived with Napoleon's congratulations, in which the Emperor of the French assured Maximilian I, as the new Emperor was henceforward called, that he could count upon his friendship and support.¹⁴²

Immediately after taking the oath, and after the *Te Deum*, Maximilian signed the military convention which he had initialised in Paris, together with its secret articles, then the con-

¹⁴¹ Since 1863 the Archduke and his wife had devoted themselves to the study of Spanish, and had mastered, among other things, the Spanish literature dealing with Mexico.

¹⁴² The Emperor Napoleon to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, April 10, 1864; telegram in V. N. A.

tract for the issue of a loan of two hundred million francs, the decrees concerning the raising of the Austrian and Belgian volunteer corps, the act entrusting Velazquez de León with the formation of the ministry, and lastly that appointing Almonte as the Emperor's deputy till his arrival in Mexico. The new Emperor also nominated the diplomatic representatives of Mexico in Europe. Maximilian had originally chosen Gutierrez de Estrada as his representative in Vienna, for he knew that the prudent Mexican wanted to stay in Europe even after the establishment of the Empire for which he had worked so zealously. The Emperor Francis Joseph had already given his consent, but Gutierrez had declined with thanks.¹⁴³ He wrote that he wished "to retire," and was content with the duty of praising God that he had been the first to lay the foundation stone of the throne on Mexican soil, the first to point out to his country a prince who was so worthy of it. He was also proud to have been the first to be received at Miramar and to have requested the Archduke to accept the crown, and, finally, the first to catch the encouraging words that had fallen from the Archduke's lips! — Besides, he possessed great wealth and a glorious palace in Rome, which he would have been sorry to exchange for the Legation in Vienna, from which he might at any moment have been recalled — to Mexico. So Don Thomas Murphy was appointed as minister, and Herzfeld, a trusty comrade of Maximilian's from the time when they had been at sea together on the frigate *Novara*, as consul-general in Vienna, the former with instructions to seek his sphere of action exclusively among the "conservative" circles in society, while the equally important sphere of public life was left to the latter. Both of them were to protect Mexico's interests in the first place, and those of France in the second, and in particular to watch over Maximilian's personal and dynastic interests as jealously and tenaciously as possible.¹⁴⁴

Hidalgo, who likewise showed but little desire to exchange his comfortable position at the Court of Paris for the climate

¹⁴³ Gutierrez to the Archduke Ferdinand Max, February 16, 1864. V. N. A.

¹⁴⁴ Instructions of the Emperor Maximilian to Don Thomas Murphy and Herzfeld, Vienna, April 10, 1864. V. N. A.

of Mexico, which might be too hot for him, was somewhat less prudent, and accepted the post of Mexican minister in Paris, which was offered him with the approval of Napoleon III. The independence and honour of Mexico — ran his instructions — should be the only thing which was not to be subordinated to gratitude towards Napoleon. His relations with the representative of the United States were to be purely official, those with the representatives of the Confederate States markedly unofficial and reserved, but at the same time very friendly. On the very day he was appointed, April 10, 1864, Hidalgo wrote to Baron De Pont that he ought to be paid a salary of ninety thousand francs instead of the sixty thousand promised him. His duty of entertaining and the dignity of the Empire demanded it, and besides, everything was so dear! Here was a man who knew how to strike when the iron was hot. This letter gives a deep insight into his true character.

As minister in Brussels Francisco Arrangoiz was to win King Leopold's confidence, and so long as there was no minister in England, he was to endeavour, through the King's agency, to influence the leading English statesmen in the direction of recognizing the Empire. A minister was also appointed to the Holy See, who received instructions at once to convey an intimation that Maximilian would personally conduct the negotiations with regard to the Church property with the nuncio whose appointment was to be expected. In addition to these more important measures and appointments, a great number of less important ones were settled.

Maximilian's strength was not equal to all the agitation which he had had to go through for so long past. These ceremonies, and the efforts involved in the business of State which followed them, had severely tried his already delicate constitution. Dr. Jilek, the Emperor's physician, who had, moreover, always been a bitter opponent of the Mexican project, and was not to accompany his master to Mexico, saw with growing anxiety that he was on the verge of a nervous break-down. And such was indeed the case; when the doctor visited his master on April 10, he found him with his arms outstretched on the table and his head sunk upon them, morally distraught, and

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physically on the point of a collapse. It was not till now that the Archduke became fully conscious of the appalling burden which he had irrevocably taken upon himself. In the evening he had still to sit through a great banquet in the state banquetting-hall of the palace, to which all those who had taken part in the day's celebrations were invited. In spite of his suffering condition, he was too conscientious to shrink from this task. Dr. Jilek, who dreaded a complete break-down, advised him to spare himself, as his wife would be the best possible representative for him. It was in fact impossible, and the young Emperor withdrew, to recover his physical and moral equilibrium alone with his confidential physician. Meanwhile the young Empress was enthroned at the head of the richly decorated banquetting-table, and did the honours to her numerous guests without the slightest sign of agitation, exhaustion, or fatigue. The Empress seemed to be of a tougher and more resisting fibre than her husband; at least such was the judgment arrived at by all those who took part in this memorable but fateful day.

On the following day, April 11, the departure was to have taken place; but in the Emperor's moral and physical condition this was quite impossible. It had to be postponed till he had to some extent recovered. Meanwhile the Empress Charlotte took her husband's place on all occasions; she received the innumerable people who arrived with congratulations, the deputations from Venice and the Istrian cities, who expressed their regret that the Archduke was leaving his native land. She was constant and untiring in receiving and thanking deputations, full of enthusiasm at her new position, and inspired by the desire to start performing her new life-work as thoroughly and with as much zeal as possible.

At last, on April 13, Maximilian had so far recovered that it was possible to think of departure. He had drawn up a letter to Napoleon ¹⁴⁵ which he intended to give Hidalgo with two magnificent pistols as a present for the Emperor of the French. But the Empress considered that his letter was not suitable to the

¹⁴⁵ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, April 12, 1864, draft letter never sent off. V. N. A.

occasion, and herself composed another,¹⁴⁶ which was actually dispatched, and which said how touched they had been at Napoleon's telegram. "It is only," it ran, "thanks to my confidence in those sentiments of which you have always given proof towards me that I hope to bring to a good issue the noble task with which the Mexican people has entrusted me." With protestations as to the happiness it would be to him to draw the bonds of friendship ever closer, and his gratitude to Napoleon for having stretched out the noble hand of friendship towards Mexico, Maximilian promised that he would do all that was in his power to give worthy expression to his gratitude and affection. Napoleon telegraphed his thanks,¹⁴⁷ with renewed good wishes for the further prosperity of the courageous young couple.

The departure was now finally fixed for the 14th. So far the Emperor Maximilian had shown himself to nobody; full of melancholy, he wandered once more through the rooms of his palace, the plan of which he had drawn, and the arrangements in which he had so carefully directed in accordance with his own taste, and through the fairy-like garden wrung from a rocky and refractory soil. Tears were in his eyes and mourning in his heart. When, on the day of his departure, he found the household assembled together, and bade farewell to all his trusty servants, his emotion knew no bounds. It was with difficulty that he controlled himself far enough to say a few friendly words in a voice choked with tears to the mayor of Trieste, who had also appeared to bid him farewell. The kindly, upright, amiable, and courteous Prince had been sincerely loved on all sides, not only in his own house. This was now apparent; the sympathy of the people was enormous; all Trieste was drawn up on the Molo and in the streets leading from the town to the palace, to wave a farewell greeting to the imperial Prince.

The launch of the frigate *Novara*, with the Mexican im-

¹⁴⁶ The Archduke Ferdinand Max to the Emperor Napoleon, draft of a letter sent off on April 13, 1864; in the Empress's handwriting. V. N. A.

¹⁴⁷ Napoleon III to the Archduke Ferdinand Max at Civit  Vecchia, April 20, 1864; telegram in V. N. A.



DEPARTURE OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS
FROM MIRAMAR, APRIL 14, 1864

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perial standard at its stern, and its eight pairs of oars rising straight up into the air, already lay beside the little flower-strewn Molo, waiting for the Emperor and Empress. The *Novara*, gaily decked with flags, and the French war-ship *Themis*, were weighing anchor outside. No English ship had appeared to escort them; in this, too, King Leopold had been unsuccessful. At the last moment telegrams were still arriving, among them one with the Empress Caroline Augusta's blessing,¹⁴⁸ and two touching telegrams from Maximilian's parents:¹⁴⁹

"Farewell. Our blessing — Papa's and mine — our prayers and tears accompany you; may God protect and guide you. Farewell for the last time on your native soil, where alas! we may see you no more. We bless you again and again from our deeply sorrowing hearts."

The telegram was intended in a different sense, but Fate had guided the pen. The parents were indeed to see their child no more. When Maximilian read the telegram, the calm which he had won by a struggle was once again deeply shaken; it was with difficulty that his wife restored him to the necessary tranquillity. To the sound of the newly-composed Mexican imperial anthem and a storm of cheers and farewells from the populace and all whom they were leaving behind, the Emperor and Empress entered the launch. The Emperor was still overcome by his feelings. Charlotte looked at him with sympathy. Then she turned to the Countess Zichy-Metternich, who was seated beside her, and said: "Look at poor Max! How he is weeping!"¹⁵⁰

Meanwhile the Imperial yacht *Phantasie*, the frigate *Bel-lona*, and six liners, all decked with flags, and with their crews drawn up on deck, were lying at anchor in the roads ready to escort the two imperial ships for an hour. The weather was

¹⁴⁸ The Empress Caroline Augusta to the Emperor Maximilian, April 10, 1864. V. N. A.

¹⁴⁹ The Archduchess Sophie to the Emperor Maximilian, April 11, 1864. V. N. A.

¹⁵⁰ From the memoirs of the Countess Zichy-Metternich, *Monatsschrift der österreichischen Frauenwelt*, 1913-14.

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glorious, the sea lay smooth as a mirror in the sunlight; it was as though Nature desired to soothe the Emperor's troubled heart. And indeed the old seaman's blood prevailed; the peace and calm on board and the splendid air had their effect; on the following day the Emperor appeared once more on deck calm and composed.

The curtain went up, the play was ready to begin.



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NAPOLÉON TO THE COMTE DE FLAHAULT IN LONDON

Palace of Compiègne, October 1861

My dear Comte de Flahault,

Hearing from Mr. Thouvenel that our convention on the subject of Mexico is making no progress, I wish to express my ideas to you frankly, so that you may communicate them to Lord Palmerston. When the Prime Minister is informed of the intentions with which I approach this affair I hope he will be so good as to tell you equally clearly what is in his mind, and that the result will be an understanding and common action. There is no need for me to enlarge upon the common interest which we in Europe have in seeing Mexico pacified and endowed with a stable government. Not only has that country, which enjoys every natural advantage, attracted much of our capital and many of our fellow-countrymen, whose existence is subjected to a continual menace, but, if it were regenerated, it would form an impassable barrier to the encroachments of North America, it would afford an important opening for English, Spanish, and French trade, while exploiting its own wealth, and lastly it would render great services to our manufactories by extending its cultivation of cotton. The consideration of its various advantages, as well as the spectacle of one of the finest countries in the world given over to anarchy and threatened with impending ruin, such are the motives which have always given me a keen interest in the fate of Mexico. For many years past important persons from that country have waited upon me in order to draw a picture of their unfortunate condition and ask for my help, saying that a monarchy alone could restore order in a country rent by factions; they also, I believe, approached England, but at that time I could only indulge in fruitless wishes. In spite of my sympathy, I

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replied that I had no pretext for intervention in Mexico; that in America, above all, my course of action was closely bound up with that of England; that I thought it would be difficult to arrive at an agreement with the Cabinet of St. James's for the purpose which they proposed; that we should risk falling out with the United States; and that it was therefore necessary to wait for better days. Today unexpected events have arisen and changed the face of affairs. The American war has made it impossible for the United States to interfere in the matter, and, what is more, the outrages committed by the Mexican Government have provided England, Spain, and France with a legitimate motive for interference in Mexico. What direction ought this intervention to take? That is the question. I can quite understand that the convention between the three powers which will send forces to America should lay down as the ostensible object of our intervention nothing but the redress of our legitimate grievances, but we must foresee what may possibly happen, and not gratuitously tie our hands in such a way as to prevent a solution which would be to the interest of all. According to the information I have received, as soon as the squadrons arrive off Vera Cruz, a considerable party in Mexico is prepared to seize the supreme power, summon a national assembly, and proclaim the monarchy. I was asked confidentially who would be my candidate in the event of this happening. I declared that I had none, but that, should the occasion arise, it would be necessary to choose a prince informed with the spirit of the age, endowed with sufficient intelligence and firmness to found a durable order of things in a country disturbed by so many revolutions; and lastly that it was necessary that this choice should not wound the susceptibilities of the great naval powers; and I put forward the name of the Archduke Maximilian. This idea was joyfully accepted by the little committee resident in Paris. The Prince's personal qualities, his connexion through his wife with the King of the Belgians, the natural link between France and England, and the fact that he belongs to a great non-maritime power, appeared to me to meet all desirable conditions. For my part, I confess, I thought it was in good taste for me to propose as candidate, in certain contingencies, a prince belonging to a dynasty with which I had recently been at war. The Mexicans, who naturally show more eagerness in the matter than I do, and are impatient to see events move quickly, have had the Cabinet of Vienna sounded, and according to the information I have received, it has accepted the overture, subject to two conditions: firstly, that the Prince should have the support of France and England, and secondly, that

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the wishes of the people should be frankly and fairly expressed to me.

Such is the position of affairs. You see, my dear Monsieur de Flahault, that I have only one object in this whole question; namely, to see to it that French interests are in future protected and safeguarded by an organization which should rescue Mexico from devastation by the Indians or an American invasion. I am moreover very glad to show that, far from having any selfish preferences or unjust dislikes, I seek nothing but good, convinced that to try to make a people prosperous is to work effectively for the prosperity of all.

To sum up, I ask nothing better than to sign a convention with England and Spain, in which the ostensible object of our intervention shall be the redress of our grievances, but it would be impossible, without a breach of good faith, and knowing the state of affairs as I do, to bind myself not to lend at least moral support to a change which I desire with all my heart, because it is in the interest of the whole of civilization.

Be assured of my sincere friendship.

Napoleon.

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HANDWRITING.
MIRAMAR, JANUARY 2, 1862

Sir,

I am informed by a report from Prince Metternich which Count Rechberg has just communicated to me, containing an account of an interview which Your Majesty and the Empress were pleased to grant him recently, that Your Majesty continues to manifest the same gracious interest in the pursuit of the project which you have conceived with regard to Mexico as induced you, Sir, to put forward my name in this important affair. I no doubt owe this interest to the too fleeting relations with Your Majesty which I have been able to enjoy since my visit to St. Cloud, relations which will remain for ever engraven upon my soul as one of those memories which mark an epoch in one's life, and which have, I venture to hope, left Your Majesty with the conviction that you have gained in me yet another admirer. Allow me to add, Sir, that the kindness which Her Majesty the Empress has been pleased to show towards me since the opening

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of the negotiations in question has deeply touched the Archduchess and myself; I have seen in it fresh evidence of that kindness which has never failed me since I had the good fortune to become acquainted with that august Princess. To come to the three points which Your Imperial Majesty has deigned to indicate to me, allow me to say, as touching the question of funds, that, according to the opinion of competent authorities whom I have consulted, if the new Government is to be enabled to exist and reduce the finances to order, it cannot dispense with negotiating a loan of twenty-five million piastres. It goes without saying that if Your Majesty's Government were prepared to facilitate this loan by its influence with the great banking-houses, it would establish a strong claim to the gratitude of Mexico. Next, with regard to the question of the flag under which I should make my entry into Vera Cruz, I think I may flatter myself that the Austrian navy will gladly render this last service to its former head, who is, on the other hand, prompted by a sentiment of pardonable pride to desire to take leave of it on setting foot on his new territory. I am confident that the Emperor my brother will not refuse to accede to this desire. The third point to which Your Majesty drew our Ambassador's attention is one, as you yourself pointed out, of which the solution is difficult, but at the same time most important. It would certainly be dangerous to place the new authority at the mercy of generals accustomed for years past to anarchy, and information drawn from more than one source confirms how necessary it is that the ruler of Mexico should be surrounded by an armed force of his own, sufficient to impose respect upon a people less prone, perhaps, than any other to understand authority without military prestige.

My desire would therefore be to take with me a small body of troops, wearing the Mexican cockade and bearing its flag, and composed of men enlisted in Europe, the vacancies in which should gradually be filled up by Mexicans, thus forming the nucleus of a native army.

Such, in a few words, are my views on the three questions that Your Majesty has been pleased to ask me. I should consider myself fortunate if I could hear that they were in harmony with the wise and noble views of him whose disciple I am proud to be. The task which may be in store for me is pre-eminently a work of civilization, and your voice, Sir, more than any other, has a right to be heard in such a matter. I am therefore following in Your Majesty's footsteps in attaching to my acceptance of the offer made to me the express

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condition that my candidature should be supported by the clearly expressed wish of the nation.

Begging that Your Majesty will continue to show me that gracious kindness which you have so far been pleased to grant me, I am, Sir, Your Imperial Majesty's

Most devoted servant and cousin

Palace of Miramar, January 2, 1862

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NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL.

JANUARY 14, 1862

Sir my brother,

The letter which Your Imperial Highness was so good as to write me has touched me deeply, for it contains sentiments with regard to the Empress and myself the value of which I fully appreciate. We have all preserved a very pleasant memory of your stay among us a few years ago, and this memory is certainly not unconnected with the desire which I feel to see Your Imperial Highness at the head of a great and noble mission.

For your personal qualities and the illustrious house to which you belong are causes which ought to ensure the success of the task which you are undertaking. Never, in my opinion, will any task produce greater results. For it is a question of rescuing a whole continent from anarchy and misery; of setting an example of good government to the whole of America; and lastly of raising the monarchist flag, based upon a wise liberty and a sincere love of progress, in the face of dangerous Utopias and bloody disorders.

The ideas which Your Imperial Highness is good enough to communicate to me seem very just, and when the time comes, I will do all that is in my power to facilitate their carrying into effect.

Until then I shall be most impatient to learn how things turn out in Mexico. Faced with the suspicions of England, I did not at first dare to send any more troops overseas. I now regret it. However, I am sending another 600 zouaves; and I do not think there will be any serious resistance over there.

This letter will be handed to you by General Almonte. He is a very excellent fellow, and, what is more, a very capable man who is highly esteemed. I think Your Imperial Highness will do well to give him full powers, and choose him as the centre of action and your principal

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agent. He is about to start for Mexico, and his presence over there will, I think, be very useful.

I beg you to accept the assurance of the feelings of esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's brother and cousin,

Napoleon.

Paris, January 14, 1862

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THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE TO THE EMPRESSE EUGÉNIE, JANUARY 22, 1862, MIRAMAR, SENT BY THE HAND OF ALMONTE

Madam,

I avail myself of General Almonte's return to express to Your Majesty our gratitude for the interest which you are so good as to take in the cause of an unhappy country. Your Majesty, who always encourages what is good, seemed obviously marked out by Providence to initiate a work which one might call a holy one, by reason of the regeneration which it is intended to bring about, and above all by reason of the fresh impulse which it is bound to give to religion among a people whose civil discords have not yet succeeded in extinguishing the ardent Catholic faith of their ancestors. Your Majesty's compassionate goodness has not allowed you to forget that the Mexicans belong to a Spanish race; it is therefore to you that this ill-fated nation will be indebted for the first prospect of a future which has been offered to it for forty years past; and so it will never separate the name of its august benefactress from that of the Emperor in the thanksgivings which it will render to Heaven on the day when that future is realized. Allow me to add, Madam, that the Archduke, who has the honour of Your Majesty's personal acquaintance, and has so often extolled to me your graces, virtues, and exalted qualities, will always cherish, as I do, a deep memory of the kindness which you have deigned to display towards us.

We hope soon to have the happiness of offering Your Majesty by word of mouth our assurance of the sentiments of admiration with which we are animated towards you.

I am, Madam,

Your Majesty's most devoted servant and cousin,

Charlotte.

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HANDWRITING.
JANUARY 22, 1862

Sir,

The kind reception which Your Imperial Majesty has deigned to give to my letter of the second of this month caused me the most intense satisfaction, and I take advantage of General Almonte's return to express my gratitude for the gracious allusions which you made to myself in the answer which you were so good as to send me. You find me, Sir, deeply imbued with the importance of the mission which you desire to see entrusted to me, and which you describe as grand and noble. The flag which Your Majesty would like to see me unfurl in America has ever been my own, and it will surely be the object of all my efforts to hold it firmly aloft, in case I am called upon to reign.

But though such is my settled resolve, I am far from hiding from myself the enormous difficulties with which the infant monarchy will have to contend in Mexico, and it is because I have no illusions on the subject that I consider the benevolent support of Your Majesty, as I may say, the first condition of success; it has required all the confidence which I have in that support to prevent me from shrinking at the outset from the prospect of such a formidable task.

I was delighted to hear that, in view of the doubtful attitude of the Spaniards, Your Majesty has decided to strengthen the French forces of occupation; this measure not only gives evidence of your goodwill towards Mexico, but offers fresh guarantees for the success of the work with which we are concerned.

I am extremely obliged to you, Sir, for having enabled me to make the acquaintance of General Almonte; he is a man whose talents and experience will be of great service to the monarchical cause in his country. As chance would have it, he has met here one of the most eminent members of the Mexican episcopate, Mgr. de Lavastida, Bishop of Puebla, who had presented himself at Miramar on the eve of betaking himself to his diocese.

The different points indicated by Your Majesty to the general have formed the main subject of our conversations, and the upshot of them has been a memorandum which he will have the honour, Sir, of laying before you.

I have felt it my duty to incorporate in this document an article

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

laying down the necessity of a perfect understanding between Mexican Conservatives and of their co-operation with General Santa Anna. So far as I am able to judge, it is most important to secure up to the end the co-operation of that person, who enjoys such a great reputation in his country. He has repeatedly promised his assistance in the most explicit terms; he has, moreover, everything to gain by the establishment of a monarchical regime, and would have everything to lose if he dreamt of opposing the will of Europe. It therefore seems to me, and M. Almonte appeared to be of my opinion, that we should risk nothing by placing Santa Anna at the head of the Regency which would have to conduct the administration of the State until the arrival of the sovereign.

Among those points which General Almonte told me had been recommended to his attention by Your Majesty, there is only one which it has not yet been possible to settle definitively: namely, that concerning the nationalization of the property of the clergy. Mgr. de Puebla, who, in any case, holds very sensible opinions on this question, as on others, suggested that before proceeding any further it would be useful to enlighten the Holy Father on the subject. He has undertaken to go to Rome and treat directly with His Holiness on this point, as well as the other religious questions touched upon in our conversations.

In short, Sir, I believe I am justified in hoping that the views recorded in the memorandum of which General Almonte is the bearer, and with regard to which he is in a position to offer you all explanations that may be desirable, will be in accordance with Your Majesty's intentions.

I am, Sir, with the highest consideration, Your Imperial Majesty's
Most devoted servant and cousin

Miramar, January 22, 1862

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THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE. FEBRUARY 3, 1862. AUTOGRAPH LETTER ¹

Paris, February 3, 1862

Madam,

I should have liked to answer Your Imperial Highness sooner, but having been unwell for a few days I have not been able to do so, in spite of my eager desire. Your Highness has defined so well in your letter the bond by which all my sympathies are attached to the poor Mexican nation that it would be impossible for me to add anything to them; I hope that after their ceaseless struggles a new era will at last dawn for that nation, which only requires to be governed by a wise and firm hand to become once more what it was. Providence aiding us, as it has done up to this day, we hope that the moment is at hand when the wishes of the Mexicans, as well as the desire of civilized nations, will be carried into effect.

I know in advance what a providence Your Imperial Highness will be for all these peoples at present abandoned to demoralization, but who are none the less ready to rally round those who will henceforth throw in their lot with that of the people; I am sure that their gratitude will be the reward of the prince who is leaving his country and family in order to be the bearer of regeneration and life to them. Everything will have to be done, both in the moral and the material sphere; it is the greatness of the task which has found such a noble echo in your hearts, and what obstacles can one not overcome by the aid of a firm will!

I hope you will read with interest the report from a naval officer stationed at Vera Cruz which we sent yesterday to Prince Metternich; what is most remarkable is that he was still unaware of Admiral Jurien's instructions, and yet he found in the country the germ of the idea which it only remains for us to develop and lead to a happy issue, by God's help.

¹ The original text of many of the letters from the Empress Eugénie included in the following correspondence is almost entirely devoid of punctuation. A few specimen letters have been left with the original punctuation (see pages 396, 405, and (II) 833), in order to give the reader the impression of incoherence, which it may be legitimate to interpret as revealing the mentality of the woman largely responsible for the Mexican adventure. The remaining letters have been punctuated in such a way as to make them readable and intelligible.—
Translator.

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

I am most happy at the hope which Your Imperial Highness held out to me that I might make your acquaintance; the Archduke's short visit to Paris has left us too pleasant a memory for us not to welcome eagerly the idea of seeing him again, together with Your Imperial Highness.

The Emperor desires me to remember him to the Archduke and to present his homage to you. Be assured, Madam, of the feelings of sincere friendship with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's affectionate cousin,

Eugénie.

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NAPOLEON III TO FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL.
MARCH 7, 1862

My brother,

I did not answer Your Imperial Highness before because I was waiting to receive news from Mexico before doing so. That which has arrived is not very good, for General Prim seems to be animated by motives of personal ambition, and has caused Admiral Jurien to take a number of rash steps; fortunately the arrival of my reinforcements will alter the situation. But we cannot hear from him for a month. Instead of marching onward and adopting an authoritative tone, General Prim has, so to speak, abased himself before Juarez's Government. The aide-de-camp whom he sent to Mexico replied to those who displayed a desire for the return of the monarchy *that there would soon be no monarchies left in Europe!* — In spite of this the Prussian Minister writes to M. de Saligny that the monarchist party is making remarkable progress; a more recent communication from Admiral Jurien, dated February 9, announces that the expedition is at last about to advance. The elements in the country seem to be all ready, all that is necessary is to know how to take advantage of them, and I am distressed to see that my Admiral is allowing himself to be tricked by General Prim. It is very unfortunate that Spain has entrusted this weighty mission to such a man; I am going to send another general to examine the situation and see whether Admiral Jurien ought not to retire. Finally, I have great hopes of the moral effect which will be produced by the arrival of General Lorencez, for, according to all the

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accounts I receive, the French are as much loved as the Spaniards are detested.

I have made a point of giving Your Imperial Highness these details so that you may know that I am making every effort for the success of the plan which we have conceived.

I repeat my assurances of the high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

March 7, 1862

*See page
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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.

DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.

MIRAMAR, MARCH 15, 1862

Sir,

The light which Your Majesty has been pleased to throw upon the present condition of the Mexican affair by your gracious letter of the 7th of this month has afforded me intense interest, and I venture to beg you to receive my sincerest thanks. In the candour with which you have developed these considerations I recognize Your Majesty's noble heart. I am more grateful, Sir, than I can say for the kindly solicitude which you continue to devote to the success of this affair. Unfavourable though the latest news may be, it is none the less permissible to indulge the hope that Your Majesty's power, by coming to the aid of the national aspirations, will succeed in triumphing over all the obstacles which the passions of interested parties are at this crucial moment placing in the way of the creation of a strong and stable power in a country which has seen itself too long deprived of one.

Until the desires of Mexico can find free expression beneath the sheltering protection of the forces of Europe, and of France in particular, I feel that I am doing right in not departing from that attitude of reserve which Your Majesty's wisdom has from the first recognized to be indispensable.

In presenting my homage to Her Majesty the Empress, be so good, Sir, as to tell her how touched the Archduchess is by her kind letter; and rest assured of the feelings of high consideration with which I am

Your Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.
BRUSSELS, MAY 18, 1862

Sir,

One of my chief causes of regret in connexion with the sad journey which the state of my father-in-law's health has obliged us to make to Brussels is that, though such a little way from Paris, I have had to refrain from going there with the Archduchess to wait upon Your Imperial Majesties. You, Sir, no doubt felt, as I did, that such a step coming in confirmation of rumours which have already been too widely disseminated would have been incompatible with the reserve which I have accepted as binding upon me, in accordance with Your Majesty's recommendations. This reserve is such that, on the one hand, it has caused me to renounce the pleasure of seeing MM. Gutierrez and Hidalgo, and, on the other hand, it has prevented me from making a short visit to London, where, as Your Majesty may imagine, I should have been charmed to take a look at the Exhibition. Believe me, Sir, I am truly grieved that it is impossible for me to gratify my heart's desire in this matter, and I pray that things may soon shape themselves definitely enough to enable me to realize it.

I beg you, Sir, to present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress, and am, with the highest consideration, Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin
Palace of Brussels, May 18, 1862

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NAPOLEON III TO FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL.
JUNE 7, 1862

My brother,

I can quite understand why Your Imperial Highness was unable to come to Paris in the present circumstances, but I none the less regret it, for you know how happy we should have been to see you. The news from Mexico is very good, now that we have at last emerged from the fumbling and ridiculous advances that General Prim was

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making to the Mexican Government; however, the next post will no doubt bring decisive news, for if the great city of Puebla pronounces for us, the odds are that the rest will follow. There is no kind of intrigue that Prim has not resorted to in the attempt to thwart our projects, but unfortunately this will all redound to his shame. I have always [word indecipherable] gone straight upon my way. Being at war with the Mexican Government, I have not been willing to treat with it. I have told my representatives that there was no question whatever of imposing any kind of government upon the Mexicans, but only of supporting a monarchy if it found partisans in the country and a prospect of stability. This course of action was quite simple and straightforward, and yet attempts have been made to distort my intentions and misinterpret the character of the intervention. The English will, I think, be much pleased if it succeeds, but they do not want to help us pick the *chestnuts out of the fire*. I am most anxious to know what has been going on for the last month, General Lorencez wrote me that he reckoned upon being in Mexico City on May 25 at latest. The yellow fever in the coastal region is the sole obstacle to the dispatch of further reinforcements. I beg Your Imperial Highness to accept my assurance of the feelings of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Paris, June 7, 1862

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THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE. TUILERIES, JUNE 7, 1862

Madam,

Before answering your letter from Brussels I have waited for the mail from Mexico so as to have some news to give Your Imperial Highness. I felt great regret at not having made your acquaintance when you were so near us, but I understand how impossible it was for us to meet in present circumstances. The news is excellent. General Lorencez considers that he is now master of the country, having passed the Chiquihuite. News of the adhesion of generals and cities reaches us daily, the country is weary of discord and dreams of nothing but a stable government which shall give it the power to develop itself, and consequently sets all its hopes upon the monarchy. Poor

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

General Almonte has suffered greatly of late from the bad faith of General Prim and Sir Charles Wyche. The former wanted to work for his own ends, and the English commissary encouraged him, knowing quite well that in the last resort it would be easy to trick him; but fate has decided otherwise, and *here we are, thanks be to God, without allies!* It is a very significant fact that so long as three of us were acting together, not a single Mexican was in favour of us, not even Juarez, for whom the treaty, or rather the preliminaries, were a triumph; but since our action has been freed from all constraint, the country feels safe enough to express its wishes, and all men are grouping themselves round Almonte, who, but yesterday an exile, is today the dictator of the provinces through which we have just advanced. The next mail will probably bring the news of the arrival in Mexico City. The Emperor is doubtless giving the Archduke the same details. Unfortunately many mistakes were made at first; but I have never had any doubt of the success of the enterprise. I am very glad to hear that the King's health no longer causes you anxiety and that he is recovering daily. My affectionate remembrances to the Archduke, and be assured, Madam, of the sentiments with which I am Your Imperial Highness's most affectionate

Eugénie.

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.
MERAN, JULY 12, 1863

Sir,

The departure of my brother-in-law Philip provides me with the happy occasion of offering Your Imperial Majesty my most sincere congratulations on the capture of Mexico City, the news of which has this moment arrived by telegraph. These two great successes of the French eagles, coming close upon each other, are a fresh triumph for that will-power which is not daunted by either the obstacles created by man or those presented by nature, and which will always remain one of the most characteristic features of Your Majesty's history.

In accordance, Sir, with the advice which you deigned to give me in your letter of June 21, I have hastened to request my brother-in-

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law to bring influence to bear upon the English Government in order to try to obtain its assistance in certain eventualities on behalf of the monarchical establishment which we are concerned in founding beyond the sea, and which, especially at the beginning, could not dispense with the assistance of the two great naval powers. I am expecting the return of my courier every moment, and I shall not fail to inform Your Majesty of the King's reply.

I am, Sir, with the sentiments of high consideration and attachment with which you are acquainted,

Your Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

Meran, July 12, 1863

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON.

DRAFT. MIRAMAR, JUNE 12, 1863

Sir,

The interest with which I am following the varying evolutions of the drama which is going on beyond the Atlantic gives me the right to be among the first to offer Your Imperial Majesty my sincere congratulations upon the important success obtained by your arms. It is calculated to prove once again to the world of what Your Majesty's resolution and high intelligence are capable in the teeth of the most vigorous resistance. Now that this great point is gained, Sir, you will doubtless soon triumph over the last obstacles with which your generous enterprise is still confronted, and if, with the assistance of Your Majesty's mighty hand, the Mexicans, as their fellow-countrymen in Europe lead us to expect, find in themselves that moral force without which the regeneration of their country cannot be accomplished, it is permissible to believe that this unfortunate people will be rescued from the abyss into which long years of anarchy have plunged it.

In that case we shall perhaps see England also shake off the lethargy which hitherto she has unfortunately opposed to Your Majesty's noble efforts.

Unceasingly menaced by the American spirit of conquest, this power is bound to realize in the end that her own interests demand that she should forward a work which tends to set limits to the encroachments of her ambitious neighbours.

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

Be so good, Sir, as to present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress and be assured of the sentiments of high consideration with which

I am Your Majesty's most devoted servant and cousin,

Maximilian.

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NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
ORIGINAL. JUNE 21, 1863

Convinced of the interest with which Your Imperial Highness was following the varying phases of our expedition to Mexico, I was not surprised at your congratulations upon the capture of Puebla, but I was none the less touched by them. The justice which you love to render to the courage and perseverance of my army amid so many obstacles caused me sincere pleasure. I hope that the party of order in Mexico will now be able to raise its head again, and that it will at last be possible to realize our projects.

There are, however, still many obstacles to be overcome, and the support of England would be very useful to us.

Your Imperial Highness should certainly request the King of the Belgians to use his legitimate influence in London to this effect.

The Empress requests me to remember her to you, and for my part I beg to assure you of the feelings of sincere friendship and high esteem with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's brother and cousin,

Napoleon.

Fontainebleau, June 21, 1863

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THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE. AUTOGRAPH LETTER.
FONTAINEBLEAU, JUNE 15, 1863

Madam,

I thank Your Imperial Highness for your kind letter; I was awaiting the post with great impatience so as to be able to give Your Highness some fresh news.

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So many vicissitudes have taken place in Mexico since this question was broached that it was difficult to foresee anything, but the capture of Puebla and the moral effect produced in the whole country seem to me a good omen for the realization of our desires. It seems to me that the return of the bishops would be very desirable, for they possess great influence among the people, which would be very useful. I also believe that at present there can no longer be any idea of personal danger for them and that their departure can therefore be hurried on without misgivings.

I hope that the English mail of the 28th will bring us news of the entry into Mexico City; we do not think there will be any resistance, for Comonfort's army has been defeated at San Lorenzo and there are no other organized forces.

I beg Your Imperial Highness to remember me to the Archduke and be assured, Madam, of the feelings with which I am

Your Imperial and Royal Highness's most devoted cousin,

Eugénie.

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. TELEGRAM FROM PARIS.
AUGUST 8, 1863

I was about to write to Your Imperial Highness when the news arrived of your proclamation as Emperor in Mexico City. I am glad of this first result, I hope that the whole of Mexico will soon follow the example of the capital and summon Your Imperial Highness to regenerate her. The Empress unites her congratulations with mine.

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
MIRAMAR, AUGUST 8, 1863

I am deeply moved and touched, and so is the Archduchess, at the kind and gracious telegram which Your Majesty has deigned to send me with such kindly promptitude, and which is such a happy omen for the future. We also beg you to offer Her Majesty the Empress the expression of our intense gratitude.

THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. MIRAMAR, AUGUST 10, 1863

Sir,

I cannot resist the desire once more to give Your Imperial Majesty written evidence of the sentiments aroused in me by the affectionate telegram in which you deigned, with such gracious promptitude, to give me the first news of the desire expressed by the Assembly of Notables at Mexico City that I should accept the crown. I have known for long past that Your Majesty possesses the secret of how to touch the heart, and you have proved it once again in the present case.

It has redoubled my gratitude for your gracious telegram, Sir, to see that Your Majesty has not abandoned your original design of calling, not only upon the notables of the capital, but upon the whole country, to declare themselves with regard to its destiny. Though there cannot be the least doubt that the acts of the provisional Government are all dictated by the sincerest zeal, there are, however, some which have given momentary cause to fear that a kind of rashness might be displayed in the conduct of political matters in Mexico which might have led to trouble. The program laid down in a few words in your telegram, Sir, makes it certain that this affair will be treated in the same spirit of exalted wisdom and with the same entire sense of dignity as preside over all affairs in which Your Majesty takes the initiative. The feeling of attachment inspired in me by Your Majesty from the moment when I first had the good fortune to see you will never pass away, and I shall be happy, Sir, to prove this to you if things turn out in such a way as to enable my brother the Emperor and myself to lend a hand in the work of regenerating Mexico.

It seems to me that the most serious obstacle to the carrying out of this work will come from North America, the recent news from which appears to foreshadow the reconstitution of the Union, which is as greedy of aggrandizement as it is hostile to the monarchical principle in the other hemisphere. The armed support of France will be the most solid bulwark of the new empire against the attacks of this inveterate enemy, which is no doubt impatient to consolidate itself internally in order to advance to the overthrow of the throne set up at its gates.

The Archduchess joins me in begging Her Majesty the Empress to

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accept the expression of our gratitude for the touching interest in us which she deigned to display on the occasion of the latest news from Mexico.

I am, Sir, with the highest consideration,
Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted
Servant and cousin

THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. MIRAMAR, AUGUST 15, 1863

Encouraged by the evidences of Your Majesty's high favour I cannot allow August 15 to pass without offering you sincerest congratulations from myself and the Archduchess.

NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
ST. CLOUD, AUGUST 15, 1863

I am greatly touched by Your Imperial Highness's congratulations.
I am writing to you today by the post.

Napoleon.

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NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
ORIGINAL. ST. CLOUD, AUGUST 15, 1863

My brother,

I am sending Your Imperial Highness the resolution of the Assembly of Notables at Mexico City and Vera Cruz. I am happy to see that Your Imperial Highness's name is rallying to it a great number of adherents; however, in order that the will of the Mexicans should be more manifest, I should like an appeal made to the people to ratify the choice of the notables by their votes. My minister writes that Doblado and Comonfort have asked to come to Mexico City, and appear to be rallying to the intervention. I hope therefore that in spite

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

of great obstacles the summer will not go by before Mexico is pacified and transformed.

I seize this fresh opportunity of renewing my assurance of the sentiments of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

St. Cloud, August 15, 1863

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.
MIRAMAR, AUGUST 26, 1863

Sir,

M. Hidalgo's return to Paris offers me an opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Your Majesty for your gracious letter of the 15th of this month, in which you deign to transmit to me an address from the Regency set up in Mexico City announcing the vote of the Assembly of Notables of that capital in favour of the monarchy, and also the act of adhesion to this vote from the junta of Vera Cruz. The expressions of great kindness accompanying this communication of Your Majesty's have, if possible, increased the sentiments of devotion to you with which you have long known me to be inspired.

Your intention, Sir, of appealing to the whole nation to ratify the act of these two great cities is an unequivocal proof that Your Majesty intends, in your exalted wisdom, to establish a firm and lasting structure in Mexico. The expression of the will of the nation will give the Government the conviction that the intention is to establish a strong moral force both at home and in foreign relations. This moral force will be of great value, though it naturally requires to be supplemented by a sufficient material force to guarantee the new empire against the aggressions to which it will be exposed. I have therefore felt it to be my duty from the outset to claim for the throne which is to be established, not only the moral, but the material support of the two great naval powers. In order to be efficacious, this support should, in my opinion, assume the form of a treaty of alliance, to be concluded with the Empire of Mexico, by which pledges should be given to defend it against all armed attack for a period of from fifteen to twenty years. Thus protected against the dangers which it would be unable to resist by its own strength, the infant monarchy would be in a position to ensure the well-being of the country, and to devote itself consci-

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entiously to a task the credit for which would belong in the first place to the illustrious sovereign who, by his generous initiative, has placed the sword of France at the service of the cause of order and humanity.

There are other points which I have placed M. Hidalgo in a position to lay before Your Majesty, if you deign to allow him to state my ideas. He will be able, in particular, to describe the terms in which I propose to express myself to the Mexican deputation which is shortly to come and offer me the crown, and the steps which I should esteem it useful to make with the object of inducing England to give her effective support to the throne to be set up in Mexico.

Thanking Your Imperial Majesty for the valuable information which you were so good as to convey to me by M. Hidalgo as to your intentions with regard to several important points, I am, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

Miramar, August 26, 1863

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.

MIRAMAR, AUGUST 31, 1863

Sir,

Confident of Your Imperial Majesty's exalted favour, I thought I might present to you a distinguished Mexican, Don F. de Arrangoiz, a former Minister of Finance, with whom I have just been discussing a question upon which the success of the monarchist project set on foot by Your Majesty to a large extent depends: namely, the financial question. M. Arrangoiz's ideas on this subject seem to me very plausible, and I should be happy, Sir, if you would deign to allow him to submit a brief statement of them to Your Majesty. I have further induced him to visit England and use his influence with the Queen's ministers with the object of making them revise their prejudices with regard to a cause which the British sovereign originally pursued in concert with France, and to which her own interests should lead her to rally.

I am, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

Miramar, August 31, 1863

THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. MIRAMAR, SEPTEMBER 12, 1863

Sir,

The enclosed letter, which I have just received from General Almonte, seems to me to define so clearly and definitely the course which it would, in his opinion, be suitable to follow in order to lead to a happy issue the work of regeneration in which Your Majesty is lending his powerful aid, and this opinion seems to me in almost every respect so well founded, that I cannot do better than commend the Regent's propositions to your gracious approbation, with the exception of certain slight differences which I shall now have the honour of indicating.

The only question of much importance in which my views — and, I may say with satisfaction, Your Majesty's own as well — part company from General Almonte's ideas is with regard to the sense and import of the vote of the notables of Mexico City. The general seems to regard this vote as the expression of the desires of the nation: Your Majesty, like myself, has from the outset seen in it no more than a *first result*, in itself very happy, but which must be completed by the adhesion of the whole country, or, at least, of the large majority of provinces composing it. I do not underrate the disadvantages caused by the prolonged absence of a settled government in Mexico; but, in any case, the agitation of demagogues in the interior will not, I think, cease until the arrival at the different centres of detachments of Franco-Mexican troops, however few in number, has inspired confidence in the people and enabled them to give free expression to their will. The latest news agrees in recording that wherever the expeditionary forces appear, they are received as liberators, and, thanks to their assistance, the pacification of the country could, in the opinion of competent persons, be completed in a few months. It is therefore on the progress of these latest military operations that the more or less prompt accomplishment of the fundamental condition, which regard for my dignity made it incumbent upon me to lay down from the outset of the affair, would seem to depend — a condition with which I also intend to acquaint the Mexican deputation, the impending arrival of which at Miramar has been announced to me. If this condition and the other which I have formulated are eventually carried into effect, neither the outcry nor the manœuvres foretold in General Al-

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monte's letter will cause me to hesitate in carrying out the contingent engagement into which I have entered with Your Majesty.

With regard to points 2, 3, and 4 of the Regent's letter, his views seem to me in general very plausible. I have myself long ago considered the formation of a corps of volunteers, and obtained the assent of the Emperor my brother. This corps, which should consist of two regiments of light infantry and two regiments of cavalry, should not at first exceed a total of 4,000 men; but it would be increased from year to year simultaneously with the native army, and would thus enable Your Imperial Majesty gradually to decrease the effective strength of the auxiliary troops stationed in the country.

With regard to the amount of the loan which it would be necessary to raise in order to reduce the ruined finances of Mexico to order, and provide the Government with the means of working in an orderly manner, the opinion of the President of the Regency is in agreement with the financial project which M. Arrangoiz, on his return from Miramar, will perhaps have been able to have the honour of submitting to Your Majesty. Allow me, Sir, to add here that M. Bourdillon, whom Your Majesty deigned to receive in audience a few months ago, writes me from Mexico that if the loan in question could be placed under the joint guarantee of France and Great Britain, this would, in his opinion, furnish an indirect means of securing to the Mexican monarchy not only the moral, but the material support of the latter power, so long as this debt has not been paid in full.

The choice of the Apostolic nuncio seems to me, as to General Almonte, a matter of great importance, and I am going to write to the Holy Father with the object of obtaining the appointment to this post, should the case arise, of a person possessing the combination of qualities necessary if we are to be able to hope for a propitious solution of the thorny questions which remain to be decided between Church and State in Mexico.

I now come to the 5th and last point in General Almonte's letter, in which he proposes a treaty, to be concluded with Mexico by the signatories of the London Convention, with the object of placing the new empire and its territorial integrity beneath their effective guarantee. On this point I entirely share the opinion of the President of the Regency, especially with regard to the guarantee of France and England. In many letters which I have had the honour of addressing to Your Imperial Majesty I have explained the motives which lead me to lay stress upon this point, upon which, as you know, Sir, I felt it from the first to be my duty to make my acceptance

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conditional. Like a true patriot, Almonte recognized from his point of view that, before it had acquired the strength which time alone can give it, a monarchy in Mexico would be incapable, without the guarantee of Europe, of maintaining itself against the dangers which would threaten its northern frontier. The assurances conveyed to me by M. Hidalgo on behalf of Your Majesty's Government augur well for the intentions of France in this respect. As to the support of England, I am not without hopes of obtaining it through the influence of the King of the Belgians, who is to have a meeting with Queen Victoria about this time, and whom the Archduchess has been to see, in order to give him by word of mouth all the explanations he may desire.

In this manner, while acting in Mexico in such a way as to restore to the nation as a whole the power of voicing its desires, we can take advantage of the intervening time in Europe to try to settle the different points upon which depends the success of the great enterprise which Your Majesty is pursuing in the New World.

I beg you, Sir, to present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress, and am, with high consideration,

Your Majesty's most devoted
Servant and cousin

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL. BIARRITZ, SEPTEMBER 19, 1863

My brother,

Your Imperial Highness's letter of September 12 deals with several important questions which I will answer briefly; I have discussed them at greater length with M. Arrangoiz, who will soon have the honour of seeing you.

To achieve the aim which we have in view, we must in the first place pacify Mexico by well-considered military operations and group all honourable men round the new Government, while avoiding all reactionary measures. According to the reports which I have received, General Forey's proclamation has met with the entire satisfaction of the country; we must therefore not depart from the fundamental conditions laid down in it. Once the country is pacified, both physically and morally, Your Imperial Highness's Government will

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be recognized by everybody, and the guarantee of the naval powers, which would be hard to obtain, would add hardly anything to its stability. The United States are well aware that since the new regime in Mexico is the work of France, they cannot attack it without at once making enemies of us.

The chief banking-houses in London and Paris are engaged, in concert with my Minister of Finance, upon the question of the loan, and I do not doubt that it will succeed as soon as a stable government is established.

As to the auxiliary troops to be formed for Mexico, I think the best thing to do would be to hand over the Foreign Legion to Your Imperial Highness for ten years, and to open recruiting offices for it everywhere. By this means the nucleus and cadres would already be in existence, and the effective strength could easily be raised to whatever figure you may wish, and Your Imperial Highness would not appear to be going to Mexico with a force foreign to you.

I submit these ideas to Your Imperial Highness. You will understand that my object is to render your mission as easy as possible. I greatly esteem General Almonte, but it seems to me that he is too ready to regard things as already done, instead of seeking for practical means of ensuring their success.

I repeat my assurances of the sentiments of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Biarritz, September 19, 1863

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL AND ENCLOSURE.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1863

My brother,

I feel it my duty to communicate to Your Imperial Highness the enclosed extracts from a letter which I have just received from Marshal Forey. Unless a perfectly clear declaration is made with regard to the ratification of the sales of national property, I regard the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico as impossible.

I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Biarritz, September 25, 1863

Extracts from Forey's report

I confess that I should rather lay siege to Puebla again than be what I am here, a check on people who do not want to be checked. General Almonte, who has been placed at the head of the regency, is, if not a reactionary, at any rate an extremely weak man, always ready to let himself be persuaded into regrettable measures, which I do not allow because I do not want the French flag to cover acts contrary to your policy; but it is none the less painful for me to look on at it every day. I am obliged to observe what use the Government thinks fit to make of its power and to watch it as I shall watch the enemy's party.

For instance, in addition to their decrees or ordinances with regard to the observance of Sunday, and certain measures concerning the property of the Church, and contrary to my declarations, decrees, and ordinances which I have had placed on record, would you believe it, Sir, the regency wanted to compel all Dissidents returning to localities occupied by our troops, or who have recognized the provisional Government, to send in their adhesion in writing, under pain of arrest and imprisonment—a regular law of the suspects? And these great politicians also took it into their heads to apply my decree concerning the giving up of arms not only to those bearing arms against us, but to all Dissidents. I declared firmly that this must not be done; but it is none the less painful for me to be always on my guard against a Government which it is my duty to protect, and thus to appear to keep it under tutelage, which is bound to discredit it in the eyes of the public and encourage its enemies in their resistance, in the hope of overthrowing it as soon as it loses our support. . . .

The misgivings I have several times expressed to Your Majesty with regard to the reactionary tendencies which I seemed to detect in those around me appear to be coming only too clearly to light. Your Majesty must have noticed that though, in accordance with the intentions expressly laid down in almost all your letters, my manifesto was directed towards reassuring purchasers of national property, that of the provisional Government observed almost total silence on this point. If I did not remonstrate with this Government at the time when it appeared, this was because I did not want to cause it any embarrassment, being unable to imagine that it had any mental reser-

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vations on a point which concerns its very existence; for I have no faith in the stability of any government which does not recognize the principle of the sale of the national property.

But it would seem as though the silence of the Government had been interpreted by the legitimate owners of the property of the Church in a sense unfavourable to the sincerity of the manifesto, and I was bound to point this out to the members of the regency, giving them to understand that it was indispensable that they should issue such a declaration as should reassure the purchasers of national property, acquired in due form, and I pointed out a means of arriving at this result, by setting up a commission with the task of examining into the sales, so as to confirm some and invalidate others. But General Almonte, who is weak, and forms, with Bishop Ormachea, a clerical majority in the Government, while disclaiming in principle any idea of hostility to the validity of the sales of Church property, barred my proposal by the plea that the question had been submitted to the Roman Curia, and that since Mgr. Labastida, Archbishop of Mexico, was on his way back from Rome, and would certainly bring with him the solution of this question, it seemed fitting to await the archbishop's arrival.

I confess, Sir, that I was not satisfied with this report, and that I dread some blunder—to say no more—by the party which has arrived at the supreme power, and is more reactionary than it admits. And so, when *L'Estafette*, a French local newspaper, showed signs of fearing the very thing which I had myself laid before the Government, I felt it my duty to write it a letter in which I confirm the validity of the promises made in my manifesto; and M. de Saligny was so good as to say to me that, in view of the attitude adopted by the Government in this matter, my letter was a master-stroke. I am sending you the two numbers of *L'Estafette*. Your Majesty will judge for yourself whether my action was opportune.

For the rest, Sir, I am sorry to see that the Government is placing itself in too great a dependence upon the clergy. I can understand that it should honour religion and the ministers of religion, though in this country they are not always very worthy of honour. The people are devout and bigoted to the verge of fanaticism, and it is good policy to respect and even honour what it respects and honours; but it is to be feared that, whereas the Government which has been overthrown had gone too far in the spoliation and ill-treatment of the clergy, the present one may go too far in the opposite direction. If it

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places itself under clerical domination, as it seems to intend, it will be following a reactionary policy, and will not rally round it moderate men who are truly but simply religious.

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON III. MIRAMAR, SEPTEMBER 27, 1863.
DRAFT IN DE PONT'S HAND

Sir,

The Emperor my brother has just apprised me of his decisions with regard to several points treated of in General Almonte's letter; which I had the honour to communicate to your Majesty, and which particularly concern Austria. The Emperor confirms the benevolent intentions which he had previously expressed with regard to the projected formation of a corps of volunteers; recruiting for this corps will be authorized in our States, should the occasion arise.

With regard to the guarantee of Austria, which General Almonte wishes to see added to those of the signatories of the London Convention, in the interest of the integrity and independence of the future empire, the Emperor's reply is that, since our Government does not dispose of sufficient naval resources to undertake expeditions beyond the ocean, it would not be in a position to back up any guarantee it might give with the energy befitting its dignity and power; he consequently regrets that he is unable to associate himself with such treaties of guarantee as might be concluded.

As to the guarantee of the loan by Austria, the Emperor points out that such a measure, which would tend in certain contingencies to impose burdens upon the Austrian Treasury, could not be decided upon without the assent of the Chambers, and that they would in all probability shrink from committing themselves to any such course.

I have the honour to forward to Your Majesty the draft of the answer which I contemplate making to the deputation which is coming to offer me the crown. I am confident, Sir, that you will find nothing in it that is not in accordance with your views.

On her return from Brussels the Archduchess has given me the most satisfactory news as to her father the King's determination to support the Mexican cause warmly in London.

Besides this, M. d'Arrangoiz will have been able to submit to your

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Majesty some interesting information with regard to the state of feeling which he found in England, which is on the whole fairly favourable. What has been heard there as to my taking my stand upon the will of the nation, and the liberal spirit in which I am resolved to govern, should the case arise, seems to have made a good impression; moreover, they say that English commercial circles regard with favour the possibility of the establishment in Mexico of a stable and well-ordered authority.

I was particularly pleased to hear that the English Government seems disposed to recognize the Confederate States, provided that they give some proof of being strong enough to maintain their independence.

The creation of this new State, by aid of the support of France and England, will be, in my opinion, an absolute necessity for the Mexican Empire, and cannot fail greatly to facilitate the task of the powers guaranteeing the existence of this Empire. I am, Sir, with high consideration, Your Imperial Majesty's

Most devoted servant and cousin

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NAPOLEON III TO FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL.
BIARRITZ, OCTOBER 2, 1863

My brother,

I was most happy at the good news which Your Imperial Highness is so good as to give me. That which I have lately received from Mexico is favourable; there are, however, still disagreements between the regency and the commander of the troops of occupation. The great question is that of the national property.

The words of Your Imperial Highness's proposed answer to the Mexican delegates are noble and apposite, and I have no doubt of the good effect which they will produce in Europe. But allow me to lay great stress upon one point: a country torn by anarchy cannot be regenerated by *parliamentary* liberty. What is needed in Mexico is a *liberal* dictatorship; that is to say, a strong power which shall proclaim the great principles of modern civilization, such as equality before the law, civil and religious liberty, an upright administration, an equitable judicial procedure, etc. As for the constitution, it must be the work of time, and I believe that, though promised and

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elaborated, it should be applied only after a few years' time, when the country is pacified and the Government well established.

The Times itself said in a very remarkable article a few days ago that what was needed in Mexico was to pacify the country, and provide security for life and property, before thinking about liberty, which would come later of its own accord.

I have written to Mexico to have M. Arrangoiz given exclusive charge of the negotiation of the loan. It will easily be arranged under the guarantee of foreign Governments, but we must prevent the interference of schemers.

I am very pleased at what Your Imperial Highness tells me about the intentions of the English Government with regard to the Confederate States, but I confess that I am still in doubt as to its decision.

I beg Your Imperial Highness to present the homage of my respect to the Archduchess, and to be assured of the feelings of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Biarritz, October 2, 1863

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III. DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND. MIRAMAR, OCTOBER 9, 1863

Sir,

I have received the last two letters which Your Majesty has been pleased to write me with feelings of the deepest gratitude. I was happy at the favourable judgment which you passed upon my reply to the Mexican deputation. The mention in it of a constitutional regime was chiefly dictated by the consideration demanded by public opinion in England, and even in Austria, and thanks to the effect of this hint, a very favourable change of ideas can already be noted here. I see with satisfaction that my views on this point, as on all others, are essentially in complete harmony with those of Your Imperial Majesty.

After the reception of the delegates we discussed with the most prominent of them points in the instructions sent to the president of the deputation by the regency. The result of the deliberations has been recorded in a document the contents of which have my entire

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assent, and which these gentlemen will have the honour, Sir, of submitting to you when Your Majesty deigns to receive them.

In order to clear up the question of the ecclesiastical property, raised in Marshal Forey's reports, which Your Majesty was so kind as to send me—a question of which I fully recognize the extreme importance—I requested M. d'Arrangoiz to obtain authentic information on this subject, and he has just laid before me the enclosed statement, to which I take the liberty of drawing Your Majesty's gracious attention.

The Archduchess was deeply touched by Your Majesty's kind remembrances, and joins me in begging you to offer Her Majesty the Empress our most respectful homage.

I am Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

Palace of Miramar, October 9, 1863

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.

DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND, MIRAMAR, NOVEMBER 7, 1863. NO. 28

Sir,

The kind expressions which Your Majesty deigned to use about me in the memorable speech which has just opened the session of the Corps Législatif, and of which we have received a summary by telegraph, have filled me with a gratitude which is all the deeper because it is due to your words of gracious sympathy for the Mexican cause, which will be hailed with joy by all those interested.

This unfailing sympathy, which has triumphed over so many difficulties, and has just been displayed again at the gracious reception with which Your Majesty has honoured the Mexican delegates, is calculated to touch me deeply. I am happy, Sir, that by insisting on that occasion upon the urgent need for conciliation you have lent the weight of your counsels to the vigorous representations which I had felt it my own duty to make to the deputation on this point, and which it must have repeated in its reports to General Almonte. It seems to me that, by freeing itself from all party tendencies, and punishing offences without persecuting opinions, the provisional Government will dispose men's minds in favour of the new order of things, and will thus effectively forward the efforts of the expedition

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to bring freedom, at the same time rallying foreign opinion to its cause. I saw a new and precious mark of Your Majesty's favour in the contingent offer which you were pleased to make of handing over the Foreign Legion to me for a given period. I have hastened to inform General Woll,² who is kindly undertaking to draw up a project of organization for the armed forces which we may have occasion to form.

I present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress, and am, Sir, with high consideration,

Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted
Servant and cousin

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.
MIRAMAR, DECEMBER 26, 1863

Sir,

After having the honour of being received in audience by Her Majesty the Empress at Compiègne, Mr. Kint has arrived, bringing me the words which he heard from your lips on the subject of the Mexican affair. I was happy to see, from the account which he gave me, that my views with regard to the course to be followed in the internal government of that country were in perfect harmony with those of Your Majesty.

Mr. Kint leaves again today, taking with him my detailed instructions; if therefore Your Majesty deign to allow him to do so, he will be able to explain with a full knowledge of the situation my views on the various points upon which my definitive acceptance of the throne depends.

I should be greatly obliged to your Majesty if you would have the extreme goodness to apprise me of your intentions with regard to these different points.

Begging you, Sir, to present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress, I am, with high consideration, Your Imperial Majesty's

Most devoted servant and cousin

Miramar, December 26, 1863

² Had fought in Texas in 1842.

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NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
JANUARY 2, 1864. TELEGRAM

The Empress and I thank Your Imperial Highness for your good wishes, and send you our wishes for your happiness.

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON.
VIENNA, JANUARY 19, 1864

Sir,

The latest news from Mexico, which is so favourable to the cause of intervention, and announces that your Majesty is achieving fresh triumphs in this arduous enterprise, make it probable that it will not be long before the desires of the great majority of the country, which incline towards offering me the crown, become known in Europe. By that time the first condition laid down in my speech to the deputation will have been fulfilled; namely, that for which I asked the Mexicans themselves.

For his part, the Emperor my brother has shown the most gracious readiness to accede to the requests which I made him; he has even given the necessary orders to fit out the frigate which is to take me to Vera Cruz. If, as I hope, the negotiations with a view to a loan are successful, only one duty will be left for me to accomplish before making a definitive pronouncement—a sacred duty, for it has as its object to secure the future of the monarchy which I am to found. In my opinion, its future will be guaranteed if the project for a military convention, which, according to information received from M. T. Kint, is shortly to be sent me by Your Imperial Majesty's order, is based upon the principles which I desired him to submit to you, and if, in the enclosed copy of the note which you were so very good as to hand that diplomatist, Your Majesty deigns to modify a few of the points dealing with the support of France in the spirit of those oral explanations which he had the honour of giving you on that occasion, and which have in general already obtained Your Majesty's assent. Thus, for instance, Sir, I would take the liberty of asking you to allow the debt to France to be discharged in ten annual payments,

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in view of the financial conditions of the new empire, which are necessarily not very brilliant at the outset, but which, with God's help, will become more prosperous in proportion as the State gains in stability.

If this consideration were to induce Your Majesty so to arrange the payments that the annual contingents were to increase progressively, you would add still further to the gratitude which Mexico already owes you.

Your Majesty was so good as to tell Monsieur Kint that you saw no objection to the proposal that the effective strength of the Foreign Legion recruited in France, which is to remain in Mexico for another six or eight years after the departure of the French troops properly so called, should be increased from six to eight thousand.

That, Sir, is another modification which I would ask you to have made in the note in question. I should also be very glad if it could further contain a statement that this legion, representing, as it were, the French army in Mexico, shall carry the French flag.

In every other respect the note in question could not but inspire me with the deepest gratitude, owing to the generous concessions contained in it. If it please Your Majesty to crown them by an answer in the affirmative to the various points which I have ventured to indicate, I am prepared definitively to accept the throne and to make a declaration to this effect before the delegates who are to come and lay the vote of the Mexican people before me.

I am certain, Sir, that I have your approval in feeling it to be my duty to make the reception of these delegates contingent upon the answer which I crave of Your Majesty's goodness. Faced with questions of such importance to the destiny of a nation which has put its confidence in me, I thought that the dictates of my conscience forced me to define the situation clearly.

Begging you, Sir, to excuse my insistence in view of these considerations, I present my homage to Her Majesty the Empress and am, with high esteem, Your Majesty's most devoted servant and cousin,

Maximilian.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL. JANUARY 30, 1864

My brother,

I have it at heart to reply to Your Imperial Highness's letter as clearly as is in my power, though I have found it difficult to understand your desire.

According to what I wrote in my note, the French Government can bind itself only subject to the following guarantees:

1. The French army will leave Mexico only gradually, and when it can do so without compromising the existence of the new Government.
2. When it withdraws, it will leave the Foreign Legion in Mexico for a period of six to eight years, increasing it to the number of 8,000 men, either with Indians or recruits from Europe. The question of the flag will be settled before the departure of the French troops.
3. The naval stations in the Antilles and the Pacific will frequently send ships to show the French flag in the ports of Mexico.
4. The French Government will accept such conditions as shall be least unfavourable to Mexico for the repayment of the cost of the expedition.

Such are the assurances which I am able to give Your Imperial Highness, but I repeat that the most essential thing is the loan, and that your presence is indispensable in order that the preliminaries may be quickly settled. I therefore feel it to be urgent that you should decide to come to Paris, from whence you could easily visit Brussels and London. With regard to the visit to Rome, allow me to say that I see great dangers in it; the Pope will want pledges, and if Your Imperial Highness accepts them, you will meet with disfavour in Mexico; if you refuse them, the Holy Father will be offended. Besides, time is going by, and since Rouher's speech, which has produced a great effect in France, opinion is very propitious to the negotiation of a loan and everything which may be helpful to your Government.

I repeat my assurance of the feelings of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,
Napoleon.

Paris, January 30, 1864

I enclose the copy of the military convention sent to the provisional Government in Mexico some months ago.

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NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND MAX. TELEGRAM.
MARCH 13, 1864

To His Imperial Highness the Archduke Max, Brussels.

We thank Your Imperial Highnesses for your congratulations. We regret that your stay was so short, and send our sincerest wishes for your happiness.

Napoleon.

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FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON III.
DRAFT IN BARON DE PONT'S HAND.
LONDON, MARCH 14, 1864

Sir,

I avail myself of the first moment's respite allowed me in London to prove to Your Imperial Majesty the gratitude with which I am filled by the evidences of your kindness to me, which are old, yet ever new. The gracious reception which Your Majesties were pleased to give us during our last stay at the Tuileries will never be effaced from my memory, and I venture to beg you to believe that, in any circumstances whatsoever, you will find in me a heart sincerely attached to you.

I leave it to my wife to express to the Empress on her own behalf the feelings with which she is animated, and I am, Sir, with high consideration, Your Imperial Majesty's most devoted

Servant and cousin

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THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE. ORIGINAL. MARCH 16, 1864

Madam,

Your Imperial Highness's all too short visit has left an impression which it would be difficult to efface from our hearts, so you may

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believe me when I say, how much we should have liked to keep you longer.

Our prayers will follow you on the distant voyage which you are on the point of undertaking and I can assure you that you have in us sincere friends. The task which you have undertaken may have its difficulties. But the heart which has been capable of undertaking it, will always have the strength to surmount them.

The letters brought by this post are all excellent, the *Te Deum* celebrated by Mgr. Labastida seems to me to augur well for better relations with the regency, but I believe that the clergy, or rather the higher clergy is none the less persisting in its ideas. From private letters which we have been shown, it can be seen that the whole country is impatiently looking forward to a better future, and that the expedition into the interior has been one unending demonstration in favour of the monarchy.

The Emperor is to see Count Zichy on his return from Brussels, I hope that the affair of the loan will go well. I have had letters from Spain but unfortunately they have their eyes riveted upon England, in order to do as she does, as if there were no other interests, and duties however I do not despair, that the idea of the *Visit* may make them go further, their argument is to say, England withdrew with us, she has as yet recognized nothing and yet the Archduke and Archduchess have been to see the Queen, I answered that the situation is not the same, since the visit to London was entirely private, besides which the presence of the King, and of Queen Amélie, was a motive which excluded that of mere courtesy, that your relationship to the Queen, was a natural reason for a farewell visit, and above all that since you had not yet accepted the crown the position was quite clear and definite, whereas after it had been accepted at Miramar, a visit was impossible, if the Emperor had not already been recognized, as to the frigate it was meeting one courtesy with another which is very natural. I still hope then that they will put aside the idea of acting like England. But since the present ministry offered a stubborn opposition to the Odonell [O'Donnell] Cabinet over Mexican affairs they are afraid that they may be reproached with excessively French sympathies, and would like to be able to base themselves upon England's course of action in order to counterbalance the opposition. If I hear anything new I will not fail to have Your Imperial Highness informed.

The Emperor asks me to send you his kind remembrances, I beg you to do the same to the Archduke in my name and I beg to assure

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

Your Highness of the feelings of true affection with which I sign myself

Your Imperial Highness's most sincere cousin and friend

Eugénie.

Tuileries, March 16

NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
ORIGINAL. MARCH 18, 1864

I thank Your Imperial Highness for the letter which you have been so kind as to write me and for the expressions of friendship contained in it. I beg you always to rely upon my friendship, and to be assured that I appreciate at their true value the lofty sentiments which prompt Your Royal Highness to accept the throne of Mexico. To regenerate a people and to found an empire on principles which reason and morality approve is a fine mission worthy to arouse a noble ambition.

You may be sure that my support will not fail you in the accomplishment of the task which you are undertaking with so much courage.

Your Imperial Highness's visit was very short, but was long enough to leave us with sincere regrets, and make us appreciate the charm and high qualities of her who shares your destinies. I beg you to remember me to her, I shall always cherish the most sincere attachment to her. I repeat to Your Imperial Highness the assurance of the feelings of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Paris, March 18, 1864

NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX.
ORIGINAL. MARCH 28, 1864

I am writing Your Imperial Highness a line to tell you that, just as I thought the business of the loan was concluded to the general satisfaction of all those interested, the English bondholders have shown a dissatisfaction which threatens to hinder the success of the

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loan by closing the London Stock Exchange to us. In these circumstances the Minister of Finance writes that the highest importance attaches to consenting to what Mr. Glyn proposes. Your Highness will find a further advantage in this, since you obtain the liberation of that portion of the guarantees which is secured upon the customs and the portion of the debt representing [two illegible words].

With renewed wishes for your happiness I sign myself Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. TELEGRAM. PROBABLY OF MARCH 28, 1864

From the Emperor.

I implore Your Imperial Highness to arrive at no decision contrary to our engagements before receiving my letter.

Napoleon.

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NAPOLEON III TO FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL.
PARIS, MARCH 28, 1864

I am writing to Your Highness under the influence of strong emotion, due to the news which I received yesterday evening from Vienna and Trieste.

It is not for me to discuss the family questions which may have been treated upon between you and your august brother, but I am bound to point out the full gravity of the present situation, both for you and for me. By the treaty concluded between us, and mutually binding upon us, by the assurances given to Mexico, by the pledges exchanged with the subscribers of the loan, Your Imperial Highness has entered into engagements which you are no longer free to break. What, indeed, would you think of me if, once Your Imperial Majesty had arrived in Mexico, I were to say that I can no longer fulfil the conditions to which I have set my signature?

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

No, it is impossible that you should give up going to Mexico, and say before the whole world that you are obliged by family interests to disappoint all the hopes that France and Mexico have placed in you.

It is absolutely necessary in your own interests and those of your family that matters should be settled, for the honour of the house of Habsburg is at stake.

I beg your pardon for this somewhat severe language, but the circumstances are so grave that I cannot refrain from telling you the whole truth.

You may always rely upon the feelings of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

Paris, March 28, 1864

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO THE EMPEROR
NAPOLEON. UNDATED TELEGRAM, PERHAPS MARCH
29, 1864

Reception of deputation adjourned, negotiations proceeding; in my sincere attachment to Your Majesty I will go to the utmost limits of what my personal honour will allow. Inacceptable document was given me to sign on the eve of my departure for Miramar, without having been shown to me previously. I have in my hands all the proofs establishing my good faith.

Maximilian.

See page
342

THE ARCHDUCHESS CHARLOTTE TO THE EMPRESS
EUGÉNIE. THIS LETTER WAS NEVER SENT.
MIRAMAR, MARCH 28, 1864

Madam,


It is with a heart full of the most painful emotions, but still dominated by the sincere and deep affection which Your Majesty has inspired in us, that I take up my pen today. By an inscrutable decree

Maximilian's Plans for the Future


Maximilian originally dreamt of a great Habsburg double empire of Mexico and Brazil, to include the whole of Central and a large portion of South America. The shaded areas were, with this aim, gradually to be absorbed.

After the Archduke Ludwig Viktor's refusal of the Brazilian marriage, Maximilian's arrival in Mexico, and the marriage of the Brazilian princesses, Maximilian's idea was that the United States should be the dominant power in North America, Mexico in Central America (up to and including Panama), and Brazil in South America. The plan of annexing the areas with the double shading was the one adopted (see Rességuier's mission).

[See insert on map on following pages.]



T E X A S



APPENDIX

Heaven has deprived us of the happiness of contributing towards the accomplishment of Your Majesty's generous desires with regard to a country for which we were prepared to sacrifice all that one can give, our whole selves. We had joyfully entered upon this arduous path with no other motive save that of the good, and we were happy to devote our youthful ardour, and bring the tribute of our goodwill, to a difficult but great work; the conditions attached at the last moment to the acceptance of this mission, so laboriously matured during the last three years, are of such a nature that Your Majesty's noble heart will understand that they were incompatible with the Archduke's honour and even with the future of the new empire. He is preparing with a broken heart to receive the Mexican deputation tomorrow and tell them that the promise made on October 3 will never be carried into effect, but at the same time he solemnly dissociates himself from responsibility for the consequences of this grave step which he finds himself compelled to take, consequences which are in my opinion incalculable.

Your Majesty may rest assured that, whatever may befall, we are devoted to you in life and death. Our first thought when this fateful plan was revealed to us was for you, for the Emperor. The farewells we said on March 12 are graven upon our hearts in indelible characters, and our gratitude for so much kindness and affection will last as long as our lives. I beg Your Majesty to convey these sentiments to the Emperor, and if I might add a humble request, it is that, in memory of the kindly hospitality of the Tuileries, I may be allowed to possess a photograph of you and one of the Prince Imperial, to group them round the dear portrait that Your Majesty promised me. May you see in this desire a fresh expression of our sentiments towards you, and believe me ever

Your Majesty's devoted servant and cousin,

Charlotte.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX. ORIGINAL. MARCH 31, 1864

I am sending Your Imperial Highness the following telegram from Vera Cruz which I think you will read with interest.

I beg that you will return it to me. I am Your Imperial Highness's good brother,

Napoleon.

March 31, 1864

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

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THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND MAX TO NAPOLEON.
DRAFT. APRIL 8, 1864

Sir,

I am fulfilling a pleasant duty in expressing to Your Imperial Majesty my heart-felt thanks for your latest kind communications, so full of friendliness and heart.

I hasten to return herewith the interesting report which you were so good as to allow me to see. I was also, Sir, greatly touched by the mark of affection which you gave me in sending me General Frossard, whose qualities of character I greatly appreciate. Your Majesty will soon be convinced by the facts, as well as by the information which the General and M. Herbet will convey to you, that I have kept my plighted word, by which I undertook, out of sincere attachment to your person, to make every sacrifice compatible with my honour. My conduct in this whole affair has always been upright and straightforward. On my approaching arrival in Mexico there will be no lack of opportunities of proving to Your Imperial Majesty my gratitude for the kindnesses which you have never ceased to shower upon me. I am making every effort to consider the interests of the bondholders, as recommended to me by Your Majesty in the letter of which Count Zichy was the bearer. The Archduchess has this very minute returned from her painful and trying visit to Vienna, and desires me to present her respects to Her Majesty the Empress. Deign, Sir, to accompany them by my own, and be assured of the feelings of high consideration with which I am Your Imperial Majesty's

Most devoted servant and cousin,

Maximilian.

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III TO THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN. TELEGRAM. APRIL 10, 1864

I congratulate Your Majesty with all my heart. You can rely upon my friendship and support.

Napoleon.

APPENDIX

THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE EMPRESS CHARLOTTE.
TELEGRAM. APRIL 10, 1864.
TO MIRAMAR FROM PARIS

To Her Majesty the Empress of Mexico.

We have received the Emperor's beautiful speech with intense pleasure, and we congratulate Your Majesty with all our hearts. We wish all happiness to Your Majesties, and prosperity to the lovely country over which you are called to reign. May Heaven bless the new empire.

Eugénie.

See page
357

THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III. APRIL 12, 1864. COPY. NEVER SENT.
DRAFT NO LONGER IN DE PONT'S HAND.

Sir and brother,

A slight indisposition, resulting from a chill caused by the visit of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, my brother, keeps me perforce at Miramar. I am, however, impatient to begin carrying out the work which I have undertaken, and I hope to be able to sail for my new fatherland towards the end of this week.

Before leaving Europe to accomplish the mission which I have undertaken, thanks to your generous inspiration, I should like to send you a remembrance which seems to me not devoid of a certain artistic merit, but which will assume a real value in my eyes if it reminds you that you have in Mexico a devoted brother and friend, who will never forget either your beneficent intervention or the affectionate reception which he has received from you, and will make every effort to continue to be worthy of your wise counsels, weighty support, and benevolent approbation.

Miramar, April 12, 1864

THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III. MIRAMAR, APRIL 13, 1864.
IN THE EMPRESS'S HANDWRITING.

My dear brother,

I have been detained at Miramar till now by an indisposition arising out of the Emperor Francis Joseph's visit. None the less I hope to be able to set sail tomorrow for Rome and from thence for my new fatherland.

I was deeply touched by the telegram which Your Majesty sent me on the day of my acceptance.

It is, indeed, my confidence in the sentiments towards me of which you have always given proof that makes me hope to bring to a happy issue the noble mission with which the Mexican people have entrusted me. Your flag and its civilizing influence will help me in this work, while, for my part, I shall be happy to see drawn closer the bonds of mutual friendship which unite us to one another and will unite our two empires.

At the moment of leaving Europe allow me to offer you a slight token of my esteem, which I am desiring M. Hidalgo to convey to Your Majesty. Be assured that I shall never forget either your kind reception at the Tuileries or the generous and friendly hand which you are extending to Mexico, and that I shall do all that is in my power to express its gratitude and affection to you. I also hope always to be worthy of your friendly counsels and weighty support.

Be assured of the unchangeable friendship with which I am, my dear brother,

Your Majesty's good brother and friend,

Maximilian.

APPENDIX

THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE TO THE EMPRESS CHARLOTTE.
APRIL 15, 1864

Madam and good sister,

I have just received Your Majesty's letter which has been handed to me by M. Hidalgo; ³ he has given me all details about the touching ceremony at the acceptance of the crown, and I can assure Your Majesty that I did not spare him a single detail for though at a distance I have been present in spirit at all that happened at Miramar, I greatly fear that it was the emotions and fatigues of the previous days which may have caused the Emperor's indisposition, but thanks be to God, the telegraph has brought us good news of his health today. I hope with all my heart that Your Majesties are not going to stay in Vera Cruz, for everybody says that it would be imprudence to attempt it, and besides all the letters we have received say that everybody hopes you will only pass through there. So many great interests are bound up with your preservation that one trembles at even the appearance of danger, and allow me to add that those who have had the pleasure of making your acquaintance are drawn by another and tenderer feeling which also causes them to fear perhaps, without reason, but one is frightened by dangers seen from afar.

We have been most happy to see the difficulties of these recent days smoothed away, which must have been so painful to Your Majesties.

M. Hidalgo tells me that the Emperor was pleased with General Frossart [Frossard], at which we are most happy, he has not yet returned, or at least we do not know whether he arrived today. But Hidalgo's arrival removes part of our interest in his prompt return. We have this moment received the news of Your Majesties' departure, may God watch over you it is my heart-felt prayer.

I hope that you will receive my letter as you pass through Rome, and I enclose the little photograph for which you asked.

I should like to remind you in turn that I have not one of the Emperor I rely upon our Majesty to ask him for one for me, I should like it to be signed. You could give it to Madame de Montebello, so as not to lose any of the brief and precious time that you are to spend in Rome. I beg Your Majesty to remember me to the Emperor and offer him my best wishes for his journey.

³ This letter is missing from the collection.

MAXIMILIAN & CHARLOTTE OF MEXICO

The Emperor also desires me to offer you his homage and be assured of the sincere and tender friendship with which I am

Your Majesty's most devoted sister,

Eugénie.

April 15

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THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON TO THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN. TELEGRAM. APRIL 20, 1864

To His Majesty the Emperor of Mexico, Civit  Vecchia.

Greatly touched by Your Majesties' wishes, I send you my thanks and sincere wishes for your happiness and for a fortunate voyage.

Napoleon.



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CORTI, EGON
MAXIMILIAN AND CHARLOTTE
OF MEXICO.

DATE DUE

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Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico

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